Bergson, Plotinus and the Harmonics of Evolution by Hubbard, Lynn
 
 
 
 
 
 
BERGSON, PLOTINUS 
 and the 
 HARMONICS OF EVOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
LYNN VIVIEN HUBBARD 
 
  
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of the 
West of England, Bristol for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Faculty of Health and Applied Sciences, 
University of the West of England, 
Bristol 
 
November 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
BERGSON, PLOTINUS 
and the 
HARMONICS OF EVOLUTION 
 
 
 
LYNN VIVIEN HUBBARD 
 
  
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of the 
West of England, Bristol for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy 
November 2017 
 
 
Abstract 
 
* 
 
 
It has been acknowledged that Bergson and Plotinus share many concepts, however 
ambiguities in the texts have presented unresolved challenges to scholars of both 
philosophers.  The aim of this study is to examine what is explicit and speculate on 
what is implicit in the texts, and to argue they both replicate the Pythagorean tradition 
by proposing a philosophy of dynamic transformation underpinned by two fundamental 
and interlinked premises: a universe generated and governed by a natural law of 
musical harmonics, and the concept of kairos as time signifying the emergence of 
qualitative change. 
Following an examination of the revival of Pythagoreanism in the eras of 
Plotinus and Bergson, the concepts central to Pythagorean cosmogony, cosmology and 
theory of harmonics are explained.  It is proposed these concepts, together with the 
mechanism of procession and reversion explain the generation and evolution of 
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Plotinus’ Intellect and Soul as an integrated compound series consisting of a 
fundamental vibration and its self-generated harmonics, thus potentially clarifying the 
nature of the forms, λόγος, the decad, and the various levels of Soul.  Furthermore, that 
Pythagorean concepts and the harmonics model are also at work in Bergson’s 
cosmology, in the impulsion and inversion of the élan vital, demonstrating consistency 
with his arguments for partial finalism, theory of number and the influence of 
mathematics.  It is argued that for Plotinus and Bergson, contemplation and intuition 
respectively is kairos, the moment in which mind and matter, sense perception and 
memory, freedom and determinacy, integrate, an integration grounded by the 
harmonics model. 
This new interpretation suggests a previously unacknowledged Pythagorean 
influence on Bergson and an underestimation of the influence on Plotinus. 
Significantly, it clarifies ambiguities, challenges old perceptions, reinforces the 
influence of Plotinus on Bergson, and provides a novel perspective for further re-
evaluation of the texts and secondary literature. 
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Bergson, Plotinus 
 and the 
 Harmonics of Evolution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
* 
 
 
But, friend, when you grasp the number and nature of the intervals of sound, from 
high to low, and the boundaries of those intervals, and how many scales arise 
from them, which those who came before handed down to us, their followers, to 
call ‘harmonies,’ and when you grasp the various qualities inhering in the 
motions of the body, which they said must be measured with numbers and named 
‘rhythm’ and ‘metre,’ and when you apprehend that every One and Many should 
be so investigated, when you have grasped all of that, then you are wise ... 
 
(Plato, Philebus, 17c11-e1, in Kennedy, 2011, p.viii) 
 
The link between Bergson and Plotinus has long been acknowledged.  Émile Bréhier, 
who attended Bergson’s lectures on Plotinus, commented: “Plotinus is one of the very 
rare philosophers with whom Bergson felt an affinity… he treated him, as if he 
recognised himself in Plotinus” (Bréhier, 1949, pp.107-108).  Despite Bergson’s 
affinity with Plotinus, the only Bergson scholar to publish a comprehensive work on 
the significance of Plotinus on his philosophy is Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide whose 
Bergson et Plotin, published in French in 1959, is no longer in print and has never been 
translated into English.  Since then, only a few articles have specifically addressed the 
Plotinus/Bergson relationship. 
Bergson describes Plotinus as his “favourite philosopher” and Mossé-Bastide 
demonstrated a sympathy or meeting of minds in her examination of the shared 
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concepts and differences of their respective philosophies.  She proposed that Bergson’s 
‘creative evolution’ is a “dynamic schema” that is “rooted in the philosophy of 
Plotinus” (Mossé-Bastide, 1959, p.355), having developed it further by integrating the 
generative functions of Plotinus’ hypostases, Intellect and Soul, within his concept of 
duration. 
The aim of this study is to build upon Mossé-Bastide’s work and to support the 
thesis that the “dynamic schema” underlying both their philosophies is rooted in the 
science of harmonics and philosophy of the Pythagorean tradition, an influence 
underestimated by commentators on Plotinus, and previously unrecognised by 
commentators on Bergson.   
The Pythagorean influence on Plotinus arises from its philosophical influence on 
Plato, and its revival in the first and second centuries A.D. by Neo-Pythagorean 
philosophers including Moderatus, Nicomachus, Numenius, and Plotinus’ teacher 
Ammonius Saccas.  It must be noted that while being referred to as Neopythagoreans, 
they considered themselves to be Platonists (Dillon, 2014, p.250).  O’Meara comments: 
 
Plotinus regards himself as interpreting Plato, who expresses with greater clarity 
truths obscurely and partially indicated by Pythagoras. (O’Meara, 2014, p.404) 
 
The Pythagorean legacy Plotinus continued is slowly coming to light, with Stamatellos’ 
Plotinus and the Presocratics (Stamatellos, 2007) and Slaveva-Griffin’s Plotinus on 
Number (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009) being of particular relevance, and it will be proposed 
that a deeper analysis of the text reveals the nature of the legacy to be of paramount 
importance to our understanding of the Enneads.   
The Pythagorean influence on Bergson could have presented itself through 
personal, educational, scientific, and other cultural influences, and it will be argued that 
like Plotinus there is a Pythagorean influence buried within the text.  Stephen Clark, 
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author of Plotinus: Myth, Metaphor and Philosophical Practice, suggests that while 
some scholars believe exegesis must be confined to “what the text says” without 
speculating on it, “scholarly exegesis simply of the text cannot be all we do” because 
“all philosophers have more beliefs than they write down, beliefs that may influence 
their arguments” and to understand the text “we have to make our own assumptions 
about what it might reasonably say”.  In referring to Plotinus he proposes that we shall 
not understand the Enneads until “we can make a worthwhile guess about what is not 
said, and develop them in ways Plotinus did not, quite possibly, intend”.  Clark claims 
that this is what Plotinus did with Plato (Clark, 2016, pp. xii-xvi), and it is suggested 
this is what Bergson did with Plotinus.  The task of this project is however to present an 
interpretation of the texts and make a “worthwhile guess” about what they do not say 
with a view to revealing the real intentions rather than developing them in ways that 
they did not intend.  In this context the conception of “worthwhile” is to make sense of 
aspects of the texts scholars have found challenging and therefore remain unexplained, 
as well as promoting greater understanding among all who read the texts. 
There are a number of aspects of the Enneads Plotinian scholars have found 
obscure and remain the subject of debate, for example, why procession and reversion 
are necessary for the generation of Intellect and the multiplicity within it; the nature 
and shape of the forms; the nature of logos (λόγος); how number relates to the primary 
kinds and generates the Beings in Intellect, as well as the nature of the Plotinian decad.  
There are also disagreements amongst scholars concerning his account of Soul and 
matter, as well as the role of music and musical metaphors in the Enneads. 
While many commentators on Bergson note certain ambiguities in his work, 
particularly in Creative Evolution concerning the nature and generative process of the 
élan vital, and his theory of perception in Matter and Memory, in general much of the 
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later work presents a summary of his philosophy, and there appears to be an attitude of 
acceptance of the ambiguities, with little effort to resolve them; hence there tends to be 
a lack of disagreement or debate amongst modern Bergsonian scholars.  It is anticipated 
the arguments presented in the following chapters will help to resolve some of the 
ambiguities and stimulate debate. 
My thesis is that there are two fundamental dominant and interlinked themes that 
Plotinus and Bergson have assimilated from the Pythagorean tradition: the ancient 
Greek science of harmonics and the concept of kairos.  A brief introduction to them is 
therefore appropriate.  The origin of the science of harmonics has been traced to 
Pythagoras (c.530 B.C.) who is said to have discovered that musical intervals could be 
expressed as ratios.  He was the founder of a Pythagorean tradition that considered a 
divine cosmos in which multiplicity is generated from a central point of power and 
remains unified in the generative process because it is ordered according to a natural 
law of musical harmonics based on numerical ratios.  ‘Proportion’ was therefore 
integral to their cosmogony, cosmology, and intimately linked to their religious values, 
ethics and practice of medicine.  Musical harmonics was considered a science, along 
with geometry and astronomy, for which arithmetic was considered foundational.  
The science of harmonics is also closely linked with kairos, one of the concepts 
the ancient Greeks utilized for time; the other is chronos.  Chronos is chronological, 
sequential, quantitative or measured time, while kairos is purely qualitative as a 
moment of action or timing, an occasion signifying the emergence of qualitative change 
that is situation specific.  Kairos is essential in the ontological structure of the shaping 
of the moment, and so represents the Pythagorean notion of time always present within 
the natural evolutionary process involving real change.  The Pythagoreans 
acknowledged it in the outer world as well as the inner; in the outer world kairos was 
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considered as a moment of necessity or providence and in the human inner world it is 
the moment of the free act based on good judgement. 
A survey of the literature reveals that kairos is largely neglected by scholars of 
Plotinus and Bergson, particularly in the English language literature.  The articles 
written in French are very general in nature and include contributions from Vladimir 
Jankélévitch (Jankélévitch, 1959) and J.M. Gebaude (Gebaude, 1991), who has written 
specifically about the concept in Bergson’s philosophy, while E. Moutsopoulos, a 
philosopher of kairicity, has written about its relevance to the philosophy of Plotinus 
(Moutsopoulos, 1984; 1991).   
Harmonics and kairos have a dynamic and transformative character and entail the 
integration or synthesis of natural philosophy and psychology.  Bergson refers 
specifically to harmonics, almost as an aside in some of his texts, but does not mention 
kairos, whereas Plotinus refers to kairos but does not mention harmonics.  Neither 
philosopher refers to them explicitly as grounding principles; however, it will be argued 
that they are implicit in the texts, and the philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson only 
makes sense if it is founded on the model of harmonics, a theory that once understood, 
has the potential to resolve many of the perceived ambiguities in their work and re-
enforces their philosophical connection.  It is therefore anticipated that the thesis will 
be of interest to historians of philosophy as well as to scholars of Plotinus and Bergson.  
Furthermore, since it potentially transforms our understanding of their metaphysics it 
will raise the profile of harmonics and kairos in the field of metaphysics in general.   
This is the first time that harmonics and kairos have been studied in both 
philosophers; hence the arguments presented rely heavily on analysis of the text of the 
Enneads and Bergson’s work.  The level of analysis required and the potential 
importance of the interpretation arising from that analysis has meant, perhaps 
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surprisingly, for a thesis on the history of philosophy, that it has been necessary to be 
selective whilst being comparative.  For example, although presumed to be highly 
influential on Plotinus, the role of Pythagorean harmonics in Plato’s texts, particularly 
in the Timaeus where he uses Pythagorean harmonic ratios in his cosmology (Timaeus 
35a-37e), has not been addressed in detail because significant work on how Plato 
applied Pythagorean harmonics in his dialogues has already been published by 
commentators.  Barker writes about Plato’s musical ethics in the Republic and Laws, as 
well as harmonics in the Republic and Timaeus (Barker, 2007, pp. 308-327); Cornford 
examines harmonics in the Timaeus (Cornford, 1935); Crickmore suggests how 
Pythagorean harmonics underpins Plato’s political and moral theory in the Republic 
(Crickmore, 2006); Kennedy proposes that a stichometric analysis of Plato’s 
Symposium and Euthyphro reveals a musical scale built in to the text (Kennedy, 2011); 
McClain explains how Pythagorean mathematics and harmonics was influential in key 
dialogues such as the Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Statesman and Laws (McClain, 
1978); Pelosi investigates Plato’s philosophy of music as it relates to the body and soul 
(Pelosi, 2010) and Moro Tornese has examined the theories of music and harmony in 
Proclus' commentaries on Plato's Timaeus and Republic (Moro Tornese, 2010; 2017).  
Due to the extensive nature of addressing how Plato incorporated Pythagorean 
harmonics into his philosophy it is deemed prudent to explore how Plotinus takes 
metaphysics beyond Plato to a level in which the ratios of musical harmonics have a 
basis in modern physics.  The need to be selective has also entailed the isolation of 
Bergson from his acknowledged philosophical influence of French Spiritualism, a 
detailed analysis of which would divert from the focus of the thesis.  While Bergson 
disagreed with aspects of Plato’s philosophy to the extent that Plato could be 
considered an influence that separates Bergson philosophically from Plotinus, one of 
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the key conclusions of the thesis is that Pythagoreanism is the tradition that unites them 
more strongly than previously realised.  The scope of the thesis is therefore limited to a 
comparison of the philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson with the Pythagorean tradition. 
 
Chapter Synopsis 
 
This study will be presented in nine Chapters and a Conclusion.  Chapter One places 
the proposed Pythagorean influence on Bergson and Plotinus within its philosophical 
and historical context to provide important background information that supports the 
examination of the interlinked concepts of harmonics and kairos explored in 
subsequent chapters.  The Chapter opens with a brief history of Pythagoreanism and 
then examines the influence of Pythagoreanism in the eras of Plotinus and Bergson.  
Chapter Two provides an important, but necessarily brief introduction to the 
concepts central to Pythagorean cosmogony and cosmology because they will be 
referred to in subsequent chapters: Nature, the Principles of Limiting and Unlimited, 
Harmonia (ἁρμονία), and the function of the Pythagorean Monad in their number 
theory.  This is followed by a brief history of Pythagorean harmonics and number 
theory, and a basic introduction to the Pythagorean science of harmonics.  Finally, it 
will discuss the notion that within the science of harmonics the Pythagoreans conceived 
numbers as powers.   
Chapter Three examines the generation and nature of Intellect in the Enneads.  It 
commences with an explanation of Plotinus’ theory of the One as the first principle of 
unity, and the source of multiplicity.  This is followed by a summary of Plotinus’ 
account of the generation of Being and Intellect as an activity of procession away from 
the One and reversion to the One.  It will be argued, with the help of illustrations, that 
the generation of Intellect and its Beings takes the form of an integrated compound 
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series consisting of Intellect as a fundamental vibration and its Beings as self-generated 
harmonics. This will be followed by clarification of the ontological status of logos as 
the substance of the Beings in Intellect.  While commentators understand logos to 
imply a logical ordering structure that is commonly defined as ‘rational forming 
principle’ or ‘reason principle’, it will be proposed, following an examination of the 
ancient Greek meaning of logos and the nature of logos as described by Plotinus, that it 
could be defined more precisely as ‘ratio’, emulating the term used in the Pythagorean 
tradition of musical harmonics.  Finally, by analysing how substantial number is 
generated with the primary kinds: motion, rest, otherness and sameness, it will be 
argued that Plotinus’ concept of Being consists in the decad, which is modelled on the 
Pythagorean tetractys that represents the structural order or numerical organisation of 
the universe. 
Chapter Four continues the examination of Plotinus’ account of the generation of 
multiplicity by examining the generation of Soul and origin of Matter.  It will reveal 
how the harmonics model applies to the Hypostasis Soul and the generation of the 
World Soul and Soul of individual souls, and their relationship to Intellect.  Then it 
examines the role of ‘providence’ and harmonia in the making of the universe by the 
World Soul, and subsequently explains the application of the concepts of sympathia and 
synesis in the integration of body and Soul.  Finally, it examines the nature and origin of 
matter.  It will be argued that the model of harmonics provides a solution to ambiguities 
debated by scholars and that the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus is greater than 
previously realised. 
Chapter Five explores the nature of Bergson’s cosmology described in Creative 
Evolution and provides a novel interpretation of how Bergson conceives the generation 
of multiplicity according to the model of harmonics.  It commences with an 
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examination of the ambiguity surrounding the nature of the élan vital and will argue that 
Bergson followed Plotinus and the Pythagoreans in presenting a non-pantheist 
philosophy in which the First Principle remains distinct from its products.  This is 
followed with an explanation of the mechanism of the élan vital, and it will be 
proposed, with the aid of illustrations, that it replicates Plotinus’ movements of 
progression and reversion, thus generating the ‘form’ of the élan vital as the first 
harmonic that subsequently divides itself into matter and consciousness as separate 
tendencies, thus creating an impersonal supra-conscious memory as a series of 
harmonics.  
Chapter Six develops the argument that Bergson’s cosmology is modelled on the 
generation of harmonics by examining his arguments for partial finalism, his theory of 
number, and the influence of mathematics.  It will be proposed that since his arguments 
are compatible with the 3-stage generative structure of Pythagorean cosmology, this 
potential influence suggests that a re-evaluation of the influences normally attributed to 
these concepts is necessary.  An examination of his lectures on the Pythagoreans will 
reveal Bergson’s sympathy with Pythagorean number theory and philosophy of 
transformation.  Finally, the commonly held view that Bergson’s theory of duration as a 
melody is a metaphor will be discussed and contested.  
Chapter Seven introduces the concept of kairos as it was understood in ancient 
Greece by the Pythagoreans, as a prelude to explaining the nature of kairos in Plotinus 
and Bergson.  It explains how kairos is connected to rhetoric under Pythagorean 
influence.  
Chapter Eight opens with an explanation of the nature of kairos in the Enneads in 
respect of the role of freedom in the World Soul, and nature.  This is followed by an 
examination of how kairos is implicated in the key concepts of sense perception, 
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memory, reason, and freedom as they relate to the individual soul, and it will claim that 
perceived ambiguities can be resolved if the model of harmonics is applied to these 
concepts. 
Chapter Nine explores how Bergson utilises the ancient concept of kairos in the 
model of harmonics in his theories of perception and memory as proposed in Matter 
and Memory, and how kairos is intimately connected to his understanding of morality 
and individual freedom as proposed in the Two Sources of Morality and Religion.  
Finally, it will suggest that kairos in Bergson’s philosophical method of intuition may 
have been inspired by ancient Greek rhetoric under the influence of the Pythagorean 
tradition. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the main points and a discussion about 
their relevance as well as opportunities for further work.  
 
All references to Plotinus’ Enneads use the A. H. Armstrong translation in the 
Loeb Classical Library series published by Harvard University Press unless specified 
otherwise. 
English translations of Henri Hude’s ‘Introduction to Bergson’s Lecture on the 
Pythagoreans’, ‘Bergson’s Lecture on the Pythagoreans’, Henri Hude’s ‘Introduction to 
Bergson’s Lectures of Plotinus’ and ‘Bergson’s Lectures on Plotinus’ have not 
previously been available.  With kind permission of Presses Universitaires de France 
my translations are included as Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively, as they are 
referred to in the thesis and may be of interest to Bergson scholars.  Presses 
Universitaires de France have granted permission for them to be included in the thesis 
on the condition they are neither reproduced nor marketed commercially. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Philosophical and Historical Background 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
In his ‘Introduction’ to A History of Pythagoreanism, Carl Huffman remarks that the 
subject of the Pythagorean tradition is ignored by most scholars of ancient history 
(Huffman, 2014, p.1); however, it is a subject demanding recognition if we are to 
understand its influence on the philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson.  Pythagoreanism 
was not simply of historical importance to the ancient Greek schools; through its effect 
on philosophy, science, as well as the wider culture of the respective eras in which both 
philosophers lived, the impact on their lives would have been significant.  This Chapter 
therefore introduces the Pythagorean tradition and examines the extent of its influence 
in the eras of Plotinus and Bergson, thus providing historical context for the 
philosophical influence that will be proposed in subsequent chapters.   
 
 
  
1.1   Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism 
 
 
 
Pythagoras was acknowledged to be a mathematician, philosopher, scientist, mystic, 
and founder of a religious order in Croton, southern Italy.  Pythagoreans were either 
acusmatici, i.e., those who only followed the tradition’s ethical practices; or 
mathematici who employed themselves in mathematical or scientific study.1  Despite 
                                                            
1  For a detailed account of the differences see: Burkert, W., 1972, pp.192-208; Zhmud, L.,  
   1994, pp.169-208. 
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the differences within the tradition its spiritual character permeated the whole system.  
It was a culture whose religious values and ethics were based on the belief in a divine 
cosmos ordered on ‘proportion’ or harmonic principles, the key to which is the function 
of number, hence the integration or synthesis of psychology and natural philosophy.  
The scientific pursuit of harmony or order in nature facilitated the attainment of the 
religious ideal of the unity and harmony of the soul and the divine cosmos (Guthrie, 
1962, p.246). 
The primary sources of information about Pythagoreanism are Aristotle, 
Nicomachus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and according to Iamblichus’s Life of 
Pythagoras, the concept of silence was an integral part of the religious ideal of unity, as 
Riedweg comments: 
…the Pythagoreans saw the practice of silence not only as a way of achieving 
ascetic self-mastery but also for the training for the duty to keep the teachings 
secret. (Riedweg, 2008, p.101) 
 
Initiates were expected to follow a vegetarian diet and to maintain physical, mental and 
emotional balance at all times, facilitated by the therapeutic effects of music.  The 
primacy attributed to harmonics and music arises because Pythagoras is said to have 
discovered that musical intervals could be expressed as ratios, hence the Pythagorean 
tradition considered numerical ratios as universal principles that revealed a harmonia, 
or natural law of tonal order within their cosmology, ethics and practice of medicine.2  
The sciences studied by the mathematici included arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and 
harmonics; arithmetic was foundational for the other sciences, as Huffman explains: 
                                                            
  
2  While it has been suggested that makers of musical instruments were aware of the ratios of 
   the musical concords, there is no supporting evidence. For objections, see Barker, A., 1989, 
   p.43, fn. no. 256, and Burkert, W., 1972, p.374. 
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… while it does have as its own proper object the counting and multiplying and 
dividing of objects in the world, it is also involved in each of the other 
sciences, insofar as their accounts of the sensible particulars are all given in 
terms of numbers, ratios and proportions. (Huffman, 2005, p.65) 
 
Pythagoras wrote nothing himself and his followers obeyed a strict rule not to 
divulge the secrets of the tradition; however, the earliest written work of Pythagorean 
philosophy entitled On Nature was written in the late fifth century B.C. by Philolaus 
(470-390 B.C.).  Philolaus succeeded Pythagoras by approximately one century, and 
while there is no evidence that he conducted experiments in harmonic science (Creese, 
2010, pp.104-117) it provided the basis for his cosmogony and cosmology; its 
application was solely for understanding the nature of reality (Barker, 2007, p.275).  Of 
the eleven fragments considered to be authentic (Frs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6a, 7, 13, 16 and 
17)3 it has been deduced that while he is not known as a mathematician Philolaus had 
an interest in mathematics and demonstrates knowledge of the harmonic ratios 
(Huffman, 1993, p.54).  He also wrote on psychology, embryology and medicine.  His 
pupil, Archytas (428-350 B.C.), a contemporary and colleague of Plato (Huffman, 
2005, pp.32-42), wrote a number of works of which only a few fragments that remain 
are interpreted as being genuinely Pre-Socratic, i.e. not being influenced by Plato, 
Aristotle or their followers (Burkert, 1972, pp.144-145).4  The Sectio Canonis, a 
Pythagorean text attributed to Euclid, dates from the fourth century B.C.  
The influence of the Pythagoreans in the ancient world facilitated the 
reconceptualization of scientific knowledge, politics, ethics, and hence philosophy.  It 
is commonly accepted that Pythagoreanism was important for Plato’s cosmology and 
                                                            
3  The surviving fragments of Philolaus are in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der 
   Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1951), I: 398-419.  
 
4  The surviving fragments of Archytas’ work appear in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Fragmente der  
   Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1951). 
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political theory but was concealed in myths and allegory, a subject that has been of 
increasing interest to scholars of Plato.  It is acknowledged that Pythagorean 
mathematics and harmonics was influential in key dialogues such as the Republic, 
Timaeus, Critias, Statesman and Laws, and the Phaedo incorporates the Pythagorean 
concepts of purification, reincarnation or metempsychosis, and the forms as 
mathematical entities (Hackforth, 1972, pp.4-6).   
The Pythagorean School ebbed away after Plato, and according to Kahn, in the 
second and third centuries B.C. the acousmatici were “replaced as mendicant 
philosophers by the Cynics”, and the mathematici were “absorbed into the Platonic 
school of Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon” (Kahn, 2001, p.72).  While 
Pythagoras himself became a legendary figure, during this period a corpus of pseudo-
Pythagorean texts emerged making it difficult to distinguish truth from fiction; 
however, Centrone argues that they all basically articulate the same system (Centrone, 
2014, pp.315-340). 
Neo-Pythagoreanism originated with Nigidius Figulus who revived Pythagorean 
doctrines in Rome in the first century B.C., while Apollonius of Tyana and Moderatus 
of Gades spearheaded the revival in Greece.  The trend continued in the second century 
A.D. with Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius of Apamea who considered 
Pythagoreanism to be the influence behind Plato’s concepts of the Good and the 
indefinite dyad.  Central to Neo-Pythagorean theory was the concept of the soul and a 
desire for mystical union with the divine. 
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1.2    The Pythagorean Influence in the Era of Plotinus 
  
 
 
Key Neo-Pythagorean concepts appear in the Enneads, and Porphyry, Plotinus’ student, 
writes that he was knowledgeable about Neo-Pythagorean philosophy, and even that he 
had been accused of plagiarising Numenius, a view that was accepted as wrong 
(Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 17-18,8).  Porphyry refers to a book written by 
Longinus who comments: “Plotinus … has expounded the principles of Pythagorean 
and Platonic philosophy more clearly than anyone else before him” (Porphyry, 20, 71-
73).  While Plotinus was highly esteemed in Neo-Pythagorean circles, Huffman 
suggests that Plotinus was influenced by “Neo-Pythagorean speculation on first 
principles”; however, it was his successors that absorbed Neo-Pythagoreanism into 
their philosophy.  Plotinus himself was not Neo-Pythagorean because he considered 
Plato to be divine, not Pythagoras who he treats “as just one among many 
predecessors” (Huffman, 2014); however, Chapters 3, 4 and 8 will claim that 
Pythagoreanism is more strongly implicated in the Enneads than previously 
acknowledged. 
Stamatellos comments that in the Enneads, Plotinus maintains that his primary 
influence was Plato (Stamatellos, 2007, pp.11) and as the instigator of Neoplatonism, 
Plotinus presents an innovative development of Platonism in which he also respectfully 
acknowledged, and was knowledgeable about, the theories of the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers who influenced Plato and Aristotle.  Stamatellos writes: “His thought 
assimilates nearly eight centuries of philosophy and intellectual history” (Stamatellos, 
2007, p.1), and referring to doxographical material in Ennead VI.8-9 he suggests: 
 
… his intention [is] to show that his philosophical system is not a mere 
modernity but an essential continuation of Greek philosophy. … Plotinus aims 
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to prove that the fundamental principles of his metaphysical system were 
rooted in Greek philosophical tradition and the teaching of the ancients. 
(Stamatellos, 2007, p.28)  
 
Bergson expresses a similar view of Plotinus in a letter dated 31st May 1939 to 
Professor Charles Werner, after reading his book on Greek philosophy (Werner, 1938): 
 
…my favorite philosopher has always been Plotinus, who in my eyes 
synthesizes all of Greek philosophy and who was also convinced that all Greek 
philosophers have said the same thing. (Correspondances, p.1,626) 
    
While Plotinus’ primary philosophical influence was Plato, the influence of 
Pythagoreanism in the wider culture of his era cannot be ignored.  Joost-Gaugier’s 
study of the Pythagorean influence on art and architecture indicates that the influence 
of Pythagoreanism continued for centuries after the death of Pythagoras.  The sustained 
veneration of Pythagoras by his followers is reflected in a consistent tradition of 
portraits of him in both Greek and Roman sculpture.  It is held that Pythagoras 
worshipped one God, Apollo.  The cult of Apollo was established in Rome as early as 
the fourth century B.C., and by late antiquity Pythagoras was regarded as the son of 
Apollo and “thus a deity in his own right, meriting not just veneration but something 
approaching ritualized worship”, and furthermore, that “it came to be believed that 
Pythagoras was the incarnation of Apollo” (Joost-Gaugier, 2007, p.137).  Like 
Pythagoras in Greece, Apollo came to be associated with medicine and healing in 
Rome.  In Porphyry’s ‘Life of Plotinus’ he states that following Plotinus’ death Apollo 
was consulted by Amelius, who desired to know where Plotinus' soul had gone 
(Porphyry, 22, 8).  While there is no suggestion that Plotinus worshipped Apollo, or 
had any specific religious leanings, Joost-Gaugier notes: 
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Less formidable than he was in Greece, the Roman Apollo thus played a 
socially cathartic role in Rome, where he was accepted by all classes of Roman 
society. (Joost-Gaugier, 2007, p.152) 
 
The study of harmonics conducted by the Pythagoreans and Aristoxenus5 was 
also influential in the fields of Roman architecture and mechanics.  In the first century 
B.C. Vitruvius wrote that the architect should know music in order to have a grasp of 
harmonic and mathematical relations (Vitruvius, 1914, 1.1.8), and as Walden remarks: 
“He immediately focuses on the practical importance of ancient Greek music theory for 
architectural and mechanical design” (Walden, 2014, p.126), and “proposes a number 
of ways in which the musical-architectural theories he describes can be applied in 
everyday architectural practice” (Walden, 2014, p.131).  Porphyry comments that 
Plotinus “had a complete knowledge of geometry, arithmetic, mechanics, optics and 
music, but he was not disposed to apply himself to detailed research in these subjects” 
(Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 13, 8-10), so it is not impossible that Plotinus was 
familiar with Vitruvius’ work. 
The Pythagorean influence was also reflected in Plotinus’ lifestyle.  Porphyry 
notes that Plotinus was a vegetarian (Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 2.5), lived an 
ascetic existence (Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 8, 13-24) and placed an importance 
on the tradition of silence in his philosophy.  Plotinus was sworn to secrecy about the 
teaching of his teacher, Ammonius Saccas (Porphyry, The Life of Plotinus, 3, 24-29), 
and he is silent, for example, when discussing the nature of the One, which is his 
version of Plato’s Good.  Plotinus explains that he considers it information not to be 
disclosed to the uninitiated: 
 
                                                            
5  Chapter 2.3, pp.45-46.  
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This is the intention of the command given in the mysteries here below not to 
disclose to the uninitiated; since the Good is not disclosable, it prohibits the 
declaration of the divine to another who has not also himself had the good 
fortune to see. (Ennead VI.9.11, 1-4) 
 
Philosophical tradition is important to Plotinus; hence the concepts of concealment, 
secrecy and silence are ubiquitous in the Enneads.  In 1919 Casel referred to the 
concept as ‘silentium philosophorum’ (Casel, 1919).  Clark helpfully references 
Clement of Alexandria and Eunapius of Sardis as confirmation of the tradition of 
secrecy (Clark, 2016, p.xii): 
 
It was not only the Pythagoreans and Plato that concealed many things, but the 
Epicureans too say that they have things that may not be uttered, and do not 
allow all to peruse those writings.  The Stoics also say that by the first Zeno 
things were written which they do not readily allow disciples to read, without 
their first giving proof whether or not they are genuine philosophers. And the 
disciples of Aristotle say that some of their treatises are esoteric, and others 
common and exoteric.  Further, those who instituted the mysteries, being 
philosophers, buried their doctrines in myths, so as not to be obvious to all. 
(Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 5.9, in Roberts and Donaldson (eds.), 1867) 
 
…some philosophers hide their esoteric teachings in obscurity, as poets 
conceal theirs in myths. (Eunapius 456, in Wright, 1921, p.357)  
 
Plotinus also follows the tradition in considering philosophy to be an initiation 
into higher truths; the information is not explicitly given to the student because 
initiation is a journey of discovery the student has to undertake for him/herself; the 
philosopher is the hierophant, or the one who shows the way.  We therefore find that 
Pythagoreanism touched every aspect of Plotinus’ life including his philosophy. 
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1.3    The Pythagorean Influence in the Era of Bergson 
 
 
 
Understanding the Pythagorean influence in Bergson’s era requires a brief history of 
developments in the years between Plotinus and Bergson. 
The scientific study of the universe ordered according to musical harmonic 
principles continued up to the time of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), who is regarded as 
the last genuine Pythagorean scientist (Kahn, 2001, pp.161-171).  This shift was 
provoked by religious influences dating back to Galileo (1564-1642), when scientific 
research into so-called pagan harmonic philosophies was actively discouraged by the 
church.  Pythagorean philosophy and science were driven underground, concealed in 
art and architecture, and held within secret societies such as the Freemasons.  
Following Kepler, the fact that musical harmony can be expressed in terms of 
numerical ratios was still recognised; however, science dismissed the previously held 
thinking that the Good, telos, harmony, and musical ratios are cosmological principles 
governing all of reality; the focus of science became the physics and mathematics of 
acoustics, as noted by Gouk: 
 
By the end of the [17th] century the notion of heavenly harmonies was no 
longer popular, having largely given way to acoustical studies based on the 
joint development of classical physics and mathematical analysis, and the 
harmonies of the heavens had fallen silent. Enlightenment philosophes 
themselves certinly claimed to have removed the need for occult principles in 
nature. (Gouk, 2006, pp. 228-229) 
 
Despite this important change, music continued to influence and inspire scientific and 
mathematical discoveries.  Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) proved the mathematical laws 
that pertain to the harmonic series as frequency of oscillation, and the link between 
music or sound and geometry was discovered by Ernst Chladni (1756-1827) a German 
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physicist and musician.  In 1787 Chladni published an article entitled ‘Discoveries 
Concerning the Theory of Music’ in which he revealed that sound waves naturally 
create geometric patterns in matter.  The study of ‘sound made visible’6 uses a 
‘tonoscope’ and is now known as ‘cymatics’ from the Greek κῦμα (wave), so called by 
Hans Jenny in 1967.  Cymatics is now considered both as a science and an art.7  
Similarly, in 1827 the English physicist Sir Charles Wheatstone (1802-1875) invented a 
kaleidophone to make sound waves visible; he referred to it as a "Philosophical Toy" 
(Bowers, 2001, p.22). 
Music, or more specifically musical harmonics, lost its status as a mathematical 
science by the middle of the eighteenth century and was henceforth considered a 
performing art by the scientific community; however, those studying music still 
considered it a science and an art.  Professor William Crotch, who held the Heather 
Chair in Music at Oxford University, quoted Sir William Jones (1746-1794) when 
opening his 1831 lectures: 
 
Music … belongs as a science, to an interesting part of natural philosophy, 
which, by mathematical deductions …explains the causes and properties of 
sound … but, considered as an art, it combines the sounds which philosophy 
distinguishes, in such a manner as to gratify our ears, or affect our 
imaginations, or by uniting both objects to captivate the fancy while it pleases 
the sense, and speaking as it were, the language of nature, to raise 
corresponding ideas and connections in the mind of the hearer.  It then, and 
then only, becomes fine art, allied very nearly to poetry, and rhetoric. 
(Wollenberg, S., 2006, p.6) 
                                                            
6  This phrase was used by Goethe who in 1817 in "Schicksal der Handschrift". Schriften zur 
   Morphologie said of Chladni: “Who will criticize our Chladni, the nation’s crowning jewel? 
   The world owes him gratitude, since he made sound visible.” (Goethe, 1817, p.51) (My  
   translation). 
 
7  There are many examples of this on the internet; however, the following is particularly 
   impressive: Cymatics Experiment:Singing Into a Tonoscope - Mozart Una Donna a Quindici 
   Anni. 2013.  Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mStM S7Qcf1s. 
 
21 
 
Advances in the sciences and mathematics during the nineteenth century were highly 
significant for Bergson; in fact, in the first pages of Time and Free Will he 
acknowledges them without being specific.  They are however linked to discoveries 
regarding the electromagnetic spectrum: in 1800 William Herschel discovered infrared 
light; Johann Wilhelm Ritter discovered ultraviolet light in 1801; electromagnetism 
was discovered by Hans Christian Ørsted in 1820 and in 1845 Michael Faraday 
formulated the field theory of electro-magnetism.; in 1886 the physicist Heinrich Hertz 
detected radio waves, and later microwaves; and in 1895 Wilhelm Röntgen discovered 
x-ray radiation.  Gamma rays were not discovered until the early twentieth century.  
Significant advances in mathematics were made by the French mathematician Joseph 
Fourier who discovered that any temporal wave that has a consistent repeating pattern 
or continuous function, can be broken down into an infinite sum of simpler sine and 
cosine waves with differing amplitudes (Fourier, 1822), and during the 1860’s James 
Maxwell developed four partial differential equations for the electromagnetic field, and 
predicted an infinite number of frequencies of electromagnetic waves that all travel at 
the speed of light (Maxwell, 1865).  These discoveries coincided with advances in the 
study of acoustics.  Pesic, in Music and the Making of Modern Science, has surveyed 
the importance of music in science from the dawn of Pythagorean harmonics to modern 
quantum theories, and contends that:  
…the Pythagorean theme of harmony remains potent in contemporary physics, 
though its harmonies are more and more unhearable, ever more embedded in its 
mathematical formalism” (Pesic, 2014, p.5) 
  
He further comments: 
music continues to link vibrating bodies and particle physics, for resonance is 
the hallmark of musical tone. (Pesic, 2014, p.280) 
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While Pesic describes how music influenced and inspired scientists and 
mathematicians from the Pythagorean era to the present day, in general, science in 
Bergson’s day could not be taken to be consciously influenced by Pythagoreanism.  
The mathematics of harmonic motion studied by science ignores its musical counterpart 
even though, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is a correspondence between 
the harmonics of music and sound; hence the gap between sound studied as a science 
and music studied as an art remains.   
The new scientific concept of a vibratory universe coincided with a revival of 
Pythagoreanism in the wider culture, which included part of the wave of romantic and 
‘traditionalist’ occultism that swept Europe in the nineteenth century as a reaction 
against mechanical materialist science.  In the Foreword to The Pythagorean 
Sourcebook and Library, Joscelyn Godwin describes how the nineteenth century 
“swarms with semi-Pythagoreans” following the publication of Fabre d’ Olivet’s 
Golden Verses and commentary in French, Taylor’s Theoretic Arithmetic in 1816 and 
his translation of Iamblichus’s Life of Pythagoras, which in 1818, formed the basis of 
Guthrie’s version (Guthrie, 1988, p.13).  In France there was a revival of the occult 
aspects of Pythagoreanism and an upsurge in numbers of esoteric societies that were 
unconnected with the natural sciences, and which were founded on Pythagoreanism 
and Neoplatonism, including the Theosophical Society, a middle-class spiritualist 
movement established by Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891) who aimed for a synthesis of 
science, religion and philosophy.  Davis and Taylor propose: 
 
Blavatsky’s writings attempted to reframe the supposedly universal truths of 
mysticism in the light of contemporary scientific advances, including 
Darwin’s account of evolution and the discovery of the electromagnetic 
spectrum, whose “vibrations” provided a ready model for Theosophical 
accounts of spiritual energy” (Davis & Taylor, 2017, p.1,390)  
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Similarly, Bergson claimed that scientific advances supported his theory of duration as 
vibrations of energy; hence as Owen remarks: 
 
Bergson’s philosophy spoke to an esoteric understanding of a reality beyond 
the purview of “modern Science”, and complemented occultists’ long-held 
assertions that scientific materialism was incapable of penetrating the deepest 
secrets of the universe. (Owen, 2004, p.137) 
 
The Theosophical Society flourished from roughly 1860 to 1890, and its offshoot, the 
Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, was established in London in 1888 by Dr William 
Wynn Westcott (1943-1925), Dr William Robert Woodman (1828-1891) and Samuel 
Liddell Mathers (1854-1918), who all had a background in freemasonry that has 
historical links to Pythagoreanism.  Samuel Mathers married Bergson’s sister Moina in 
the same year, and one of the key practices of the order involved the use of the “will”, 
as described by Mary K. Greer: 
 
The student’s goal was to unite the Will with the Highest Self.  Will (with a 
capital W) was the consciously focused intention of one’s highest, divine, or 
God-like Self, charged by a desire that was purified of all ego-content and 
actualized through an imagination that used all the senses but was untainted by 
material illusion. (Greer, 1996, p.57) 
 
This goal is influenced by the mysticism of the Pythagoreans and Plotinus who argued 
for the mystical union of the soul and the impersonal One; however, they did not 
consider selfhood as medium and goal.  In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
Bergson utilises concepts of ‘self’ and ‘will’ as applied by the Hermetic Order of the 
Golden Dawn, by proposing that the ultimate goal of man is to attain the status of the 
mystic who unites his will with the will of God or the élan vital (T.S.M.R., p.99).  
Furthermore, Bergson, Theosophy and its offshoots, such as the Hermetic Order of the 
Golden Dawn, share the view that the universe undergoes a spiritual evolution or 
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transformation, and it is purposeful evolution as opposed to Darwin who proposed a 
materialist purposeless theory of natural selection or adaptation to circumstances.  For 
Bergson and Theosophy, the purpose of evolution is to be like God and act with love 
towards others.  In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion Bergson defines the 
“great mystic” as: 
 
an individual being, capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the 
species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action. 
(T.S.M.R., p.220-221) 
 
Theosophists believe in the Pythagorean theory of reincarnation, and similarly Bergson 
is also open to the notion of the survival of the soul after death, if not reincarnation 
itself.  Bergson’s philosophy was therefore compared to Theosophy by members of the 
Society; his work was reviewed over four editions and included in two volumes of the 
Theosophical Quarterly, published in New York between 1913 and 1914.  The review, 
authored by John Blake Jr., refers to his work in glowing terms as following the path of 
the Theosophist to “the divine nature, to the divine power, to righteousness and to 
wisdom and to light”, and significantly he remarks: 
 
he is describing the same effort, the same experience, and his contribution, 
therefore, has profound significance for the student of all such searchings after 
Divine Wisdom. (Blake, 1913-1914, p.337)  
 
In the second volume of the magazine the author continues his review of Bergson’s 
philosophy and states the following: 
 
Some of these ideas, however, are very suggestive of the philosophy advanced 
by Madame Blavatsky and often called Theosophy.  It was this that first 
attracted the writer to Bergson; and it would be gratifying to think that 
Theosophical ideas had so permeated the Western world's atmosphere as the 
result of the labors of the Society, that an intuitional philosopher could find 
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them available in his search after the Divine Wisdom. (Blake, 1914 (July), 
p.17) 
 
While Blake does not explicitly suggest that Bergson was influenced by Theosophy, a 
subtle inference could be read into the quotation above.  The review does however 
imply that the popularity of Bergson’s philosophy supported the views of the Society.  
To my knowledge, Bergson never accepted nor denied the influence of Theosophy on 
him, or the influence of his philosophy on Theosophy. 
Following Mathers’ death in 1918, Moina headed a successor organisation, the 
‘Rosicrucian Order of the Alpha et Omega’ (Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, 
2017).   All these orders emphasised the acquisition of secret knowledge derived 
through processes of ‘will’, education, and initiation, hence the desire to integrate 
science and religious belief.  Bergson’s desire was to integrate science and metaphysics 
through the same means of education and initiation.  It is not suggested that Bergson 
was personally involved specifically with any of these occult societies; however, 
commentators concede that his curiosity about unexplained and hidden knowledge was 
an open secret8 and a reflection of contemporary middle-class culture. 
Bergson, like his sister, was a member of the Society for Psychical Research 
founded in 1882 by Westcott, one of the founders of Golden Dawn, and Bergson 
became its president in 1913.  Grogin remarks that Bergson was trying to “validate 
esoteric ideas through empirical and rational means.  This was why he rejected the 
more extreme forms of the occult in favour of the empirical methods of psychical 
research” (Grogin, 1988, p.43).  In his inaugural address as President of the Society he 
                                                            
8   Barnard, 2011, p. 251 and Lefebvre & White, 2012, pp. 297, fn.8 quote Bertrand Méheust,  
    Who writing about mesmerism in France, in Somnambulisme et médiumnité: Tome 1 et Tome 
    2, states that Bergson’s interest in the paranormal was an open secret in the society of his  
    time. 
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suggested that if science had taken the psychological route rather than the 
mathematical, the combination of vitalist biology and the science of mind-energy could 
be beneficial in medicine: 
 
there would have arisen a medical practice which would have sought to 
remedy directly the insufficiencies of the vital force; it would have aimed at 
the cause and not the effects, at the centre instead of the periphery; healing by 
suggestion or, more generally, by the influence of mind on mind might have 
taken forms and proportions of which it is impossible for us to form the least 
idea. (“Phantasms of the Living” and “Psychical Research”, in M.E., p.99) 
 
This view of medicine, grounded in the notion of a vibratory universe and underpinned 
by sonorous mathematics, was gaining increasing scientific support, and develops the 
Pythagorean approach to healing that had a musical basis and was linked to kairos, as 
will be explained in Chapter 7.9     
The concept of initiation was a preoccupation of every occult organisation, 
including the Freemasons, the Theosophists, Hermeticists and others, and a concept 
that retained its importance in the twentieth century.  While Bergson was quietly 
spoken with an unassuming character, his style of lecturing could be considered an 
‘initiation’ for those who heard him.  In 1913 Arthur Lovejoy described Bergson’s as 
“the most Eleusinian of contemporary philosophies” and proposes that Bergson fulfils 
the “need for a, new sort of philosophic Eleusinia [that] is recurrent among the 
cultivated classes every generation or two” (Lovejoy, 1913, p.254).  According to 
Synesius, Aristotle wrote, “Initiates do not need to understand anything; rather, they 
undergo an experience and a disposition – become, that is, deserving” (Aristotle, 
Synesius, Dio, 10, frag. 15, in, Rice and Stambaugh, 2009, p. 143), and furthermore, in 
                                                            
9  Chapter 7.2, p.218. 
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referring to states of catharsis Aristotle writes: “All who use these rites experience 
release mixed with joy” (Politics 8.7,1342a14, in Burkert 1987, p.19).  Bergson also 
proposes that “joy” is attained by his method of intuition (‘Philosophical Intuition’, in 
C.M., pp.128-129) and the emotion attained by the mystics who possess supreme good 
sense (T.S.M.R., p.220).  If the ultimate aim of Bergson’s philosophy is to experience 
the joy of the intuition of duration, he appeared to have achieved it in his writing and 
lectures; Le Roy, for example, described the experience of reading Bergson’s 
philosophy: 
 
Mr Bergson's readers will undergo at almost every page they read an intense 
and singular experience. The curtain drawn between ourselves and reality, 
enveloping everything including ourselves in its illusive folds, seems of a 
sudden to fall, dissipated by enchantment, and display to the mind depths of 
light till then undreamt, in which reality itself, contemplated face to face for the 
first time, stands fully revealed. The revelation is overpowering, and once 
vouchsafed will never afterwards be forgotten.  (Le Roy, 2005, p.3) 
 
Grogin provides many quotes from those who attended Bergson’s lectures, some of 
whom, like LeRoy, described it as an emotional and even religious experience (Grogin, 
1988, pp.124-126).  Grogin writes: 
  
He was more poet than orator, a man using a personal charm and magic to take 
possession of his listeners. Philosophy in Bergson's hands became something 
experienced, and students left his room as if in a dream. (Grogin, 1988, p.42) 
 
Bergson was aware of his impact on his readers and those attending his lectures, and 
these accounts of the experience of Bergson’s philosophy can only lead one to conclude 
he intentionally continued the ancient tradition of regarding philosophy as an initiation.   
   Like Plotinus, Bergson was knowledgeable about music, mathematics and 
science.  His father was a musician, a composer and teacher of music, holding positions 
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of Professor at the Geneva Conservatory and Head of the London Conservatory; hence 
music was in Bergson’s blood.  Before studying philosophy, Bergson completed a 
degree in mathematics and would have studied the history of mathematics, including 
Pythagorean mathematical science.  It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the 
Pythagorean study of harmonics would have been of considerable interest to him due to 
his musical and mathematical background, and that he would have understood the 
correspondence between the mathematics of music and the mathematics underpinning 
the science of the electromagnetic spectrum derived from acoustics.  Furthermore, it 
will be argued in Chapter 9 that Bergson’s method of intuition could also have been 
influenced by his study of rhetoric, for which he won a prize (Chevalier, 1928, p.43), 
and that it has its roots in ancient Greek rhetoric, and the Pythagorean notion of 
kairos.10   
As for Bergson’s philosophical influences, he acknowledged being influenced by 
the philosophical tradition of French Spiritualism, particularly by Maine de Biran and 
Ravaisson who proposed a philosophy that opposed materialism and the notion of an 
impassive mind, in favour of the view that the empirical sciences could be founded on 
the fact that the inner psychological life is active, dynamic and correlated with the 
external objective world.  Bergson specifically mentions Plotinus as a positive 
influence from ancient philosophy; however, his references to ‘the Ancients’ or Greek 
philosophy are usually limited to criticising Plato or Aristotle, and with the obvious 
exception of Zeno, he rarely refers specifically to Pre-Socratic philosophy, despite 
being fully knowledgeable about the subject.  After reading Charles Werner’s book on 
Greek philosophy he wrote to him saying:  
 
                                                            
10  Chapter 9.3, p.279. 
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...  I was particularly struck by your conclusion that Greek philosophy has lost 
none of its relevance, being the necessary complement to modern philosophy.  
I may surprise you by telling you that I almost accept this idea, that Greek 
philosophy always interested me as much as modern philosophy, and for 
several years at the College of France, Plotinus was the subject of my course 
and the topic of literal explanation. … What has always attracted me to the 
Greek philosophers is the atmosphere they created and which seems to me to 
be where philosophy must live; with them, I feel at ease. (Correspondances, 
p.1,626) 
 
For Bergson, ancient Greek philosophy is not a “mere complement” to modern 
philosophy, but a philosophy that has evolved throughout the centuries.  In 1900 as a 
Professor at the Collège de France Bergson accepted the Chair of Greek Philosophy, 
and as he mentioned in his letter to Charles Werner, he lectured there on Plotinus for 
several years.  Prior to that, between 1884 and 1885 he lectured on the history of Greek 
Philosophy at the Université de Clermont-Ferrand.  The lecture notes have now been 
published by Henri Hude (Hude, 2000).  The timing of these lectures at Clermont-
Ferrand coincides with Bergson’s work on his doctorate, awarded in 1889, and for 
which he produced two theses: Quid Aristoteles de loco senserit (On Aristotle's Sense 
of Place) (Bergson, H., 1889) and Essai sur les donnés immédiates de la conscience 
(Time and Free Will) (Bergson, H., 1889).  Pogson, in the ‘Preface’ to Time and Free 
Will (his translation of the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience) 
comments: “The book itself was worked out and written during the years 1883 to 1887” 
(T.F.W., Preface, p.v); the overlap is therefore significant.  In Hude’s publication of 
Bergson’s lectures on Greek Philosophy he notes that we find many of the central 
themes of the Essai in the substance of these lectures: 
 
…firstly we find many of his familiar references.  For example, Bergson made 
reference to Évellin’s, Infinity and Quantity, 1881, which he quoted in Time 
and Free Will.  His course on Socrates draws heavily upon that of Boutroux on 
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the same subject, and so do his strong references to Zeller.  Furthermore, we 
find the core interests, the problems and theories of Bergson's Essai.   The 
Ionians are presented as physicists and most of the Presocratics are studied 
from the standpoint of the philosophy of science.  The Eleatics are the subject 
of special attention (two lessons).  Zeno's arguments are detailed and examined 
with the greatest care. (Hude, 2000, p.12)11 
 
What Hude doesn’t mention is that Bergson considered the Pythagoreans superior to 
the Ionians and Eleatics, and in his lectures on the Pythagoreans he expressed sympathy 
with their number theory and incorporated their key cosmological concepts into his 
metaphysics.  This will be explained in Chapter 6.  
While Bergson did not adopt an ascetic lifestyle in the vein of the Pythagoreans 
or Plotinus, there are noticeable similarities in their method of philosophising, for 
example, we find the concept of silence within Bergson’s philosophy in his method of 
intuition.  By directing attention within we silence the external world and hence 
become aware of the rhythms of duration.  F. L. Pogson, who collaborated with 
Bergson in the translation of Time and Free Will, writes in his ‘Translator’s Preface’: 
  
It is no doubt misleading to attempt to sum up a system of philosophy in a 
sentence, but perhaps some part of the spirit of Professor Bergson’s 
philosophy may be gathered from the motto which with his permission, I 
have prefixed to this translation: "If a man were to inquire of Nature the 
reason of her creative activity, and if she were willing to give ear and 
answer, she would say – ‘Ask me not, but understand in silence, even as I 
am silent and am not wont to speak.’” (T.F.W. p.viii) 
 
Interestingly, Pogson keeps his own silence about acknowledging this quotation comes 
from Plotinus, Ennead III.8.4, 1-3.  It is not known whether this was at Bergson’s 
                                                            
11  Appendix 1, p. 2 
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request or whether it is nothing more than an implicit reference to the similarity 
between them. 
Ancient philosophy therefore appears to have retained an important place in 
Bergson’s life, through his family, his education, the wider culture, where his 
philosophy was considered similar to Theosophy, and via his affinity with Plotinus.      
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Bergson and Plotinus had much in common; they both lived in eras when 
Pythagoreanism was experiencing a revival, and while Plotinus believed and 
acknowledged he was following Plato in adopting Pythagorean philosophy, Bergson 
acknowledges Plotinus as his favourite philosopher, and even that Plotinus is linked 
through Plato to Pythagoreanism (T.S.M.R., p.219) without acknowledging any direct 
or indirect Pythagorean influence on himself.  The following Chapters will argue that 
both philosophers implicitly and intentionally incorporate Pythagorean concepts into 
their respective philosophies: Plotinus more than has previously been accredited to 
him, and Bergson whose Pythagorean influence has not been taken seriously and 
therefore recognised as significant by modern commentators.  These arguments must 
be appreciated alongside the philosophical and historical context presented here.  
Chapter two will set the stage by explaining the key Pythagorean concepts that are 
implicit in the philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Pythagoreans - The Generation of Multiplicity 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Bergson followed Plotinus who was influenced by an understanding of Pythagorean 
philosophy that he considered to be a philosophy of transformation in which 
multiplicity is generated from an original unity.  This Chapter examines the generation 
of multiplicity from a Pythagorean perspective to build a foundation for assessing the 
influence of the tradition on Plotinus and Bergson.  It provides an important, but 
necessarily brief, introduction to the concepts central to Pythagorean cosmogony and 
cosmology, and which will be referred to in subsequent chapters: Nature, the Principles 
of Limiting and Unlimited, Harmonia (ἁρμονία), and the function of the Pythagorean 
Monad in their number theory.  Much of the evidence comes from Philolaus; however, 
we cannot be certain of the extent to which his views are typical of the school.  This is 
followed by a brief history of Pythagorean harmonics and number theory, and a basic 
introduction to the Pythagorean science of harmonics.  Finally, it will discuss the notion 
that since numbers are implicit within the science of harmonics, the Pythagoreans 
conceived numbers as powers. 
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2.1   Pythagorean Cosmogony and Cosmology 
 
 
 
The Pythagorean Philolaus wrote a treatise On Nature (Περὶ φύσεως) that begins as 
follows: 
 
Nature in the world-order [cosmos] was fitted together out of things which are 
unlimited and out of things which are limiting, both the world-order as a 
whole and everything in it. (Fr. 1, in Huffman, 1993, p.37) 
 
This opening statement introduces the concept of nature (φύσις) as well as the 
principles that underpinned his philosophy: world order (cosmos), fitting together 
(harmonia or ἁρμονία), and things which are limited (ἄπειρα) and limiting 
(περαίνοντα).  Kahn (Kahn, 2001, p24) and Mourelatos follow Huffman in translating 
“ἄπειρα” and “περαίνοντα” as “limited things” and “limiting things” respectively, and 
Mourelatos explains that it is Philolaus’ intention “to classify … all existing things 
under these two broad types” (Mourelatos, 2009, p.66).  There is consensus that cosmos 
refers to a world that is structurally organised; however, since Philolaus does not 
provide definitions in his work, there is considerable debate and little consensus about 
the exact meaning of ‘nature’, ‘unlimited’ and ‘limiting’ things, as well as harmonia 
with the association of number and musical harmonics.  These concepts and the debate 
surrounding them will be examined in the following sections.  
 
 
 
2.1.1   Nature (φύσις) 
 
 
 
Huffman discusses the various interpretations of ‘nature’ including: “real constitution” 
as used by Heraclitus in the Pre-Socratic sense; “growth” that can be activated in 
certain contexts (e.g. Empedocles Fr.8); “genesis” and “all that exists”.  Huffman 
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dismisses the interpretation of “all that exists” Burkert (Burkert 1972, pp.250, n.58; 
274) and Holwerda (Holwerda, 1955, p.78) as erroneous because it is based on a 
presocratic reading of nature that does not account for the fact that Philolaus “specifies 
two areas in which Nature is being considered, in the cosmos as a whole and in the case 
of individual things in it” (Huffman, 1993, pp.96-97).  Furthermore, Huffman argues 
that in Fragment 6 Philolaus states: 
 
Concerning nature and harmony the situation is this: the being of things, which 
is eternal, and nature in itself admit of divine and not human knowledge … (Fr. 
6, in Huffman, 1993, pp.123-124) 
 
Therefore “nature itself” in F6 is paired with “the being of things” (Huffman, 1993, 
p.97).   The view of Viltanioti who refers to Naddaf’s dynamic reading of nature as 
growth, is, as we will see in subsequent chapters, more in line with the philosophy of 
Plotinus and Bergson: 
 
Phusis must be understood dynamically as the real constitution of a thing as it 
is realized from beginning to end with all of its properties. This is the meaning 
one finds nearly every time the term phusis is employed in the writings of the 
pre-Socratics. It is never employed in the sense of something static, although 
the accent may be on either the phusis as origin, the phusis as process, or the 
phusis as result. All three, of course, are comprised in the original meaning of 
the word phusis. (Naddaf, 2005, p.15) 
  
Viltanioti comments: “The Pre-Socratics conceive φύσις as essentially dynamic or 
powerful … realized by a transition to a different status of itself” (Viltanioti, 2012, 
p.26).  Philolaus’ claim that nature is produced from the combined action of unlimited, 
limiting principles and Harmonia differs from his Pre-Socratic predecessors, who 
explained nature in terms of individual elements or groups of elements such as earth, 
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water, air or fire; however, the interpretation of powers in nature means Philolaus’ 
concepts may be understood as such and will be examined next.  
 
 
 
2.1.2   The Principles of Limiting (ἄπειρα) and Unlimited (περαίνοντα) 
 
 
 
In Fragment 6, Philolaus refers to the “pre-existence” of limiters and the unlimited, 
emphasising the ontological priority he clearly gives them; not to ‘number’ as stated by 
Aristotle in Metaphysics 985b32.  Philolaus’ reference to unlimited and limiting as 
“things” in Fragment 1 quoted above, has meant that commentators have disagreed 
about their nature, and the table below demonstrates the variety of interpretations: 
 
Author Unlimited Limiter 
Boeckh12 Indefinite Dyad The One 
Kirk et al.13 Even Numbers Odd Numbers 
Burkert14 Empty interstices between atoms Material atoms 
Raven15/Guthrie16 A basic principle of number A basic principle of number 
Barnes17 Hussey18 Various kinds of ‘stuffs’(matter) Geometrical shapes (form) 
Huffman19 A continuum without boundaries Provider of boundaries 
 
Viltanioti’s argument, that Philolaus considered nature as dynamic implies that 
unlimited and limiters are powers to act rather than ‘things’ that ‘act’ or ‘things’ that 
                                                            
12  Boeckh, 1819, p.54 
13  Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983, p.326 
14  Burkert, 1972, pp.258-259 
15  Raven, 1981 
16  Guthrie, 1962, pp.240 
17  Barnes, 1979, p.86 
18  Hussey, 1997, p.61 
19  Huffman, 1993, pp.37-53 
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‘are’.  She proposes that limiters possess the active power to limit and the unlimited 
possesses the passive power to be limited; powers “dispose their possessor to be or act 
in a specific way” and therefore differ from their bearers; hence “What the “things that 
are” do, or can do, depends on the powers they have”, and the powers of limiting and 
being limited have varying proportions (Viltanioti, 2012, pp.15-16).   
Aristotle (Metaphysics 986a22), refers to a table of opposites that the 
Pythagoreans considered to be principles of reality: 
 
limit unlimited 
odd even 
unity plurality 
right left 
male female 
rest motion 
straight crooked 
light darkness 
good bad 
square oblong 
 
There is no evidence that Philolaus included this table in On Nature, nor does there 
appear to be any obvious relationship of the columns to limit and unlimited which 
appear at the top, e.g. we cannot assume that odd, male or good are considered as limit.  
However, by interpreting limit and unlimited as powers, the other opposites may be 
understood as examples of how the principles of limit and unlimited apply to qualities 
that have the powers to act either passively or actively on each other in our experience.  
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2.1.3   Harmonia (ἁρμονία) 
 
  
 
Philolaus’ third principle is harmonia, the principle that fits together the limiters and 
unlimited: 
   
But since these beginnings [limiting and unlimited] pre-existed and were 
neither alike nor even related, it would have been impossible for them to be 
ordered, if harmony had not come upon them, in whatever way it came to be.  
Like things and related things did not in addition require any harmony, but 
things that are unlike and not even related nor of [? the same speed], it is 
necessary that such things be bonded together by harmony, if they are going 
to be held in an order. (Fr. 6, in Huffman, 1993, p.124)  
 
Barnes notes that the action of harmonia is a “force”; the active, creating, regulating 
force in nature (Barnes, 1979, pp.15-16).   
 
 
 
2.1.4   The Pythagorean Monad 
 
 
 
The importance of number for the Pythagoreans was represented in their sacred 
symbol, the tetractys (Figure 1), which they considered to be “The source and root of 
everflowing nature (Burkert, 1972, pp.54-56), hence it represented the generative 
nature of reality.  It is also a graphic description of the structural order or numerical 
organisation within the nature of sound because it contains the harmonic ratios that 
underlie the mathematical harmony of the musical scale: the octave (1:2), the fifth (2:3) 
and the fourth (3:4). 
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Pythagorean Tetractys (Figure 1) 
 
 
The sum of the numbers of the tetractys, 1, 2, 3, and 4 is ten, the base of all number, 
and according to Aristotle, ten was “considered to be perfect and to embrace the whole 
nature of number” (Metaphysics 986a 8).  Similarly, Stobaeus notes: 
 
The power, efficacy and essence of number is seen in the Decad; it is great, it 
realises all its purposes, and it is the cause of all effects.  The power of the 
Decad is the principle and guide of all life, divine, celestial, or human into 
which it is insinuated; without it everything is unlimited, obscure, and furtive. 
(Stobaeus, Eclogae, 1.3.8, (DK 11), in Guthrie, 1988, p.171) 
 
In this fragment the decad appears to have been understood to have a limiting role in the 
generation of multiplicity; however, while there is a consensus that the tetractys is early 
Pythagorean the importance of the decad is disputed.  Zhmud comments that we cannot 
regard Aristotle as representing authentic Pythagorean doctrine; he argues that Aristotle 
was influenced by Speusippus’ work “On the Pythagorean Numbers” which was 
inspired by Pythagorean arithmology, and: 
 
… it is very likely Speusippus who made a decisive step in the identification of 
the early τετρακτtύς with the number ten” (Zhmud, 1998, p.263). 
 
 The Stobaeus’ fragment quoted above is also most probably based on a Platonic 
interpretation of the tetractys.  
There is no current consensus on the exact nature of the Pythagorean Monad due 
to a lack of source material and Schibli has comprehensively characterised the debate 
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(Schibli, 1996, pp.114-130).  While Zhmud suggests that Philolaus developed an 
epistemological, rather than ontological, theory of number (Zhmud, 1998, pp.256), 
Schibli, supported by Schrenk (Schrenk, 1994, pp.171-190), proposes that unity is 
generated by a harmonia of the limited and unlimited or odd and even, which conforms 
to Philolaus statement that the ‘world order’ was fitted together out of limiters and the 
unlimited, dual principles.  Aristotle asserted that the Pythagoreans identified the 
limited with the odd, and the unlimited with the even elements of number.  The Monad 
or one, the starting point of the number series, is both odd and even because it consists 
of both; and number is derived from Unity (Metaphysics, 986a 17-21).  This view is 
supported by Huffman (Huffman, 1993, p.186), and according to Cornford, the tetractys 
should be considered as symbolising “the evolution of the many out of the One”, 
analogous to earlier “mythic” and “scientific” cosmogonies: 
 
There is (I) an undifferentiated unity. (2) From this unity two opposite powers 
are separated out to form the world order. (3) The two opposites unite again to 
generate life. 
 
From this explanation, the Monad is the undifferentiated unity of the odd and even and 
should not be considered the first number because: “the Monad is prior to, and not a 
resultant or product of, the two opposite principles”.  The first even number is 2 and the 
first odd number, 3 (Cornford, 1923, pp.2-4).   However, this raises an important 
question: Is there a ‘One’ or originating source of the Monad or tetractys that could be 
understood as the ultimate source of power from which the powers of the unlimited and 
limiting are derived?   
  In his account of the history of the doctrine of the One between the late fourth 
century B.C. and the third century A.D., Dodds proposed that in this scenario the 
Monad appears to be duplicated in the dyad: 
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 …in Aristotle's references to the Pythagoreans there is no trace of any such 
duplication of the One; and the antithesis of the One and the Indeterminate 
Dyad is Platonic, not Pythagorean.  
 
Dodds argues that the notion of multiple ‘Ones’ originated in the first century A.D. with 
Moderatus of Gades and was based on a Pythagorean interpretation of Plato’s 
Parmenides rather than authentic Pythagorean doctrine (Dodds, E.R., 1928, pp.136-
137).20  
While the tetractys symbolises the Pythagorean fundamental principle that 
embodies a unity that accounts for everything, in Philolaus’ cosmology it is linked with 
a central or fire hearth:   
 
The first thing fitted together, the one in the centre of the sphere, is called the 
hearth. (Stobaeus, Eclogae, 1.21.8, Fr.7, in Huffman, 1993, p.62) 
 
There is considerable controversy over Aristotle’s interpretation of natural bodies, and 
hence ‘the one in the centre’ being a construction (Metaphysics, 1091a 15).  Huffman 
interprets the central fire as “…the one in so far as it is the primeval unity, the 
paradigm case of unity in the cosmos” (Huffman, 1993, p.211), while Kahn (Kahn, 
2001, p.27) and Schibli (Schibli, pp.119-122) propose that it is the first integer, a view 
contested by Huffman because the central fire is “more than a bare monad with 
position; it is also fiery and orbited by ten bodies” (Huffman 1993, p.205).  According 
to Stobaeus, Philolaus referred to the hearth as “the Guardpost of Zeus, the Mother of 
the Gods, the Altar, the Link, and the Measure of Nature” (Stobaeus, Eclogae,  I.22.1, 
in Guthrie, 1988, p.170).  None of these terms suggests it to be an original divine 
source of unity because in Greek religion Zeus was the supreme deity, the king of the 
                                                            
20 See also: Rist, 1962. 
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gods who, while having a mother (Rhea) and father (Cronus) himself, became known 
as the Father of the Gods.  Since Philolaus states that limiting and limiters pre-exist the 
one, or ‘the first thing fitted together’, the ‘one’ here, considered the Monad as 
symbolised by the tetractys, must be the first rational power source of everything else, 
not the highest principle that is beyond being as is the case in Plotinus’ ‘One’.  There 
has been a tendency to conflate hearth and fire; however, if hearth is considered a 
‘place’, as Cornford appears to suggest it is in Fragments 146-7 of Empedocles (ca. 
495-435 B.C.) (Cornford, 1912, p.229), it is reasonable to consider the hearth to be the 
place of fire and the Monad to be the place containing the creative power of the first 
unity of the limiting and unlimited, i.e. harmonia.  Simplicius also considers the central 
fire in terms of ‘power’: 
  
the more genuine adherents of the school mean by fire at the centre the 
creative power which animates the whole earth from the centre and warms 
that part of it which has grown cold. (Simplicius, De Caelo 512.9, in Guthrie 
1962, p. 290) 
 
There is no evidence that the Pythagoreans conceived the Monad or numbers as 
having a mediating role between the physical world and a transcendent world of first 
principles, other than thinking in terms of the powers of the limiting and unlimited.  
This appears to be a project developed by Speusippus (410-339 B.C.) and subsequently 
Xenocrates (396-314 B.C.), and it was not until the first century B.C. that the 
Neopythagoreans, Eudorus of Alexandria and Moderatus of Gades, developed a 
henology organised as serial emanations of the divine One.21  Chapter 3 will argue that 
Plotinus places the unity of the tetractys or the Pythagorean Monad as a distinct 
                                                            
21  For a detailed history of the historical development of the theory of the Monad, see: 
Albertson, 2014, Chapters 1 and 2. 
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generative power of everything in the universe at the level of ‘Being’, not the One; 
hence he follows Plato and his Neo-Pythagorean predecessors in attributing this view to 
the earlier Pythagorean tradition.   
Having ascertained the Pythagoreans conceived the harmonic ratios of the 
musical scale to be unified in the Monad and therefore implicit to the structural order in 
the universe22, the following section will briefly explain the concepts of Pythagorean 
harmonics and number theory. 
 
 
 
2.2   A Brief History of Pythagorean Harmonics and Number Theory 
 
 
 
Music has been culturally important for man since pre-historic times.  The oldest 
musical instruments found date from around 40,000 B.C. (Higham, T., et al., 2012, 
pp.646-676) and Sachs suggests that because “only man is gifted with conscious 
rhythm” they evolved as the result of the human motor impulse to add sound to 
emotional movements such as dancing, to “express emotion as motion” (Sachs, 1940, 
pp.25-26).  Musical instruments were later used in rituals during hunting and religious 
ceremonies (Rault, 2000, p.34).  In ancient Greece, music was an integral part of life 
and intimately linked to their mythology.  The lyre, aulos (a double piped reed 
instrument), and kithara, played by professional musicians, were the three main 
instruments, played either alone, or as accompaniment to singing, dancing, or recitation 
in religious ceremonies, festivals and sporting contests.  The playing of musical 
instruments and the study of musical composition and performance has a long history, 
and while Aristoxenus (430 B.C.), in his Elementa Harmonica, refers to empirical 
                                                            
22  See p.37. 
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musical theorists as harmonikoi, he clearly distinguishes their study from Pythagorean 
harmonic science as well as his own.23  There is no evidence to support the theoretical 
study of harmonics as a science of the tuning of musical scales prior to the 
Pythagoreans.  Xenocrates (396-314 B.C.), pupil of Plato and leader of the Academy 
after Speusippus, is one of the earliest sources to attribute to Pythagoras the discovery 
that musical intervals could be expressed as ratios: 
 
Pythagoras discovered also that the intervals in music do not come into being 
apart from number, for they are an interrelation of quantity with quantity.  So 
he set out to investigate under what conditions concordant intervals come 
about, and discordant ones, and everything well attuned and ill attuned. 
(Heinze, 1892, Fr. 87, in Zhmud, 1994, p.291)   
 
The story of how Pythagoras discovered the intervals or ratios of the musical 
scale is described in Nicomachus’ Manual of Harmonics (Levin, 1994, pp.83-85), and 
reproduced in Iamblichus’ The Life of Pythagoras (Guthrie, 1988, pp.61-65).  As 
Pythagoras was passing a blacksmith’s he was moved to investigate musical intervals 
on hearing the notes produced by the sounds of differing size hammers striking an 
anvil.  He determined the weights of the hammers were responsible for the differences 
in the notes and concluded that simple ratios (logoi) accounted for the concordant 
sounds.  While this story has been discredited on technical grounds, Burkert notes that 
from the evidence available, only Hippasus can be linked to music theory before 
Philolaus (Burkert, 1972, p.295).  This evidence comes from Aristoxenus who claims 
Hippasus of Metapontum made four discs of equal diameter but with different 
thickness, whose pitches make up the basic intervals of the octave (2:1), fifth (3:2) and 
fourth (3:4) (Wehrli, 1967, pp.32-33, fr. 90).  Zhmud, however, comments that: 
                                                            
23  See Barker, 2007, pp.33-67 for a detailed discussion of Aristoxenus’ comments on the 
     harmonikoi. 
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Hippasus’ experiment is too complex to be a first attempt … It was conducted 
in order to confirm what Pythagoras had already discovered, most likely by 
observations and experiments with a stringed instrument” (Zhmud, 1994, 
pp.291-2). 
 
While we cannot be certain of the instrument(s) used by Pythagoras, it is known that 
later Pythagoreans experimented with the monochord that consisted of a sound box 
over which a single string was raised and stretched between fixed bridges [nodes]24 at 
either end with a movable bridge between, allowing the string to be divided at any 
point and plucked (Creese, 2010, pp.3-4). 
      
With its single string, movable bridge and graduated rule, the monochord 
(kanon) straddled the gap between notes and numbers, intervals and ratios, 
sense –perception and mathematical reason.  By representing musical sounds 
as visible, measurable distances (lengths of string) and by representing 
numbers audibly to the musical ear, it offered a way to study music as an 
arithmetical science through the medium of geometry. (Creese, 2010, p.vii) 
  
From the end of the fourth century B.C. the theoretical study of harmonics split 
into two traditions with differing presumptions, method and purpose: the Pythagorean 
tradition and the ‘experiential’ tradition.  Barker helpfully describes the key differences 
in their approach and a summary is provided below. 
 
 
 
The Pythagorean Tradition 
  
 
 
Apart from Pythagoras the three most prominent figures in the Pythagorean tradition in 
terms of harmonics were Philolaus, Archytas and Euclid who considered notes as 
                                                            
24  Brackets mine. 
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entities, the pitch of which: “… varies quantitatively, and can be expressed as 
numbers”.  Intervals are taken as ratios, not points on a line measurable as linear 
distance.  The method and language of analysis is mathematical, rather than musical.  
Mathematics “re-identifies” the notes perceived “as movements in a material medium.  
It is to these movements that the quantitative characteristics can be attached directly.”  
Number, and especially that of mathematical harmonics, is fundamental for 
understanding the rational order inherent in the whole universe, not simply the ordering 
principles of musical melody (Barker, 2007, p.8).  Music is considered an expression of 
philosophical truth.  
  
The Experiential Tradition 
  
Aristoxenus was a leading figure within the ‘experiential’ tradition.  He was a 
practicing musician from Tarentum, southern Italy who travelled to Athens to study 
Pythagorean harmonics with Xenophilus before becoming a pupil of Aristotle.  His 
Elementa Harmonica analyses the principles of musical structure inherent in melody 
understood through perception rather than the focus on tuning and the formal or 
mathematical structure of ratios as advocated by the Pythagoreans, and he does not link 
it to physical causes such as the movement of air, rate of vibration or musical ratios.  
Notes are considered as linear magnitudes that lie on a continuum of pitch, and the 
intervals or distance between them are only referred to in musical terms such as tones 
or half-tones etc.  The essential ordering principles are taken from the data perceived by 
a “trained musical ear” that listens for melodic sequences (Barker, 2007, p.4). 
Aristoxenus is valuable for clarifying aspects of the Pythagorean tradition that 
remain open to interpretation because of the scarcity of authentic Pythagorean sources, 
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and as we will later discover in Section 2.4, the science of harmonics as studied by the 
Pythagoreans and Aristoxenus includes the concept of ‘power’, which they interpret 
differently. 
    
 
 
2.3   An Introduction to the Pythagorean Science of Harmonics 
   
 
  
The science of harmonics is complex; therefore, to simplify it as much as possible an 
explanation of the basics will assist those unfamiliar with musical concepts.  
Pythagorean harmonic science was the study of intervals.  An interval is the 
difference in pitch between two notes, i.e., the relationship of the higher note to the 
lower note.  They are considered harmonic if two notes are played simultaneously, e.g. 
C and G together; and melodic if the notes are played successively, e.g. C then G. 
 
Division of the Monochord (Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how harmonics are generated when dividing the string on a 
monochord.  When the undivided string is held between two nodes and plucked it 
produces the fundamental note (1:1), also known as unison or the first harmonic. 
Dividing the plucked string in two in the ratio 2:1 or 1:2 produces the second harmonic, 
an exact replica of the fundamental, but one octave higher (2:1) or lower (1:2).  
Dividing the string in thirds, in the ratio 3:2 (ascending scale) or 2:3 (descending scale) 
produces the third harmonic, which is known as the fifth above or below the octave.  
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Dividing the string into fourths, in the ratio 4:3 (ascending scale) or 3:4 (descending 
scale) produces the fourth harmonic, known as the fourth or 2nd octave.  References to 
fourths and fifths are musical terms and must not be confused with the fractions 1/4 and 
1/5.  The essential point is the three intervals of octave, fourth and fifth are regarded as 
concordant and primary, the elements out of which any musical scale or composition is 
built (Guthrie, 1988, pp.24-29).  What gives each note its identity is not its pitch or 
name, but the relations in which it stands to others in the system.  A Pythagorean 
diatonic, (διατονικός) scale, which means ‘progressing through tones’, unfolds 
successively in time and is a series of seven notes that divide an octave set out in order 
of pitch and the intervals between those pitches.  While musical scales are themselves 
melodic, they are also the building blocks of melody.  A melody is a continuous 
succession of notes and intervals forming a distinctive sequence that is considered 
musical and based upon a structure of attunement and scales considered a priori by the 
Pythagoreans.  While the structure is invariable melodies can be infinitely variable.  
The fact that we can identify the same melody in different keys (transposition), 
demonstrates that melodies are perceived as being made up of intervals rather than of 
notes (Trehub, 2014, pp.163-164). 
The divisions of the monochord correspond to the physical properties of a string 
that when plucked vibrates and produces a series of harmonics as illustrated in Figure 
3. 
Harmonic Series (Figure 3) 
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In terms of the physics of acoustics, when a single string is plucked its vibration 
naturally produces a series of harmonics or nodes, making a note a compound tone.  
First the string vibrates as a unit, then in two parts, then in three parts, four and so on.  
These frequencies are integer multiples of the fundamental.  Significantly, these 
divisions result in an integrated series, not discrete harmonics, and each overtone 
becomes a ‘fundamental’ that has its own harmonic series.  In effect the vibration of the 
string generates new nodes or harmonics itself (Gunther, 2012, pp.21-22).  Since the 
string represents an indefinite continuum of intervals or tonal flux that may be infinitely 
divided, in theory the harmonics are infinite in number.  Placing Figures 2 and 3 
together illustrates how harmonics (green nodes) produced geometrically by dividing 
the string on a monochord correspond to the harmonics produced dynamically by a 
vibrating string (Figure 4).  
 
Geometrical and Dynamic Correspondence of Harmonics (Figure 4) 
 
         Division of the Monochord                     Harmonic Series 
 
 
While today an interval can be determined spatially, i.e. on a musical instrument or 
musical score, as continuous by perception, or dynamically as vibrations, it must be 
noted that the early Pythagoreans had no way of measuring vibrations accurately and 
did not specifically study the harmonics of vibrating strings.  It was not until Euclid 
(c.330 B.C.) that the correspondence of physical distance and the musical ratios was 
considered in terms of vibrations.  In the Sectio Canonis (Division of the Canon) Euclid 
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demonstrated the harmonic ratios or intervals have speeds of vibration which are 
inversely proportional to the length of string, i.e. a shorter string produces faster 
vibrations, and a longer string, slower vibrations.25  This text provides a basis for a 
mathematical solution to the subject of physical acoustics and was a development of 
Archytas’ incorrect theory (Fragment 1) that provides a physical explanation of pitch in 
terms of the speed at which sound travels through the air.  He proposed sound is 
dependent on the force of the impact of things in motion, and the speed at which they 
are traveling determines the pitch of the sound.  A faster speed produces a higher pitch, 
and a slower speed a lower pitch (Huffman, 2005, p.106).   
According to Pythagorean harmonics harmonia refers not to harmony as we 
commonly understand it, but to concordant intervals of a musical scale that are ‘fitted 
together’ or interlocked according to proportions of an unequal ratio.  Guthrie, quoting 
Cornford, explains how this may be interpreted in terms of limit and unlimited: 
 
The whole field of sound, ranging indefinitely in opposite directions - high 
and low - represents the unlimited. Limit is imposed on this continuum when 
it is divided according to the relevant system of ratios, which reduces the 
whole to order, starting from the octave (sc. 1:2, the unit and the first even 
number, both of which have their places in the table of archai). ‘The infinite 
variety of quality in sound is reduced to order by the exact and simple law of 
ratio in quantity. The system so defined still contains the unlimited element in 
the blank intervals between the notes; but the unlimited is no longer an 
orderless continuum; it is confined within an order, a cosmos, by the 
imposition of Limit or Measure’. (Guthrie, 1962, p.248)26 
 
                                                            
25  For a comprehensive analysis and discussion, see: Barker, 2007, pp.364-410. 
 
26  See also: Cornford, 1922, p.145. 
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If Guthrie is right, we could understand Philolaus’ reference to the imposition of limit 
on the unlimited as ‘measure’ in terms of the ratios implicated in harmonia.  I return to 
Barker’s interpretation of measurement as quoted on page 43: “Notes are considered as 
entities, the pitch of which, … varies quantitatively, and can be expressed as numbers” 
and that intervals are taken as ratios, not as points on a line that can be measured as 
linear distances.  In the Republic Plato states the Pythagoreans, “wasted their time 
measuring audible concords and notes against each other” (531a) and they looked “for 
numerical relationships in audible concords” (531c).  Pythagorean measurement 
therefore focused on relative values of the audible intervals that are expressed as ratios, 
not absolute distances between string lengths.  Similarly, the Euclidean Sectio Canonis 
refers to ratios of the musical intervals (diastemata) themselves.  Whereas the 
measurement of absolute distance increases as the distance increases, relative 
measurement means that a smaller ratio is attributed to a larger interval.  Having found 
a correspondence between interval and ratio when experimenting with different 
instruments they concluded that the ratios are inherent in the intervals themselves. 
For the Pythagoreans the cosmos consists of ten heavenly bodies, including the 
central fire, situated in the centre, and the five planets, sun, moon and Earth in the outer 
sphere of the fixed stars.  According to Aristotle (Metaphysics 986a3) a Counter-Earth 
was added to complete the ten of the tetractys.  Kahn remarks while it is not explicit in 
Philolaus, the inference is: 
 
…that the periodic motions of these bodies around the central Hearth 
somehow instantiate the ratios of musical concord, so that their revolutions 
produce the cosmic music of the spheres. (Kahn, 2001, p.26) 
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Guthrie proposes “they believed the ratios of their relative distances to correspond to 
recognized musical intervals … of the diatonic scale” (Guthrie, 1962, p.289).27  
  If the Pythagorean Monad, the source of multiplicity, is a power generating the 
fundamental tone, it has no location on the string itself, ignoring the fixed nodes.  It is 
however omnipresent to the multiplicity that is generated in a linear sequence by fixed 
locations on the fundamental.  This reasoning was applied to their notion of an unseen 
central fire around which the planetary bodies are situated and move according to the 
laws of harmonics; however, as Maconie notes there appears to be a “discrepancy” in 
the representations: 
 
 … contradictions [that] can be interpreted as differences in reference, aural 
convention focusing on the omnipresence of the fundamental, whereas visual 
convention, interpreting for example the observed motions of heavenly bodies 
as the expression of harmonic laws, having to attribute a pivotal location to the 
fundamental, while acknowledging the power of the centre to influence the 
motions of planetary bodies at a distance. (Maconie, 1997, pp.121-122) 
 
Whether the harmonic laws are interpreted from an aural or visual perspective, power 
(dynamis) appears to be implicated in both and is intimately linked to number.  
 
 
 
2.4   Number as Dynamis 
 
 
 
Before examining how dynamis (δύναμις) and number are intimately linked in the 
Pythagorean tradition, it is pertinent to explain how Aristoxenus considers the notion of 
dynamis in his experiential theory of harmonics as it was central to his arguments. 
                                                            
27  Huffman, 1993, pp.279-283 notes that no early Pythagorean documents exist that explain 
how the musical scale corresponds to the astronomical system. 
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Aristoxenus proposed that melody is capable of being created according to 
natural order (Aristoxenus, Elements of Harmonics, 1.24 -2.3), and while he does not 
treat harmonics in any metaphysical or cosmological sense, he argued that power 
(dynamis) is fundamental for a well attuned melody and that it is encountered both in 
perceptual experience and when thinking about it.  Without the power “the attunement 
is destroyed” (Aristoxenus, Elements of Harmonics, 1.19).  Barker offers a 
comprehensive analysis of Aristoxenus’ concept of dynamis (Barker, 2007, pp.175-
192) and comments: “So far as we know, Aristoxenus was the first theorist to give the 
term dynamis a special application in harmonics” (Barker, 2007, p.184).  According to 
his interpretation, dynamis refers to notes, not intervals. 
 
[Notes] …have a kind of ‘power’, which determines features of the route that the 
voice can take next, and the pattern of relations into which its subsequent 
movements can fall. It is not just a fixed point, a pitch, but something with its own 
dynamic properties, which (for example) impel the voice to move next, in its 
melodious trajectory… (Barker, 2007, p.188) 
 
Levin explains that dynamis is essentially qualitative and implicated in the infinite 
continuum and succession within melody; hence “This crucial power is understood by 
Aristoxenus to be continuity (συνέχεια)” (Levin, 2009, pp.88).  For Aristoxenus, 
continuity arises due to the individual notes that do not move, as well as the intervals 
between them in which the voice rises or falls, and he does not consider this motion a 
movement of the voice, but a motion determined my natural laws that are implicit in 
musical sound (Aristoxenus, Elements of Harmonics, 1.10): 
 
When, however these single units or notes are compounded into scales and 
modes in which each is assigned a particular function (dynamis), something 
miraculous happens, … a gravitational field of motion is released within the 
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scale, the distinctive characteristics of which are transferred to any melody that 
is composed according to the laws of that particular scale. (Levin, 2009, p.112) 
    
Barker comments that Aristoxenus does not explain how the notes as powers could be 
integrated within the melody; however, Levin suggests that Aristoxenus does consider 
integration in the mind as the creative or generative process of melody.  She refers to it 
as an a priori or innate notion of synesis (musical intuition), a combination of aural 
perception and mental apperception, and notes that Laloy (Laloy, 1904, p.164) 
describes it as "une sorte de kantisme inconscient”, or a Kantian aesthetic (Levin, 1972, 
p.229).28  For Aristoxenus, this involves the ability to hear, remember and distinguish: 
 
It is clear that to understand (xynienai) melodies is to follow, with both hearing 
and thought (dianoia), the things that are coming into being in respect of all 
their distinctions. For melody consists in coming-into-being (genesis), just as do 
the other parts of music. Understanding (xynesis) of music arises from two 
sources, perception and memory; for one must perceive what is coming into 
being, and remember what has come into being. It is not possible to follow the 
contents of music in any other way. (Aristoxenus, Elements of Harmonics, 
38.27–39.3, in Barker, 2007, p.172)  
 
This quotation bears a remarkable similarity to Bergson’s arguments for perception that 
will be examined in Chapter 9. 
We cannot be certain that dynamis within the science of harmonics originated 
with Aristoxenus; however, it is unlikely if the Pythagoreans considered intervals to be 
powers.  It is possible that he merely adopted the concept having learned of it from 
Xenophilus and applied it to suit his own theories of melody.  It therefore appears 
likely that in the science of harmonics dynamis was ontologically and epistemologically 
significant, both for Aristoxenus and the Pythagoreans.   
                                                            
28 See also Levin, 2009, pp.116-117 and Barker, 2007, p.168-175. 
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Number as the power to connect is the key notion in Pythagorean harmonics, and 
as previously mentioned, the ratios represent the intervals between notes, not the notes 
themselves.  While there is no written evidence directly referring to the intervals as 
dynamis it is reasonable to conclude that they considered the intervals to possess 
qualitative powers, just as the qualities in the table of opposites have varying 
proportions and can be viewed as examples of how limit and unlimited are powers to 
act rather than ‘things’ that ‘act’ or ‘things’ that ‘are’.   
The Pythagorean, Philolaus, stated the following: 
 
And indeed all things that are known have number. For it is not possible that 
anything whatsoever be understood or known without this. (Fr. 4, in Huffman, 
1993, p.172) 
  
Number, indeed, has two proper kinds, odd and even, and a third from both 
mixed together, the even-odd. Of each of these two kinds there are many 
forms, of which each thing itself gives signs. (Fr. 5, in Huffman, 1993, p.178) 
 
One may speculate that we can have knowledge of things because they give “signs” of 
the power inherent in the number itself.  It is possible that Philolaus’ “signs” are 
associated with number symbolism as noted by Aristotle, who writes that the 
Pythagoreans linked numbers with justice, soul and mind, as well as time (kairos) 
(Metaphysics 985b 29).  Alexander also tells us that the Pythagoreans linked 4 with 
justice, 5 was considered a harmonia, a marriage or fitting together of the odd and the 
even, the two and the three; and 7 with opportunity (kairos) (Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Metaphysics I, 38, 8-18, in Dooley, 1989).  Opportunity is present in the ending of the 
old and start of the new, just as the seventh note of an octave marks its end, before the 
cycle repeats.  The Pythagoreans did not distinguish between form and matter, causing 
Aristotle to ask, “How indeed can qualities white, sweet, hot be numbers?” 
(Metaphysics, 1092b 15).  The idea of linking number to qualities is often derided as 
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number mysticism or symbolism; however, it is more understandable if number is 
considered in the same vein as the qualities listed in the table of opposites, of which we 
understand the meaning.  While dynamis is in the ratios as the unlimited nature of 
intervals, the Pythagoreans considered the power of each number to be derived from 
the power of the tetractys and to possess meaning, character and the ability to influence 
the outcome of events.  Since each of the numbers was perceived to have its own 
quality or ‘energy’, not only are we able to sense this power, but number makes it 
intelligible for us.  This is possible because there is a correspondence, but not 
equivalence, between sensibility and intelligibility. 
The Pythagoreans argued the whole cosmos was ordered according to musical 
harmony; however, we are unable to hear its music because from birth we become 
accustomed to its presence.  We would only become aware of it if it stopped 
completely, when confronted with absolute silence (Aristotle, On the Heavens (De 
Caelo), 290b).  As noted in Chapter 1, silence and listening were key themes in the 
Pythagorean way of life because it promotes the unity of man and God.  According to 
Cornford: 
 
It was assumed, moreover, in sharp contradiction to orthodox Olympian 
religion, that there was no insuperable gulf between God and the soul, but a 
fundamental community of nature. The same order (cosmos) or structural 
principle is found on a large scale in the universe and on a small scale in 
individuals, i.e. those parts of the universe which are themselves wholes, 
namely living things. The living creature (soul and body) is the individual unit 
or microcosm; the world, or macrocosm, is likewise a living creature with a 
body and soul. Individuals reproduce the whole in miniature; they are not 
mere fractions, but analogous parts of the whole which includes them. 
(Cornford, 1922, p.142) 
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While the origin of the term sympathia which means “feeling together” (Preus, 2007, 
p.254) is normally associated with the Stoics who referred to it as cosmic sympathy 
(Ierodiakonou, 2006, pp.100-101), Pythagorean religious beliefs were founded on the 
world-wide primitive idea of universal kinship or sympathy, which in a more or less 
refined and rationalised form, permeates its central doctrines of the nature of the 
universe and the relationship of its parts.   
Through the power of number, harmonia is the essential principle of unity 
forming the basis for any possibility of knowledge.  Through the discovery of harmonic 
ratios, “music, as philosophy’s companion, became a bridge between the inner and 
outer cosmos, stirring not just the soul but the stars” (Hermann, 2004, p.103).  The 
discovery of the harmonic ratios cemented a change of consciousness that had already 
begun with Anaximander, a change from a Homeric or mythopoetic consciousness to a 
naturalistic consciousness of an ordered world founded on the principle of ratio or 
logos, the “principle of proportionality, balance and equilibrium, harmony and concord, 
reciprocity and exchange” (Johnstone, 2009, p.81).29  
 Zhmud argues that the mathematical sciences of astronomy and harmonics form 
the basis of Philolaus’ epistemological theory of number:   
  
By the time of Philolaus the exact sciences had repeatedly proved their ability to 
be a powerful instrument of cognition which can provide an irrefutable truth 
(Zhmud, p.257). 
 
Hence, the Pythagorean science of harmonics was not entirely rational because it 
provided a link between mind and matter, or intelligibility and sensibility.  While 
                                                            
29  While logos can be translated as ‘ratio’ it is also interpreted as ‘logic’, and as ‘the 
rational/logical/intelligible order of things’.  Ratio is also a Latin root for ‘reason’, 
‘rationality’, etc.  Thus, in the ancient mind, ratio, logic, reason, harmony, and later, the 
Platonic ‘good’ are all interconnected.  Interpretations of logos will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter 3.4, p.77.  
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Aristoxenus criticised the Pythagoreans for neglecting the empirical, this was not the 
case.  Plato, probably criticising Archytas, who based his science of harmonics on the 
tuning practice of musicians (Huffman, 2005, p. 418), acknowledged the Pythagorean 
concepts of harmony in music and mathematics; however, he disagreed with them on 
hierarchy.  He believed the harmony of mathematics to be superior to the harmony of 
music and criticised the Pythagoreans for focusing too much on the actual sound of 
musical intervals, and not concentrating enough on the silent harmony of pure numbers 
(Republic, 529d and 531c). 
The science of harmonics from the perspective of Aristoxenus emphasises the 
power that drives the continuous temporal process and generative nature of melody, 
which is complemented by an a priori or innate notion of synesis (musical intuition) in 
which sensibility in the form of hearing is combined with memory in the listener or 
musician.  Sensibility and intelligibility are also aspects of the Pythagorean generation 
of multiplicity; while sensibility is unquantifiable and therefore unintelligible, the 
degrees of change when expressed as ratios are intelligible.  Maconie sums it up nicely: 
  
In saying that the universe of things can only be known in terms of degrees of 
change, the school of Pythagoras is saying in effect that the universe is only 
real in so far as it is subject to change. A dynamic universe is a universe in 
motion. The static universe of conventional wisdom is by the same token 
unknowable. This is very up-to-date thinking. (Maconie, 1997, pp. 109-110) 
 
Plotinus and Bergson share the Pythagorean view that the static universe as we 
normally conceive it is unknowable because it is essentially dynamic; it does not mean 
a static universe exists that cannot be known. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
This Chapter explained that there is little to provide reliable evidence for Pythagorean 
cosmology and cosmogony, and it is interpreted differently by commentators.  It was 
proposed that the key concepts in Pythagorean cosmogony and cosmology may be 
considered in terms of powers: ‘nature’ is a power that is perpetually realized by a 
transition to a different status of itself; the ‘unlimited’ and ‘limiting’ are powers that act 
either passively or actively on each other; ‘fitting together’ (harmonia)  is the active, 
creating, regulating force in nature; and ‘cosmos’ refers to the generation of the world 
from the Monad, as the power that generates an organised structure of tonal order based 
on numbers, ratios and proportions as symbolised by the tetractys.  The Pythagorean 
Monad does not appear to be a first principle as we find in the development of 
henology in Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism, despite their attribution of the 
theory to earlier Pythagoreanism.  It was suggested that the nature of Pythagorean 
cosmology and cosmogony is reflected in the science of harmonics as conceived by the 
Pythagoreans and Aristoxenus in the experiential tradition.  Most important is the 
notion of dynamis, understood to be implicit within musical intervals, ratios, and 
therefore scales and melody.  It implies a power driving scales and melody in an 
orderly fashion and which applies to the dynamic nature of the universe, a universe that 
is continuously transforming itself according to the logical structure of the tectractys.  
Because music or harmonics forms a bridge between intelligibility and sensibility it has 
an epistemological role as well as ontological; the structure is in the world and it can be 
understood and sensed.  It will be argued in subsequent Chapters that it underpins the 
metaphysics of Plotinus and Bergson; a metaphysics that is supported by modern 
physics.  Pythagorean philosophy cannot therefore be subjugated to the interests of 
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historians of philosophy; it is highly significant for the study of metaphysics in general.  
Its significance becomes more apparent in the following Chapters as the metaphysics of 
Plotinus and Bergson are explained. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Plotinus - The Generation and Nature of Intellect 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The generation of multiplicity in Intellect has proved challenging for scholars of the 
Enneads due to perceived ambiguities in the text.  I will argue that if Pythagorean 
theories of harmony are taken as heuristics for an interpretation, possible resolutions to 
existing aporias become evident.  In employing the model of harmonics, Plotinus 
follows in the footsteps of Plato, who in the Timaeus describes how the World Soul 
(35a-39e) and cosmos, with a spherical earth at the centre (53c-56c), is built from 
substances that the Demiurge combines in ratios which are based on the mathematics of 
music, the harmonic series (35b-c).  While Plato is of utmost importance to Plotinus, it 
is not possible to address the complex and profound nature of the harmonics present in 
Plato’s texts here30; instead, the comparison will be made with the Pythagorean tradition 
as explained in Chapter 2. 
The Chapter commences with an explanation of Plotinus’ theory of the One as the 
first principle of unity and source of multiplicity, which is followed by a summary of 
Plotinus’ account of the generation of Being and Intellect as an activity of procession 
away from and reversion to the One.  It will be argued, with the help of illustrations, 
that Intellect generates itself as a ‘fundamental’ and its content or Beings as an 
integrated compound series of harmonics as understood in the physics of sound.  
                                                            
30  See: Barker, 2007, pp.308-327; Cornford, 1935; Crickmore, 2006; Kennedy, 2011; McClain, 
    1978; Moro Tornese, 2010, 2017; For a more general account of the role of music in Plato’s 
    Texts see: Pelosi, 2010. 
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This is followed by clarification of the ontological status of logos as the substance 
of the Beings in Intellect, because it is a concept understood to imply a logical ordering 
structure that commentators have been unable to define.  It will be argued, based on the 
interpretation that Intellect is a fundamental and self-generated harmonics, that the 
Plotinian logos should be defined as ‘ratio’, emulating the term used in the Pythagorean 
tradition of musical harmonics.  An explanation will then be proposed as to how 
substantial number is generated with the primary kinds: motion, rest, otherness and 
sameness, the composite of which Plotinus considered an undivided unity within Being 
that he models on the Pythagorean tetractys.    
 
 
 
3.1 Plotinus’ Principle of Unity – The One (τὸ ἕν) 
 
 
 
Plotinus develops a comprehensive theory explaining the physical universe as a 
continual process of generation by way of three linked metaphysical, sequential, and 
irreducible Hypostases: the One, Intellect and Soul.  The Hypostases have three distinct 
functions as: theoretical ontological structures or hierarchical explanatory principles; 
paradigms imitated by lower levels and entities; and causes that produce everything 
that exists (Gerson, 1994, pp.3-4).  As such they function as dynamic or generative 
powers of the One (Ennead VI. 9.3, 45-49 and III.2.1, 22-26).  It will be explained that 
Plotinus believed that his theory of the One replicated the early Pythagorean tradition.   
For Plotinus, the One is simple, the principle of all things (Ennead V.2.1, 1-7) 
and the first principle of unity.  The One is perfection, indescribable, beyond discursive 
thought, logic or knowledge, and as prior to being, it is neither intelligent nor 
intelligible (Gerson, 1994, p.14).  The One is not a substance, subject, or a thing that 
creates the universe as an intentional act, and while it does not have an external cause 
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since it is cause of itself, it is the efficient and final cause of everything else (Ennead 
VI.8.14, 20-33).  It is the first in the hierarchy because of its infinite and 
incomprehensible power that is everywhere (Ennead VI.9.6), not as a unit or central 
point that implies place, spatiality or temporality (Ennead VI.8.11; VI.9.9, 1), but it is a 
paradigm in that individual things in the physical world exist each as a One and 
therefore All as a many; hence it is present in all things (Ennead V.5.9, 33-35).  While 
the One possesses all things indistinctly it is “the potency of all things” (Ennead 
V.3.15, 31-33).  Plotinus refers to the Pythagoreans who referred symbolically to the 
One as “Aπόλλων” (Apollo, where A = not, pollo = many), i.e., the negation of 
plurality (V.5.6, 26-30); however, he asserts it must not be considered a number 
because it is prior to number (Ennead V.1.5, 6-7; V.1.7, 23-24; V.5.4, 17-19).  
Schürmann describes the One as an event, function, or the differentiating and co-
ordinating principle among things (Schürmann, 2002, p.162). 
Plotinus uses metaphors of an ever-flowing spring, a growing tree, (Ennead 
III.8.10, 4-13 or the sun radiating light (Ennead V.1.6. 28-30) to describe the generative 
function of the One whose power continues eternally undiminished while it remains 
unmoved itself (Ennead V.1.6, 18; IV.8.6, 7-16).  Rist remarks that for Plotinus, “… 
plurality arises because of the overflowing of the One.  This overflowing is the effect of 
infinite power and exists eternally” (Rist, 1965, p.340).  In the act of production its 
radiation is a spontaneous generation directed outside to produce something other than 
itself that can only be less perfect and less unified.  Cause and effect therefore differ 
ontologically.  While the One, as prior, has its own internal infinite power and is 
independent and superior, its offspring, Intellect and Soul, are dependent and therefore 
inferior; Intellect, because it contains a “a one-many” multiplicity, and Soul, because it 
is “one and many”, is dependent on the power of the One via Intellect while being less 
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unified than Intellect.  The hierarchy is therefore not temporal but prioritised according 
to Platonic “priority by nature” (O’Meara, 1999, p.72), degrees of power that become 
more dependant and less unified at each level.  The One as final causation is explained 
in terms of “the actualisation of Intellect” which is the “primary instance of the One’s 
causality”.  Intellect exists as inchoate in the One’s radiation or procession, and in its 
reversion, Intellect desires the unity of the One; hence the One becomes the Good as 
the universal object of desire. (Bussanich, 1988, pp.45-57).  Plotinus’ metaphysics is a 
system in which procession and reversion is applied at each Hypostasis to explain the 
causal power of the One.  First, the One generates Intellect that acts as the archetype for 
individual entities in the world and generates Soul as the third Principle or Hypostasis.  
Intellect contemplates, or participates in the One, and Soul contemplates, or participates 
in Intellect to express Intellect’s archetypes.  The One therefore provides an ontological 
and epistemological basis for the physical world, since it is both the source of being 
and the reason of being (Ennead VI.8.14, 31-32).  
The One also has psychological significance.  For Plotinus, love is the freely 
created gift of the One or the Good (Ennead VI, 8, 15; VI, 7, 22) and acts as an 
incitement for the soul to love and return to him, to experience absolute simplicity or 
unity (Hadot, 1988, p.59).  In his 1914 University of Edinburgh Gifford Lectures 
entitled ‘The Problem of Personality’, Bergson stated: “Of all the ancient philosophers, 
Plotinus was the only one who was really a psychologist”, and he addresses Plotinus’ 
psychology of the individual soul and its desire for unity: 
  
He supposed that each of us was multiple “in our lower nature” and single “in 
our higher nature.” In other words, he considered a person as a being 
essentially one and indivisible, which by a kind of declension or excursion 
beyond itself runs down into indefinite multiplicity. Each of us, according to 
Plotinus, may experience these two states. In the second, we lean towards 
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division, we materialize ourselves more and more; in the first, on the contrary, 
we become more spiritual and tend to a higher and higher unity. That is to say, 
the unity of the person tends to coincide with the unity of other persons, and 
the person to be one with God Himself.  (Mélanges, p.1,055)  
  
Plotinus never claimed his account of the One was his invention, and he 
acknowledges, without being explicit, it had ancient origins, relying on Plato for 
evidence that these views are ancient. (Ennead V.1.8, 11-14): 
 
… the ancient philosophers who took up positions closest to those of 
Pythagoras and his successors (and Pherecydes) held closely to this nature, but 
some of them worked out the idea fully in their own writings, others did not do 
so in written works, but in unwritten group discussions, or left it altogether 
alone. (Ennead V.1.9, 28-34) 
 
The beginning of Ennead V.1.10 reads: “It has been shown that we ought to think that 
this is how things are, that there is a One beyond being”, where “beyond being” is 
taken from Plato’s Republic 509b, as noted by Dodds (Dodds, 1928, p.136); therefore, 
there is no doubt he believed his theory of the One replicated the early Pythagorean 
tradition.  
 
 
 
3.2   The Generation and Nature of Intellect, the Form of the First Forms 
 
 
 
Plotinus provides a metaphorical theory of vision and a psychology of thinking to 
account for the generation of Intellect as an act of procession from and reversion to the 
One; however, Plotinian scholars have found the subject challenging.  Emilsson 
remarks: “all those who have tried to work through the texts, which are several, know 
how complex and bewildering the material is” (Emilsson, 2007, p.69).  Plotinus refers 
to Intellect as the “Form” of the “first forms” that are vaguely identified with Plato’s 
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Forms, intelligible models or archetypes for things in the sensible world; however more 
precision is necessary to clarify the generation and nature of the forms as they are 
central for understanding the Enneads.  It will be argued that Plotinus’ metaphorical 
theory of vision and psychology of thinking is modelled on the physics of sound, a 
model that complements the text and could dispel some of the bewilderment, especially 
as it underpins arguments developed later in this chapter as well as chapters four and 
eight.     
In Ennead III.8.10, 14-19, Plotinus refers to the generation of multiplicity from 
the One as a “wondrous act” (thauma) that defies explanation, yet he proceeds to offer 
one in Ennead V:  
 
This, we may say, is the first act of generation:  The One, perfect because it 
seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows… and its 
superabundance makes something other than itself.  This, when it has come 
into being, turns back upon the one and is filled, and becomes Intellect by 
looking towards it.  Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its 
gaze upon the One, Intellect.  Since it halts and turns towards the one that it 
may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. (Ennead V.2.1, 8-13) 
 
As noted by Slaveva-Griffin, Plotinus inverts Plato’s account of generation in the 
Timaeus.  While Plato adopts a “bottom-up” approach where the universe is built into a 
model of perfection by the orderly composition (systasis) of chaotic matter (Timaeus, 
30a and 48b), Plotinus adopts a “top-down” approach, where multiplicity is the orderly 
expression of a prior cause and is ultimately ‘otherness’, a standing away, standing 
apart, or separation (apostasis) of multiplicity from the One and is its radiation (Ennead 
V1.6.1, 1).  Slaveva-Griffin notes that Plotinus’ concept of apostasis has its roots in the 
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philosophy of the Neopythagoreans, especially Numenius under the influence of the 
Timaeus (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, pp. 24-25).31   
Plotinus argues that the first separation from the One involves movement and 
otherness: 
  
…Movement too was called otherness because Movement and Otherness 
sprang forth together.  The Movement and Otherness which came from the 
First are undefined, and need the First to define them; and they are defined 
when they turn to it. (Ennead II.4.5, 30-34) 
 
Following Aristotle’s characterisation of Plato’s account of matter (Physics 187a17), 
Plotinus refers to the indefinite dyad as movement and otherness (Ennead V.I.5, 6-9), 
which he describes in the above quotation as “undefined” and in Ennead V.3.11, 5 as 
“sight not yet seeing”.  It must not be considered a multiplicity because, as Rist 
remarks, “The expression 'otherness' is common throughout the Enneads and its aspect 
of unlimitedness must be pressed so that it may be seen to mean 'neither simple nor 
multiform'” (Rist, 1962, pp.99-100).   
In the next stage of the process, the movement away from the One halts and turns 
towards the One because it has an innate desire for the unity of the One, which is the 
Good.  As Emilsson explains, being ‘other’ than the One it is not completely self-
sufficient.  For Plotinus, “the Good is the telos of everything but pre-eminently it is the 
telos of its first product, the inchoate intellect” (Emilsson, 2007, p.72); however, it 
cannot ‘think’ it lacks something because it is not yet an Intellect that thinks.  Just as 
vision requires a subject that sees and an object that is seen, thinking requires a thinker 
and an object of thought (Ennead V.3.10).   
                                                            
31  In Chapter 1 Slaveva-Griffin provides a comprehensive account of how Plotinus’ cosmology     
inverts Plato’s cosmogony, with Neo-Pythagoreanism acting as intermediary. 
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In Ennead V.2.1, 8-13, quoted above, Plotinus states: “Its halt and turning 
towards the One constitutes being”, and in Ennead V.1.4, 27-29, that Intellect makes 
Being exist in thinking it, and Being gives thinking and existence to Intellect by being 
thought.  Like Plato, Plotinus gives ontological priority to the primary kinds: Otherness, 
Sameness, Motion, Rest and Being.32  
 
For there could not be thinking without otherness, and also sameness. …But 
one also must include Motion and Rest.  One must include movement if there is 
thought, and rest that it may think the same: and otherness, that there may be 
thinker and thought… But one must include sameness, because it is one with 
itself, and all have a common unity; and the distinctive quality of each is 
otherness. (Ennead V.1.4, 33-41) 
 
Plotinus refers to the primary kinds as the principles in Being from which everything 
else comes (Ennead V.1.4, 44), and as he does not include Intellect as one of the 
primary kinds (Ennead VI.2.18, 12-14), the passage above suggests they precede the 
thinking Intellect, not as distinct kinds but unified in Being.  This is confirmed in 
Ennead VI.6.8, 16-19 where Plotinus proposes that Being and Intellect are 
“simultaneous and exist together”; but Being precedes Intellect; so, this only makes 
sense if Being is present in inchoate Intellect.  It was noted motion and otherness were 
indefinite in the radiation from the One; however, for Plotinus, rest is also present 
because it is the “defining limit of Intellect” due to the halt and turn, while “Intellect is 
the movement of the Form” (Ennead VI.2.8, 22-24).  Sameness arises because motion, 
otherness and rest are the same in Being (Ennead VI.2.8) and are therefore undefined in 
Being.33  The precedence of Being in the generative process must not be considered 
                                                            
32  Plato, Sophist 254 Dff. 
 
33  This will be discussed further in Section 3.5, p.85 which examines the link between Being 
and numbers. 
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temporal but a priority of nature, as it is an intelligible reality concerning universal truth 
and is therefore unchanging.34  The opposites in Being represent the indefinite nature of 
the dyad that must be understood in terms of unlimited and limited: 
 
One will conceive it as the opposites and at the same time not the opposites: 
for one will conceive it as great and small – for it becomes both – and at rest 
and moving- for it really does become these.  … before becoming them it is 
neither definitely: otherwise, you have limited it [or defined] it. (Ennead VI. 6. 
3, 28-34)35 
 
While Plotinus followed Plato in adopting the primary kinds, the notion of opposites in 
terms of unlimited and limited originates with Philolaus who, as explained in Chapter 
2, gives ontological priority to limiters and the unlimited by referring to their “pre-
existence” in Fragment 6.36  
The final stage is the gaze upon the One arising from desire for the Good; “desire 
generates thought” (Ennead V.6.5, 9-10).  Plotinus refers to the reversion or “gaze” as a 
“touching and a sort of contact” and “coincidence” with the One (Ennead V.3.10, 43); 
it is this contact that defines Intellect and gives existence to Being.   
The puzzling feature of Plotinus’ account is why the radiation from the One halts 
and turns back to it.  Emilsson comments, Plotinus “entirely fails to explain the 
conversion.  There is certainly nothing in the emission of light or heat, or the flowing of 
                                                            
 
34  For Plotinus, the objects of intellectual cognition are eternal truths, whereas the objects of 
perceptual cognition are perceived one after another in temporal succession.  See Ennead III. 
7, ‘On Eternity and Time’. 
 
35  Armstrong comments (Ennead VI.6-9, p.17) according to Aristotle, “Plato spoke of the 
indefinite principle of multiplicity as a dyad “great and small””.  See references to Physics 
203a15-16 and Metaphysics A6. 987b 26.  
  
36  Chapter 2.1.2, p.82. 
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liquids, that provides a reason for a conversion of the efflux”.  He refers to the lack of 
explanation as a “gap between the procession and the conversion”, proposing the return 
is required for a psychological theory based on a desire for the Good, and that Plotinus’ 
metaphorical use of vision constitutes the difference between subject (inchoate Intellect) 
and its object (the One) (Emilsson, 2007, pp.70-78).  It is true that Plotinus does not 
explain why the reversion is necessary; however, since reversion is a natural part of the 
process of generation of harmonics, and complements his account, it is suggested that 
this is the model Plotinus had in mind.   
To understand how the generation of Intellect conforms to the generation of 
harmonics, let us return to Figures 2 and 3 in Chapter 2.37  Figure 2 illustrates the 
musical harmonics produced by dividing the string on a monochord; however, let us 
first consider the monochord itself which is basically a simple instrument consisting of 
a single string held in equilibrium between two stationary nodes.  The apparatus is set, 
now for the physics.  Figure 5 illustrates that as energy travels through the string held 
between two nodes it causes a displacement from equilibrium, and the maximum point 
of displacement is referred to as an anti-node.  On reaching the second stationary node 
the energy is reflected back to the first node, creating a second anti-node, thus forming 
a standing wave and creating a fundamental tone which is known as unison (Gunther, 
2012, p.15). 
                                                            
37  Chapter 2.3, p.46 and p.47 respectively. 
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Creation of the Fundamental (Figure 5)
 
 
This serves as a model for Plotinus’ account of procession and reversion that is 
illustrated in Figures 6 and 7.  Let us take Node 1 on the left to represent the One 
because Plotinus regards the One or Good as a stationary power source; Plotinus is clear 
that the One does not move and refers to it as being formless itself but providing a 
“base” for Intellect “… the “Form” of the first “Forms” (Ennead VI.7.17, 35-36). 
The arrow pointing to the right represents the energy radiating from the One in 
the form of the indefinite dyad (motion and otherness), and whereas Plotinus applies a 
metaphor of light to the One, the indefinite dyad is in darkness or “unilluminated from 
the First” (Ennead II.4.5, 34-35).  The idea that darkness is prior to light is exemplified 
in Hesiod’s Theogeny [116–125] where Nyx, Goddess of the Night, daughter of Chaos, 
was one of the ancient Protogenoi, the first-born elemental gods, and who together with 
Erebos (Darkness) gave birth to Hermera (Day).  Similarly, in ancient religious 
cosmology such as that found in versions of Hinduism, Buddhism as well as 
Christianity, priority is given to the primeval ‘sound’ of creation, with the first creation 
described in terms of light.  This is epitomised in the Bible, where the voice or sound of 
God created light; for example, in Genesis 1: “And God said, “Let there be light,” and 
in John 1.1: “In the beginning was the Word, & the Word was with God, and the Word 
was God” (King James Bible, 1611).   
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Node 2 represents the point at which the procession halts and turns, and according 
to Plotinus, “Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being”. 
 
Procession and the Creation of Being (Figure 6) 
 
 
The indefinite dyad, in its movement away from the One becomes limited by resting 
(Bussanich, 1988, p.15), since he states that “rest is the limit of intellect” (Ennead 
VI.2.8. 18-24); though at this stage Being remains indefinite, and potentially the 
principle that unifies the primary kinds, motion, rest, same and other.  Plotinus refers to 
it as “primary being” and an “image of the One”, both within the context of sound: 
 
And if someone says that this word einai [being] - which is the term which 
signifies substantial existence – has been derived from the word hen [one] he 
might have hit upon the truth. For this which we call primary being proceeded, 
so to speak, a little way from the One, but did not wish to go still further, but 
turned inwards and took its stand [estē] there, and became substance [ousia] 
and hearth [hestia] of all things;  it is like what happens in the utterance of the 
sound; when the utterer presses on it hen is produced which manifests the 
origin of the One and on [being] signifying that which came to exist, substance 
and being, has an image of the One since it flows from its power. (Ennead 
V.5.5, 12-23) 
 
Plotinus appears to conceive rest as a sense of place when he uses the Pythagorean 
notion of “hearth” (Hestia), which is a fitting metaphor for ‘node’ in the generation of 
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harmonics38; however, he did not consider ‘hearth’ in a spatially extended context 
because Intellect is self-inclusive in that it contains internal differences, and it’s eternal, 
non-discursive nature means that it is neither in space nor time.  Plotinus refers to 
eternity as “the life which exists around being, all together and full, completely without 
extension” (Ennead III. 7. 3, 36-38)39 while Emilsson refers to Intellect as having 
“Intellectual space” (Emilsson, 2007, p. 51) that can be interpreted as the intellectual 
substantial “place” of internal difference.   
For Plotinus, the One (Node 1) and rest as Being (Node 2), are essential for 
providing the shape of the form of Intellect: 
 
Being must not fluctuate, so to speak, in the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit 
and stability; and stability in the intelligible world is limitation and shape, and it 
is by these that it receives its existence. (Ennead V.1.7, 24-28) 
  
The Form of Intellect (Figure 7) is completed on its reversion or gaze which is 
represented by the arrow pointing towards the One and its coincidence with the One 
(Node 1).  
                                                            
38  Plotinus refers to Being as a “hearth” again in Ennead VI.2.8, 8. 
39  See also: Ennead IV.3.5, 23-30. 
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Creation of the Form of Intellect (Figure 7)
 
This accounts for why Plotinus refers to the gaze as “touching and a sort of contact”, as 
without it the form would not be completely bound: 
 
For immediately by looking to something which is one the life is limited by it, 
and has in itself limit and bound and form; and the form was in that which was 
shaped, but the shaper was shapeless. But the boundary is not from outside, as 
if it was surrounded by a largeness, but it was a bounding limit of all that life 
would be which shines out from it. (Ennead VI. 7, 17, 15-22) 
 
In Plotinus’ account of procession and reversion, he insists the Form of Intellect has a 
shape and boundary; there is no shapeless straight line of procession and reversion 
between the One and Being.  If we interpret his account from the perspective of sound, 
anti-nodes occur naturally between Nodes 1 and 2 in the procession and reversion, 
generating the shape and boundary of the ‘fundamental’ or first harmonic that nicely 
complements his description.   
 Plotinus explains that while Intellect is defined as one, it includes a multiplicity 
within its boundary which will be interpreted as an integrated compound series 
consisting of the form of Intellect as a fundamental and its Beings as self-generated 
harmonics.   
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3.3   The Generation of Intellect as Being and Beings 
 
 
 
Continuing the process from the previous section, will demonstrate how Plotinus 
followed the Pythagoreans who considered musical harmonics to be the a priori 
structure for the generation of, and order in, the universe.  
 On contact with the One the primary kinds in Being that were undefined and 
potential, become defined and actual because they are thought by Intellect as many; it 
becomes “seeing sight” when it receives the light or power of the One (Ennead V.3.11, 
8-13).40  Aristotle proposed in De anima (419a 10-22) that vision requires a medium for 
visual contact because an object cannot be seen if it comes directly into contact with the 
eye, and similarly, Plotinus proposes that on contact with the One, Intellect does not see 
it.  As it is unable to grasp it in its full power it reverts to itself, dividing the One’s 
power into a multiplicity (Ennead V1.7.15, 20-24);41 hence Intellect becomes conscious 
of its own existence or Being, and as the “primary knower” (Ennead V.3.12, 47) it turns 
to itself for knowledge of the One and in doing so generates itself: 
 
Intellect, certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by the 
power which comes from the One, …But Intellect sees, by means of itself, like 
something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and thought and all 
things come from the One. (Ennead V.1.7, 13-19) 
 
Intellect now has a ‘life’ (ζωή) in thinking the actuality of Being, motion, rest sameness 
and otherness.  Plotinus states that Intellect’s knowledge of the many in itself is 
                                                            
40  See also Ennead VI.7.16, 20-23. 
 
41  Lloyd and Bussanich, disagree about the One’s role in the generation of Intellect.     
     See: Lloyd, 1987 and Bussanich, 1988.   Their arguments are discussed in Emilsson, 2007, 
p.75.  See also Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.50, for her interpretation that multiplicity is the 
flowing or radiation of the One.   
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immediate, so we certainly cannot consider them to be “premises” or “axioms” or 
“expressions”, as Intellect would have to place the objects of thought outside itself 
(Ennead V. 5. 1, 40-43).  Intellect is ontologically and epistemologically unified 
simultaneously as subject and object, knower and known, i.e. it knows itself as content 
and thinker of its content, and yet its thoughts are determined by the One (Emilsson, 
2007, pp. 4-5).   
Once again this can be understood as harmonic motion.  Having created the 
fundamental as a result of energy being reflected from the second node back to the first 
node, the first node continues the movement by reflecting the energy back to the 
second, again producing anti-nodes or displacements in the mode of oscillation (Figure 
8). 
Harmonic Motion (Figure 8) 
 
 
 
The movement illustrated in Figure 8 is replicated in Plotinus’ account of Intellect 
seeing and knowing itself as Being when Being is illuminated by the One.  Intellect 
turns away from the One and to itself (Figure 9). 
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Intellect’s Return to Itself (Figure 9) 
 
 
 Returning to harmonic motion, the second node reflects the energy back again, 
hence a further displacement and the creation of a third node and the second harmonic 
where the waveforms cross, half-way between the two nodes.  Because the waves are 
travelling in different directions at the same speed they cancel each other out and there 
is hardly any motion at this point.  The movement continues and produces a further anti-
node (Figure 10).  These shorter wavelengths correspond to a vibration with twice the 
frequency of the fundamental frequency42 and which constitutes the first overtone, or a 
difference of an octave in music. 
 
Generation of the Second Harmonic (Figure 10) 
 
  
                                                            
42  The harmonic is a multiple of the fundamental frequency. 
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This is replicated in Plotinus’ account of the generation of Soul, the first being (Ennead 
V.2.1, 15-16).  When Intellect turns to itself its desire for the Good makes it return to 
the One, generating Soul as the third stationary node and second harmonic as a principle 
of limit (Figure 11). 
 
The Generation of Soul (Figure 11) 
 
 
If we think of it in terms of music Soul is the same note as Intellect but with a difference 
of one octave, and significantly, it is an instance of the primary kinds in action.  
 Subsequent harmonics are produced because energy continues to be reflected by 
the nodes, and further displacements in the mode of oscillation produces additional 
nodes or harmonics together with their corresponding partials at 1/3, 1/4, 1/5 etc., of the 
string's fundamental wavelength (Gunther, 2012, pp.20-21).43  The shorter wavelengths 
correspond to harmonics at frequencies that are 3, 4, 5, etc., times the fundamental 
frequency.  Figure 12 illustrates how a limited number of multiple harmonics are 
generated, using different colours to emphasise the harmonics.  It is a natural process of 
generation that theoretically continues to infinity, and which in mathematics is known 
as a slowly diverging series.  Furthermore, each harmonic becomes a fundamental in its 
                                                            
43  See illustration 2.6a. 
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own right, generating its own harmonics or nodes in the same manner as the 
fundamental from which it was generated. 
 
Generation of Multiple Harmonics (Figure 12) 
 
 
With these features of harmonic generation in mind, let us consider what Plotinus 
tells us about the nature of Intellect.  He describes Intellect as a substantial (Ennead 
II.6.1, 6-9) one-many, a unified multiplicity, a ‘Complete Living Being’ (Enneads 
VI.6.8, 1-4; V.9.9, 4-9; VI.7.8, 30-32) whose parts are self-generated (Ennead III.7.4, 
10).  Its offspring is a multiplicity of Beings which are all different forms of itself and 
are therefore all individual intellects which are bounded by Intellect; it thinks and keeps 
them within itself (Ennead VI.7.17, 26-28).  This one-many does not consist of discrete 
parts, they interpenetrate44 just as harmonics are self-generated as an integrated 
compound series when the pulse of energy is carried along the string between two 
nodes.  While Intellect is the first form and has a shape, the Beings themselves also 
have shapes or forms that Plotinus refers to as intelligible matter (Ennead II.4.3, 15-
17): 
 
But if intelligible reality is at once many and partless, then the many existing 
in one are in matter which is that one, and they are its shapes: conceive this 
unity as varied and of many shapes. (Ennead II.4.4, 14-17) 
                                                            
44  Armstrong, 2013, p.40 and p.50. 
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While Plotinus explains that the shapes in Intellect are not the same as those 
experienced in the sensible world, he refers to the movement of Intellect as a 
“wandering in itself” (Ennead VI.7.13, 30-31).  He is not explicit about what he means 
by shapes in Intellect other than describing Intellect as an “outline” that holds “outlines 
inside itself”, and furthermore, that “its division does not go on in a straight line but 
moves always to the interior” (Ennead VI.7.14, 13-17).  It is therefore suggested that 
the shapes to which he refers are the shapes generated as varying wavelengths are 
created with the production of nodes and anti-nodes, and which constitute Intellect’s 
‘life’ (ζωή).  Plotinus describes Intellect as “boiling over with life” (Ennead VI.5.12, 
9), a metaphor that accurately describes the bubbling appearance as waves are 
generated by the vibrations and harmonics in the fundamental, as illustrated in Figure 
12.  He also considers Intellect and the generated intellects or forms to be an infinite 
process of division (Ennead VI.7.13, 5-8).  The fractalisation of Intellect is consistent 
with the mechanism of harmonic generation.  If the first being generated by Intellect is 
Soul considered as the third stationary node, (Figure 11), all the other realities follow as 
forms which are underpinned by the generation of nodes as substance.  Each partial 
becomes a fundamental in its own right generating an infinite series of harmonics each 
of which follows the same physical law as the fundamental.  Stamatellos comments: 
“…every intelligible within the realm of intellect is actually itself, “but potentially all 
the others” (Stamatellos, 2007, p.62).  Similarly, Plotinus describes Intellect as the 
principle of necessity (Ennead V.3.6, 10-11) operating as a “law of being” by which 
Beings are generated (Ennead V.9.5, 26-29).45  This is similar to the Pythagoreans who 
considered musical harmonics to be the a priori structure for the generation of, and 
order in, the universe.  Furthermore, just as the physical laws of harmonics are 
                                                            
45  This will be examined in detail in Section 3.5, p.89. 
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considered unchanging, Plotinus considers Intellect to be unchanging and eternal, 
“…for “eternity” is derived from “‘always existing” (Ennead III.7.4, 43-44), hence the 
generation of Intellect is non-spatial and non-temporal because Intellect and its content 
undergo no change (Ennead II. 4. 5, 26-27; Ennead V. 9. 5, 33-35).  While in Plotinus’ 
day there would be no means of measuring the time taken for a pulse of energy to travel 
through a string, modern technology has now made it possible. On a musical instrument 
it occurs in a measurement of milliseconds (Gunther, 2012, pp.11-12), a speed that we 
are unable to perceive as a temporal process, hence all the harmonics of a tone or sound 
are perceived simultaneously.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that Plotinus also 
considered the harmonics of Intellect to be generated simultaneously, thus partially 
contributing to his argument that it lacks temporality. 
The harmonics model could understandably be rejected on the view that the 
physics of standing waves was not understood in Plotinus’ day.  It is true that 
references to standing waves and nodes were a much later discovery by Robert Hooke 
(1635-1703) and Joseph Sauveur (1653-1716).  Sauveur was the first to use the terms 
fundamental frequency, and harmonics for higher frequencies that are determined by 
nodes for points of rest and loops for motion (Rao, 2007, p.7), while the discovery of 
standing waves is attributed to Faraday, who in 1831 observed standing waves on the 
surface of a liquid in a vibrating container.  Plotinus would not have been familiar with 
the terms nodes and antinodes; however, the phenomenon is, easily observed when 
energy travels through a rope, an example commonly used in modern school textbooks.  
It is conceivable that it was understood by Plotinus because the theory of sound as a 
mechanical wave predated him.  Euclid linked harmonics to vibrations, though not as 
standing waves specifically, and Freely comments: “The Stoics were the first to use the 
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analogy of water waves to explain the propagation of sound”, referring to a quotation 
from Aetius: 
 
The Stoics say that air is not composed of particles, but that it is a continuum 
which contains no empty spaces.  If it is struck by an impulse it rises in circular 
waves proceeding in a straight sequence to infinity, until all the surrounding air is 
stirred, just as a pool is stirred by a stone which strikes it.  But whereas in the latter 
case the motion is circular, the air moves spherically. (Freely, 2012, p.75) 
 
Kilgour writes in his ‘Vitruvius and the Early History of Wave Theory’, that the Stoics, 
Vitruvius (Vitruvius, 1914, V.4) and Boethius (A.D. 480-524) (De Musica, Book I, 
chapter 14) considered sound a transverse wave, as when a stone is thrown into water 
the ripples expand outward and waves form perpendicular to the trajectory, a theory 
that persisted until the sevententh century when it was superseded by longitudinal wave 
theory.  Since Porphyry confirms that Plotinus was knowledgeable about mechanics it 
is possible that this is how he understood the vibrations of sound and explains why in 
Ennead 1.8.2 he refers to Intellect living around the One and Soul circling around 
Intellect, while the One remains unmoved in the centre.  Vitruvius also, compares 
sound to waves in water, which when obstructed flows back and breaks up the 
subsequent waves, and as Kilgour comments: “Vitruvius shows that wave theory 
accounts for interference and reflection, to use modern terms-in his phrases, dissonance 
and echo” (Kilgour, 1963, p.284-285).  Nicomachus (c. 60-120 A.D.), in Chapter 10 of 
his Manual of Harmonics specifically refers to the inverse proportion obtaining 
between the length of string on a canon and its vibration when the string is plucked, 
such that if the pitch is increased one octave, the string is half as long and is vibrating 
twice as fast, and if the pitch is increased by a fifth, the string is 2/3rds as long and is 
vibrating 3/2 as fast, and if the pitch is increased by a fourth, the string is 3/4ths as long 
and is vibration 4/3rds as fast (Levin, 1994, pp.141-146).  It could therefore be argued 
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that Nicomachus had already made the connection between harmonic ratios and the rate 
of vibration; hence the logic behind procession and reversion forming waves as 
vibrations and harmonics.  It is contended that Chapters 4 and 8 will support the 
argument and that it cannot be dismissed because Plotinus could not have understood 
the concept. 
Plotinus appears to have understood the generation of harmonics from the 
fundamental to be a natural physical law and applied it in metaphysical terms, which 
indicates an important development of Pythagorean philosophy.  The argument that 
Plotinus used the generation of harmonics as a model is strengthened if we consider 
what he says about intelligible matter and its link to number. Both are implicated with 
the concept of logos that will be explored next.  
 
 
 
3.4   Intelligible Matter, Logos (λόγος) and Substance in the Enneads 
 
 
 
Plotinus claims that the universe is generated according to the law within Intellect 
which is logos, a concept central to his metaphysics and which commentators rightly, 
but vaguely, interpret as ‘rational forming principle’ or ‘reason principle’.  The aim of 
this section is to propose a precise understanding that is compatible with the model of 
harmonics.  
For Plotinus there is a distinction between intelligible matter and physical 
matter.  Physical matter generates nothing because it is powerless, always receiving 
different forms one after another, and therefore constantly changing because “one thing 
pushes out another” (Ennead II.4.3, 9-17).  The composite of intelligible matter is logoi 
or forming principles whose actuality makes form that is always the same but shaped in 
a different way, and it is all things at once, unchanging and eternal.  Whereas the matter 
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of the world of sense is dead, intelligible matter is living (Ennead II.4.5, 15-19).  
Plotinus describes the nature of intelligible matter as “illuminated substance”: 
 
So those who say that matter is substance must be considered to be speaking 
correctly if they are speaking of matter in the intelligible world.  For that 
which underlies form There is substance, or rather, considered along with form 
imposed upon it, it makes a whole which is illuminated substance. (Ennead 
II.4.5, 19-24) 
 
This passage confirms that intelligible matter is “illuminated substance” consisting of 
substance with “form imposed upon it”.   Plotinus refers to illumination or light 
elsewhere as “formative power” (Ennead I. 6.3, 18-19) and logos, interpreted as “the 
rational forming principle” (Ennead II.4.5, 7-8).  For Plotinus the concept of logos is 
fundamental to his metaphysics as a principle of generation, process, order, and that 
which constitutes Being.  It is considered to have been a development of the Stoic 
logos,46 the logoi spermatikoi, situated within, and acting upon physical matter to 
produce things in the universe, although it is acknowledged that Plotinus rejects this 
view because for him the logoi in the physical world “include powers which are prior to 
the principles in the seeds” (Ennead IV.4.39, 6-18).  Interpretations of the logoi in 
Intellect have lacked precision; Pauliina Remes, for example, examines Plotinus’ 
concept in some depth and refers to them as “logical parts of forms… entities that 
explain the details and differences of any one entity that will be instantiated in the 
material realm” (Remes, 2007, p.8).47  While she accepts their ontological role as 
“entities”, she does not explain what they are.  Similarly, John Deck devoted a whole 
chapter to the subject without clarifying his description of logos as “the diversifying 
                                                            
46  See for example: Witt, 1931, pp.103-111; Armstrong, 2013, pp.107-108; See discussion in: 
     Rist, 1977, pp.84-102.   
 
47  For Remes’ analysis of Plotinus’ concept of logos or logoi see Remes, 2007, pp.66-91. 
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aspect of intellectuality” (Deck, 1991, p.80).48  Gerson has also examined the concept in 
some depth (Gerson, 2012); however, vagueness within Plotinian scholarship is perhaps 
due to the range of varying definitions of logos used in antiquity, and which are the 
product of lexographers trying to make sense of that range.  The Liddell–Scott Greek-
English Lexicon refers to the following categories of usage: computation, reckoning; 
relation, correspondence, proportion, ratio; explanation; inward debate of the soul; 
continuous statement, narrative (whether fact or fiction), oration, etc.; verbal expression 
or utterance (not a single word); a particular utterance, saying; thing spoken of, subject-
matter; expression, utterance, speech regarded formally; the Word or Wisdom of God, 
personified as his agent in creation and world-government.  The meaning of logos in 
Plotinus appears within the third category of explanation, as “the generative principle 
in organisms” and as “regulative and formative forces, derived from the intelligible and 
operative in the sensible universe” (Liddell & Scott, Online)   Sleeman and Pollet’s 
Lexicon Plotinianum includes various translations of the meaning of logos including: a) 
of the spoken thought or written word; b) of reason in general, rational thought, 
reasoning; c) of rational, creative, formative principles; of the concept, definition or 
meaning of a thing; d) reasoning in argument, discussion, etc. e) used of proportion, 
relation, counting, etc.” (Sleeman J. H. & Pollet G., 1980, pp.601-614).  
The lack of clarity about the ontological status of logos in the Enneads is 
therefore understandable; however, returning to the subject of intelligible matter, it was 
proposed that logos is form and its underlying substance.  Plotinus clearly states that in 
Intellect substance is number (Ennead V.1.5.6-9); in Ennead V.1.5, 13-14, that: “What 
is called number in the intelligible and the dyad are rational principles and Intellect”; 
and in Ennead V.4.2, 7-8, “from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the forms and 
                                                            
48  See Chapter 5, ‘Logos’. 
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numbers”.  Furthermore, in Ennead III.6.1,31 Plotinus refers to soul as “a number or 
whether it is a rational formative principle, as we say it is”.  It can therefore be 
ascertained that logos, and therefore intelligible matter, is form with number as its 
underlying substance, as noted by Atkinson who has endeavoured to clarify the issue of 
the difference between forms and numbers (Atkinson, 1983, pp.118-119).  Plotinus 
introduces the concept of substantial number in Ennead V and specifically addresses it 
in Ennead VI.6. 1, “On Numbers”; however, many commentators fail to acknowledge 
it. Slaveva-Griffin comments: 
 
If number has such a paramount ontogenic role in the intelligible, it seems 
strange that it does not figure more prominently in all scholarly presentations 
of Plotinus’ architecture of the universe. 
 
She adds: “it is often buried in footnotes or hidden in the context between the lines” and 
suggests the subject has simply been “overlooked”, and significantly, that “Plotinus’ 
conception of number is the fundamental framework on which his entire philosophical 
system is built” (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.3 and p.11).  Her important contribution, 
Plotinus on Number, together with a less comprehensive account from Dimitri Nikulin49 
is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the different aspects of number 
described by Plotinus; however, several issues remain unresolved.   
For Plotinus, the One represents absolute unity, without form and must not be 
considered as substance because “a substance must be some one particular thing, 
something, that is defined and limited” (Ennead V.5.6, 5-7).  Since each being/number 
of Intellect is an individual intellect, it is also considered as a one-many unity.  In 
Ennead V.1.5, 15-17 Plotinus states: 
 
                                                            
49  Nikulin, 2002.   
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…each and every number [εἴδος] that comes from [the indefinite dyad] and the 
One is a form, as if Intellect is shaped by the numbers [εἴδεσιν] which came to 
exist in it. 
 
It is important to note that Plotinus uses the words “εἴδος” and “εἴδεσιν” which 
Armstrong translates as number and numbers respectively, hence he appears to conflate 
forms with numbers, whereas in Makenna’s translation we have “Form-Idea” and 
“Ideas”, which is even more ambiguous.  As noted above, the subject is examined by 
Atkinson, who makes the point that Plotinus divides the shape of the forms into a formal 
and material principle (Atkinson, 1983, pp. 118-119).    
Furthermore, while each individual intellect shares the form and numbers of 
Intellect, they differ in their participation of it (Ennead V.5.5, 13); therefore if, as was 
suggested, the forms are fractals of Intellect, they are defined in terms of unequal 
numbers.  
In VI.6.2-3, Plotinus discusses the number of infinity and its link with the 
unlimited and limited.  He argues number cannot be infinite from a mathematical or 
ontological perspective; since the objects of sense are not infinite, the substantial 
number applying to them cannot be infinite either, because in the intelligible number is 
limited to as many as the real Beings (Ennead VI.6.3, 2-3).  He continues, even if we 
count with abstract numbers, we still finish with a finite number; therefore, the 
unlimited is always limited.  Plotinus urges us away from thinking of infinity as in a 
place because “…infinity … runs away from the idea of limit, … but when it is caught 
place comes into existence” (Ennead VI.6.3, 14-19), and Slaveva-Griffin notes that this 
is “place in the sense of ontological instantiation” (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.66).   As 
previously explained (p.72), this can be understood the intellectual substantial “place” 
of internal difference that is analogous to a node in the model of harmonics.  
Furthermore, in VI.6.17 Plotinus examines the subject of number in terms of its limited 
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and unlimited nature.  When we speak of unlimited number, it is like the idea of a 
limited line, we can always think of a longer one; numbers can also be multiplied in 
thought.  But nothing is unlimited in Intellect because the idea of something unlimited 
negates its real existence.  Unlimitedness, even an unlimited line, may exist in Intellect 
in a form that is not the same as something that has an unreachable end.  He claims that 
unlimitedness is after number; it proceeds from one point over a distance that cannot be 
quantitatively measured.  It is proposed that nothing is unlimited in Intellect because 
each form is limited by its node or substantial number; however once formed, it 
becomes unlimited in its infinite and therefore unmeasurable generation.  Plotinus 
suggests that forms exist as “unfigured figures”, which Slaveva Griffin describes as the 
“antecedents of figures” such a “point, line, plane or solid” because they lack quantity, 
quality and spatial extension (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.120).  This is consistent with the 
interpretation that Plotinus is thinking of the forms as vibrations. 
The ontological status of Plotinus’ logos in Intellect makes more sense when it is 
considered with his model of procession and reversion.  In this model, logos as 
substantial number and form emulates the Pythagorean tradition of musical harmonics 
in which an interval, the difference in pitch or ‘power’ between two notes, is understood 
as a ratio or logos, not as monadic numbers we use to count or measure sensible things, 
or points on a line that can be measured as linear distances.  In Ennead VI .6, ‘On 
Numbers’, Plotinus establishes substantial numbers, or “numbered numbers”, measure 
other things, but are not measured themselves (Ennead VI.6.15), and they represent 
unities in Intellect while acting as archetypes of monadic number that numbers things in 
the sensible world.  As Slaveva-Griffin points out, “number does not count substance” 
in Intellect (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.78); substantial number has a purely ontological 
and generative role.  
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In VI.6.16 Plotinus argues that the substantial number within us is actualised by 
outward appearances, thus generating the real existence of quantity, and he clarifies 
what he means by the “substantial number within us”: 
 
It is the number of our substance; for Plato says, since it participates in number 
and melody it is again number and melody; for, one says, it is not body or 
magnitude; the soul therefore is a number, if it is a substance.  The number of 
body is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the number of soul is 
substances in the way souls are.  (Ennead VI.6.16, 40-45) 
 
In this passage Plotinus refers specifically to the link between substance, number and 
melody, which can only mean the ratios that form the basis of musical melody.  This is 
supported by Armstrong, who in a footnote to his translation of this passage refers to 
Plato, Timaeus 36e6-37a1, and comments: 
  
In considering Pythagorean and Platonic thought about numbers it is most 
important always to remember that, from Pythagoras onwards, the numbers are 
musical numbers, the numbers of melody and rhythm. (Armstrong, Plotinus 
Ennead VI.6-9, fn.1, p.64) 
 
Gerson acknowledges that ratios are important in Plotinus’ account of logos because he 
is following Plato, and in referring to the difference between substantial number and 
monadic number he states: 
  
…we may suppose that the numbers that Aristotle says Plato identified with 
Forms are not integers but rather ideal ratios, or, more exactly, constitutive 
formulae of ratios of the elements that go to make up all the things in the 
world.  To know a Form is then to see not an infinite array of ratios or even an 
infinite array of ratios of ratios, but to see discrete ideal ratios of ratios. 
(Gerson, 2012, p.21) 
 
And in a footnote to this passage he refers to: 
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Timaeus 53B5 where the Demiurge is said to have implanted intelligibility in 
the preexistence chaos of pseudo-elements by giving it "shapes and numbers." 
The "shapes" are the continuous quantities of the five regular solids and the 
"numbers" are the discrete quantities that are ratios or formulae for creating 
the actual elements and the things made out of these. (Gerson, 2012, p.21)  
  
So, while Gerson is correct in his assertion about ratios, he links it with geometry, thus 
failing to make the connection that for Plotinus harmonic ratios are linked to forms or 
vibrations that have the power to give organised existence to the material world.   
I propose that much of the difficulty experienced by commentators on Plotinus’ 
account of Intellect and the ontological status of logos arises from a general reluctance 
to analyse the role of number in the Enneads.  It has been argued that whenever Plotinus 
refers to intelligible matter, logos, or substance he means substantial number that must 
be considered as a harmonic ratio, and form considered as a vibration.  Two questions 
remain unanswered: How does number relate to the primary kinds: being, motion, rest, 
otherness and sameness? What is the role of number in the generation of the Beings in 
Intellect?  The answers proposed in the following section support the argument for a 
strong Pythagorean influence on Plotinus.  
   
 
 
3.5      The Generation and Nature of Being as Substantial Number 
 
 
 
The question of how number relates to the primary kinds: being, motion, rest, otherness 
and sameness, and its role in the generation of the Beings in Intellect, has not been 
adequately explained in the secondary literature.  Plotinus’ reference to number and 
melody, plus other music, sound, rhythm and dancing metaphors dotted throughout the 
Enneads, has led Slaveva-Griffin to concur with Gerson that: 
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there is a deeper ontological meaning in these metaphors.  … there is a certain 
literalness to them that conceptually reveals the inherent ontological roles of 
substantial number in the structure of the intelligible. (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, 
p.119).   
 
While she acknowledges the link to the primary kinds she does not explain how they are 
linked or their relevance to the generation of multiplicity.  Nikulin also comments that 
Plotinus does not directly answer the question of how substantial number generates 
multiplicity as a unity.  He suggests Plotinus “…gives a number of indirect indications 
and provides a henological and ontological system within which the problem of the 
constitution of number can be solved” (Nikulin, 2002, p.76); however, Slaveva-Griffin 
points to difficulties with the interpretation because Plotinus uses the concepts of 
monads and henads inconsistently (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, pp.92-93).  It will be argued 
that if Plotinus is founding his philosophy on substantial number that emulates 
harmonic ratios, we must look to the Pythagoreans for clarification. 
In Chapter 2, it was explained that for the Pythagoreans number is intimately 
linked to the tetractys that contains the three concordant and primary intervals of the 
octave, fourth and fifth, regarded as the elements out of which any musical scale or 
composition is built and the order governing the generation of the universe.50  The 
Pythagoreans considered the tetractys to be the sacred figure by which they are said to 
swear: 
By him who gave to our soul the tetractys, 
The source and root of everflowing nature. 
(Sextus Empiricus, Against Professors, VII, 94-5, in Kahn 2001, p.31.)51 
 
                                                            
50  Chapter 2.1.4, pp.37-38. 
 
51  See also: Burkert, 1972, pp.54-56. 
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It cannot be mere co-incidence that Plotinus refers to substantial number as the 
“foundation” and “source, root and principle” of Beings (Ennead VI.6.9, 38-39, my 
emphasis).  The influence of the Pythagorean tetractys on Plotinus has been noted by 
Alexandrakis, who comments: 
 
Both Pythagorean and Plotinian thought are directed towards an ordered 
rational system: the Tetractys and the One. (Alexandrakis, 2002, p.153) 
 
While Alexandrakis rightly makes the link, he does not explain how Plotinus 
incorporates it into his metaphysics.  Nikulin makes no connection with the tetractys but 
questions whether Plotinus limits the total number of substantial numbers to ten and 
adds a footnote to inform us that “Plato… limits the number of the ideal numbers to ten 
only”.  Since Plato’s ‘true numbers’ are Plotinus’ main reference, limiting them to ten 
as ‘primaries’ would be fully in accordance with Plato under the influence of 
Pythagorean number theory.  Nikulin also comments that Plotinus mentions the decad 
in Ennead VI.6 forty-five times and suspects the decad is important and in some way 
linked to substantial number; however, he notes that Plotinus is not explicit; Plotinus 
“… gives no indication of whether the number of numbers is limited by a particular 
number”.  Nikulin concludes that according to his interpretation substantial number 
must be limited but is unable to explain why (Nikulin, 2002, pp.88, fn.103).  Nikulin’s 
suspicion is confirmed by Plotinus who says: “the generation of number is already 
limited and stands fast” (Ennead VI.6.2, 8-9).  It is however contended that a solution 
can be found within key points arising in VI.6, “On Numbers” and Ennead VI.2, ‘On 
the Kinds of Being II’. 
In VI.6.8, Plotinus claims that since Intellect comes after Being, substance was 
already one and many in Being; Being as one and Intellect as two existed before the 
Complete Living Being that encompasses all Beings, so number cannot be dependent on 
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it.  Substantial numbers are the “number in Being and with Being and before the 
beings” (Ennead VI.6.9, 37-38); therefore, they must be linked to the primary kinds.  In 
VI.6.9, Plotinus asks:  Did substance and movement, rest, same and other produce 
number or did number generate them?  Does number exist before Being itself?  He aims 
to prove that one is before number, and that number is generated from Being, its source.  
Plotinus then sums up the nature of substantial number in the realm of the intelligible in 
an important passage: 
 
But, if numbers were before beings, they were not beings.  Now number was in 
being, not as the number of being – for being was still one – but the power of 
number which had come to exist divided being and made it… in labour to give 
birth to multiplicity.  For number will be either the substance or the actual 
activity of being, and the absolute living being is number, and intellect is 
number.  Is not being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded, 
and Intellect number moving in itself, and the Living Being inclusive number?  
Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, 
Being must also in this way be number: this is why they called the Forms 
henads and numbers.  And this is substantial number; but the other, which is 
called monadic, is its image.  But substantial number is that contemplated in 
the Forms and sharing in their generation, and, primarily, the number in Being 
and with Being and before the beings.  The beings have their foundation in it, 
and their source and root and principle. (Ennead VI.6.9, 24-39) 
 
For Plotinus there is a subtle difference in the substantial nature of Being and the 
substantial numbers and forms (logoi) in Intellect because ‘being’ is a ‘principle’ of 
substance, the ‘law’ by which substantial numbers and forms (logoi) are generated in 
Intellect through procession and reversion.  Being is therefore ontologically prior.  It 
can be deduced that number existed as substance potentially in inchoate Intellect and 
actually as a “power” of Being, thus emulating the Pythagorean conception of number 
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as dynamis as discussed in Chapter 2.52  Slaveva-Griffin notes that Plotinus placed 
substantial numbers “among the Platonic primary kinds: (being, rest, motion, same, and 
other)” (Slaveva-Griffin, 2009, p.85), which makes sense because everything else 
comes from them (Ennead V.1.4, 42- 44).  Significantly, as Plotinus does not include 
Intellect as one of the primary kinds (Ennead VI.2.18, 12-14), like the One, it cannot be 
a substantial number, so our focus must be solely on being, motion, rest, otherness and 
sameness.  Plotinus begins Ennead VI.2.2 by arguing that the primary kinds are 
“principles of substance” and “a composition”.  In Ennead VI.2.3, he refers to “several 
genera” and suggests that this is not accidental.  While he does not specifically explain 
why this is so, he makes the following points: The One must not be numbered with the 
primary kinds because he is considering the genera as Being, not what is beyond being.   
As Plotinus refers to substantial numbers as “numbered numbers” we can deduce that 
each of the primary kinds is numbered as they are thought, for example movement is 1, 
otherness 2, rest 3 and sameness 4.  Being itself is not numbered because for Plotinus, 
Being is always a unified one.  Then he suggests that “If we grasp how many genera 
there are it will tell us how they are.”  In Ennead VI.2.7-8, Plotinus presents the 
argument that motion, rest, otherness and sameness must be considered an undivided 
unity within Being.53  Each primary kind is an individual, a one, and therefore different 
from the others, but all of them share the same nature.  Each is a unity of all the others, 
for example, motion is a unity of being, rest, otherness and sameness, rest is a unity of 
being, motion, otherness and sameness, and similarly for otherness and sameness.  For 
Plotinus, it is Being that brings them into identity.  If you take movement and Being, 
                                                            
52  Chapter 2.4, pp. 54-56. 
   
53  See also Ennead V.1. 4, 33-41where Plotinus refers to them as all being simultaneous and 
having a common unity. 
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the two are one nature; movement appears in Being and being in movement, each taken 
separately has the other; however, rest also appears in being because it exists “in the 
same state and in the same way” (Ennead VI.2.7).54   
In VI.2.13, Plotinus states that number cannot be a primary kind itself because 
number exists within the primary kinds (Ennead VI.2.13, 7-9).  He claims that having 
posited ‘three’ primary kinds we recognise difference in being; furthermore, we can add 
another ‘two’, sameness and otherness, making a total of five.  In Ennead VI.2.17, 24-
25, Plotinus specifically, and almost deliberately, states that he has “counted up” the 
primaries using monadic numbers; however, he makes it clear that substantial numbers 
do not come together by counting because he is not thinking of each primary kind as 
one unit.  It is therefore suggested that the Plotinian decad is created by adding the 
numbers as they are numbered, 1+2+3+4 = 10, that is, Intellect numbers the primary 
kinds as it thinks or separates them into distinct units that are in fact already unities 
(Rist, 1963, p. 227).  While the number in Being totals ten, Being is always considered 
to be one; however, while Plotinus does not give each individual kind a specific 
number, each of the others could be numbered one to four as unities within Being which 
Plotinus refers to as “unified number”. 
In VI.6.14, 28, Plotinus asks: What is the proper cause of number? A thing is “one 
by the presence of one and two by the presence of the dyad”, and the rest in the same 
way.  Furthermore, in VI.6.16, 48-49 Plotinus refers to “the triad in real being” as “a 
principle of substance”.  He continues VI.6.14 as follows: 
 
But we must affirm that the decad is observed in one way in things that are 
discrete and in another in things that are continuous, and in other ways in the 
many unified powers of this particular number; and that we have already 
                                                            
54  Plotinus quotes Plato’s Sophist 248A12. 
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ascended among the intelligibles; and that there are true numbers, no longer 
observed in other things but existing themselves on their own, the absolute 
decad, not the decad of some intelligibles. (Ennead VI.6.14, 44-50) 
  
The dyad, triad and “absolute decad” must have a place in Being, notably for its “many 
unified powers”.  While Plotinus does not explicitly refer to the link between the decad 
and Being as “unified number” or “true numbers”, it appears to be implied here, and it is 
helpful to return to the quotation from Stobaeus which refers to the Pythagorean 
Decad:55 
  
The power, efficacy and essence of number is seen in the Decad; it is great, it 
realises all its purposes, and it is the cause of all effects.  The power of the 
Decad is the principle and guide of all life, divine, celestial, or human into 
which it is insinuated; without it everything is unlimited, obscure, and furtive. 
(Stobaeus, Eclogae, 1.3.8, (DK 11), in Guthrie, 1988, p.171) 
 
It is therefore suggested that Plotinus’ “absolute decad” reiterates its historical 
significance and is intimately related to Plato’s true numbers and the Pythagorean 
tetractys that contains the harmonic ratios which underlie the mathematical harmony of 
the musical scale, the octave (1:2), the fifth (2:3) and the fourth (3:4), as well as the first 
ten numbers that form the basis of all the numbers.  Since Being similarly contains 
within itself the law by which the Beings are generated, it suggests that Plotinus limits 
the number of substantial numbers to four, but their nature in Being expressed 
graphically as per the tetractys is such that they form the basis of the decad, hence the 
ability to count in monadic numbers.  Furthermore, in section 3.2, (p. 71), a passage was 
quoted from Ennead V.5, 5 where Plotinus refers to Being as “the hearth of all 
things”,56 a concept Philolaus used in his cosmogony to represent the Monad as the 
                                                            
55  Originally quoted in Chapter 2, p.38. 
56  Plotinus refers to the “hearth” again in Ennead VI.2.8,8.   
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generating source of the universe, and like the Pythagorean tetractys, in this passage 
Plotinus also links it to sound.   
While this provides a solution to Nikulin’s questions about whether the number of 
substantial numbers is limited by a particular number, and why the decad is linked to 
substantial number, it is helpful to clarify how the four unities in Being form a decad.  If 
we return to the Pythagorean tetractys (Figure 1) in Chapter 257 and take it to represent 
the unity of Being by inputting Plotinus’s primary kinds, many different permutations of 
unities can be formed because they are all of one nature and none of the primary kinds 
is allocated an individual number.  In VI.2.11, 45-48, Plotinus states: 
 
… in being nothing prevents some things from being prior and others 
posterior, and some simple and some composite. 
 
The position of any one primary kind within the structure of the tetractys is completely 
irrelevant because the ratios and decad hold fast within it.  Figure 13 illustrates the 
primary kinds as unities, and in Figure 14 they are represented by ‘●’. 
 
 
Unities within the Plotinian Decad (Figure 13) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
57  Chapter 2.1.4, p.38. 
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The Plotinian Decad/Tetractys (Figure 14) 
 
 
 
 
Intellect of course thinks in terms of the whole numbers one two, three and four, just as 
Plotinus did, and these numbers relate to unities that act as a substantial base for the 
forms.  Considered in terms of whole numbers they demonstrate the generation of 
Beings in terms of the number of Beings in Intellect, and when considered as ratios they 
measure the interval or distance between them that determines the shape of, and quality 
within the forms.   
It is proposed that for Plotinus, numbers are actualities, with the power to 
generate vibratory motion through which Intellect divides itself into partials or forms 
because numbers represent nodes or a stable base for the forms.  Significantly, this 
reveals that number-figuration has an ontogenic function for Plotinus.  Substantial 
numbers break up the power of the One which when interpreted within the harmonics 
model produces forms or Beings that have their own character, just as the vibratory 
motion of sound produces tones that convey meaning in terms of the character of sound; 
not as notes that are considered to have a purely spatial dimension as when placed on a 
musical score.  Plotinus transfers the physical nature of ‘tone’ into a metaphysical 
principle describing the essential characteristics, i.e., quality, quantity, shape, etc., that 
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each form contains rolled up within it and that can be expressed as a composite in 
physical matter.  He states, Intellect: 
  
… has each and every reason why of the things in it; but it is itself individually 
all the things in it . . . all the things each individual has are each individual 
reason why . . . the reason why is contained in its existence. (Ennead VI.7.2, 
25-49) 
 
This means each material thing has a vibration of what it is, and each particular 
vibration is an activity of substantial number, otherwise referred to as logos or rational 
forming principle.  This rolled up nature of the individual form reflects the fractal 
nature of Intellect, because each individual intellect is a proportional representation of 
Intellect divided according to the same law of harmonics but diminished in numerical 
value because it commences on a lower scale. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The harmonics model together with the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus explains 
several difficulties perceived by Plotinian scholars. It was argued that the mechanism of 
procession and reversion is harmonic motion that generates Intellect and its content as 
an integrated compound series consisting of a fundamental and its self-generated 
harmonics.  While it was noted that it could quite reasonably be rejected on the basis 
that the physics of standing waves was not understood in Plotinus’ day, it was suggested 
that the argument cannot be dismissed.  Vitruvius had already regarded sound as a 
mechanical wave similar to waves in water that when obstructed flow back and break 
up the subsequent waves.  It is conceivable that it was understood by Plotinus due to his 
knowledge of mechanics and the fact that Nichomachus had already linked harmonics 
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to vibrations.  Plotinus’ reference to intelligible matter in Intellect as logos fits into the 
harmonics model if it is understood as substantial number which must be considered as 
a harmonic ratio, and form considered as a vibration.  Furthermore, it was argued that 
number relates to the primary kinds: being, motion, rest, otherness and sameness since 
they are unities or powers in Being.  Not only does Plotinus replicate the Pythagorean 
theory of opposites with his primary kinds, the nature of Being can be understood as the 
decad that he believed the Pythagoreans represented graphically as the tetractys. 
Plotinus is not explicit about the harmonics model in the text; however, there is 
no doubt that it is compatible with his account. Nothing has been found in the text that 
seriously challenges the argument.  It is significant that it potentially overcomes so 
many ambiguities noted by commentators, and if this is the case, it is a remarkable 
development of Pythagorean philosophy that was founded on the science of harmonics.  
The following Chapter will examine how this new interpretation provides greater 
clarity about his account of the generation of the Hypostasis Soul and matter and 
provides further support to the arguments presented here. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Plotinus - The Generation of Soul and Origin of Matter 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This Chapter argues that the model of harmonics provides a solution to ambiguity in 
Plotinus’ account of Soul and Matter, the text of which has caused debate amongst 
scholars.  With the aid of illustrations, it explains the nature of the Hypostasis Soul, its 
role in the generation of the World Soul and Soul of individual souls, and their 
relationship with Intellect.  Then it examines the role of ‘providence’ in the making of 
the universe by the World Soul, and subsequently explains the application of the 
Pythagorean concepts of harmonia and sympathia, and how sympathia provides the 
ontological basis of synesis, an a priori intuition that functions in the integration of 
body and Soul.  It will be argued that Plotinus’ account of Soul only makes sense from 
the perspective of the harmonics model proposed in Chapter 3, and that disagreement 
amongst scholars concerning the role of music and musical metaphors in the Enneads 
arises because they have failed to understand how harmonics are generated in Intellect.  
Furthermore, it will also claim that the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus’ theory of 
Soul has been misunderstood and underestimated.  Finally, disagreements about the 
nature and origin of matter are discussed and a solution is proposed that conforms to 
the harmonics model.  As in Chapter 3, the influence of Plato’s cosmology in the 
Timaeus which is based on the harmonic series (35b-c) is presumed.  The comparison 
will be made directly with the Pythagorean tradition discussed in Chapter 2.  
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4.1   The Levels of Soul and their Relationship with Intellect 
 
 
 
According to Plotinus’ theory of procession from the One, Intellect generates the 
Hypostasis Soul that generates the World Soul and the Soul of individual souls; 
however, commentators have noticed ambiguity concerning the various levels of Soul. 
Majumdar, for example, references Blumenthal and remarks that Plotinus: 
 
…appears to use the World Soul and the Hypostasis Soul interchangeably, 
leaving no intermediary between Intellect and the World Soul …thus in II.3 17-
18, the World Soul seems to be contiguous to Intellect in the ontological order. 
(Majumdar, 2007, p.47) 
 
She proposes that the Hypostasis Soul is a rational form (Majumdar, 2007, p.46); 
however, it is suggested that the mechanism of harmonic motion helps to clarify the 
various levels.  Chapter 3 explained how in the physics of harmonics the displacement 
of the string caused by the reflection of energy between two nodes effectively divides 
the string in half creating two standing waves and an additional node, and this 
corresponds to the generation of Soul as the third stationary node and two additional 
forms by the second instance of procession and reversion.58  Plotinus states: 
 
The soul which abides is a single expression of Intellect, and from it spring 
partial expressions which are also immaterial, just as in the world of intellect. 
(Ennead IV.3.5, 17-19) 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the Hypostasis Soul is the “soul that abides”, because as 
the third stationary node it generates the forms of the World Soul and the Soul of 
individual souls (Figure 15), but it is not a form itself, thus challenging the view 
expressed by Majumdar. 
                                                            
58  Chapter 3.3, p.77. 
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Generation of World Soul and Soul of Individual Souls (Figure 15) 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Plotinus states that the Hypostasis Soul itself is a number (Ennead 
VI.6.16, 45), and while Plotinus considers substantial number to be prior to the forms 
as holding ‘places’ for the forms, Soul comes in “third place” after the One, Being and 
Intellect (Ennead V.1.10, 4-5).  Number is generated as ‘place’ or rest when “infinity is 
caught” (Ennead VI.6.3, 16).  The Hypostasis Soul represents the first substantial 
number that must be two since Being is one; however, Plotinus also tells us that the two 
and the half are generated simultaneously: 
 
The double and the half come into existence together, they are two and one 
respectively – also the double has the name and reality of the double and the 
one the name and reality of the half.  (Ennead VI.1.7, 32-33) 
 
We can therefore consider the Hypostasis Soul as two in Intellect and as half in its 
function of dividing Intellect, which could be represented by the ratio 1:2 which is the 
second harmonic.  Ratio makes sense because it refers to intervals, and for Plotinus 
unity was measured in terms of ontological difference, or distance from the One 
(Ennead IV.3.11, 23-24).  In musical terms the ratio 1:2 represents an interval that is the 
same tone an octave lower than the fundamental, hence Plotinus’ assertion that Soul is 
an inferior image, imitation, or “ghost” of Intellect (Ennead V.1.6, 47).  For Plotinus the 
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natural order of generation is one in which the number of Beings (nodes and forms) 
increase while there is a reciprocal diminishment of value in the progeny, and whereas 
we normally think of an ascending musical scale, do-rei-mi etc., Plotinus, following the 
Pythagoreans and Plato adopts a descending scale, from the higher octave to the lower 
that was normal in ancient Greece (Barker, 2007, p.13). 
The partial expressions of the Hypostasis Soul are initially two souls; the World 
Soul, which is responsible for regulating natural organic processes and for generating 
souls that will be expressed in nature as forms of bodies, including human bodies, and 
the Soul that generates individual souls; however, Plotinus tells us that the World Soul is 
the elder of the two because it was generated first (Ennead IV.4.36, 25-26).  This can be 
explained by following the arrows indicating the movement of procession and reversion 
in Figure 15 which shows that Soul is generated after the World Soul. 
Both of these primary Soul forms generate their offspring as partial expressions of 
themselves (Ennead V.7.3, 23-24) according to the rule of decreasing proportion, but 
one in which the earlier expressions remain intact in the latter.  Plotinus states: 
 
In Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of these principles [numbers] 
which come out ready for use in Soul. (Ennead V.7.3, 24-25)59  
 
The model of harmonic generation means that each Soul becomes a fundamental in its 
own right, generating its own harmonics within itself whilst remaining within Intellect 
(Figure 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
59  Brackets mine, to clarify that the nature of the principles is substantial number. 
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Harmonic Generation of Soul and World Soul (Figure 16) 
 
 
 
It is suggested that if Plotinus is basing the generation of Beings on the harmonics 
model, we must consider the Hypostasis Soul and its progeny to be included in the 
generation of Beings in Intellect, that is, at its highest possible level.  Plotinus refers to 
Soul as the “matter” of Intellect (Ennead V.9.4, 11-12), which can only be intelligible 
matter that was established in Chapter 3 to be substance or number that serves as a base 
for the forms of individual intellects, which are also Beings as souls of everything in 
the universe.  In a short treatise, Ennead III.9 ‘Various Considerations’, Plotinus refers 
to Plato as presenting a “planning” principle proceeding from Intellect that makes the 
universe as a result of seeing or thinking Intellect.  Plotinus refers to this principle as 
Soul.  While Intellect sees Being as many, that is moving in itself or thinking in whole 
numbers, it is the Hypostasis Soul as an activity of Intellect that divides Intellect into 
forms by acting as a node; the World Soul divides Intellect by expressing the forms 
individually: 
 
what is the third, which “planned” itself to construct and make and divide into 
parts the things seen by Intellect in the living creature?  Now it is possible that 
in one way it may be Intellect that divides, but in another way the divider may 
not be Intellect; for in so far as the things divided into parts come from it, it is 
itself the divider, but in so far as it remains undivided itself, and it is the things 
105 
 
which come from it which are divided – and these are souls - it is Soul which 
makes the division into many souls. (Ennead III.9.1, 26-41) 
 
It is also important to note that Plotinus distinguishes between an activity belonging to 
substance and one that goes out from substance but differs from it (Ennead V.4.2, 28-
32).  So, while the Soul of individual souls and the World Soul are in Intellect as 
intellects at their highest level and are therefore an activity belonging to Intellect, they 
are also different from Intellect when considered as Intellect’s external activity.  The 
difference lies in their thinking and function.  For Plotinus, “intellect is all things 
together and also not together, because each is a special power” (Ennead V.9.6, 8-9); 
the function of the higher Souls is to express these powers discursively.  Similarly, 
Plotinus states we possess the forms in two ways, “in our soul, in a manner of speaking 
unfolded and separated, in Intellect all together” (Ennead I.1. 8, 6-8).  If we think of 
Intellect as a fundamental tone, the individual harmonics are all sounded together; 
however, in souls that think discursively, the harmonics are expressed individually one 
after another, that is, in temporal succession as in a musical scale or melody: 
 
It is like a long life stretched out at length; each part is different from that which 
comes next in order, but the whole is continuous with itself, but with one part 
differentiated from another, and the earlier does not perish in the later. (Ennead 
V.2.2, 27-30) 
 
Hence for Plotinus, Soul is not in time; this temporal succession is the life of the Soul. 
Having explained that the harmonics model clarifies the generation and status of 
the Hypostasis Soul and the primary Soul forms, it becomes necessary to account for its 
presence in Plotinus’ description of the characteristics of the dual Souls, and since it is 
the elder of the two I begin with the World Soul.   
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4.2   The World Soul, Providence and the Making of the Universe 
 
 
 
In the examination of the World Soul, Providence and the making of the universe it will 
be explained how Plotinus assimilates key Pythagorean concepts into his cosmology. 
According to Plotinus the World Soul was generated first and its function is to produce 
and maintain the universe according to the rational principles it receives from Intellect, 
that is, according to providence.  The bodies generated by the World Soul are souls 
themselves because they have a “trace of the World Soul” (Ennead II.3.9, 23).  In 
Ennead II.2.1, 38-39, Plotinus states that “Nature is just what has been ordained by 
universal soul”.  It does not make by “deliberate choice” (Ennead IV.4.36, 26) or 
reasoning, but by necessity according to a law of decreasing proportion such as we see 
in harmonic generation:  
  
And since the Soul acts as a genus or specific form, the other souls act as 
specific forms.  And the activities of these are double; that which is directed 
above is intellect, and that which is directed below is the other powers in 
proportion and order. (Ennead V1.2.22, 28-31)60 
 
Nature, the lowest aspect of the World Soul, organises the universe so that each part 
grows and evolves, having a function according to its logos while being related to and 
contributing advantageously to the whole because it provides the world with a formal 
structure and the individual soul with a body with which it perceives and lives in the 
world.  Nature has a soul that is a trace of its maker and is therefore correspondingly 
weak; however, its presence to matter as a diminished logos makes living bodies as it 
unfolds the logos it contains.  As such, it does not contemplate or return to Intellect, but 
like Intellect it contemplates itself, not generating new rational forming principles but 
                                                            
60  See also Ennead II.3.13, 4-5 and Ennead III.3.3, 20-30. 
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unfolding the diminished principles it contains within itself.61  Each body therefore is a 
logos, which as explained in Chapter 3,62 must be understood as substantial number and 
form: 
 
Even in seeds it is not the moisture which is honourable, but what is unseen: 
and this is number and rational principle. (Ennead V.1.5, 12-15) 
 
The matter to which it is present reflects the forms in the same way a body of a stringed 
musical instrument makes the vibrations of the string perceptible; however we must not 
think of nature as producing spatial objects or images because Plotinus specifically 
denies nature the power of imagination (Ennead IV.4.13, 7-9 and 11-15); imagination is 
a faculty involved in perception and is a power of the individual soul that descends to its 
body.63  At the level of nature, before human or animal perception the Plotinian 
universe is, like Bergson’s durational universe, a field of vibrating energy.  Plotinus 
refers to nature as the vegetative soul, which is responsible for the growth and nutrition 
and reproduction of living beings (Ennead IV.3.23, 36-43; IV.9.3, 11-29), as well as 
seeking the remedy for any pain or distress suffered by the body (Ennead IV.4.20, 22-
36).  It therefore has the power to transform itself within the bodies it makes, and this 
transformational power reflects the Pythagorean concept of nature, ordered by number, 
and which they considered to be a power that is “perpetually realised by a transition to a 
different status of itself” (Viltanioti, 2012, p.26).64 
                                                            
61  See: Deck, 1991, p.87-90. 
62  Chapter 3.4, pp.82-89. 
63  Imagination as a faculty or power, and its function within perception and memory of the 
individual soul, will be examined in Chapter 8. 
  
64  Chapter 2.1.1, p.34. 
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It is the function of the World Soul to make and maintain the universe in balance 
or harmony.  In Enneads III.2 and III.3, ‘On Providence (1)’ and ‘On Providence (2)’ 
respectively, Plotinus refers to both the making of the universe and the interaction of 
the parts in musical terms.  He uses the word ἁρμονία, which as noted in Chapter 2,65 
refers to the Pythagorean concept of harmonia, the concordant intervals of a musical 
scale which are ‘fitted together’ or interlocked according to proportions of an unequal 
ratio.  While Armstrong translates ἁρμονία as melody, it is likely Plotinus intended it as 
it was used in Pythagorean harmonics, that is, the fitting together of opposites, though 
‘melody’ would be appropriate for temporal making.   
On composing the universe, the World Soul places individual bodies into places 
according to their “worth”, worth here meaning their logos, each of which has a unique 
character and is placed so it is “in tune with the rational principle of the universe” 
(Ennead III.2.17, 59-61) or according to the “the law of correspondence” (Ennead 
III.3.5, 4), although the term ‘attunement’ is more appropriate given the musical 
significance.  Plotinus states, the individual contributes to the harmony of the universe 
by “contributing his own sound” and proposes even in a panpipe the stronger and 
weaker notes contribute to its harmony, which is complete and made up of all of them.  
“So too the universal rational principle is one, but it is divided into parts which are not 
equal” (Ennead III.2.17, 71-77).  The inequality of the parts is necessary because 
Providence ensures war and strife, as well as friendship in the universe, due the 
separation of parts: 
  
From that true universe which is one this universe comes into existence, which 
is not truly one for it is many and divided into a multiplicity, and one part 
stands away from another and is alien to it, and there is not only friendship but 
                                                            
65  Chapter 2.1.3, p.37. 
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also enmity because of the separation, and in their deficiency one part is of 
necessity at war with another. (Ennead III.2.2, 1-8) 
 
The parts are in conflict in many places, but the All is in accordance with its 
rational formative pattern, and it is necessary that this one formative pattern 
should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposition of this kind 
which gives it its structure, and, we might say its existence. (Ennead III.2.16, 
48-52) 
 
Plotinus therefore follows the Pythagoreans in maintaining that conflict between 
opposites occurs, just as high and low notes are built into the laws of harmonics.  He 
seems to consider conflicting sounds in terms of high and low, not harmonic and 
disharmonic, a view also shared by Alexandrakis, who comments: “What Plotinus has 
in mind here is the Pythagorean combination of higher and lower sounds into an 
harmonia” (Alexandrakis, 2002, p.153).  The conflicting sounds exist as a unity within 
the fundamental, and which come together as musical ratios, hence ἁρμονία: 
 
…but in the universe the battle of conflicting elements springs from a single 
rational principle; so that it would be better for one to compare it to the melody 
[ἁρμονία] which results from conflicting sounds, and one will then enquire 
why there are conflicting sounds in the rational proportions {of musical 
scales}.  If, then, in music the laws of rational proportion make high and low 
notes and come together in a unity – being the proportional laws of melody 
[ἁρμονία] they come together into the melody [ἁρμονία] itself, which is 
another greater law of proportion, while they are lesser ones and part of it; in 
the universe too we see the opposites. (Ennead III.2.16, 39-46) 
 
This passage supports the harmonic model theory because it demonstrates that Plotinus 
recognised two different laws of proportion.  The first appears to be the purely 
mathematical physical law of acoustics, in which the fundamental generates harmonics 
as whole numbers by dividing itself as in Intellect, and the second, which Plotinus 
considers to be the “greater law”, is the musical law that determines the “lesser ones”, 
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the ratios of the musical scale and which are also contained within unified Being, his 
version of the Pythagorean tetractys.  As was suggested in Chapter 3, Plotinus’ 
‘tetractys’ is constituted from the four primary kinds that are numbered and unified in 
Being as substantial numbers as musical ratios, and which when totalled (1+2+3+4) 
form the basis of the decad.  The Pythagorean tetractys represented the order by which 
the cosmos is generated and similarly, Plotinus refers to Being as containing within 
itself the law by which the Beings are generated.66  Plotinus is eager to ensure that we 
do not mistake the generation of body in the sense of the World Soul “tuning” the body 
or being in tune with it.  He states: “For though the Pythagoreans meant this term, 
tuning in another sense”, (that is in the sense that he also proposes), “people thought it 
was something like the tuning of strings” (Ennead IV.7.84,3-5).  For Plotinus the World 
Soul, considered as a fundamental, is already a harmony in the same way that Intellect 
is, so it does not need to tune or be in tune with its contents. 
 It is the function of the World Soul to maintain harmony in the universe once it is 
made, because the interaction of the parts has the potential to create new bodies that are 
not rational principles in Intellect.  As will be discussed in section 4.4, physical matter 
is non-being; so, any interaction of the parts can only occur between the forms of souls 
that animate material bodies.  The Plotinian universe therefore contains individual 
energies or vibrations that interact and impact on each other both positively and 
negatively.  If the interaction is considered in musical terms, the universe is a 
harmonious whole, like an orchestra in which each instrument plays its part in the 
symphony unfolding in time; however, if a musician makes a mistake or if an 
instrument is badly tuned there is the potential for disharmony.  When considered 
purely in the context of modern physics, if standing waves interact they combine to 
                                                            
66  Chapter 3.5, pp.96-97. 
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produce either constructive or destructive interference (Gunther, 2012, pp.209-211), 
potentially changing the vibration of one or both for better or worse.  In each case of 
interference in the Plotinian universe a new ‘node’ or existence is generated that does 
not receive its rational forming principle from Intellect. Plotinus is however thinking 
purely in musical terms: 
 
… this All has arisen and separated into parts, and of necessity some became 
friendly and gentle, others hostile and at war, and some did harm to each other 
willingly, some too, unwillingly, and some by their destruction brought about 
the coming to be of others, and over them all as they acted and were acted 
upon in these kinds of ways they began a single melody [ἁρμονία], each of 
them uttering their own sounds, and the forming principle over them producing 
the melody [ἁρμονία] and the single ordering of all together to the whole. 
(Ennead III.2.2, 25-33)  
 
Maintenance of the universe involves making continual adjustments to the products of 
nature that puts some things together badly, “as when a lyre is not so tuned that it takes 
the melody [harmony] accurately so as to make it musical” (Ennead II.3.13, 46-47).  In 
this metaphor the lyre represents a body in the universe and the lack of tuning implies 
disharmony when the musical ratios are applied by nature under the order of the World 
Soul.  According to Plotinus: 
 
… it makes some things without hindrance, but in others, the worse ones, it 
meets obstruction.  Since its power to make is derived, and it is filled with 
forming principles that are not the original ones, it will not simply make 
according to the forms which it has received but there would be a contribution 
of its own, and this is obviously worse.  Its product is a living being, but a very 
imperfect one. (Ennead II.3.17, 18-22) 
 
The products of nature are therefore imperfect compared to the Beings in Intellect 
because nature starts from a much lower level in terms of its logos.  This together with 
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the various degrees of passivity, activity and opposition of the parts means that 
maintenance is necessary; however, the World Soul maintains the universe in perfect 
order according to the laws of providence (Ennead II.3.13, 35-42). 
Having explained how the harmonics model is implicit in the method by which 
the World Soul orders and maintains bodies for living beings, and how they interact, the 
following section will examine how the individual soul as a rational being becomes 
present to its body.   
 
 
 
4.3   The Integration of Body and Soul 
 
 
 
This section will explore how the Pythagorean concepts of harmonia and sympathia, 
function in the integration of body and Soul, and will speculate that under the influence 
of Aristoxenus sympathia forms the ontological basis of synesis, an a priori intuition 
that functions in the soul.   It will then examine the subject of music as metaphor in the 
Enneads. 
The World Soul participates directly in Intellect to make bodies; however, it 
does not descend to this world because it has the world within itself (Ennead IV.3.11).  
Individual souls therefore depend on the World Soul for the making of their physical 
bodies:  
 
…there is, … a difference between souls, and all the more in that the Soul of 
the All has not separated itself from the soul as a whole but remained there and 
put on the body, but the individual souls, since body exists already, received 
their allotted parts when their sister soul, as we may say, was already ruling, as 
if it had already prepared their dwellings for them. (Ennead IV.3.6, 11-15) 
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Plotinus refers to the Soul as being in the middle position between Intellect and matter 
(Ennead VI.8.7, 5-9) because its thinking moves between the two.  The upper part of 
the individual soul is eternally within Intellect (Ennead IV.8.8, 1-3), thinking non-
discursively like Intellect, seeing all its objects simultaneously as whole; and when it 
directs its attention to the individual images in matter it thinks discursively, employing 
logical activity, propositions and syllogisms (Ennead I.3.4, 17-19).  Its moral activity 
arises from a gift of providence, the freedom to choose.67  While the World Soul 
governs our association with our bodies:  
 
The other soul, by which we are ourselves, is the cause of our well-being, not 
of our being.  It comes when our body is already in existence, making only 
minor contributions from reasoning to our being. (Ennead II.1.5, 20-24) 
 
Individual souls remain in Intellect until they receive an “illumination” from the World 
Soul that incites the descent of the individual soul into a body.  As noted in Chapter 3,68 
light or illumination refers to power or logos: 
 
Now the soul which comes from the divine was quiet, standing in itself 
according to its character; but the body, in a tumult because of its weakness, 
flowing away itself and battered by the blows from outside, first itself cried out 
to the community of the living thing and imparted its disturbance to the whole. 
(Ennead VI.4.15, 19-23) 
 
Previously, Plotinus described the union of soul and body as “hearing made actual”; the 
soul hears the cries of the body (Ennead VI.4.14, 28).  This is possible because soul 
and body are substance, that is, substantial number and form:  
 
                                                            
67  This subject will be explored in detail in Chapter 8, which examines the nature of kairos in 
the Enneads. 
 
68  Chapter 3.4, p.83. 
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The number of body is certainly substance, in a bodily way, but the number of 
soul is substances in the way souls are. (Ennead VI.6.16, 45-46) 
 
But the souls of men see their images as if in the mirror of Dionysus and come 
to be on that level with a leap from above. (Ennead IV.3.12, 1-3) 
 
In a footnote to the translation, Armstrong explains that the mirror of Dionysus is a 
symbol of the visible world of physical matter which attracts the souls that must 
descend into it.69  Plotinus explains that the soul does not descend because it is sent or 
because it deliberately chooses to do so, but it does it “as if of its own accord” (Ennead 
IV.3.13, 7-8).  It is: 
 
…like a natural spontaneous jumping or a passionate natural desire of sexual 
union or as some men are moved unreasonably to noble deeds. … the 
individual … is sent according to law …, given to be in those themselves who 
are subject to it, and they bear it about with them. (Ennead IV.3.13, 19-27) 
   
Plotinus seems to suggest that it is an inherent instinct or intuition operating according 
to natural law.  This is possible because each soul comes down to a body made ready 
for it according to its resemblance to that soul’s disposition (Ennead IV.3.13, 1-6).  The 
World Soul fits human souls into the universe according to the law of correspondence or 
attunement: 
 
Since each individual is fitted in according to justice, in the parts of the 
universe designed to receive him; just as each string is set in its own proper 
place according to rational proportion which governs the sounding of notes, of 
whatever quality its power of producing a note is. (Ennead III.2.17, 59-64) 
 
There is therefore an intimate connection between individual souls and their bodies 
because of their shared association with the Hypostasis Soul; they have the same form 
                                                            
69  Armstrong, Ennead IV.3.12, fn. 2, pp.72-73. 
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and share its substance, and because the individual soul had “… an adaptability present 
to it, it had that to which it was adapted …, the body … was not alien to it” (Ennead 
VI.4.15, 2-18).  In effect body and soul function according to the same “law”, and as 
such we can consider the body produced by the World Soul as having a ‘tone’ which 
vibrates at a certain frequency, its “illumination”, and it resonates with or is attuned70 to 
the vibration of the individual soul.  This does not mean that the substantial numbers of 
the body and soul are quantitatively equal.  Plotinus refers to them in terms of value, 
which is qualitative; they are linked according to musical ratios consisting of unequal 
whole numbers, but they are in sympathetic harmony with each other.  For Plotinus 
sympathetic interaction is essential as a cause of producing harmony and change in the 
physical universe; it is not just the result of the unfolding of rational principles in 
nature, of which we can think in terms of a musical scale, a sequence of steps that 
unfold successively in time:71 
 
…one part is in sympathetic connection with another, just as in one tense 
string; for if the string is plucked at the lower end, it has a vibration at the 
upper.  But often too, when one string is plucked another has a kind of sense of 
this by its concord and the fact that it is tuned to the same scale.  But if the 
vibration can even pass from one lyre to another in so far as a sympathy exists, 
then there is also one single harmony in the All, even if it is composed of 
opposites. (Ennead IV.4.41 2-9) 
 
Plotinus compares the harmonious adjustment of individual souls to the order in the 
universe with the Pythagorean conception of the harmony of the spheres: 
 
                                                            
70  Barker describes attunement as “simply a structure or pattern, in which no element is 
temporally prior to any other” (Barker, 2007, fn.5, p.8). 
 
71  Ibid.  Barker’s definition of a ‘scale’. 
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They are not cut off from it, but fit themselves in in their descents and make 
one harmony with its circuit, so that their fortunes and their lives and their 
choices are indicated by the figures made by the heavenly bodies and they 
sing, as it were with one voice and never out of tune. (And this is more 
properly the hidden meaning of the doctrine that the heavenly spheres move 
musically and melodically). (Ennead IV.3.12, 20-27) 
 
In Ennead IV.4 Plotinus frequently refers to musical examples to explain the concept of 
sympathy: 
But if we remember that we posited that the universe is a single living thing, 
and that since it is so it was absolutely necessary for it to have an internal self-
communication of its experiences; and if we remember further that the process 
of its life must be rational and all in tune with itself, and that there is nothing 
casual in its life but a single melody and order, and that the celestial 
arrangements are rational, and each individual part moves by numbers … 
(Ennead IV.4.35, 8-13) 
 
Gurtler emphasises the influence of the Stoic notion of the “the organic unity of the 
cosmos as the eternal basis for perceptual awareness” and he also acknowledges “The 
Stoic term sympathy fills out the Platonic notion that the universe is a single living 
organism (Timaeus 30d3-31a1)” (Gurtler, 2002, pp. 241-2).72  It is suggested that too 
many commentators overemphasise the relevance of Stoic concepts in the Enneads, and 
this is particularly relevant when discussing the Plotinian understanding of sympathy, 
for not only does Plotinus refer specifically to the music of the spheres to account for 
universal harmony, he also understood that the Pythagoreans considered sympathy to be 
natural in a cosmos ordered on harmonic principles.  Rather than limiting our thinking 
to a single living organism, we must also take account of the underlying harmonic 
structure. 
                                                            
72  See also: Emilsson, 1988, p.111 who also shares the view that “Plotinus’ notion of 
     sympatheia is a borrowing from the Stoics”.  
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While harmonics lie at the ontological basis of sympathy, they also appear to form 
the basis of synesis (σύνεσις), the lack of a ‘reasoned’ awareness, consciousness or 
understanding of individual souls when they descend to their bodies.  Plotinus states 
that souls perceive their bodies; however, they do not reason before they unite with 
them (Ennead IV.3.18, 1-8), hence they descend without possessing ‘reasoned’ 
knowledge of why they do so.  Aristotle also refers to synesis in the context of a 
capacity to comprehend without making judgements based on reason or rational 
calculation (De Anima 429a 23-25; Nicomachean Ethics, 1143a 1-35), and I refer again 
to Aristoxenus who adopted the term synesis to refer to an a priori or innate form of 
musical intuition that forms the basis of all musical activity.73  As Levin explains, for 
Aristoxenus the creation of music depends on synesis “buried deep in soul”, not on 
reason in the form of “musical notation harmonic science or musical instruments” 
(Levin, 1972, p.229).  If one considers Plotinus’ “law” that human souls “bear about 
with them” and which causes them to “spontaneously” descend into their bodies, 
together with the notion of attunement, melody and order in the universe, it appears that 
the synesis of souls also operates according to an a priori innate musical intuition that 
does not depend on rational calculation or reasoning.   
Deck notes that in Ennead IV.4.13, 2-14, Plotinus states that “nature has no grasp, 
no synesis”, Ennead III.8.8, 14-16, in which nature possesses “naturely knowledge” and 
Ennead III.8.4, 22-25, where nature has the sort of consciousness of “sleep” rather than 
wakefulness.  While Deck suggests it could be that nature’s knowledge is “close to 
unconscious” (Deck, 1991, pp.88-90)74, Hutchinson clarifies the character of its 
unconsciousness: 
                                                            
73  Chapter 2.4, pp.52-53. 
74  See also: Armstrong, Ennead IV.4.13, fn.1, pp.170-171. 
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Nature directs its contemplation exclusively on the logoi it contains, and it 
produces bodies spontaneously, without any conscious reflection on, or 
deliberation over, what it is doing. (Hutchinson, 2018. p.154) 
 
 Plotinus states that nature has no synesis because it has no perception or understanding 
of the soul that is outside it; it perceives itself rather than the soul (Ennead III.8.4, 14-
23), which explains why bodies do not go to meet their corresponding souls.  Therefore, 
while sympathia is operative in nature as well as between nature and the soul, synesis 
only occurs in the soul, which descends to its body because it perceives, distinguishes 
and is therefore conscious, but its understanding is intuitive and unconscious, just as it 
is for Aristoxenus; however, only Aristoxenus insists on the importance of memory in 
the process.  For Plotinus, synesis appears to be wholly dependent upon sympathia.     
While Plotinus does not refer to Aristoxenus explicitly, according to Porphyry, 
Plotinus “had a complete knowledge” of music, (Porphyry 13, 8-10); therefore, it is 
possible that he would have been familiar with the concept of synesis in the Elements of 
Harmonics of Aristoxenus, a student of Aristotle, and who is described by Levin as “the 
foremost technical writer on the music of ancient Greece” (Levin, 1972, pp.223-224).  
Pythagorean harmonics underpins the ontological structure that facilitates sympathy in 
Plotinus’ metaphysics and one can speculate that Aristoxenus influenced his 
epistemology with the concept of synesis in the soul. 
Whether we view mind and body in terms of vibrations or number Plotinus does 
not propose two different kinds of substance à la Descartes.  Plotinus avoids Descartes’ 
dualism because unlike solid material objects, numbers and their corresponding 
vibrations or forms are energies or powers that have no physical extension and can be in 
the same place at the same time.  In fact, as body is further away from unity than the 
individual soul because it is closer to physical matter, its substance or number could be 
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of lesser value than that of the individual soul.  Plotinus states that “when the particular 
souls go to things”: 
 
They have departed to the depths; or rather, a great part of them has been 
dragged down and has dragged them with it by their thoughts to the lower 
existence. (Ennead IV.3.6, 25-27) 
 
We must remember that at the level of Intellect, the individual soul has all the numbers 
in itself, even the lower ones, hence the resonance; however individual souls keep their 
individuality and are present to their bodies as “a whole at every point of the body” 
(Ennead IV.9.1, 2).  While individual bodies eventually degrade and die, their 
individual souls are eternal because they exist prior to time at the level of intelligible 
matter.75  
We have seen that for Plotinus proportion, order and harmony are the underlying 
principles in the generation of the universe, and it was argued that Plotinus places these 
proportions in Being as the ratios of the musical scale.  While the generation of the 
universe is often referred to as a mathematical progression, it has also been argued that 
this is intimately linked to the generation of musical scales which unfold in time.  
Plotinus makes an analogy between the proportions in Intellect and art: 
 
But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living 
things and goes from there to consider the proportions of living things in 
general, it would be a part of the power which also in the higher world 
considers and contemplates universal proportion in the intelligible.  And 
certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are concerned with 
rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is 
concerned with intelligible number.  And as for the arts … for instance 
                                                            
75  See: Ennead IV.7 ‘On the Immortality of the Soul’. 
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building and carpentry, in so far as they make use of proportions they 
would have their principles from the intelligible world. (V.9.11, 7-15) 
 
Substance in the intelligible therefore orders the physical world according to proportion 
or the ratios of musical harmonics.  Plotinus knows musical scales are determined by 
harmonic ratios, and possibly influenced by Vitruvius who places great importance on 
ancient Greek music theory for architectural design he may have also considered that 
buildings were designed according to these ratios.76  Plotinus also suggests that the 
formula used in the production of sensible melodies is the same as that used for the 
production of form in general: 
 
The melodies in sounds too, the imperceptible ones, make the soul conscious of 
beauty … showing the same thing in another medium.  It is proper to sensible 
melodies to be measured by numbers, not according to any and every sort of 
formula but one which serves for the production of form so that it may 
dominate. (Ennead I.6.3, 28-33)  
 
In effect Plotinus is saying that since Intellect is beauty, these melodies exist in 
Intellect; therefore, because form needs substantial number, substantial number must be 
the numbers linked to melody.  This formula is therefore the foundation of musical 
scales conceived as number, which has been suggested to be the numbers and harmonic 
ratios found in ‘unified Being’, Plotinus’ version of the Pythagorean tetractys.   
The subject of music in the Enneads has been a subject of debate amongst 
Plotinian scholars and Panaiotidi has reviewed the conflicting positions in the literature 
on Plotinus’ account of music, especially regarding its mimetic abilities.  While she 
proposes that music theory is of particular importance to Plotinus, she also concludes 
music has worth for Plotinus “only as a means of ascent to a higher reality, and this 
                                                            
76  Chapter 1.2, p.17; Walden, 2014, p.126 and p.131. 
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capacity is grounded in its mathematical nature” (Panaiotidi, 2014, p.409).   The 
importance of music in the ascent will be examined in Chapter 8; however, it is 
contended that music also has worth for Plotinus in the descent as examined here, for it 
is the measurable ratios found in nature that demonstrate the truth of the order within 
Intellect and Being, and which dominate in the generation of the universe.  Plotinus 
followed the Pythagoreans in proposing a philosophy founded on facts that he not only 
considered universal and intelligible, but also observable in the physical world. 
This brings us to the subject of music as metaphor in the Enneads, a subject that 
Gersh has analysed in some detail.  He remarks there are “certain problems in Plotinus’ 
usage of such conceptual models”, due to the “nature of metaphoricity in general, since 
the same term can fluctuate between a metaphorical and a non-metaphorical application 
within even a restricted space of discourse”.  While he notes that Plotinus probably 
would have been familiar with Nicomachus’ “The Enchiridion”, a work influenced by 
Pythagorean harmonics, he also comments: “It is likely that Plotinus derived his 
technique of using musical or harmonic similes and analogies to explain philosophical 
concepts from the Pythagorean School of late antiquity”.  Gersh, however, suggests that 
while Plotinus refers to the Timaeus most frequently, he excludes the harmonic 
elements due to Plato’s ambiguous relation to harmonic theory.  He proposes that while 
Plotinus has reservations about harmonics, this does not apply to his use of arithmetic 
and geometry as explanatory devices.  He argues Plotinus restricts the use of musical 
similes in two ways, and while the second concerns the “mode” of application, the first, 
which is relevant to the argument presented here concerns the “range” of application:   
 
The first restriction stems from the fact that harmonics works with ratios 
whereas arithmetic works with numbers and ratios - which are inherently 
relational and dual - are less compatible with ultimate monism.  This would 
imply that harmonics would be a method more fitted to expressing aspects of 
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the lower and more multiple levels of reality than of the higher and more simple 
levels. (Gersh, 2005, p.206). 
 
The fact that Plotinus is more open about music theory in his account of Soul might 
well lead one to agree with Gersh; however, Gersh, like other scholars who have 
commented on the role of music in the Enneads, has not addressed the crucial issue of 
how the generation of harmonics at the lower levels is wholly dependent on the 
harmonic motion at work in Intellect.  The interpretation that Plotinus considers the 
generation of Intellect and Soul as the generation of harmonics means Plotinus cannot 
use musical metaphors at the higher levels because a metaphor can only be “applied to 
an object or action to which it is not literally applicable”.77  The process itself is 
literally applicable, hence his reliance on metaphors of light and vision to explain it.  
Musical or harmonic similes and analogies may be used metaphorically at the lower 
levels only because they mimic the higher levels.  Also, since an originating source of 
energy, such as Plotinus’ One, is necessary for the generation of any harmonics, there is 
no issue with it being incompatible with “ultimate monism”.  The question remains of 
why Plotinus reverted to metaphors of light and vision at the higher levels when he 
could have been more explicit about his intentions.  The reason is possibly linked to the 
process of initiation as explained in Chapter 178 and the nature of the Pythagorean 
influence that will be discussed in the final Conclusion of this work. 
The Pythagorean influence is strong in Plotinus’s description of Soul; in fact, 
there is very little difference between them.  Both propose a universe that is rationally 
ordered according to number that pre-exists the universe itself; both propose the notion 
                                                            
77  metaphor | Definition of metaphor in English by Oxford Dictionaries. [Online]  
Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/metaphor 
[Accessed 15th October 2017]  
 
78  Chapter 1.2, pp.17-18. 
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of harmonia as a fitting together of opposites according to the laws of musical 
proportion; both consider sympathy to be a means of communication and causal nexus 
between mind and body; and both adopt the view that we can have knowledge about the 
laws that order the universe through experience of those laws operating in the universe.  
This is possible because, as noted in Chapter 279, there is a correspondence, but not 
equivalence, between sensibility and intelligibility.  There is however a significant 
difference in as much as Plotinus conceived the universe as a composite of soul and 
body, which in turn is a composite of soul and matter, whereas the Pythagoreans 
conceived the universe in terms of body and soul without making a distinction between 
form and matter.  This brings us to the task of explaining the relevance of the harmonic 
model in Plotinus’ conception of the origin, generation and function of matter, “the 
mirror of Dionysus”.   
 
 
 
4.4   The Nature and Origin of Matter (ύλη) 
 
 
 
In Ennead II.4.5, ‘On Matter’, Plotinus distinguishes between intelligible matter as 
substantial number and form that acts as an archetype for physical matter; however, 
Carroll suggests that Plotinus was never clear in his own mind about physical matter; in 
fact Carroll refers to it as the “Plotinian albatross … that weighed most heavily upon 
him” (Carroll, 2002, p.202).  Once again, the text is full of ambiguity as well as alleged 
inconsistencies that have resulted in debate and disagreement amongst Plotinian 
scholars, and O’Brien speculates that Plotinus’ lack of clarity is due to “the ‘oath of 
silence’ to which Plotinus, Origen and Erennius bound themselves on the death of their 
                                                            
79  Chapter 2.4, pp.56-57.  
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common master, Ammonius” (O’Brien, 2012, p.76).  It will be proposed that a deeper 
analysis of the text will reveal how the model of harmonics provides a solution that 
accounts for matter’s origin, generation and nature.  However, before considering the 
debate and the harmonics solution in more detail, it is pertinent to clarify Plotinus’ 
theory of matter in Ennead II.4, ‘On Matter’, Ennead III.6, ‘On Impassibility’ and 
Ennead I.8, ‘On What are and Whence Come Evils’, the texts that commentators have 
regarded as inconsistent.  
In Ennead II.4.6-16, Plotinus argues against the atom theory of matter, claiming 
that matter acts as a substrate for bodies and must therefore be different from them; it is 
simple and has its own nature.  Matter is undefined because it is not form, and is 
continuous, lacking the quality we perceive in sense objects, including colours, 
temperature, weight, density, shape, size, quantity, magnitude or mass; however, as a 
substrate for bodies it is submissive to everything and receptive of quality.  Matter is 
necessary for bodies even though it is incorporeal, and he acknowledges its existence is 
“apprehended by spurious reasoning”.  While he describes it as unlimited, Plotinus 
explains that the unlimited also exists in Intellect, but it is different in as much as there 
it is limited by bounds and orders.  Physical matter is the unlimited set in order, but it is 
not limited nor is it limit.  Intelligible matter and physical matter differ as the archetype 
differs from the image, but physical matter is more unlimited because it “escaped from 
being and truth” (Ennead II.4.15, 23-24), and therefore has less existence.  Both 
intelligible matter and physical matter possess ‘otherness’ but in different forms; while 
intelligible matter is ‘other’ than the One that is ‘beyond Being’, physical matter is 
‘other’ than Being (Ennead, II.4.1, 6) and hence is “privation” (Ennead II.4.16, 3-5), 
unreal and a potentiality of Being that can never be actualised (Ennead II.5.2); it is 
“lifeless” (Ennead III.4.1,7) and “absolute indefiniteness” (Ennead III.4.1,12).  In 
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Ennead III.6.7-11, matter is incorporeal, non-being, “a ghostly image of bulk”; “static 
without being stable”; “a phantom”, invisible and what lies on it is a lie While it is 
formless, it is unaffected by forms that appear on it, and indestructible.  Matter is 
reflective like a mirror; however, unlike a mirror it is unseen.  It acts as a repellent base 
and receptacle in which forms are concentrated on the outside.  Matter is unaffected by 
the things seen it (Ennead III.6.7, 13-44) and remains what it was from the beginning 
(Ennead III.6.11, 18) and is evil because it is unaffected by the Good (Ennead III.6.11, 
44-46); however, despite this, matter is a gift of Providence because it is a necessary 
cause of everything coming into being (Ennead III.6.15, 27).  
In Ennead I.8, Plotinus addresses the question of good and evil as opposites, and 
as Armstrong comments: 
 
The primary object of [this treatise] appears to be to provide a solid 
metaphysical foundation for Plotinus’ moral teaching about the necessity of 
purifying the soul by separating it from the material. (Armstrong, ‘Introductory 
Note’ to Ennead I.8, p.276) 
 
Plotinus argues that there is no evil in the Good but claims that evil is necessary; the 
universe must be composed of opposing principles: 
 
… it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and therefore that 
the Last should exist; and this is matter. (Ennead I.8.7, 21-22) 
  
While Plotinus associates the One with the Good, he also suggests that absolute evil has 
the same nature as physical matter: 
  
… unmeasuredness in relation to measure, and unboundedness in relation to limit, 
and formlessness in relation to formative principle, and neediness in relation to 
what is self-sufficient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of 
influence, insatiate, complete poverty.  (Ennead I.8.3, 12-16) 
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Rist therefore comments that “the doctrine of the relation between evil and matter 
which can be found throughout the Enneads”, is “consistent” (Rist, 1961, p.166); 
however the debate about Plotinus’ theory of matter appears to have three key and 
interlinked themes: the first considers the origin and creation of matter, and the second 
two, the nature of matter; specifically, if everything emanates from the One, which is 
the ultimate Good, how could Plotinus regard matter as evil? And how could he 
consider matter as ‘non-being’ whilst insisting that its existence is necessary?   
Let us first consider the debate about the origin and creation of matter, which 
arises because, as Majumdar notes, “it is anything but clear as to how matter itself 
originates” (Majumdar, 2007, p.110).  She provides a helpful summary of the debate in 
response to Carroll (Majumdar, 2007, pp.112-113) who refers to three possible 
positions adopted by commentators: 
  
(i) Matter is independent of the One and opposed actively or passively to it; (ii) 
matter is the end product of the procession from the One; and (iii) the question 
of the origin of matter is meaningless since matter is nothing at all. (Carroll, 
2002, p.181) 
  
The view that matter is independent of the One is held by Bréhier and Pistorius who 
effectively argue for a dualism, that matter is opposed actively or passively to the One.  
While Bréhier suggests that matter participates in the Good and is independent of it, 
Pistorius argues against its creation because of its status as the negation of Being. 
(Bréhier, 1958, pp.174-181; Pistorius, 1952, p.68). 
The view that matter is the end product of the procession from the One is a 
monistic interpretation that appears to have the most support; however, theories of how 
matter is generated vary.  Deck, Inge and Narbonne argue that matter is generated in 
Intellect.  Deck refers to Ennead II.4.12, 8 where Plotinus states that Intellect is prior to 
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matter and to Ennead V.8.31, 7, where he states that matter is the last of the forms and 
that all form is in Intellect or dependent on it (Deck, 1971, pp.103-104).  Inge argues 
that matter was not created in time because it was necessary for soul to actualise its 
interests, therefore it must have been created in Intellect (Inge, 1929, p. 137; p.144).  
Narbonne rejects the notion that soul generates matter and favours the view that “matter 
falls out or is expelled from the intelligible” (Narbonne, 2011, p. 43). 
O’Brien suggests that matter was generated by the partial vegetative soul 
because in Ennead III.4.1 Plotinus appears to suggest that soul is the origin of matter, 
and in Ennead IV.3.9, that matter borders on Soul: 
For soul has the power of growth… Does this power of growth, then, produce 
nothing?  It produces a thing altogether different from itself; for after it there is 
no more life, but what is produced is lifeless … absolute indefiniteness. 
(Ennead III.4.1, 4-12) 
   
Soul’s rest is, we may say, confirmed in absolute rest; a great light shines from 
it and at the outermost edge of this firelight there is a darkness. Soul sees this 
darkness and informs it, since it is there as a substrate for form.  For it was not 
lawful for that which borders on soul to be without its share of formative 
principle, as far as that was capable of receiving it, of which the phrase was 
used “dimly in the dimness” which came to be. (Ennead IV.3.9, 23-29) 
 
While Carroll considers it a “remote possibility, if not impossibility” that the generator 
of matter is soul (Carroll, 2002, p.199), he rejects the notion that Intellect generates 
matter and suggests that we can consider it in terms of the causative power of the One 
as described by Proclus on the basis that the One is ultimately the efficient and final 
cause of everything (Ennead IV.8.14, 20-33):   
 
Thus, for Proclus, the causative power of the One extends to the whole 
universe.  Everything in the universe including unformed and chaotic matter 
derives its reality (or non-being) from the One.  The activity of Intelligence 
does not reach down as far as The One’s precisely because it is not the primary 
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principle or causative power.  Intelligence does not generate matter.  This is 
not to say, however, that Intelligence in no way affects matter.  It shapes it like 
a potter shapes his clay, but as the potter does not cause clay to be clay. 
Intelligence does not cause matter to be matter. (Carroll, 2002, pp.190-191) 
 
This monistic interpretation is also shared by Armstrong (Armstrong, 1966, p.xxiv), 
Dodds (Dodds, 1960, pp.21-22), Henry (Henry, 1960, pp.236-237) and Trouillard 
(Trouillard, 1955, p.15). 
The final view, that the question of the origin of matter is meaningless since 
matter is nothing at all, is held by Carbonara (Carbonara, 1954), Murry (Murry, 1951, 
p.234) and Katz (Katz, 1950, p.44) who argue against the dualistic and monistic 
positions referred to above, claiming that matter is utter negation.  It therefore cannot 
exist independently, nor be included in the generative process.  O’Brien challenges this 
view by arguing that when Plotinus refers to the non-being or privation of matter he is 
adapting “the paradoxical definition of a ‘form that is, of what is not’ in Plato’s Sophist 
(258 D 5-7)”:80 
 
‘Otherness’ and all the ‘parts’ of otherness participate, as do all the forms, in 
‘being’ (the form), since otherwise there would not even ‘be’ a form of 
otherness at all. The paradoxical conjunction of ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ arises 
therefore when the part of otherness that participates in being is also opposed to 
being. ‘The form that turns out to be, of what is not’ (258 D 6) is a form of 
‘what is not’, because it is the very part of otherness that is opposed to being, 
but a form that nonetheless ‘turns out to be’, because even the very part of 
otherness that is opposed to being cannot but participate in being. (O’Brien, 
2012, p.31) 
 
                                                            
80  See also: Rist, 1961, p.156. 
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O’Brien therefore explains that to understand Plotinus we must make the distinction 
between “‘non-being’ as a part of otherness and ‘non-being’ as sheer nothingness, as 
non-existence” (O’Brien, 2012, p.42).81  
Let us now consider how the harmonics model has the potential to provide a 
coherent solution that accounts for matter’s origin, generation and nature.  In the 
following explanation I refer to matter as ‘it’, acknowledging with O’Brien that while 
matter is non-being this does not make it non-existent, even though Plotinus offers no 
clarification of what matter is.  
In Ennead V.8.7, 23, Plotinus refers to matter as “a sort of ultimate form”; 
hence “this universe is all form, and all the things in it are forms” (Ennead V.8.7, 24); 
however, the ultimate form is infinite: 
For as long as the division of a genus for instance, arrives at another form, it is 
not yet infinite; for it is limited by the forms which have been generated; but the 
ultimate form which is not divided into forms is more infinite. (Ennead VI.2.22, 
15-17) 
 
Furthermore, he conceives of matter as a “flat surface”: 
 
What it might have grasped … slips away from it as if from an alien nature, like 
an echo from smooth flat surfaces. (Ennead III.6.14, 26)    
 
So, while matter is “a sort of form” it is not a form that has motion, shape or number, 
and it is “unmeasure” because of its infinite and indefinite nature.  It is considered to be 
“the primary evil” (Ennead I.8.8, 37-38) because it lacks the perfection of the One as a 
power to generate something other than itself; it merely acts as a substrate that reflects 
the forms projected onto it as perceived images that divert the attention of the soul 
away from the One. 
                                                            
81  See also: O’Brien, 1996; O’Brien, 2014; Armstrong, Ennead I.8.3, note 3, pp.282-3.  
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 Plotinus used the lyre as an example of a vibrating string in his explanation of 
sympathy and it is also a good example for understanding how the generation of matter 
is consistent with the generation of harmonics.  Figure 12 (p.78) demonstrates that as 
harmonics are generated from the fundamental vibration, the nodes increase in number 
and the standing waves become progressively shorter, and while the illustration is 
necessarily limited, if we think in terms of an infinite series, eventually a flat line is 
generated within the fundamental when the distance between the nodes approaches 
zero.  Similarly, if one presses on a vibrating string at every point it ceases to vibrate, 
and a flat line is effectively created.  If the nodes are considered as places of rest where 
no motion is perceived, the flat line must also be at rest; hence no movement, and no 
power to generate offspring from itself.  The flat line is infinite as it has no 
distinguishable nodes and therefore no substantial number, hence it is “unmeasure”.  It 
is indefinite or unlimited because it has no boundary as does the nature of a specific 
form.  Since it has no number it cannot be included in the Plotinian decad that is a unity 
of otherness, sameness, motion and rest in Being82; therefore, it makes sense that 
Plotinus considers it as non-being and irrational.  However, despite lacking motion, 
matter does possess three of the four primary kinds; otherness because it is “otherness 
in itself” (Ennead II.4.13, 18) and is therefore other to otherness in Being; sameness 
because it remains what it was from the beginning; it cannot be altered (Ennead 
III.6.10); and rest because it is lifeless (Ennead III.4.1), hence Plotinus can claim: 
  
Those who make the demand to abolish evil in the All are abolishing 
providence itself. (Ennead III.3.7, 6-7) 
 
                                                            
82  Chapter 3.5, pp.93-96. 
131 
 
While Plotinus does not consider matter to have a place in Being he does not eliminate 
it entirely from Intellect because “all that is here below comes from there” (Ennead 
V.8.7, 17-18), and one can assume that “everything” includes matter, presumably 
because all souls and matter are generated in Intellect as its internal activity: 
 
Intellect holds the soul which comes after it so that it is in number, and holds 
soul down to its last part, but its last part is altogether infinite. (Ennead 
VI.2.22, 20-23) 
 
This is consistent with the views of Rist and Inge who note Plotinus’ assertion that 
matter is not generated as a temporal process: 
 
In the early treatise 4.8, Plotinus mentions two theories current among the 
Platonists concerning the origin of matter. Either matter has always existed, or its 
generation is the necessary consequence of its causes which were "before" it 
(4.8.6). The πρὸ αὐτῆς here certainly refers to the temporal creation of matter as 
opposed to its eternal existence. It is quite certain that Plotinus' final view is that 
matter exists eternally and is not in any sense a temporal creation. (Rist, 1961, 
p.157) 
 
If matter has eternal existence it may be argued that it is already present in Intellect as 
its internal activity when the World Soul contemplates the forms in Intellect and orders 
the universe in temporal succession, and matter must be contemplated prior to the 
forms so that it may act as a substrate for the forms. 
Plotinus refers to both intelligible matter and physical matter metaphorically as 
“darkness”,83 and in Chapter 3,84 it was proposed that for Plotinus the “darkness” of 
intelligible matter in its undefined radiation from the One is a metaphor for inaudible 
sound, that is, sound as pure energy that will be broken up into sound waves or 
                                                            
83  On the darkness of matter, see Deck, 1991, p.44 and O’Brien, 1996, p.182. 
84  Chapter 3.2, pp.70-71. 
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vibrations in Intellect.  It seems reasonable to conclude that Plotinus conceives physical 
matter as an image of intelligible darkness, and therefore a metaphor for sound as 
phenomenal experience.  As Plotinus says, it’s “like an echo from smooth flat surfaces” 
(Ennead III.6.14, 26).  We do not perceive physical matter itself, only the forms or 
vibrations reflected by it, and we are able to do so because we are in sympathetic 
resonance with them.  Since the Pythagoreans made no distinction between form and 
matter, Plotinus follows Plato in realising the necessity for a reflective surface so that 
images arise in perception.  The images that we perceive as physical reality are not in 
matter but formed by the faculty of imagination each soul possesses.  This will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 8.  
The interpretation based on the harmonics model brings us no closer to 
understanding what matter is; however it concurs with the monistic view.  The One is 
ultimately the cause of all things by the gift of its power; however, it is Intellect, 
considered as the ‘fundamental’ which begins the harmonic series that culminates in 
matter, simply as a result of its continual halt and turning towards the One in its desire 
for the Good.  If matter originates in Intellect it cannot be independent of it as proposed 
by Bréhier and Pistorius, and while Carroll is mistaken to reject the notion that Intellect 
generates matter, he is right to suggest that we can consider matter in terms of the 
causative power of the One as described by Proclus on the basis that the One is 
ultimately the efficient and final cause of everything (Ennead VI.8.14, 20-33).  Matter 
cannot be the end product of the procession from the One if considered as a distinct 
entity that follows the generation of Intellect and Soul as Hypostases, and as a substrate 
for the forms its origin cannot be considered meaningless because matter is nothing or 
non-existent.  Narbonne is correct to reject the notion that Soul generates matter if 
considered as Intellect’s external activity; however, it could be argued that Soul 
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generates matter as harmonics in the process of Intellect’s internal activity.  Matter 
cannot be expelled from Intellect, nor does it simply fall out of Intellect since it must be 
contemplated by the World Soul.  Similarly, the harmonics model does not concur with 
O’Brien’s theory that the partial or vegetative soul, generates matter as its external 
activity.  It is therefore proposed that physical matter never was an “albatross” carried 
by Plotinus because his metaphysics is modelled on a theory of harmonic generation, 
which concurs with the text and explains its origin, generation and nature. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
This Chapter argues that the harmonic model and Pythagorean influence is operational 
at every stage in the procession from the One and resolves difficulties perceived by 
commentators concerning Plotinus’ ambiguity about the various levels of Soul in 
general and the origin and nature of matter.  It clarifies the various levels of Soul, 
challenges the view that the Hypostasis Soul is a rational form, and explains how 
Plotinus could conceive of World Soul as the eldest.  It explains how each primary Soul 
form generates its own offspring as an infinite series and why Plotinus conceived them 
as being expressed one after another in temporal succession as in a musical scale or 
melody.   
The examination of the characteristics of the World Soul and individual souls, 
together with their association explained how Plotinus utilised the Pythagorean 
concepts of harmonia and sympathia, and it was speculated that Plotinus’ concept of 
synesis is similar to the a priori innate musical intuition as proposed by Aristoxenus 
and that this may have been an epistemological influence on him.  These concepts are 
intimately linked to, ultimately depend on, and therefore support the model of 
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harmonics proposed in Chapter 3.  It was suggested that the view held by some 
commentators, that Plotinus’ primary influence was the Stoic concept of sympathia, 
requires re-evaluation because the Pythagorean interpretation is more compatible with 
his theory.  
Disagreements amongst scholars concerning the role of music and musical 
metaphors in the Enneads were noted, and it was suggested they arise because of a 
failure to comprehend that harmonics are generated in Intellect.  It was therefore 
proposed that the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus has been misunderstood and 
underemphasised in his theory of Soul, because other than their respective theories of 
matter, there is little to separate them. 
The examination of the generation of multiplicity in the Enneads concluded with 
an examination of how Plotinus conceives the nature and origin of physical matter, 
noting again differences of interpretation among commentators, because they perceived 
a lack of clarity in Plotinus.  It was argued that as harmonics are generated from the 
fundamental as an infinite series, the nodes increase in number while the standing 
waves become progressively shorter, thus generating a flat line that is at rest as the 
distance between the nodes approaches zero.  It conforms to Plotinus’ assertion that 
matter is “a sort of form” having its origin in Intellect.  Its lack of movement means it 
has no power to generate anything; hence matter acts as substrate for the forms which 
Plotinus conceives as a reflective surface, just as matter acts as a reflective surface onto 
which sound waves are projected to produce sound that is perceived.  While the model 
of harmonics accounts for the generation of matter and for why physical matter does 
not exist in Being but is necessary for the making of the universe,  it does not explain 
what matter is. 
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It is proposed that the model of harmonics adopted by Plotinus together with the 
influence of the Pythagorean tradition was understood by Bergson and contributed to 
the incorporation of Pythagorean features into his metaphysics, though like Plotinus he 
does not always make them explicit in the text.  This will therefore be explored in the 
next Chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Bergson - God, the Élan Vital and the Generation of Multiplicity 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This Chapter presents the argument that, like Plotinus, Bergson models his cosmology 
on the physics of sound and music theory, and explains how Bergson’s generation of 
multiplicity, or ‘creative evolution’, is what Mossé-Bastide refers to as a “dynamic 
schema” that is “rooted in the philosophy of Plotinus” (Mossé-Bastide, 1959, p.355).     
It sets the stage for Chapter 6 in which it will be argued that Bergson’s philosophy of 
transformation is influenced by Pythagoreanism.   
In Creative Evolution Bergson traces unorganised matter and all forms of life 
back to God and the élan vital.  His conflation of these concepts meant his cosmology 
was deemed obscure when Creative Evolution was published, and even though he later 
attempted to clarify himself in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
commentators still consider these concepts ambiguous.  It will be argued that Bergson 
followed Plotinus and the Pythagoreans in presenting a non-pantheist philosophy in 
which the First Principle remains independent but present within its progeny. 
The generation of multiplicity as presented in Creative Evolution is also 
considered mysterious by commentators due to Bergson’s reliance on metaphor to 
explain it; however, it will be clarified, with the use of illustrations, how Bergson 
follows Plotinus in adopting harmonic motion as the mechanism of the élan vital that 
generates itself as an impersonal supra-consciousness, thus replicating Plotinus’ 
generation of the ‘form’ Intellect as the first harmonic.  This will be followed by an 
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explanation of the ontological and epistemological transformation of the élan vital as it 
divides into matter and consciousness as separate tendencies, according to the model of 
harmonics.  It will be argued that while Bergson uses novel concepts, the underlying 
ontological and corresponding epistemological structure of his philosophy basically 
replicates Plotinus but differs from him because he synthesises Intellect and Soul into 
the function of a supra-consciousness generating the vital and geometrical orders in a 
wholly temporal process.  The focus on harmonics in this Chapter means that any 
potential influence of French Spiritualism on his cosmology has not been examined.   
  
 
 
5.1   Bergson’s Principle of Unity - God/Élan Vital 
 
 
 
Bergson’s concept of unity is encompassed within his concepts of duration, the élan 
vital and God.  He always denied his philosophy was systematic because he considered 
it a work of collaboration open to further development, and as such his earlier works 
intentionally avoided the notion of a First Principle; however, it will be argued that 
Bergson followed the Pythagoreans and Plotinus by advocating a philosophy that can be 
categorised as panentheism. 
Duration was the concept introduced in Time and Free Will and is the 
fundamental concept underlying all his work.  Duration is an indivisible and continuous 
multiplicity of interpenetrating heterogeneous and qualitative psychic states, and whose 
nature is a ‘one-many’ temporal unity of direction because it prolongs the past into the 
present and the present into the future (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ in C.M. p.165).85  
For Bergson, duration cannot be viewed from the perspective of unity or multiplicity 
                                                            
85  See also: ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., pp.168-176 
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without resorting to ready-made concepts, the analysis of which fails to capture duration 
in its essence, and in Matter and Memory, he aimed to “to lessen greatly, if not to 
overcome, the theoretical difficulties that have always beset dualism” by uniting mind 
and matter under the umbrella of duration or consciousness, despite referring to the 
theory as “frankly dualistic” (M.M., p.vii).  His task in Creative Evolution is to explain 
the élan vital as a ‘one-many’ durational, creative and productive impulse or power 
implicit in the evolutionary process of life; hence it is “the principle of all life, as also of 
all materiality” (C.E., p.238).  Furthermore, he introduces the notion of the élan vital as 
“supra-consciousness” that is “pure creative activity” (C.E., p.245) and “the origin of 
life” (C.E., p. 261).  For the first time he briefly introduces the link between the élan 
vital and God: 
 
God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; He is unceasing life, 
action, freedom.  Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in 
ourselves when we act freely. (C.E., p.248) 
 
The God of Creative Evolution does not appear to be a transcendent first cause as is 
Plotinus’ One, but the élan vital itself as supra-consciousness, defined during the 
course of its life.  Creative Evolution was therefore the source of much debate about 
Bergson’s concept of God being immanent in the world, because he chose not to clarify 
his position, commenting that “Everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think 
of things which are created and a thing which creates” (C.E., p.248).  There is within 
the élan the need to live and know, and like Plotinus, Bergson thinks the “theory of 
knowledge and theory of life are inseparable” (C.E., p.xiii) because “the act of knowing 
coincides with the act generating reality” (Mélanges, p.774).  For Bergson, mind and 
matter are opposing tendencies conceived as two aspects of the élan vital, co-existing 
as an undifferentiated unity that is “an immensity of potentiality” (C.E., p.258 and 
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p.269); therefore, as God appears to be dependent on matter for its existence, 
commentators accused him of failing to account for the genesis of matter,86 
unsurprisingly prompting multiple accusations of pantheism.  Bergson was adamant he 
had been misunderstood, and in 1908 following a critical article by Tonquédec, 
published in Etudes, he replied to him by letter.  He stated that in Creative Evolution, 
he refers to God as being the source from which two élans develop alternately; God is 
therefore distinct from them, and as such, we cannot say it comes to a sudden end or 
that it is at the mercy of the materiality that it had to give itself.  Furthermore, he 
suggested his refutation of the idea of “nothing” is not to deny a transcendent source, 
but to assert something has always existed (Mélanges pp.766-767).87  In Creative 
Evolution, Bergson develops Plotinus’ argument that space, or place is not prior to the 
One, claiming that because all action is geared towards “creating something that does 
not yet exist” (C.E., p. 273) the mind habitually forms the idea that something comes 
from nothing and due to the intellect’s tendency to spatialise, “being is superimposed 
on nothing” (C.E., p. 276); hence philosophies that prioritise nothing over ‘being’.  
Whereas we tend to think there is less in the idea of nothing, than in the idea of 
something, in fact, by making it non-existent we automatically add existence to it; 
hence there is more in the idea of nothing than the idea of something.  For Bergson the 
idea of nothing is an illusion of our understanding because we are always conscious of 
something, whether it is outside of us or within.  “A suppression of everything is never 
                                                            
86  Mullarkey, 2000, pp. 80-82. Mullarkey notes that the origin of matter is “ambiguous” in 
     Bergson: “Matter is sometimes opposed to life, sometimes to ‘spirit’ or consciousness and 
sometimes to the élan vital (the latter four being made equivalent).  Alternatively, life is also 
regarded as a primitive, holding matter and spirit as potential forms within itself.” 
 
87  «Je parle de Dieu (pp.268-272 de l’Évolution créatrice) comme de la source d’où sortent 
     tour à tour, par un effet de sa liberté, les « courants » ou « élans » dont chacun formera un 
     monde : il en reste donc distinct, et ce n’est pas de lui qu’on peut dire que « le plus souvent il 
     tourne court », ou qu’il soit « à la merci de la matérialité qu’il a du se donner ». 
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formed by thought” (C.E., p.279).  As soon as we try to annihilate an idea we affirm its 
real or possible existence.  In effect he is suggesting that when ‘thinking’ “not-being is 
not” it entails that “not-being is”, though the view that a negative existential claim 
entails the existence of its referent can certainly be challenged.  Like Plotinus, he also 
refutes the idea of the first principle having a purely logical existence, because an 
axiom or definition as per Spinoza or Leibniz has no independent physical or 
psychological existence, thus leaving no room for freedom within efficient causality 
(C.E., pp.275-298).  Efficient causality is essentially the creation of novelty, and like 
Plotinus, the first principle is ultimately free because everything that follows is 
dependent upon it as the primary and efficient cause.88  For Bergson then, there must be 
an independent transcendent cause, and whilst in his reply to Tonquédec he 
acknowledged that he failed to convey its nature in Creative Evolution, he also denies 
stating that it is the world itself, because the book “explicitly affirms the contrary” 
(Mélanges, pp.766-767). 
In his Huxley Lecture on ‘Life and Consciousness’, delivered to the University of 
Birmingham in May 1911, Bergson states: “We may surmise that these two realities, 
matter and consciousness, are derived from a common source” but neither can be 
explained apart from the other (M. E., p.23), and in January 1912, Tonquédec published 
an article entitled ‘M. Bergson est-il moniste?’ (Tonquédec, 1912, p.296), prompting 
Bergson to strongly refute any accusation of monism or pantheism.  Bergson argued 
that his work leading up to Creative Evolution clearly points to the idea of God as a 
creator, freely generating both matter and life, but whose creative effort is continued in 
the realm of life by the evolution of species and the constitution of human personalities.  
Bergson suggested that an investigation of moral problems would be necessary to 
                                                            
88  The concept of freedom will be examined in Chapters 8 (Plotinus) and 9 (Bergson) 
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develop these conclusions more precisely (Mélanges, pp.963-964).  His position was 
further clarified by H. Wildon Carr, whose translation of the book Mind-Energy, a 
compilation of Bergson’s lectures and essays, was authorised and approved by Bergson 
and published in 1920.  In his ‘Introduction’ he states: 
 
But although the term Mind-Energy does not, and is not intended to, imply a 
physical concept of mind, yet it is meant to imply, and does depend upon, a 
metaphysical concept.  Mind is not a vis vitae convertible into vis inertiae.  
Equally impossible is it to conceive an ultimate dualism, - mind and matter as 
the co-existence of two independent realms of reality.  Mind and matter are 
divergent tendencies; they point to an original and necessary dichotomy; they 
are opposite in direction; but they are mutually complementary and imply the 
unity of an original impulse. (M.E., ‘Introduction’, p.vii) 
   
It was not until 1932 that Bergson developed the theme of evolution within a 
moral, religious and therefore social context in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion and clarified his thoughts on the nature of God in his investigation of mystical 
experience, claiming the mystic reveals the origin of the élan vital as God.  He remains 
undecided as to whether the élan vital is God or God’s effort to create: 
 
In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, 
consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself 
manifests.  This effort is of God, if it is not God himself. (T.S.M.R., p.220)  
 
What should we make of this?  If God is the creative effort, life manifests God; and if 
the creative effort is of God, life manifests God’s creative effort, and therefore God is 
distinct from his creative effort and hence life.  The difficulty is exacerbated because 
Bergson often equates the vital impulse with life.  Furthermore, “The vital impulse is a 
creative emotion” (T.S.M.R., p.95) and “Creative energy is to be defined as love” 
(T.S.M.R., p.257), but “Divine love is not a thing of God; it is God himself” (T.S.M.R., 
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p.252).  From this we can deduce that the vital impulse is the creative emotion defined 
as love which is God.  God is the vital impulse, i.e. life, and therefore is not distinct 
from it.  Accusations of pantheism and monism therefore continued even after 
publication of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.  Mossé-Bastide suggests we 
must eliminate the concept of substance monism from Bergson because “there is no 
substance in Bergsonism”, referring to Creative Evolution in which he states: "there are 
no things, only actions" (Mossé-Bastide, 1959, pp.354-355).89  This will be 
demonstrated in the explanation of the ontological and epistemological transformation 
of the élan vital.90  
There is a second aspect to God in the Two Sources; God is distinct from beings 
(T.S.M.R., p.257) but acts through the soul of the mystic, supplying a 
“superabundance” of energy that “flows from the spring which is the very source of 
life” (T.S.M.R., p.232); “God is this energy itself”, and God’s nature is “an energy to 
which no limit can be assigned, and a power of creating and loving that surpasses all 
imagination” (T.S.M.R., p.262).  Finally, we distinctly hear the echo of Plotinus’ One; a 
God with a superabundance of energy that flows like a spring, which appears to be 
different to the élan vital of Creative Evolution that he refers to as an “explosive force” 
that is given once and for all (C.E., p.98).  There is however an important difference 
between Bergson’s God and Plotinus’ One; whereas the One of Plotinus is self-
sufficient, Bergson’s God in the Two Sources is needy.  He does not propose teleology 
in terms of predetermined design with a final purpose but supports a partial teleology in 
that God has an impulse, or a “need”, to reproduce and evolve in a form that requires a 
freely chosen process of change, creation and growth. “God needs us, just as we need 
                                                            
89  See: ‘Philosophical Intuition’, in C.M., p.127 and ‘Perception of Change’, in C.M., p.148. 
90  Section 5.3, p.157. 
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God.  Why should He need us unless it be to love us?” (T.S.M.R., p.255).  This need is 
expressed in life’s most fully evolved form, man, operating through the motives of love 
and ambition:  
  
…he who is sure, absolutely sure, of having produced a work which will endure 
and live, cares no more for praise and feels above glory, because he is a creator, 
because he knows it, because the joy he feels is the joy of a god. (M.E., p.30) 
 
Merleau-Ponty captures the essence of this aspect of Bergson’s God in The Two 
Sources: 
 
It is the doubling of nature into an irreconcilable natura naturans and natura 
naturata which in the Two Sources actualizes the distinction between God and 
his action upon the world that remained virtual in the previous works.  It is true 
that Bergson does not say Deus sive Natura, but the reason why he does not is 
that God is a different nature.  At the very moment he definitively disengages 
the “transcendent cause” from its “terrestrial delegation”, it is still the word 
nature which falls from his pen.  From this point forward, all that was truly 
active and creative in the world is concentrated in God, and the world ends up 
as nothing but a “stopping point” or “created thing”. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 
189)   
 
Mossé-Bastide makes the point that as it is the key element in Bergson’s philosophy we 
can take duration in two ways, either as an evolution of unpredictable novelty, even for 
God, or “as the creation of a kind of dynamic schema of creative emotion that reigns, 
one and indivisible throughout its deployment”.  She continues: 
   
It is this second interpretation, directly derived from the philosophy of Plotinus, 
which appears to us to be true. …  The last word is always Bergsonian duration, 
but a duration that is rooted in the philosophy of Plotinus. (Mossé-Bastide, 
1959, p.355) 
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In stating that Bergson’s duration is rooted in the philosophy of Plotinus, Mossé-Bastide 
notes that Bergson is more specifically influenced by the durational nature of Plotinus’ 
concept of the World Soul that constantly changes whilst retaining its identity, and she 
points to The Two Sources of Morality and Religion where Bergson refers to the 
difference between materiality and divine spirituality as “the distinction between being 
created and creating, between the multifarious notes, strung like pearls of a symphony 
and the indivisible emotion from which they sprang” (T.S.M.R., p. 256). 
Since Bergson denied that his philosophy is pantheistic because God as creator 
remains distinct from its creations, it is suggested that it can be placed in the category of 
panentheism, which is defined as the view that God is in all things, but not identical to 
all things (Audi, 2005, p.640). 
The philosophy of Plotinus as well as other Neoplatonists was also interpreted as 
pantheism by the Catholic Church in the late nineteenth century.  In John Hunt’s book 
Pantheism and Christianity (1884) he refers to the whole of Greek philosophy, 
including Neoplatonism, under the heading of Pantheism.91  While there is little 
disagreement about the separate identity of the One in the emanation process or descent, 
the debate around Plotinus’ theism largely centres around the mystical union of the soul 
with the One, and there appear to be three positions taken by commentators: the first is 
theistic union (Rist, 1977; 1989); the second, monistic identity (Bréhier, 1958; Hadot, 
1986; Hatab; 1982; Irwin, 1989; Mamo, 1976), and the third argues for a mystical union 
that is mediated epistemologically by Intellect (Arp, 2004; Inge, 1929; Merlan, 1963; 
Katz, 1978).  Rist makes the distinction between the first two positions as follows: 
 
                                                            
91  Hunt, 1884.  Plotinus is specifically addressed on pp.89-96.  
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By "theistic mysticism" I refer to the explanation of mystical experiences in 
terms of the union of the soul with a transcendent being: the theistic mystic 
insists that despite his experience of union, the soul and that transcendent being 
cannot "ultimately," or "in the last resort," be identical.  By a "monistic" 
explanation I mean an explanation given by a man who believes that he is 
"ultimately" identical with God, the One, the Absolute, or whatever such name 
he gives to the first cause of the universe.  (Rist, 1989, p.184) 
 
Arp argues that while both camps believe that the noetic part of the soul is transcended 
in mystical union itself whilst retaining its identity, there is a difference between the 
ontological and epistemological perspective.  While the One retains its ontological 
distinctness, epistemologically Plotinus equates the One with Intellect: 
 
… there seems to be reluctance on Plotinus's part wholly to divorce the activity 
of Nous from the One.  (Arp, 2004, p.157) 
  
While the “monistic identity” interpretation would place Plotinus within the 
category of pantheism, that God is identical with all things, the view that Plotinus was a 
pantheist is rejected by most modern commentators on Plotinus.  Armstrong for 
example, writes: 
 
It is…the sharp differentiation between the human soul or self, with its power of 
realizing its unity with the Supreme, and the separation of the visible cosmos, 
which most clearly makes it impossible to call Plotinus a pantheist, or to 
exaggerate the importance of the doctrine of the Infinite Self.  (Armstrong, 
2013, p.43) 
  
Rist’s theistic mysticism is compatible with panentheism, the view that God is in all 
things, but not identical to all things, and Cooper comments that since Plotinus makes 
“clear ontological distinctions” between the One, Intellect and Soul, it is a case of 
“classical panentheism” (Cooper, 2007, pp.42-43). 
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The third position, which acknowledges the ontological distinctness of the One 
but argues for epistemological union, leaves a question mark over the nature of 
Plotinus’ theism.  
In his early career, Bergson appears to consider the subject solely from an 
ontological perspective and held a pantheistic view of Neoplatonism, whilst rejecting 
Pythagoreanism as pantheistic.  In his lecture on ‘The Pythagoreans’ delivered at the 
Université de Clermont-Ferrand between 1884 and 1885, he rejects the emergence of 
multiplicity from an original unity as being Pythagorean; instead he links it to the later 
philosophy of the Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists: 
 
According to the Neopythagoreans and the Neoplatonists, Pythagoras would 
have identified the One with Divinity. … It is certain that the Pythagoreans 
recognised multiple gods, while following to a certain extent the direction of 
monotheism, which was so important in philosophy starting from Xenophanes.  
We therefore reject it as being like a neo-Platonic theory, the idea of the 
development of God in the world, of a division, an emanation of the original 
unity giving birth to the oppositions of the one and the many. This is a 
pantheistic theory which the Pythagoreans probably never considered. (Hude, 
2000, p. 187)92 
 
In note 54 of Bergson’s lecture, Hude comments: “Bergson never varies in his 
opposition to this kind of representation and of pantheism in general” (Hude, 2000, p. 
274).93  It is suggested that Bergson fails to make the distinction between pantheism and 
panentheism, and as discussed above, the issue is one of identity.  It was explained in 
Chapter 3 that the Pythagoreans, Neopythagoreans and Neoplatonists considered the 
original unity (the One) to be prior to number and not identical to it.  The One is the 
One, not the One-many, which is for Plotinus the second Hypostasis, Intellect, (Ennead 
                                                            
92  Appendix 2, p. 7 
93  Appendix 2, p.11 
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V.4.1, 23) or the ‘one and many’ which is Soul (Ennead VI.9.1, 39).  If pantheism is the 
view that God is identical with all things, and panentheism is the view that God is in all 
things, but not identical to all things, then Bergson was mistaken; the Neopythagoreans 
and Neoplatonists were not pantheists.  This view is accepted by most modern 
commentators on Plotinus.  Armstrong for example writes: 
 
It is…the sharp differentiation between the human soul or self, with its power of 
realizing its unity with the Supreme, and the separation of the visible cosmos, 
which most clearly makes it impossible to call Plotinus a pantheist, or to 
exaggerate the importance of the doctrine of the Infinite Self.  (Armstrong, 
2013, p.43)94 
 
If we consider that Bergson’s Pythagorean lecture was given in the early days of his 
philosophical studies, I think we can accept it as a simple misunderstanding that he later 
corrected, because he amended his views regarding Plotinus.  In his ‘Lectures on 
Plotinus’, presented at the École Normale Supérieure between 1898 and 1899, he states: 
“If the system seems to demand a pantheistic derivation, Plotinus expresses himself in 
terms which exclude this derivation” (Hude, 2000, p.63).95  So, for Bergson, the 
Pythagoreans and Plotinus ultimately present a non-pantheist philosophy in which the 
First Principle remains distinct from but present within its products; a position that is 
fully in accordance with his own, even though it took many years for him to clarify it. 
It is possible that the Pythagorean influence can be found more directly in 
Bergson in some of the metaphors he uses, for example, he refers to the élan vital as the 
“breath of life” (C.E. p.100; T.S.M.R., pp.11, 134, 311 and 312), and while this could 
                                                            
94  See also: Rist, 1977, p.216; Copleston, 1993, p.467; Corrigan, 2005, pp.185-6 
95  Appendix 4, p. 40 
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simply be referring to the Bible, Genesis 2.7,96 it could be the breath of life associated 
with Pythagoreanism.  It must be remembered that Bergson’s primary source of 
information on the Pythagoreans was Aristotle and Boutroux’s translation of Zeller’s 
Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung.  Kahn refers to 
Aristotle, Physics IV, 6, 213b 22, and comments, for the Pythagoreans: 
  
Cosmogony begins as the numbers are generated, when the Unlimited is drawn 
in (or “breathed in”) by the limiting principle.  Thus the cosmos arises from the 
One by breathing, like a newborn animal. (Kahn, 2001, p.29) 
 
Zhmud claims that this idea arises in sixth century natural philosophy, but it is 
incompatible with Philolaus’ concepts of limiting and unlimited that are united by 
cosmic harmony (Zhmud, 1998, p.6).  Zeller also rejected the notion of a breathing 
cosmos as being Pythagorean (Zeller, 1881, p.473); however, we must consider Hude’s 
comment: “Bergson uses Zeller as a template and builds his bibliographic information 
on it; that does not mean that he simply repeats Zeller and works second-hand” (Hude, 
2000, pp.11, note 5).  The evidence suggests we can only speculate on Bergson’s 
‘breath of life’ as having a Pythagorean origin; however, there is another possible 
Pythagorean link when he links his God metaphorically with “fire”.  He claims it is by 
studying the lives of the mystics and striving to experience what they experience, that 
we may penetrate by an act of intuition to the life principle itself: 
 
To pierce the mystery of the deep, it is sometimes necessary to regard the 
heights.  It is earth’s hidden fire [my emphasis] which appears at the summit of 
the volcano. (‘Life and Consciousness’, in M.E., p.32) 
 
                                                            
96  “And the LORD God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils 
the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” 
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It is not unreasonable to link it to the ‘central fire’ of Philolaus if we consider the other 
similarities in their first principle, as well as the appearance of other Pythagorean 
metaphors in his work.97  
It is suggested that the Pythagoreans, Plotinus and Bergson can be placed in the 
category of panentheism providing Plotinus was correct in interpreting the Pythagorean 
Monad from a Platonic perspective; although for the purpose of determining the 
Pythagorean influence on Plotinus, his accuracy on this point is irrelevant.  
Significantly, they all propose the unity of a first principle that remains distinct from, 
but active within, its products.  
The next stage in understanding the generation of multiplicity in Bergson is to 
establish the nature of the mechanism of the élan vital and hence duration.   
  
 
 
5.2.   The Nature and Mechanism of the Élan Vital 
 
 
 
Bergson follows Plotinus in adopting a ‘top-down’ approach where God functions, as 
does Plotinus’ One, as the energy source for the generative process, and for Bergson 
the élan vital functions as does the radiation from the One, as the form of 
superabundant energy that unceasingly creates a continuous or “uninterrupted upsurge 
of novelty” (‘Introduction I’, in C.M., p.18).   However, even renowned Bergson 
scholars have found Bergson’s cosmology problematical and have failed to understand 
and therefore explain it as being a logical process.  The tendency is to either repeat 
what Bergson says in his texts, ignore it entirely because of its perceived obscurity, or 
acknowledge the overriding mystery surrounding it; Keith Ansell Pearson, for example, 
                                                            
97  These will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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refers to the operation of the élan vital as “a mysterious conception … which is 
ultimately based on a hylomorphic model” (Ansell Pearson, 2006, p.158).  The 
generation of multiplicity as matter and form in Bergson therefore demands an 
explanation. 
While the élan vital is analogous to the radiation from the One because it contains 
an undifferentiated multiplicity, for Bergson consciousness98 and matter are pre-
requisites for existence. In Matter and Memory he proposed: 
 
existence …  appears to imply two conditions taken together: (1) presentation in 
consciousness; and (2) the logical or causal connection of that which is so 
presented with what precedes and with what follows. (M.M., p.189) 
 
Hence, we find in all Bergson’s works that the generation of novelty requires the 
interaction of two opposing but complementary tendencies, described in The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion as being formed according to the “law of dichotomy”: 
  
Now we must not make exaggerated use of the word "law" in a field which is 
that of liberty, but we may use this convenient term when we are confronted 
with important facts which show sufficient regularity.  So we will call law of 
dichotomy that law which apparently brings about a materialization, by a mere 
splitting up, of tendencies which began by being two photographic views, so to 
speak, of one and the same tendency. (T.S.M.R, p.296) 
 
This passage emphasises “regularity” in the process, and in Creative Evolution Bergson 
states that duration, multiplicity, the universe and organic life within it “is a kind of 
mechanism”, and a mechanism of the whole (C.E., p.31; p.263).  Mullarkey comments 
that it is a “movement” that is ordered, rather than “the mechanism of parts artificially 
                                                            
98  It must be clarified that for Bergson consciousness or mind is not a state of the brain, which 
    he refers to as the ‘organ of attention to life’; the function of the brain is to direct mental life 
    into bodily movement or ‘efficacious action’ (‘The Soul and the Body’, in M.E., pp.37-74). 
    The élan vital does not possess a brain, and its function has no practical utility. 
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isolated within the whole universe” (Mullarkey, 2000, p.74).  This idea underlies 
Bergson’s assertion that there is no disorder, just orders of a different kind; order in 
time and order in space.  The necessity of order is noted by Lorend: 
 
Bergson does not explicitly state it, but necessity is an important characteristic 
of order in two senses: 1) …, that the existence of some kind of order is 
necessary; 2) in the sense that although no particular order is necessary in itself, 
every order constitutes necessities. (Lorend, 1992, p.580) 
 
Bergson considers the notion of ‘disorder’, like the notion of ‘nothing’, to be the cause 
of unresolvable problems of knowledge; disorder is: 
 
the disappointment of a mind that finds before it an order different from what 
it wants, an order with which it is not concerned at the moment, and which, in 
this sense, does not exist for it …it represents nothing at all … reality is 
ordered exactly to the degree to which it satisfies our thought. (C.E., pp.222-
223) 
 
Hence, for Bergson there are two kinds of order and two modes of thinking them: the 
dynamic order is thought by intuition in time or duration, and the static order by 
intellect in space. 
While Mullarkey notes Bergson’s ambiguity about the genesis of matter 
(Mullarkey, 2000, p.82), he suggests that William E. May provides the definitive 
analysis on the subject: 
 
…, the élan precontains both consciousness and matter as interpenetrating 
virtualities, and it gives rise to both in the course of its actualisation, in the 
course of giving rise to what is other than itself. (May, 1970, p.634)  
 
May’s comment that the élan gives ‘rise to what is other than itself’ refers to Bergson’s 
concept of unity as one-many.  In the sense that the élan is one it is always itself and 
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therefore is always the same, and in the sense that the élan is many, a heterogeneous 
multiplicity, it is other than itself.  This is replicated in our own psychical life in which 
we find a unity that is at the same time a continuity of temporal variation: “a moving 
continuity is given to us, in which everything changes and yet remains the same” 
(M.M, p.260).   In Creative Evolution Bergson states: 
 
there is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and 
persisting in the same state.  If the state which remains the same is more varied 
than we think, on the other hand the passing from one state to another 
resembles, more than we imagine, a single state prolonged; the transition is 
continuous. (C.E, p.248) 
 
In his account of continuous transformation Bergson therefore conflates identity and 
changes of state by proposing that there is identity in difference.  The original élan has 
same and other as potential tendencies that are unified within it; however, the passing 
from one state to another also implies movement and rest, terms that describe 
consciousness and matter respectively as both possessing dual aspects that are static 
and dynamic.  As opposing features of the complementary tendencies within the 
original élan, Bergson’s concepts of same, other, motion and rest fulfil the same 
function as Plotinus’ primary kinds, the unified potentialities within the indefinite dyad 
and as actualities in Being.99   
Let us return to the mechanism that is implicit in the generation of multiplicity.  
In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion God is the originating source of the 
energy of the élan vital supplying, as it is required, a “superabundance” of energy 
(T.S.M.R., p.232), analogous to the radiation of Plotinus’ One.  The generation of 
multiplicity therefore begins with a source of power, and in Creative Evolution Bergson 
                                                            
99  Chapter 3.2, p.67. 
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refers to initial movement is an “explosive force”, given once and for all, and that it is 
created “due to an unstable balance of tendencies – which life bears within itself” (C.E., 
p.98).  He uses a number of metaphors to explain the initial movement or impulsion 
and subsequent division of the élan vital: an artillery shell that bursts into fragments 
(C.E., p.98); consciousness as a jet of steam under high pressure that condenses into 
little drops that fall (C.E., p.247) and rockets in a firework display whose extinguished 
fragments fall back as matter (C.E., p.261).  In Creative Evolution, the élan vital is both 
the explosion and the explosive (C.E., p.115); however, he refers to it as: 
 
… a limited force, which is always seeking to transcend itself and always 
remains inadequate to the work it would fain produce. (C.E., p.126) 
 
For Bergson the ascending movement or explosion includes the undifferentiated 
tendencies of consciousness and matter, and while metaphors of steam and fireworks 
describe the initial and subsequent movement as ascending and descending, he suggests 
that after the initial explosion of energy, the movement of the élan vital, which is 
unlimited in its original impetus, is interrupted; it loses its power and becomes limited, 
in the way that the light from a firework fades as it burns up its fuel or when raising an 
arm, it falls back by itself as soon as the will to keep it up is diminished (C.E., p.247).  
In Creative Evolution the élan vital, which Bergson refers to as “God”, is “unceasing 
life, action, freedom” (C.E., p.248), and we must understand that according to his 
definition of freedom it means that the élan vital is originally conscious or awake and 
possesses a ‘will’ to create (C.E., p.270; M.E., p.155).  On its interruption, which 
Bergson associates with a ‘deficiency of will’ or a relaxation of attention, it effectively 
becomes unconscious matter; however, he also suggests that when left to itself, a raised 
arm will fall back, but in “striving to raise it up again”, it retains “something of the will 
that animates it” (C.E., p.247); hence the élan vital is not completely exhausted.  
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Drawing on Deleuze (Deleuze, 1991, p.104), Ansell Pearson comments that the élan 
vital is: 
a limited force or power in need of actualisation: it is given as a simple virtual 
(of tendencies) but never given as a virtual whole that is always being 
actualised.  As an original impulsion it must be finite though capable of 
potentially infinite transformation. … the finite and infinite are not being 
conceived numerically …but rather in terms of limited and unlimited. (Ansell-
Pearson, 2002, p.96) 
 
Like Plotinus, Bergson utilises the Pythagorean concepts of the unlimited and limiting, 
explained in Chapter 2 as ‘pre-existing’ powers to act; the active power to limit and the 
passive power to be limited.   This describes perfectly what happens to sound; after the 
initial sound explosion it reaches a peak then loses energy, a process which in the 
science of acoustics is called ‘attack and decay’ (Gunther, 2012, p.52).  According to 
Bergson’s theory the ‘attack’ or ascending movement would include the 
undifferentiated tendencies of consciousness and matter: consciousness has the passive 
power to be limited, and which is actually limited at the peak by matter because it 
congeals or becomes static, a limitation Bergson associates with a lack of 
consciousness or a deficiency of will that may be considered as ‘decay’.  Bergson states 
that: “Extension … appears only as a tension which is interrupted” (C.E., p.245):  He 
also refers to the interruption as ‘inversion’, which refers to matter in its dynamic form 
as an independent tendency that descends, a movement in the opposite direction to 
consciousness. 
 
What, then, is the principle that has only to let go its tension—may we say to 
detend—in order to extend, the interruption of the cause here being equivalent 
to a reversal of the effect? For want of a better word we have called it 
consciousness. But we do not mean the narrowed consciousness that functions 
in each of us. (C.E., p.237) 
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there are then two processes opposite in their direction, and we pass from the 
first to the second by way of inversion, or perhaps even by simple interruption, 
if it is true that inversion and interruption are two terms which in this case must 
be held to be synonymous. (C.E., p.201) 
 
The ascending and descending movement described in Creative Evolution becomes a 
swinging of a pendulum in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (T.S.M.R., 
p.292).  In physics the movement of a pendulum is known as ‘simple harmonic 
motion’, the most elementary oscillatory system that is called ‘harmonic’ because it is 
linked to sound vibrations; therefore, it is appropriate for illustrating Bergson’s 
movement of consciousness, as was done for Plotinus in Chapter 3.  Figure 17 
illustrates that when considered as standing waves that generate harmonics between 
two nodes, God is the first node and the élan vital is the forward movement of energy 
that generates the second node, which for Bergson would be matter as interruption.  
The inversion illustrates the tendency of matter to form closed systems in its return to 
the original position, as in the return swing of a pendulum.  These two initial 
movements of the élan vital occur temporally, hence a before and after, forming the 
basis of a supra-consciousness or impersonal memory that is the origin of life (C.E., 
p.261).  As such it represents the first vibration or duration of the élan vital that can be 
considered the ‘fundamental’ or first harmonic. 
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The Creation of Memory (Figure 17) 
 
 
Bergson’s mechanism of impulsion and inversion effectively replicates Plotinus’ 
movements of procession and reversion that creates Intellect, the ‘Form of the First 
Forms’, as illustrated in Figure 7.100   
At this early stage in the generative process it is important to note an apparent 
contradiction in Bergson’s account of the extent of the élan vital consciousness.  If the 
élan vital possesses a ‘will’ to create and is “unceasing life, action, freedom” (C.E., 
p.248), features that Bergson associates with consciousness, how it is possible for the 
tendencies it contains undifferentiated to be merely virtual?  This is an issue that 
Bergson does not address; however, he appears to be adopting Plotinus’ notion of the 
inchoate Intellect that in its initial procession from and reversion to the One, is “sight 
not yet seeing”, which means that is not self-conscious or conscious of its act of 
thinking.  The following section will explore how, in the generation of life, these 
movements become self-conscious and are related to the movement of the mind that is 
implicit in Bergson’s concept of philosophical intuition. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
100  Chapter 3.2, p.73. 
157 
 
5.3   The Ontological and Epistemological Transformation of the Élan Vital 
 
 
 
In Creative Evolution, the model Bergson proposes for his cosmology comes from 
biological knowledge and theories of his day.  He notes that the process of biological 
evolution demonstrates a chronological succession among species in which complex 
forms of life evolve from more simple ones, and that in the domain of life we find 
complex forms developing when a single cell divides into two, and these in turn 
continue to divide into cells that associate to form different organs in the body (C.E., 
p.260).  Basically, all life begins as one and remains united as it becomes many in a 
process of self-generation and transformation through division and association.  It will 
however be argued that like Plotinus, harmonic motion is the mechanism Bergson 
adopts to account for the ontological and epistemological transformation of the élan 
vital. 
Bergson proposes that the élan vital functions as it does in our own psychical life, 
that is, according to the movement of consciousness implicit in his concept of 
philosophical intuition.  While he is not explicit in describing his cosmology as the 
generation of harmonics, it is noteworthy that when discussing the nature of parallelism 
of the mind and body in Mind-Energy, he implies that his philosophical method 
generates ideas in the form of harmonics: 
  
These four ideas themselves imply a great number of others, which it would be 
interesting to analyse in their turn, because they would be found to be, in a kind 
of way, so many harmonics, the fundamental tone of which is the thesis of 
parallelism. (‘Brain and Thought’, in M.E., p.254)101 
 
                                                            
101  Similarly, when discussing the play of ideas in intellectual effort he suggests that ‘these 
      mental oscillations have their sensory harmonics’ (‘Intellectual Effort’ in M.E., p.222).  
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It is only a sentence; however, it provides a ground from which we can hypothesise that 
the élan vital also generates harmonics, since Bergson claimed the cosmological 
process replicates his method of philosophical intuition that “bears above all on internal 
duration” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.32): 
 
The matter and life which fill the world are equally within us; the forces which 
work in all things we feel within ourselves; whatever may be the inner essence 
of what is and what is done, we are of that essence. (‘Philosophical Intuition’, in 
C.M., p.124) 
 
Furthermore, in a speech to the Société Française de la Philosophie, given in 1908 he 
stated: 
 
One of the objects of Creative Evolution is to show that All is ... of the same 
nature as the I, and that one grasps it by a more and more complete immersion 
in oneself. (Mélanges, p.774) 
 
Similarly, in Creative Evolution: “intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life 
itself” (C.E., p. 268), which suggests that because we obtain knowledge of 
psychological duration using this method, it can also reveal that the generative activity 
of the élan vital is an act of self-organisation.  
It was argued that Bergson regards the generation of multiplicity as harmonic 
motion, as in the forwards and backwards motion of a pendulum, and in his account of 
philosophical intuition he describes it as a reversal of thought that is essentially an act 
of self-consciousness in which intellect turns in on itself as an act of vision that is not 
directly aimed at action.  It is a “direct vision of the mind by the mind” (C.M., p.42),102 
                                                            
102  See also C.E., p.196; ‘The Perception of Change’, in C.M., p.138, where Bergson 
      Considers the act of intuition to be like that of the artist who is not focused on action but 
      Simply “perceives in order to perceive”; In ‘Soul and Body’ in M.E., p.43, Bergson refers  
      to consciousness as “a faculty of observation”.    
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thus replicating Plotinus’ act of contemplation that begins the generative process with 
an act of vision subsequent to the procession and reversion of the inchoate Intellect as 
“sight not yet seeing”.  Bergson refers to the movement to the interior as “reflection” 
(‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.88), as illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
The Reflection of the Elan Vital (Figure 18) 
 
 
 
 
Bergson refers to the movement of intuition as “the attention the mind gives to itself, 
over and above, while fixed upon matter, its object” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.79) 
and it is “self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it 
indefinitely” (C.E., p.176), and while this has epistemological implications which will 
soon be explained, for now let us focus on the movement itself.  If we return to 
Bergson’s pendulum, the reflection is interrupted by matter and by following the 
direction of the arrows in Figure 19 below, it can be seen that the second inversion 
crosses the initial reflection, generating a node that enables the two élans to generate 
alternately, as he claims in his 1908 letter to Tonquédec.103 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103  See: p.139. 
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The Alternate Generation of Consciousness and Matter (Figure 19) 
 
 
 
Alternate generation is also a theme Bergson continues in The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion where he proposes: “the tendencies, born of the process of splitting, … 
can be developed only in succession” because there is a continual progress in the 
movement from one to the other (T.S.M.R., p.295).  Therefore, it is the inversion of 
matter that is responsible for the actualisation of itself and of consciousness as 
individual durations or tendencies: 
 
Contact with matter is what determines this dissociation. Matter divides actually 
what was but potentially manifold; and, in this sense, individuation is in part the 
work of matter, in part the result of life's own inclination. (C.E., p.258) 
 
It is only in seeing consciousness run through matter, lose itself there and find 
itself again, divide and reconstitute itself, that we shall form an idea of the 
mutual opposition of the two terms, as also of their common origin. (C.E., 
p.178-179) 
 
In reflection the material object is seen as durational.  The object, and therefore 
knowledge of the object, becomes enlarged with an intense focus the attention.  The 
colours used in Figure 19 also help to demonstrate how the élan vital as supra-
consciousness becomes aware of difference or the fan-wise growth within itself as a 
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temporal process.  Following the colour of the direction of the tendencies, or simply 
considering the nodes themselves explains Bergson’s example provided in The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion: 
   
Let us imagine that orange is the only colour that has as yet made its appearance 
in the world. Would it be already a composite of yellow and red? Obviously not. 
But it will have been composed of yellow and red when these two colours are 
born in their turn; from that hour the original orange colour can be looked at 
from the twofold point of view of red and yellow; and if we supposed, by a trick 
of fancy, that yellow and red appeared through an intensification of orange, we 
should have a very simple example of what we call fan-wise growth. (T.S.M.R., 
p.294) 
 
Reminiscent of Plotinus, the crossing or coincidence of consciousness and matter is a 
phenomenon that Bergson refers to as “fan-wise growth”, which demonstrates a 
common source for all things.  In his psychology of intuition, he emphasises the 
importance of placing ourselves at the mid-point where consciousness and matter 
coincide.  At this point the élan vital will experience itself as a continuous, qualitative 
heterogeneous multiplicity because it is aware of all three colours simultaneously either 
differentiated or integrated within its consciousness, which explains why he refers to his 
philosophical method of intuition as the operation of “differentiations and qualitative 
integrations” (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.191).  He provides an example 
of how it functions within his act of vision in Duration and Simultaneity: 
 
I call two flows “contemporaneous” when they are equally one or two for my 
consciousness, the latter perceiving them together as a single flowing if it sees 
fit to engage in an undivided act of attention, and, on the other hand, separating 
them throughout if it prefers to divide its attention between them, even doing 
both at one and the same time if it decides to divide its attention and yet not cut 
it in two.  (D.S., p.35) 
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For Bergson, reflection is therefore not pure thinking or idea; it is an immediate 
experience that determines differences in kind.  He states its consciousness would: 
 
…follow purely and simply the thread of experience …  Such a mind would 
see facts succeed facts, states succeed states, things succeed things. What it 
would notice at each moment would be things existing, states appearing, events 
happening.  It would live in the actual, and even if it were capable of judging, it 
would never affirm anything except the existence of the present. 
    Endow this mind with memory, and especially with the desire to dwell on 
the past; give it a faculty of dissociating and of distinguishing; it will no 
longer only note the present state of the passing reality; it will represent the 
passing as a change, and therefore a contrast between what has been and what 
is.  (C.E., p.294) 
 
Gouhier proposes that we should not consider Bergson to be influenced here by Maine 
de Biran who referred to his method of introspection as reflection; Biran’s reflection 
and Bergson’s intuition are very different psychological experiences.  While Biran’s 
reflection depends on the experience of effort that limits the self to knowledge of its 
phenomenal states, the inner experience needs an act of faith to transcend it; however, 
Bergson’s intuition is the perception of duration as immediate experience, prolonging 
psychological experience into the metaphysical (Gouhier, 1948).  Mullarkey explains 
Bergson’s reflection on ‘the other’ and the contact or coincidence arising from that 
reflection as a “passing through rather than aiming” that provides “partial knowledge” 
of the whole, not relative.  Furthermore, “the experience of the other is part of what it is 
to understand and reclaim one’s own alterity” (Mullarkey, 2000, p.95 and p.116).  The 
élan vital experiences itself as durational; it is conscious of its present experience 
which includes the presence of its past in its entirety, a ‘perpetual present’, a past-
present or present-past that can be prolonged indefinitely.  Bergson states that “the 
piling up of the past upon the past goes on without relaxation.  In reality, the past is 
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preserved by itself, automatically” (C.E., p.5); hence, as consciousness reflects on 
matter it retains its conscious states in an impersonal memory.   
  Like Plotinus, who generates Being before knowing, Bergson generates matter 
before the reflection on it; for both philosophers there is an asymmetrical relationship 
between being and knowing, and hence thinking and knowing.   
Let us now consider how matter and consciousness develop their own offspring.  
It has been demonstrated how Bergson’s ‘law of dichotomy’ splits the élan vital, as one 
tendency or impulsion into two; and Bergson suggests that these tendencies, now 
different in nature, develop in divergent directions, ‘fan-wise’ in the shape of a sheaf, 
with each tendency receiving a certain portion of the impetus (C.E., p.116; T.S.M.R., 
p.293-294).  If we return to Bergson’s pendulum, he states: 
 
All prolonged action, it would seem, brings about a reaction in the opposite 
direction. Then it starts anew, and the pendulum swings on indefinitely. …the 
pendulum is endowed with memory, and is not the same when it swings back 
as on the outward swing, since it is then richer by all the intermediate 
experience. (T.S.M.R., p.292)  
 
Following the second inversion, the élan vital swings back again and the process 
continues “indefinitely”; hence if we consider Bergson’s metaphors in Creative 
Evolution, the firework continually sends up rockets which illuminate the falling 
fragments (matter/inversion), and the will to raise the arm subsists, despite its fall.  The 
process of division is therefore essentially open or indefinite and he describes it in 
terms of a fractalisation of a shell: 
 
The evolution movement … proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly bursts 
into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into 
fragments destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long. 
(C.E., p.98) 
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It is an accurate metaphor for describing how, in the generation of harmonics each 
harmonic becomes a fundamental generating its own harmonics as an infinite series.  It 
is reasonable to deduce that this is what Bergson intended, especially as in Matter and 
Memory he joins the physicists of his day to consider matter as having an internal 
structure that consists in a ‘pervading concrete extensity, modifications, perturbations, 
changes of tension or energy and nothing else’ (M.M., p.266).  As such Bergson 
regards it as extensive rather than extended; we must not think of the vibrations of 
matter as vibrations in a medium, such as space; matter is these vibrations.  The French 
mathematician and music theorist Marin Mersenne had already described the equations 
for the frequency of oscillation of a stretched string or monochord in his work Traité de 
l'harmonie universelle (1637) and in 1807 Fourier discovered that any temporal wave 
that has a consistent repeating pattern or continuous function can be broken down into 
an infinite sum of simpler sine and cosine waves with differing amplitudes (Fourier, 
1808).  Garber explains how his work was “crucial …as a means of expressing all 
manner of wave phenomena and arbitrary functions that occur in physics and 
engineering” (Garber, 1999, p.112).  Helmholtz provided an illustration of the 
generation of harmonics similar to Figure 3 (p.47) in his work On the Sensations of 
Tone (Von Helmholtz, 1863, p.46).  It was therefore acknowledged mathematically that 
according to the law of harmonics the fundamental initially divides into two 
frequencies, and it makes sense of Bergson’s “law of dichotomy”, the law that 
presumably applies to consciousness and matter when each is a fundamental.  Matter 
generates harmonics within itself that represent qualitative differences external to the 
perceiving subject, and consciousness generates harmonics that represent differences of 
function and degree of consciousness in living beings.  Figure 20 illustrates that 
according to this law consciousness divides into intellect and instinct, which are 
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complementary tendencies or faculties whose ontological and epistemological 
functions differ. 
 
Consciousness, Matter and the Law of Dichotomy (Figure 20) 
 
 
 
Intellect thinks but does not know the durational nature of matter; hence it is 
characterised by its natural inability to comprehend life (C.E., p.165).  It divides the 
matter it perceives into extended objects in homogenous space, purely as an outward 
projection of the practical need to fix centres of action so it can interact and satisfy 
interests or needs, and it complements matter’s tendency to become spatialized because 
“intellect bears within itself, in the form of natural logic, a “latent geometrism”” (C.E., 
p.195), hence Bergson states: 
 
And as matter is determined by intelligence, as there is between them an evident 
agreement, we cannot make the genesis of the one without making the genesis 
of the other.  An identical process must have cut out matter and the intellect, at 
the same time, from a stuff that contained both. (C.E., p.199) 
 
The common form of matter and intellect implies for Bergson that “knowledge ceases to 
be a product of the intellect and becomes, in a certain sense, part and parcel of reality” 
(C.E., p.153).  In the above quotation the “stuff that contained both” is the élan vital as 
consciousness in general before it split into two separate tendencies.  While intellect has 
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knowledge of its object in terms of its spatiality or extension, instinct, on the other hand, 
has categorical or implicit knowledge of its material object in terms of its intension or 
internal vibration as a property (C.E., p.149-150).  Instinct therefore is a vital process; it 
distinguishes properties through sympathy with the whole; it feels but does not think 
because it acts its knowledge; therefore we cannot conflate the notion of thinking with 
knowledge.   
Bergson proposes “The two tendencies, at first implied in each other, had to 
separate in order to grow” (C.E., p.150); each fringe the other: 
 
There is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be 
discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of 
intelligence. (C.E., p.136) 
 
So, while they are tendencies that differ in kind, and diverge as they develop, they are 
complementary and not absolutely separate, and in a statement, that is reminiscent of 
Plotinus, Bergson suggests that matter breaks up consciousness into individual 
tendencies or faculties: 
 
The matter that it bears along with it, and in the interstices of which it inserts 
itself, alone can divide it into distinct individualities. … This subdivision was 
vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter.  
Thus souls are continually being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain sense 
pre-existed. (C.E., p.269-70) 
 
While spatialised matter is a product of intellect, the dynamic aspect of matter, its 
inversion, breaks up or interrupts the impulse of consciousness, forming a node at their 
intersection.  Figure 20 shows how the inversion of matter is necessary for the 
generation of individual souls, and it is a process that continues indefinitely as the 
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pendulum unceasingly continues its forward motion as reflection, and its return as 
inversion. 
 
In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of 
these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an 
undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it 
living beings all along its track. Of these two currents the second runs counter to 
the first, but the first obtains, all the same, something from the second. There 
results between them a modus vivendi, which is organization. (C.E., p.250-251) 
 
For Bergson the act of thinking intuitively is an effort for the human intellect; however, 
while the reversal of its natural direction of thought is self-conscious, Bergson does not 
specifically address the issue of whether the act of thinking is included in what the élan 
vital thinks when it is thinking creation in his cosmology.  He states that in human 
intuition, the act is one of tension, and therefore, attentive, but it cannot be sustained for 
long; “It is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few 
moments at most” (C.E., p.267).  From intuition we return to intellect that transforms 
the data into concepts.  Similarly, in his cosmology, the élan vital renews its efforts to 
continue the creative process.  In Creative Evolution Bergson suggests that while self-
consciousness commences with intuition, which is the movement on which his whole 
cosmology is based, it loses something of itself in the process: 
 
It is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or 
superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by 
abandoning a part of himself on the way. (C.E., p.226) 
 
But a glance at the evolution of living beings shows us that intuition could 
not go very far. On the side of intuition, consciousness found itself so 
restricted by its envelope that intuition had to shrink into instinct, that is, to 
embrace only the very small portion of life that interested it; and this it 
embraces only in the dark, touching it while hardly seeing it. On this side, 
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the horizon was soon shut out. On the contrary, consciousness, in shaping 
itself into intelligence, that is to say in concentrating itself at first on matter, 
seems to externalize itself in relation to itself; but, just because it adapts 
itself thereby to objects from without, it succeeds in moving among them 
and in evading the barriers they oppose to it, thus opening to itself an 
unlimited field. Once freed, moreover, it can turn inwards on itself, and 
awaken the potentialities of intuition which still slumber within it. (C.E., 
p.182) 
 
Bergson proceeds to suggest that the élan vital only regains its self-consciousness in 
man who “comes to occupy a privileged place” because he possesses the ability to 
continue the vital movement indefinitely (C.E., pp.181-182); however, this implies a 
contradiction.  If the movement of intuition generates the multitude of tendencies in life 
prior to man, it suggests that the élan vital is ultimately conscious of itself and its 
creations at the highest level, in fact, he appears to consider the possibility in Matter 
and Memory when he speculates on the possibility that a supra-conscious memory could 
“watch the development of humanity while contracting it, …into the great phases of its 
evolution. (M.M., p.275).  Since ‘watching’ is an act of vision or reflection, self-
consciousness of thinking creativity concurs with the model presented here, despite the 
apparent erosion of consciousness in the generative process.  Furthermore, Bergson 
states that the élan vital retains “something of the will that animates it” on its 
interruption and inversion (C.E., p.247), a stage that is vital for continuity in the 
process.  It is therefore proposed that within Bergson’s notion of a supra-consciousness 
the act of thinking is included in what the élan vital thinks when it is thinking creation.    
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
It was explained that Bergson was ambiguous about the nature of God and the élan 
vital in Creative Evolution, but later clarified his position by proposing that God 
remains distinct from the élan vital but is active within it.  Bergson strongly rejected 
the notion of pantheism and it was therefore proposed that he followed the 
Pythagoreans and Plotinus who could be more accurately placed in the category of 
panentheism. 
Bergson follows Plotinus in rejecting the notion of parts being generated as an 
assemblage of pre-existing parts, and the generation of multiplicity for both 
philosophers is one of self-generation in which the self transforms itself.  Bergson 
states: “the essence of life is the movement by which life is transmitted” (C.E., p.128), 
and it is a description that applies equally well to Plotinus.  Similarly, Bergson captures 
the substantial nature of the movement in ‘The Perception of Change’: 
 
There are changes, but there are underneath the change no things which 
change: change has no need of support.  There are movements, but there is no 
inert or variable object which moves: movement does not imply a mobile. 
(‘The Perception of Change’ in C.M., p.147) 
 
The movement of consciousness or mind is the same for both philosophers and is 
analogous to the model of the generation of harmonics: (1) there is an initial outward 
movement of energy from a node (Plotinus/The One; Bergson/ God) in the form of 
love, which for both philosophers is an immensity of potentiality as an undifferentiated 
unity of tendencies; (2) the forward movement of energy is interrupted, generating a 
second node (Plotinus - rest/Being; Bergson - interruption/matter), and then the 
movement reverts (Plotinus) or inverts (Bergson).  Together, the first two movements 
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generate the fundamental (Plotinus - Intellect: Bergson - supra-conscious memory. (3) 
Consciousness reflects back onto the second node, and on its reversion/inversion a third 
node is generated where the movements cross, dividing the movement into two new 
fundamentals (Plotinus - Soul and World Soul; Bergson - intellect and matter).  The 
pendulum movement continues, producing new nodes and their associated vibrations 
within each fundamental. 
Plotinus’s Intellect becomes Bergson’s supra-conscious memory, both possessing 
a vibrational nature that is full of life, and the contents of which do not change once 
generated, and Plotinus’s Soul becomes Bergson’s intellect whose function is to 
spatialize matter.  Despite the similarities, Bergson’s mechanism differs from that of 
Plotinus; whereas Plotinus hypostasises Intellect as eternity and Soul as its temporal 
expression, Bergson synthesises Plotinus’ Hypostases so that his ontological and 
epistemological structure is a process that is wholly temporal. 
 It is therefore concluded that the science of harmonics potentially solves the 
‘mystery’ of Bergson’s cosmology; however, several issues require an explanation and 
will be addressed in the following chapter.  The first is how consciousness and matter 
are integrated to include spontaneity and freedom within his account of partial finalism; 
the second is how Bergson’s account of number and mathematics fits into his 
cosmology; and finally, since his “fan-wise” generation of multiplicity suggests that, 
like Plotinus, there is a connection with the Pythagorean tetractys, it needs to be 
determined whether Bergson is sympathetic to the Pythagorean philosophy of 
transformation.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Bergson - Harmonics of Evolution 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This Chapter examines Bergson’s arguments for partial finalism, his theory of number, 
the influence of mathematics, and his sympathy with Pythagorean philosophy.  It will 
be contended that in Creative Evolution Bergson adopted the 3-stage generative 
structure of Pythagorean cosmology, and applied the key themes of disassociation, 
association, attunement, sympathy, conflict and war to the evolutionary process.  His 
arguments for partial finalism reveal that the model of harmonics is consistent with the 
musical theme he proposed, and accounts for spontaneity, novelty and similarities in 
structure in the evolutionary process due to the proportional existence of tendencies 
within matter and organic life.  It will be proposed that Bergson’s notions of 
quantitative and qualitative multiplicity replicate Plotinus’ concepts of monadic number 
and substantial number as logos enabling him to reconcile matter and consciousness.  
The subject of number then leads to an examination of Bergson’s mathematical 
influences.  It will be argued that while it is commonly held that Riemann influenced 
Bergson’s account of discrete and continuous multiplicities, and that modern calculus 
influenced his method of intuition, a Pythagorean influence, not previously considered, 
makes more sense of his arguments.  The claim of a Pythagorean influence on Bergson 
will then be supported by an examination of his ‘Lectures on the Pythagoreans’, 
revealing his sympathy with Pythagorean number theory and their philosophy of 
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transformation.  Finally, the view that Bergson used melody as a metaphor for duration 
will be contested.  
 
 
 
6.1    Bergson’s Partial Finalism 
 
 
 
Bergson argues against radical mechanism and finalism because both start from the 
assumption that all is given.  Mechanism presupposes the elements out of which reality 
is built making it mathematically predictable, and finalism presupposes a plan as an end 
to be achieved.  For Bergson, they both ignore the temporality of the evolutionary 
process and cannot account for spontaneity and novelty.  He does however make a 
concession to finalism in accepting it to a certain extent (C.E., p.40) because the end to 
be achieved is the creation of novelty itself; an evolution that is established in its 
progress.  It will be contended that Bergson’s ‘creative evolution’ is grounded in the 3-
stage generative structure of Pythagorean cosmology. 
Bergson’s partial finalism rests on the notion of consciousness and matter as 
separate tendencies in the élan vital that has a ‘supra-conscious’ nature (C.E., p.261) 
because it possesses all degrees of consciousness, including intellect, instinct, intuition, 
as well as the latent consciousness of unorganised matter and the sleeping 
consciousness of immobile vegetable matter.  For Bergson consciousness is memory 
and anticipation of the future (M.E., p.8): 
 
… if …consciousness retains the past and anticipates the future, it is probably 
because it is called on to make a choice.  In order to choose, we must know 
what we can do and remember the consequences, advantageous or injurious, of 
what we have already done; we must foresee and we must remember. (M.E., 
p14) 
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The consciousness of unorganised matter is latent because while it possesses a 
memory that is limited to repeating the past (M.M., p.297), it does not anticipate the 
future.  Organised matter, however, evolves and has the potential to become conscious, 
because “movement and consciousness sleep in it as recollections which may waken” 
(C.E., p.119).  Bergson notes Darwin’s work on the movements of climbing plants and 
refers to their consciousness in terms of “the accidental awakening of an activity 
normally asleep” (C.E., pp.108-109).  Organised, or organic matter, such as that found 
in single celled organisms, plants, animals and human life, possess degrees of 
consciousness that vary with the freedom or power of choice implicit in the ability to 
move, and the power of choice is linked to the organism’s ability to anticipate the 
future together with its degree of memory. 
 
… if …consciousness retains the past and anticipates the future, it is probably 
because it is called on to make a choice.  In order to choose, we must know 
what we can do and remember the consequences, advantageous or injurious, of 
what we have already done; we must foresee and we must remember. (M.E., 
p.14) 
 
He argues that actions or movements originate with a “decision that implies choice”, 
and that these movements subsequently become automatic and unconscious.  The 
intensity of consciousness is therefore linked to the degree of choice or “to the amount 
of creation” required by the movement. (M.E., p.15) 
 
But this consciousness, which is a need of creation, is made manifest to itself 
only where creation is possible. It lies dormant when life is condemned to 
automatism; it wakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored. (C.E., 
p.261) 
 
The “need of creation” is associated with the need of Bergson’s God to reproduce and 
evolve in a form that requires a freely chosen process of change, creation and growth 
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(T.S.M.R., p. 255) as explained in Chapter 5.104  One may therefore question the nature 
of his finalism since the ‘need’ is a goal that is persistently achieved; however, from 
Bergson‘s perspective his finalism is partial because the goal is creation itself which is 
indeterminate and unlikely to be achieved because the freedom of man is restricted by 
matter.  The subject of freedom is addressed in more detail in Chapter 9.105        
While supra-consciousness is essentially mind-like because it lacks 
consciousness in some of its manifestations, as it wakens, sensibility and freedom 
increase (C.E., p.119), thus partially accounting for spontaneity and the generation of 
unforeseen novelty.   The degree of consciousness is determined by an organism’s 
vibration and is linked to its development in the evolutionary process: 
 
In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many 
different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or 
relaxation of different kinds of consciousness and thereby fix their respective 
places in the scale of being.  (M.M., p.275) 
 
Bergson claims: “like radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, our philosophy 
represents the organised world as a harmonious whole” (C.E., p.50); however, it is not 
perfect because each species and individual only receives a portion of the impetus and 
uses it for its own interests or needs.  Consciousness has the need to create in both time 
and space and “needs” a body which it carves out of matter (M.M., p.262); hence ‘need’ 
is the reason why the two dissociated tendencies, consciousness and matter, associate to 
form organic life.  The carving out of a body is achieved by perception, a subject that 
will be explored in Chapter 9; however, it is important to understand here that the 
vibrational nature of the separate tendencies makes it possible.  In perception 
                                                            
104  Chapter 5.1, p.142. 
105  Chapter 9.2, p.272. 
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consciousness condenses the vibrations of matter within its own vibration and selects a 
body based on attunement or correspondence.  In Creative Evolution Bergson proposes: 
“intellect is in tune with matter” (C.E., p.195), and therefore there is a “correspondence” 
between them (C.E., p.140) so they can associate or unite even though they are 
opposed, thus replicating Plotinus’ ‘law of correspondence’ between soul and its body 
whose parts are unequal.  Chapter 4 noted the theory of attunement or correspondence is 
linked to the Pythagorean belief in the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm in 
which universal kinship or sympathy occurs between the universe and its parts.106  
Bergson also explicitly refers to the theme of sympathy between consciousness and 
matter in his concepts of intuition (C.M., p.77; p.161-163) and instinct (C.E., p.176).  
He suggests that instinct is intuition that has shrunk its range of interest to perpetuating 
the life and evolution of individual species, (C.E., p.182); it does not speculate, but like 
intuition, has categorical or implicit knowledge of its object in terms of its intension or 
internal vibration: 
 
Intuition seeks to recapture, to get back the movement and rhythm … to live 
again creative evolution by being one with it in sympathy. (‘Introduction II’, in 
C.M., p.77) 
  
Furthermore, Bergson replicates Plotinus and the Pythagoreans in proposing the 
interaction of matter and consciousness can be harmonious or discordant: 
 
A tendency achieves all that it aims at only if it is not thwarted by another 
tendency, i.e. there is always opposition …the interaction of tendencies is 
always implied (C.E., p.13) 
 
                                                            
106  Ennead III.3.5,4; Chapter 4.2, pp.114-116. 
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We cannot regard life as the creation of a “musical concert” by something like a human 
genius, “wherein the seeming discords are really meant to bring out a fundamental 
harmony”; a large part of the evolutionary process arises from “retrogressions, arrests, 
accidents of every kind” (C.E., p.127-8).  Bergson refers to the discordance as an 
“irremediable difference of rhythm” (C.E., p.128) and a conflict of “opposing forces” 
(T.S.M.R., p.57).  He develops the theme in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
when discussing the nature of war in human societies, suggesting that ‘war is natural’ 
(T.S.M.R., p.284) and a necessary part of the evolutionary process; nature did not 
ordain it just for the sake of it. 
 
War is the ‘origin of empires’, ‘born of conquest’ has the potential to bring 
societies together, to integrate the weaker ones onto the stronger, or even 
destroy whole societies (T.S.M.R., p.276). 
  
As noted in Chapter 4, the conflict between harmonics is referred to in modern physics 
as constructive or destructive interference, where new nodes are generated from the 
interaction of standing waves that change the vibration of one or both for better or 
worse.107  It is a principle Bergson explicitly employs in Laughter and which he refers 
to as “reciprocal interference”.  In a footnote he states: 
  
The word "interference" has here the meaning given to it in Optics, where it 
indicates the partial superposition and neutralisation, by each other, of two 
series of light-waves. (Laughter, p.47) 
 
Interference must not be confused with the ‘interruption’ of the élan vital that generates 
nodes as an orderly sequence of harmonics.108 The concept of constructive and 
                                                            
107  Chapter 4.2, pp.110-111. 
108  Chapter 5.2, pp.153-155. 
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destructive interference explains why there are retrogressions, arrests, accidents and 
sudden variations in the evolution of life; why some species become extinct while 
others take on novel forms.  When harmonics are produced, the greatest harmony is 
found near the start when the vibrations are less frequent; discords naturally occur at 
more frequent vibrations when the fundamental or its subsequent harmonics form 
unions; a fact concurring with Bergson’s assertion in Creative Evolution: 
 
Harmony, therefore, does not exist in fact; it exists rather in principle. … 
Especially (and this is the point on which finalism has been most seriously 
mistaken) harmony is rather behind us than before. It is due to an identity of 
impulsion and not to a common aspiration. (C.E., p.51) 
 
When Bergson states that harmony is behind rather than before us it is consistent with 
his argument for fan-wise growth which infers a common source, that if orange is the 
only colour to have made an appearance in the world, it will have been composed of red 
and yellow when they are born in their turn.109  It is also consistent with Plotinus who 
also suggests that nature becomes disharmonious due to interference, and not only does 
nature make mistakes, but it starts from a much lower level in terms of its logos; 
however, Plotinus is more of a finalist than Bergson.  Whereas Bergson’s universe 
appears to become increasingly disharmonious, Plotinus proposes that the World Soul 
maintains the universe as a harmonious whole according the logoi or providence it 
receives from Intellect and corrects mistakes or disharmony arising in nature.  
Taking the whole process of generation into account Bergson appears to adopt 
the 3-stage generative structure of Pythagorean cosmology, as described by Cornford: 
 
                                                            
109  See: Chapter 5.3, p.161. 
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(1)  There is an undifferentiated unity. (2)  From this unity two opposite 
powers are separated out to form the world order. (3)  The two opposites unite 
again to generate life. (Cornford, 1923, p.3) 
 
At stage 3, unity may arise through the conflict of opposites: 
  
In the third stage of the cosmological formula the combination of the sundered 
opposites to generate life is represented in mythical terms either as a marriage 
or as a warfare. …The marriage symbol is appropriate in the order of space. 
…The alternative symbol of warfare [is] conceived rather as the seasonal 
powers in the order of time, in which each prevails successively and yields to 
its antagonist.  The principle of justice is preserved by this balanced alternation 
of advance and retreat. (Cornford, 1923, p.4)  
 
Furthermore, Bergson’s conception of consciousness as “powers” accords with 
Pythagorean philosophy as well as Plotinus’ account of Soul, as was explained in 
Chapters 2 and 4 respectively.  Bergson rejects the notion of a Lockean atomistic 
powers ontology that considers the intrinsic nature of powers as having external 
relations (Locke, 1689, II.23.37, p.286), in favour of tendencies, creative powers that 
continually differentiate qualitatively internally.  Bergson’s theory of the élan vital 
operating as an internal force in the evolutionary process was offered as an alternative 
to the neo-Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian theories of evolution.  While he accepted the 
neo-Lamarckian theory of an inner psychological principle, he rejected the notion that a 
living being’s individual effort to adapt to the circumstances of its existence accounts 
for variability (C.E. p.76-84).  The neo-Darwinists, including the English naturalist, 
Alfred Russel Wallace and the German evolutionary biologist, August Weismann, 
accepted Darwin’s theory of natural selection but rejected his theory of pangenesis, 
which is similar to Lamarck’s notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  
Bergson rejected the neo-Darwinian theory of natural selection or adaptation because it 
opposes the notion of an internal divine or conscious force working in the evolutionary 
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process in favour of random external factors.  Bergson argues since the structural 
changes would be so small, their utility cannot be proven, thus making natural selection 
untenable.  Furthermore, adaptation results in a conceptual confusion because it implies 
indetermination in the creation of new forms and an active response to external 
circumstances, implying a causality that is predetermined (C.E., p.86).  For Bergson, 
the élan vital is indivisibly dynamic and cannot be differentiated into cause and effect.  
He suggests that accidental changes arising from external factors cannot account for 
similarities in structure between independent species because: 
  
something of the whole therefore must abide in the parts, and this 
common element will be evident in some way, perhaps by the presence 
of identical organs in very different organisms. (C.E., p.54) 
 
Bergson’s theory that the élan vital differentiates internally and is therefore able to 
account for the creation of new forms and similarities in structure between independent 
species is consistent with the harmonics model in which something of the whole abides 
in the parts.  In Chapter 2 it was explained that concordant intervals of a musical scale 
are interlocked according to proportions of an unequal ratio, the significance of which 
is they apply to any key; hence the same melody can be played in different keys.  So, 
while the structure is invariable melodies can be infinitely variable;110 hence Hermann’s 
comment: 
 
...to be an initiate of the Pythagorean order [is] to realise that correspondence 
and proportion rule the world. (Hermann, 2004, p. 99) 
 
Proportion is also important for Bergson because he suggests that specific groups of 
living things can be distinguished by the tendencies they emphasise: 
                                                            
110  Chapter 2.3, p.47. 
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There is no manifestation of life which does not contain, in a rudimentary state 
– either latent or potential, - the essential characters of most other 
manifestations.  The difference is in the proportions.  But this very difference of 
proportion will suffice to define the group … the group must not be defined by 
the possession of certain characters, but by its tendency to emphasize them. 
(C.E., p.106) 
 
This is logical from the perspective of how harmonics are emphasised or de-
emphasised in different musical instruments causing variations of timbre or tone colour. 
A piano and a flute can play the same note but will not sound the same (Rossing, 1982, 
p.114).  It will be argued that an examination of the role of number in Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution and his view of mathematics suggest that while he uses the term 
“proportions”, musical proportions rather than mathematical proportions make more 
sense of his argument.  The faculties of each species together with its matter evolve by 
starting out as a fundamental producing its own harmonics, hence the varying 
proportions, both among individual species, and between different species.  This model 
also supports Bergson’s claim that increasing complexity does not arise from elements 
added together, nor is it an ascending scale like steps up a ladder; he suggests rather 
that evolution as duration is based on a musical theme: 
 
We seem … to be before a musical theme, which had first been transposed, the 
theme as a whole, into a certain number of tones, and on which, still the whole 
theme, different variations had been played, some very simple, others very 
skilful.  As to the original theme, it is everywhere and nowhere.  It is in vain 
that we try to express it in terms of any idea: it must have been, originally, felt 
rather than thought. (C.E., pp.171-172) 
 
Barnard makes an important point, that sound is purely temporal; it does not have a 
spatial location, being at once “everywhere and nowhere” (Barnard, 2011, p.90), and 
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Bergson’s allusion to the “original theme” being “felt rather than thought” refers to his 
account of how instinct acquires its knowledge from the internal vibrations of matter.   
Barnard suggests: 
 
from the time of Creative Evolution…intuition began to be seen…as a type of 
higher octave overtone or alternative to both instinct and intellect. (Barnard, 
2011, p.128) 
 
This makes sense because the élan vital generates and possesses knowledge according 
to the harmonic motion implicit in the act of intuition as explained in Chapter 5.  
Bergson’s arguments for partial finalism conform to and therefore support the 
musical harmonics model theory, and while Barnard has alluded to it negatively, the 
subject has been otherwise neglected.  What emerges from Bergson’s argument for 
partial finalism is an unplanned, but logical process that appears to conform to laws of 
music and physics; hence it is necessary to determine whether the proportional nature 
of Bergson’s account of the generation of multiplicity conforms to his theory of 
number. 
 
 
 
6.2    The Role of Number in Bergson’s Creative Evolution 
 
 
 
The examination of the role of number in Bergson’s Creative Evolution will explain 
how he applies Plotinus’ concept of logos. 
In Time and Free Will Bergson replicates Plotinus’ distinction between 
substantial number and monadic number with his theory of qualitative and quantitative 
multiplicities.  He considers duration as a heterogeneous, intensive, and therefore 
qualitative continuous multiplicity that cannot be stopped and measured, while 
quantitative multiplicity is conceived as inert and measurable.  In Creative Evolution 
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Bergson explains that it is the function of intellect to produce a quantitative 
multiplicity, measurable in discrete units by employing the notion of space (C.E., 
pp.210-11), and likewise, for Plotinus it is the function of the Soul to express monadic 
or quantitative number spatially; the similarity is noted by Hancock: 
 
As Plotinus’ comments regarding quantity and the other categories are 
transparent in his writings, it is quite probable that Bergson took Plotinus into 
account in fashioning his own view about quantity, including his views on the 
quantitative limits of mechanistic science. (Hancock, 2001, p.150) 
 
For Bergson, scientific methods employ intelligence in the act of spatialising time and 
perceiving quality through quantity using ready-made concepts and language.  He 
suggests we erroneously also do this with emotional states or internal sensations that 
can be described as intensive because we confuse them with their external causes, e.g. 
we confuse the sensation of brightness, which is a quality, with light that is external and 
quantifiable.  Similarly, what we perceive to be bigger or smaller sounds are 
differences in volume, which is a quality; hence we interpret the difference in intensive 
magnitude, kind or quality that cannot be measured as a difference in extensive 
magnitude, quantity or degree that can be measured.  It is an observation that has 
ancient origins in the science of harmonics.  Andrew Barker refers to Aristoxenus (El. 
harm. 10.30–11.3) who makes exactly the same point:  
 
most people mistakenly identify intensification of pitch (i.e. the process of 
raising it, epitasis) with height of pitch (oxytēs), and relaxation of pitch (anesis) 
with depth of pitch (barytēs).  (Barker, 2007, p.146). 
 
Barker also echoes Bergson in his discussion on the problem of language and 
measurement in the science of harmonics:  
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A melody, a scale or an attunement is a complex of pitched sounds, or notes, 
whose pitches stand to one another in particular relations which must be 
conceptualised in order to express not only their differences, but the 
characteristics of the patterns they form … we speak of notes as ‘higher’ or 
‘lower’, as if they were placed as points on a vertical continuum of ‘up’ and 
‘down’, and we talk of the relations between them as larger and smaller 
‘intervals’, as if they were spatial gaps between these points of pitch, and could 
be measured and compared like distances along a line.  … It is not a direct, 
objective representation of the facts, but a way of thinking and talking which 
arises from the contingencies of our own culture and its history. (Barker, 2007, 
pp.20-21) 
 
For Bergson, the quantification of psychic states always involves a synthesis of the one 
and the many (T.F.W., p.75) because the application of numbers, each of which requires 
spatial differentiation that may be actual or metaphorical, involves the notion of unity 
and multiplicity.  For example, we have an immediate subjective intuition of the 
number 5 as a unity in itself, but it also consists in objectifying a multiplicity of 5 
homogenous units of 1 that can in turn be infinitely divided.  The notion of infinite 
division underlies the idea of number itself, and the units making up number must 
ignore qualitative difference, that is, they must be identical, considered static and 
discontinuous, placed side by side in space.  Division as an act of separation means 
jumping from one number to another while ignoring the interval in between. 
Bergson proposes that while representative sensations such as colours, shapes, 
sounds, smells, tastes, textures, etc. differ, they are not separate, fixed and measurable 
but merge into each other like the colours of a rainbow: “…there is simply a passing 
from one to the other and not a difference in the arithmetical sense of the word” 
(T.F.W., p.68).  This corresponds to his statement about number being infinitely 
divisible, but not discretely divisible.  He proposes that conscious states are organically 
synthesised into a dynamic flow just as a melody captures our temporal experience as a 
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continuous qualitative multiplicity (T.F.W., p.100).  Bergson however claims that the 
act of counting is not purely spatial, it is durational, hence number is perceived as 
quality, not quantity.  He provides an example of unconsciously hearing four strokes of 
a clock, that on conscious reflection, are perceived as qualitatively different (T.F.W., 
pp.127-128), and furthermore, that number arises from qualitative difference.  Čapek 
notes this act is durational and has a ‘dialectical’ character due to the two sides of the 
process (Čapek, 1971, pp.178-179).  Bergson states:  
 
the process by which we count units and make them into a discrete multiplicity 
has two sides; on the one hand we assume that they are identical, which is 
conceivable only on condition that these units are arranged alongside each other 
in a homogenous medium; but on the other hand the third unit, for example, 
when added to the other two, alters the nature and rhythm of the whole; without 
this interpenetration and this, so to speak, qualitative progress, no addition 
would be possible. (T.F.W., p.123) 
 
In claiming that quantitative multiplicity depends on qualitative multiplicity Bergson 
replicates Plotinus’ claim that monadic number depends on the existence of substantial 
number.  While duration contains number ‘potentially’ (T.F.W., p.121), number is 
generated when it is actualized in space, thus Bergson’s assertion: 
 
the mathematical order arises automatically when within the whole a partial 
interruption or inversion is produced … this power of creation once given …has 
only to be diverted from itself to relax its tension, only to relax its tension to 
extend, only to extend for the mathematical order of the elements so 
distinguished and the inflexible determinism connecting them to manifest the 
interruption of the creative act: in fact, inflexible determinism and mathematical 
order are one with this very interruption. (C.E., p.217-218) 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, interruption arises naturally in the generation of harmonics 
in the form of nodes, and it was noted that Bergson refers to the impulse of 
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consciousness as the ascending movement, thus representing the vital order, and matter 
as the descending movement, where inversion and interruption are analogous, but 
where interruption comes to represent the geometrical.  The vital and geometrical 
therefore represent two sides of reality, just as the production of harmonics has its 
geometrical aspect as determined by the monochord for example, where numbers are 
generated in a descending series as reciprocals of the ascending series of whole 
numbers generated in its vital aspect when the vibrations are generated from the 
fundamental.111  By returning to Figure 20 it can be understood that numbers are 
generated at the same time as the nodes (interruption), therefore changing the rhythm of 
the whole.112  Plotinus uses this model for the generation of logos, substantial number 
and form in Intellect, a model that he also refers to as a melody, and in Creative 
Evolution Bergson acknowledges that he is following Plotinus’ theory of logos: 
 
Our comparison does no more than develop the content of the term λόγος, as 
Plotinus understands it. For while the λόγος of this philosopher is a generating 
and informing power, an aspect or a fragment of the ψυχή, on the other hand 
Plotinus sometimes speaks of it as of a discourse. More generally, the relation 
that we establish in the present chapter between "extension" and "detension" 
resembles in some aspects that which Plotinus supposes. (C.E., fn., p.210) 
 
Bergson proceeds to criticise Plotinus for following Plato in erecting mathematical 
essences into absolute realities rather than incorporating them into the durational 
process.  Hude remarks that Bergson’s lectures on Plotinus were given after the 
publication of Matter and Memory and are contemporaneous with the preparation for 
Creative Evolution (Hude, 2000, p.7).113  Although Bergson was obviously aware of 
                                                            
111  Chapter 2.3, Figure 4, p.48. 
112  Chapter 5.3, Figure 20, p.165. 
113  Appendix 3, p.3. 
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Ennead VI ‘On Number’ because he was critical of mathematical essences being 
erected into absolute realities and understood the nature of Plotinus’ logos to be 
substantial number and form, curiously he failed to mention or explain it in his lectures 
and talks on Plotinus, despite referring specifically to the vibrations in Soul (Hude, 
2000, p.72).114  In his lecture on Plotinus he refers to it as “a principle that unites the 
multiplicity; it is the λόγoς έν οπέρματι, the generative reason” (Hude, 2000, pp.30-31), 
a term, which as noted in Chapter 3, is ambiguously interpreted by modern scholars of 
Plotinus.115  He also refers to Plotinus’ logos in his address to the University of 
Edinburgh entitled ‘The Problem of Personality’; however, while he acknowledges: “In 
the centre of all this metaphysic is the concept of λόγος”, not once does he mention it 
refers to Plotinus’ account of substantial number and form (Mélanges, p.1,056).  It 
seems as if Bergson’s ambiguity is deliberate, and a theory of why this is so is proposed 
in the Conclusion.116  
We have seen that in Creative Evolution, living beings possess tendencies 
according to the proportions they emphasise; however, Bergson first reconciled quality 
and quantity under the auspices of duration as vibrations of consciousness and matter 
respectively, in Matter and Memory: 
 
By the idea of tension we have striven to overcome the opposition between 
quality and quantity. (M.M., p.330) 
 
                                                            
114  Appendix 4, p.48.  Here Bergson states: “But for Plotinus perception is sympathy of the 
      organ with the object with which it vibrates in unison”. 
 
115  Chapter 3.4, p.83-84 
 
116  Conclusion, pp.307-308. 
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It was noted in Bergson’s notion of association that consciousness condenses the 
vibrations of matter within its own duration, and he provides an example of perceiving a 
red light that vibrates at a rate of 400 billion times a second: 
 
Thus the sensation of red light, experienced by us in the course of a second, 
corresponds in itself to a succession of phenomena which, separately 
distinguished in our duration with the greatest possible economy of time, would 
occupy more than 250 centuries of our history. (M.M., p.272) 
 
Gunter notes the arithmetical relationship between them has “an objective basis” and 
“an element of quantitative commensurability”.  It is “the indivisibility of the rhythms, 
of both sorts, which grounds the possibility of quantitative relations” (Gunter, 1999).  
Bergson acknowledges that modern physics reveals “differences in number behind our 
distinctions of quality” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.58-59), and if consciousness is 
generated in the same way as matter, differences of number must be behind the 
proportionality of consciousness.  For Bergson these numbers make the interaction of 
mind and matter intelligible as qualities, as noted by Deleuze: 
 
And qualities belong to matter as much as to ourselves: They belong to matter, 
they are in matter, by virtue of the vibrations and numbers that punctuate them 
internally. (Deleuze, 1991, pp.87-88) 
 
Furthermore, Deleuze comments: 
 
One of Bergson's more curious ideas is that difference itself has a number, a 
virtual number, a numbering number. (Deleuze, 2004, p.34)  
 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze makes a distinction between the ‘numbered numbers’ 
belonging to striated space and the ‘numbering numbers’ pertaining to smooth space.  
For him numbering numbers are ordinal, dividing themselves without changing their 
nature on each division, the units of which represent distances, not magnitudes (Deleuze 
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& Guattari, 2004, p.535).  While Deleuze’s numbering number sounds very much like 
Pythagorean qualitative numbers in time measuring distances between musical 
intervals, Deleuze is thinking purely of virtual space, the ontological potential condition 
underlying the actualisation of extended space.  Bergson is consistent with Plotinus who 
applies the term ‘numbering number’ to monadic number which is spatial, while 
‘numbered numbers’ are whole numbers that are not divided and whose temporal 
differences can be represented as ratios.  For Plotinus numbered numbers are measures 
not measured, and this appears to be an appropriate understanding of the numbers 
punctuating duration.  There is no explicit evidence that Bergson linked Plotinus’ theory 
of number to Pythagorean harmonics, however the connection could not have escaped 
him since Plotinus acknowledged the Pythagorean influence, and Bergson lectured on 
Pythagorean philosophy as well as Plotinus.  The subject of number leads to an 
examination of the subject of Bergson’s attitude towards mathematics.  
 
  
 
6.3   Bergson and Mathematics  
 
 
 
The Pythagoreans clearly distinguished between the mathematics of space, geometry, 
and the mathematics of time, musical harmonics, and similarly Bergson distinguishes 
the geometrical and the vital orders.  He is emphatic that the mathematics of space 
cannot account for duration because it is “concerned only with the ends of the intervals 
and not with the intervals themselves” (C.E., p.9); he even states that mathematics 
“goes beyond its province when it claims to reconstruct what takes place in the interval 
between two simultaneities” (T.F.W., p.115).  It will be argued that the mathematics of 
harmonics is consistent with Bergson’s theory of duration and the logos of Plotinus as 
discussed in the previous section.  
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Despite Bergson’s statements about the shortcomings of mathematics, Deleuze 
hypothesised that his accounts of continuous and discrete multiplicities are influenced 
by Riemann’s distinction between discrete and continuous manifolds (Deleuze, 1991, 
pp.39-40).117  Deleuze is often quoted by commentators looking for a definitive 
mathematical influence on Bergson, but perhaps Riemann’s influence on Bergson 
should be approached with caution.  Duffy explains that Riemann’s theory, proposed in 
his ‘Habilitationsvortrag’ entitled ‘On the Hypotheses which Lie at the Foundations of 
Geometry’, differentiates between two concepts of magnitude: a discrete magnitude 
consists of individual elements whose metrical relations are determined by the number 
of elements belonging to it, that is, quantity determined by counting,  while a 
continuous manifold is three dimensional, like a continuous path that consists of points 
that “appear solely in relation to some continuous ambient background, whether actual 
or implied, such as a line or a plane”.  An example of a point would be the positions of 
perceived objects which are “compared to one another with regard to quantity by 
measuring” (Duffy, 2013, p.103).  Plotnitsky explains that Riemann’s theory applies to 
the geometry and topology of space.  It is a ‘conceptual mathematics’ in which 
Riemann pursues ‘a conception of space as a continuous three-dimensional manifold, 
such as a sphere: 
 
[which] is a conglomerate of (local) spaces, each of which can be mapped by a 
(flat) Euclidean, or Cartesian coordinate map, and treated accordingly (and thus 
also given geometry), without allowing for a global Euclidean structure for the 
whole or a single coordinate system for the whole, except in the limited case of 
a Euclidean homogenous (flat) space itself. (Plotnitsky, 2009, p.108) 
 
                                                            
117  This view is supported by Durie (Durie, 2004). 
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Riemann’s concept of a discrete manifold may be similar to Bergson’s discrete 
multiplicity; however, the spatial nature of Riemann’s continuous manifold does not 
apply to duration which implies succession and interpenetration, not externality of 
spaces within a continuum; hence Duffy comments:  
 
While at first glance this appears to correlate quite closely with the Riemannian 
account, however, upon closer inspection it is apparent that what Bergson 
leaves out of his account is the very spatial nature of Riemann’s qualitative 
multiplicity. (Duffy, 2013, p.107) 
 
It is strange that Deleuze proposed the influence of Riemann on Bergson while also 
suggesting that Bergson “did not feel able to pursue the mathematical implications of a 
theory of multiplicities” (Deleuze, 1991, p.39); in fact, it was Deleuze himself who 
followed Riemann in associating the concept of a qualitative multiplicity with space as 
well as time. 
Bergson introduced ambiguity as to the nature of durational number by accepting 
the validity of quantitative calculus in scientific enquiry, suggesting: 
 
metaphysics should adopt the generative idea of our mathematics in order to 
extend it to all qualities, that is, to reality in general. (‘Introduction to 
Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.190) 
 
Furthermore, he proposes: 
 
one of the objects of metaphysics is to operate differentiations and qualitative 
integrations. (C.M., p.191) 
 
Bergson’s reference to modern calculus led Gunter to conclude that Bergson develops a 
‘qualitative calculus’ on the model of the infinitesimal calculus of mathematics enabling 
him to differentiate the real parts of consciousness and break it down into a hierarchy of 
durations (Gunter, 1999).  This is linked to the French mathematician Jean Baptiste 
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Joseph Fourier, who in 1822 published his theorem that any regularly repetitive motion 
and any wave, irrespective of the complication of its form, can be treated as the sum of 
a series of simple harmonic motions or waves (Roederer, 2008, p.127).  While Gunter 
does not specifically refer to Fourier, it makes sense that the mathematical order to 
which he refers is that applicable to harmonic motion.  Bergson was an adept 
mathematician who recognised the importance of the revolution that arose in 
mathematics and the sciences resulting from the development of infinitesimal calculus 
by Newton and Leibniz, because it was the first tool that made the mathematical 
modelling of continuous change possible.  He also states that metaphysics, in adopting 
the method of modern calculus, “will in no way proceed to universal mathematics, that 
chimera of modern philosophy” (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.190)’, which 
led Gunter to concur with Jean Millet, who proposes that Bergson regards it as an 
“epistemological archetype” (Millet, 1987, pp.33-34).118  Although Bergson considers 
calculus to be the most accurate tool for scientifically measuring the nature of matter, he 
also considers its methodology to be “unstable” since it fails to capture the dynamic 
nature of duration.  In Creative Evolution Bergson describes how the mathematician 
excludes flowing time because he calculates the state of a system at static moments: 
   
In short, the world the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is 
reborn at every instant – the world that Descartes was thinking of when he 
spoke of continued creation. (C.E., p.22) 
 
The problem arises because the interval between the static moments is excluded.  He 
agrees with George Berkeley, who in The Analyst, attacked the logical foundations of 
Newton’s calculus and “fluxions”, and Leibniz’s notion of infinitesimal change, both of 
                                                            
118  See also: Millet, J., 1974   
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which dealt with change in terms of continuous magnitudes as a succession of infinitely 
small jumps rather than a continuous flow.  Berkeley asked: 
 
And what are these fluxions? … They are neither finite quantities, nor quantities 
infinitely small, nor yet nothing.  May we not call them the ghosts of departed 
quantities? (Berkeley, 1734, pp.59 - XXXV) 
 
This criticism also applies to Fourier’s mathematics of harmonics that relies on spatial 
superposition, a notion that Bergson would ultimately reject because it is geometric 
(C.E., p.218).  Calculus is the key method for solving any problem of change and 
principally consists in three steps: (1) Divide a problem in differential quantities. (2) 
Solve the problem for each differential quantity. (3) Integrate to sum up all the 
differential quantities.  There is however, an alternative explanation of calculus that 
was proposed in the account of Bergson’s partial finalism, the 3-stage generative 
structure of Pythagorean cosmology: (1) There is an undifferentiated unity; (2) From 
this unity two opposite powers are separated out to form the world order; (3) The two 
opposites unite again to generate life (Cornford, 1923, p.3).119  This process of 
qualitative differentiation and integration is linked to the Pythagorean tetractys, the 
ultimate symbol of calculus, a pebble diagram that represented the generative nature of 
reality as a temporal and qualitative evolution of the many out of the One,120 a model 
much more in line with Bergson’s concept of duration as a melody, especially as it 
contains the harmonic ratios that underlie the mathematical harmony of the musical 
scale.  Bergson argues that the latent geometry underpinning the mathematics applied 
by science to the study of nature takes account of simultaneities without succession or 
                                                            
119  Chapter 2.1.4, p.39; Chapter 6.1, pp.177-178. 
 
120  Calculus is a Latin word meaning "pebble or stone" (as it is still used in medicine and 
dentistry) and indicates that pebbles (prehistorically and later) were used to "calculate." 
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duration (C.E., pp.210-11), hence in his view: “there is no definite system of 
mathematical laws, at the base of nature” (C.E., p.219).  However, he claims that there 
is an objective order “approximately mathematical immanent in matter, an order, which 
our science approaches in proportion to its progress” (C.E., p.218).  This could be 
related to the fact that by the middle of the eighteenth century music, or more 
specifically musical harmonics, was no longer considered a mathematical science 
applicable to the scientific study of nature, as explained in Chapter 1; however, in its 
study of the physics of acoustics, the mathematics of which pertains to the scientific 
notion of a vibratory universe, science was ‘approaching’ the mathematics of music.  
As noted in Chapter 5, for Bergson the order in space differs to the order in time,121 and 
as his ‘law of dichotomy’ generates proportions that are underpinned by number, the 
number he refers to as that used in its geometrical aspect of mathematics must be 
applied differently from that used in its durational aspect.  While he does not discuss 
the nature of number underlying the vital order, the numbers of musical harmonics 
make most sense of his theory because they fill the intervals and reflect the temporal, 
qualitative and substantial nature of duration.  This is consistent with the logos of 
Plotinus as discussed above and the Pythagoreans who made a similar distinction 
between the mathematics applying to the geometrical and vital orders; geometry was 
considered the mathematics of space and musical harmonics, the mathematics of time 
(Guthrie, 1988, p.34).  It is noteworthy that Bergson refers to duration as the 
‘uninterrupted humming of life’s depths’ (Perception of Change, in C.M., p.150), 
which could be interpreted as an implicit reference to a quotation commonly attributed 
to Pythagoras, though the source is unknown: 
 
                                                            
121  Chapter 5.2, p.151. 
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There is geometry in the humming of the strings, there is music in the spacing 
of the spheres.122 
 
The Pythagorean influence on Bergson is purely speculative because he never mentions 
them as one of his positive influences; therefore, the next task is to assess his attitude to 
Pythagorean number theory and their philosophy in general by scrutinising the lectures 
he gave on Greek philosophy. 
 
 
 
6.4   Bergson and Pythagorean Number Theory 
 
 
 
Bergson’s ‘Lecture on the Pythagoreans’ reveals an understanding of and sympathy 
with Pythagorean number theory.123  He draws upon several sources including 
Philolaus and Stobaeus; however, he relies heavily on Aristotle because he considers 
his texts to be authentic.  At the start of his ‘exposition of the system’ Bergson makes 
the following statement: 
 
The principle of Pythagoreanism is clear in Aristotle (Metaphysics, I, 5).  
Mathematical principles are the principles of things, and the elements of 
numbers are the elements of all beings.  Everything is explained. (Hude, 2000, 
p.182)124 
 
Bergson firstly addresses the statement that mathematical principles are the principles 
of things and considers whether number is substance or attribute.  He points to 
contradictory statements in Aristotle: Physics III, 4 refers to number as substance and 
not an attribute; it is bound to sensible things in such a way that it cannot be mentally 
                                                            
122  As quoted in the preface of the book entitled Music of the Spheres by Guy Murchie (1961).  
123  A translation of this lecture is provided in Appendix 2.   
124  Appendix 2, p.3. 
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abstracted, i.e. that things are numbers, or that number would be the immanent principle 
of things, whilst Metaphysics I, 6 states things exist by imitation of numbers and Plato 
merely substitutes the notion of ‘participation’ (μέθεξις) for the Pythagorean notion of 
‘imitation’ (μίμησις).  This latter point seems to be confirmed by Stobaeus: 
 
I know, he said, that many consider Pythagoras as having said that things arise 
from number, but in reality, Pythagoras did not say that things come from 
number, but that they are according to number, κατ'άριθμόν. (Stobaeus, 
Eclogae, I.302, in Hude, 2000, p.183)125 
 
Bergson notes: “According to some critics and Brandis in particular, there would be the 
two opposing tendencies”; however, he refers again to Aristotle who states: “Because 
the Pythagoreans found a resemblance between numbers and things, they accepted that 
number is the principle of things” (Metaphysics, I.5).  Bergson acknowledges this 
reconciling statement as a likely truth, i.e. the Pythagoreans confused “simple 
resemblance and identity … Perceiving that things are subject to precise mathematical 
relationships that had the character of number, they concluded they were numbers”.  He 
further adds: 
 
In fact the Pythagoreans, having not yet distinguished a metaphysical principle 
from a material principle, had not realised that the reality of things and their 
intelligibility are two separate things; perceiving that number is the condition 
for the intelligibility of things, they concluded that number constituted the 
substance, the matter of things.  Number is a metaphysical principle used as 
material principle by philosophers who did not make the distinction. (Hude, 
2000, p.184)126 
 
                                                            
125  Appendix 2, p.4. 
126  Appendix 2, pp.4-5 
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Having acknowledged the metaphysical nature of number, Bergson then attempts to 
resolve a further confusion about Aristotle’s statement that the Pythagoreans considered 
units to have magnitude or extension, and that it is a contradiction for material bodies to 
have the form of number.  Bergson criticises Aristotle for interpreting his predecessors 
based on his own ideas, i.e. likeness only explains likeness, or “extended elements are 
needed to explain extended things”.  He suggests we would have to reject the materialist 
interpretation of German historians Reinhold and Brandis, as well as a different theory 
proposed by Ritter, that although number is immaterial, the Pythagoreans considered 
material bodies to be geometric properties that would be represented by number, that is, 
the unit would be the point and numbers would represent relationships of a spatial 
magnitude.  Bergson rejects this theory because it would not have been possible before 
Democritus: 
 
This way, the point would be identified with the atom.  However, the atom is a 
direct product of the eclecticism subsequent to Pythagoreanism. (Hude, 2000, 
p.185)127 
 
Bergson prefers Aristotle’s contention that number is substantial and purely 
mathematical, i.e., having no magnitude.  In his ‘Introduction’, Hude comments that in 
his lecture Bergson relies heavily on Zeller for both content and references, and that 
Bergson used Boutroux’s translation of Zeller (Hude, 2000, p.11).128  In Zeller’s text, 
following his reference to Ritter, he makes some interesting comments that Bergson 
                                                            
127  Appendix 2, p.5. 
128  Appendix 1, p.2.  
     For Boutroux’s translation of Zeller, E., 1869-1881.  Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer 
     Geschichtlichen Entwicklung, see: Boutroux, E., 1877. La philosophie des Grecs, vol.1 and                                    
Boutroux, E., 1884. La philosophie des Grecs, vol.2.  
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does not appear to have discussed in his lecture, but which reflect Bergson’s tendency 
to prioritise melody, duration and intuition over geometry, space and intellect: 
 
Since geometrical relations were derived from numbers, the elements of figure, 
- that is to say the point and the interspace - must be posterior to the elements of 
number. …Had the Pythagorean philosophy taken the opposite course, and 
proceeded from space dimensions and figures to numbers, the geometrical 
element in it must have predominated over the arithmetical; figure, instead of 
number, must have been declared to be the essence of things; and the system of 
geometrical figures must have taken the place of the decuple numerical system.  
Even harmony could no longer have had the great significance that it possessed 
for the Pythagoreans, since the relations of tones were never reduced by them to 
space relations. (Zeller, 1881, pp.416-417) 
 
Bergson then addresses the issue of how the Pythagoreans applied number to make it 
the general explanation of things, referring to the Pythagorean table of opposites and 
the conception of harmony (proportion) as that which brings the opposites together.  It 
is noteworthy that the differentiation and integration of opposites later become key 
concepts in his work.  
  In his lecture, Bergson was quite sympathetic to the notion of Pythagorean 
number mysticism, in which each of the numbers was perceived to have a meaning 
attributed to its quality or ‘energy’ thus providing a correspondence between sensibility 
and intelligibility.  Rather than dismissing the theory as outright nonsense, he saw 
‘method’ in what many consider to be madness: 
 
it should not be assumed that these connections are always made without 
method. (Hude, 2000, p.188)129 
  
                                                            
129  Appendix 2, p.8. 
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Bergson’s sympathetic reading is reflected in his theory that “Creation signifies, above 
all emotion” (T.S.M.R., p.45), because emotion is linked to the power of qualitative 
change or the ‘meaning’ that lies in the intervals.  In Time and Free Will Bergson 
proposes that the qualitative nature of numbers has an emotional equivalent: 
 
When we explicitly count units by stringing them along a spatial line, is it not 
the case that, alongside this addition of identical terms standing out from a 
homogeneous background, an organisation of these units is going on in the 
depths of the soul, a wholly dynamic process, not unlike the purely qualitative 
way in which an anvil, if it could feel, would realize a series of blows from a 
hammer?  In this sense we might almost say that the numbers in daily use have 
each their emotional equivalent. (T.F.W., p.123) 
 
Bergson’s example of an anvil and hammer could possibly be another reference to 
Pythagoras, because Iamblichus tells us that it was hearing the notes produced by the 
sounds of differing sized hammers striking an anvil that inspired Pythagoras to 
investigate the musical intervals.  Bergson proceeds to note that tradesmen are aware 
that when pricing goods we notice a qualitative difference between £4.99 and £5.00 for 
example (T.F.W., p.123).  Furthermore, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
Bergson’s intention is to link states of emotion to moral dispositions, proposing that 
emotions are prefigured in nature as “harmonics” arousing in us elementary feelings 
that are almost sensations: 
 
They are recognisable because they are destined to spur us on to acts answering 
to needs.  The others, on the contrary, are real inventions, comparable to those 
of the musician.  ……But a fresh emotion, surely has arisen and used pre-
existing notes as harmonics. (T.S.M.R., p.41) 
 
He suggests this is what Rousseau did with the emotion prefigured in mountains.  
Harmonics also underpin his arguments In Laughter: 
199 
 
Here we have the first illustration of a law which will appear with increasing 
distinctness as we proceed with our task. When a musician strikes a note on an 
instrument, other notes start up of themselves, not so loud as the first, yet 
connected with it by certain definite relations, which coalesce with it and 
determine its quality. These are what are called in physics the overtones of the 
fundamental note. It would seem that comic fancy, even in its most far-fetched 
inventions, obeys a similar law. (Laughter, p.27) 
 
Furthermore, he suggests: 
 
an emotion may be said to be dramatic and contagious when all the harmonics 
in it are heard along with the fundamental note. (Laughter, p.69) 
 
While Bergson does not explicitly link numbers to emotion in these passages, the 
reference to harmonics, notably musical harmonics, and his assertion that numbers 
have an emotional equivalent must be considered alongside his view that there are 
differences in number behind our distinctions of quality.   
 
 
 
6.5 Bergson and Pythagorean Philosophy 
 
 
 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that Bergson feels at ease with Greek philosophers;130 
however other than Plotinus he gives no hint of being influenced by them.  It is 
noticeable that he never criticises philosophy before the Eleatics but is very critical of 
philosophy from the time of the school of Elea and subsequently, Plato.  In ‘The 
Perception of Change’ Bergson writes: 
 
The conceptions of the earliest Greek thinkers were certainly very close to 
perception, since it was by the transformations of a sensible element like water, 
air or fire, that they completed the immediate sensation.  But from the time the 
                                                            
130  Chapter 1.3, p.29. 
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philosophers of the school of Elea, criticising the idea of transformation, had 
shown or thought they had shown the impossibility of keeping so close to the 
sense data, philosophy started off along the road it has since travelled, the road 
to a “supra-sensible” world: one was to explain things henceforth with pure 
ideas. (‘The Perception of Change’, C.M., p.132) 
 
Bergson’s main problem with philosophy from the time of the Eleatics was that they 
rejected the emphasis on sense data and criticised the idea of ‘transformation’, the 
philosophy of Pythagoreanism.  Bergson regards his philosophy to be true empiricism 
and he makes “transformation” a key theme in Creative Evolution (C.E., pp.230-231). 
Number atomism and a distrust of the senses first emerges with the Eleatic school, and 
Cornford comments: “it is generally admitted that Zeno’s arguments are directed 
against the Pythagoreans” (Cornford, 1923, p.7; p.11).  This view is consistent with 
Bergson’s, that geometry always involves spatialization; hence while Zeno’s project is 
to demonstrate that continuous becoming is impossible, for Bergson the paradoxes 
serve to demonstrate the intellect’s inability to conceive motion other than as a series 
of discrete states and the impossibility of representing absolute duration or the mobility 
of movement. 
Bergson was also aware that by way of music the Pythagoreans found an 
underlying structure that led to the conclusion all relationships could be regulated by 
the same harmonious principles, and as noted in Chapter 2, music formed a bridge 
between the inner and outer cosmos.  Through their empirical investigation of musical 
harmony, they determined that musical ratios were not just perceived by the sense of 
hearing; they could be apprehended by the mind as number in time, as noted by 
Hermann:  
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The discernment between agreeable and disagreeable sounds was no longer the 
exclusive domain of one’s ears.  One could also determine these ratios by 
entirely intelligible means. (Hermann, 2004, p.94) 
 
The Pythagoreans instigated a shift in Plato’s philosophic inquiry away from 
materialistic cosmologies of the earlier Ionic tradition to the consideration of form.  
Aristotle said that what differentiates Plato from the Pythagoreans is separation 
(Metaphysics, 989b 29) or the introduction of the Forms (Metaphysics, 987b 31) which 
he traces back to the dialectic developed by Socrates.  Plato’s ideas are criticised by 
Bergson in Creative Evolution because he identifies the theory as a product of the 
function of intellect and language that separate the parts from the whole, suggesting 
that Plato’s dialectic laid the foundation for separating qualities and quantities (C.E., 
pp.314-328).  Bergson’s criticism of Plato could also be linked to the prioritisation that 
Plato ‘appears’ to give to mathematics over the science of harmonics.  In Republic 
(529b-531a) Plato prioritises the harmony of mathematics over that of the harmony of 
music played on instruments because in his view ideal and abstract mathematical 
relations are not present in material objects.  He criticises the Pythagoreans for 
focusing too much on the actual sound of musical intervals, and not concentrating 
enough on the silent harmony of pure numbers.131  It is possible that Bergson shared 
Burkert’s view that Plato distorted the empirical nature of the Pythagorean tradition:  
 
The problem of the Pythagorean tradition lies in Platonism, for Platonizing 
interpretation took the place of historical reality.  One can only guess at the 
reasons why Plato and his pupils saw themselves as continuators of 
Pythagoreanism. (Burkert, 1972, p.92)  
 
                                                            
131  See: Guthrie, 1962, pp.161-162. 
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If, as has been proposed, Bergson’s transformational philosophy is founded on the 
science of harmonics, it is possible that underlying his criticism of Plato was the 
thought that the death knell for Pythagoreanism was rung by Plato, and from that time 
intellect dominated the fields of science and mathematics.  Pythagorean harmonics and 
a philosophy of transformation were forgotten until they were revived by Plotinus in the 
form of logos in which movement and change is implicated, and which Bergson adopts 
as central to the evolution of the élan vital.  Having said that, neither Plato nor Plotinus 
neglected the empirical; while Plotinus cannot be described as an empiricist he 
described how forms perceived empirically by musicians, can lead us to the nature of 
the forms in Intellect (Ennead I.3.1, 20-35),132 in the same way that Plato said that 
geometers use visible forms to lead them to their intelligible paradigms (Republic VI, 
510d-e).  However, for Bergson, it was Plotinus’ concept of logos that differentiated 
him from Plato, and while he criticises Plato in particular for proposing a philosophy 
based on the notion of static ideas existing in eternity, he considered it an error that 
Plotinus tried to ‘fix’, and this is why he excluded Plotinus from his criticism of Greek 
philosophy in Creative Evolution (C.E., p.326, fn.). 
The examination of Bergson’s theory of multiplicity in this Chapter as well as 
Chapter 5 has brought to light that there are inferred references suggesting a possible 
Pythagorean influence on Bergson, and a further example is found in The Two Sources 
of Morality and Religion.  Bergson proposes that life proceeds by progress and 
oscillation between opposites, or what he refers to as the ‘law of twofold frenzy’ 
(T.S.M.R., p.296), that life has become complex and will swing in the opposite 
direction to a simpler life.  He refers specifically to vegetarianism and the idea that 
science will prove he is ‘directly and slowly poisoning’ himself ‘by eating meat’, 
                                                            
132  Chapter 8.2.2, p.244. 
203 
 
though oddly, he adds a footnote to say that he chose the example of meat as he might 
have that of any other food, as if he anticipated his reference would lead us to think of 
an inference to Pythagoreanism (T.S.M.R., pp.300-301).  The fact is, he chose ‘meat’, 
not any other food.  In the light of all the other evidence linking Bergson to 
Pythagoreanism, it is appropriate to speculate that the return to a simple ‘vegetarian’ life 
could symbolise a return to a philosophy of transformation like that of the vegetarian 
Pythagoreans whose philosophy he was influenced by. 
 
 
 
6.6   Bergson and Metaphor 
 
 
 
Bergson makes various explicit references to harmonics as well as melody in his work; 
however, the common view is they are purely metaphorical, as noted by Edward 
Campbell who refers to Marcel (Marcel, 2005, p.86, pp.88-89): 
 
In 1925 Gabriel Marcel argued convincingly that Bergsonian duration does not 
accurately encapsulate musical experience.  Bergson had not set out to develop 
a theory of musical time or duration, and he used the example of melody only 
metaphorically. (Campbell, 2014, p.229) 
 
The Pythagorean influence on Bergson has also been rejected by Barnard, who in his 
chapter entitled ‘Melodies of the Self and the World’ offers an enlightening description 
of how Bergson sees reality as a “vast ongoing musical creation” while considering it a 
metaphor that excludes any likeness to the Pythagorean music of the spheres:  
 
Instead of envisioning the universe as the rigorously formulaic manifestation of 
some Pythagorean regularity, as the terrestrial echo of the “music of the 
spheres” in which matter obeys the preset “score” given by the Laws of Nature, 
why not think of physical reality as a complex jazz performance in which old 
standards are frequently performed (making them “habits” rather than “laws of 
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nature”), even if, periodically and regularly, something unexpected also occurs, 
something genuinely new takes place as the adaptive result of different 
individuals and groups responding to and interacting with each other. (Barnard, 
2011, p.92) 
 
Barnard gives the impression that law does not apply to Bergson’s creative evolution 
and that a law of harmonics, which is “formulaic”, cannot account for spontaneous 
novelty and freedom through constructive and destructive interference.  Most musicians 
base their spontaneous creations on pre-existing scales from which they are free to 
choose the notes to play.  He also provides a distorted impression of Pythagorean 
philosophy as being “pre-set” and rigid, whereas it proposes that human action can 
counter the effects of nature by awareness of the natural energy encountered daily, a 
view also held by Bergson, as will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
It is also significant that several of Bergson’s arguments have a basis within the 
ancient science of harmonics, particularly that of Aristoxenus who, as explained in 
Chapter 2,133 considered melody to possess power (δύναμις) that is essentially 
qualitative and implicated in its succession and continuity (συνέχεια), because notes 
have their own dynamic properties or functions that determine the progress of a melody 
in terms of its intervals.  Similarly, while there is no evidence that Bergson read 
Aristoxenus, he proposes that organised matter evolves and has continuity due to its 
power in terms of ‘genetic energy’ (C.E., p.27) that varies with its function.  It was 
noted in section 6.2134 that Bergson employs the claims of Aristoxenus in his argument 
that scientific methods employ intelligence that uses ready-made concepts and 
language, and in his number theory, we interpret the difference in intensive magnitude, 
                                                            
133  Chapter 2.4, pp.52-53. 
134  Chapter 6.2, pp.182-183. 
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kind or quality that cannot be measured, as a difference in extensive magnitude, 
quantity or degree that can be measured.135  While Bergson appears to be influenced by 
Pythagorean harmonics, he appears to combine it with the more empirical Aristoxenian 
theory in a way that is not found in the Enneads. 
   Commentators appear to assume that Bergson’s philosophy is not literally 
based on music or harmonics; however, in The Creative Mind, Bergson’s opening 
words are: ‘What philosophy has lacked most of all is precision (‘Introduction I’, in 
C.M., p.11), so if precision is his primary concern, why would he say that duration or 
the inner life “is that very melody” (‘Introduction I’, in C.M., p.19), or that our 
personality is “precisely the continuous melody of our inner life” (‘The Perception of 
Change’, C.M.,  p.149) if he intended the melody to be taken metaphorically?  For 
Bergson intuition, which is durational, pre-exists intellect which thinks in terms of 
space.  The intellect has to use spatial metaphors to explain that which is experienced 
immediately through intuition; however, as Harris notes, Bergson struggles to explain 
duration using spatial metaphors: 
 
Bergson proposes one explanatory metaphor for duration after another, only to 
find them inadequate, if not deceptive. In essence, we find that Bergson lacks 
any notion of “space” or spatial metaphors which would accommodate the 
definitive characteristics of his concept of multiplicity. The chief impasse lies in 
that fact that qualitative or continuous multiplicity entails “reciprocal 
penetration,” a tangled weave of sorts, and Bergson could not find a visual or 
spatial analogue because he equated space in general with the Euclidean space 
of common sense. (Harris, 2004, p.102) 
 
                                                            
135  Chapter 9 will also claim that Bergson follows Aristoxenus in implicating the necessity of 
perception and memory in the theory of continuity (p.261-262).  See also Chapter 2.4, p.53. 
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Not only are spatial metaphors ineffective in explaining duration, in Creative Evolution 
Bergson states that the intellect will essentially regard duration as metaphorical: 
 
It is of the very essence of mechanism, in fact, to consider as metaphorical 
every expression which attributes to time an effective action and a reality of its 
own.  (C.E., p.16) 
 
In The Creative Mind Bergson suggests that spatial metaphors or images can bring 
forth an intuition of duration; however, they have to be different with a possibility of 
convergence due to them having “the same degree of tension”.  Difference is needed to 
prevent any one of them from taking the place of the intended intuition, but together 
they gradually bring consciousness to a position where the intuition will be unveiled 
(‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.166).  So, we can acquire an intuition of 
duration by using spatial metaphors that appear to converge; however, they have to be 
different. 
In the light of what Bergson writes about the need for spatial metaphors it is 
understandable that commentators assume that he has no other means of describing 
duration; however, it is suggested that his spatial metaphors form part of the process of 
‘unveiling’ or initiation for the reader who is possibly not yet ready to see the light, and 
as was explained in Chapter 1, the information is not explicitly given because initiation 
is a journey of discovery that the student has to undertake for him/herself.  On the other 
hand, his reference to duration as melody is temporal rather than spatial and brings 
consciousness to an immediate and “precise” understanding, which is why he repeats it.  
Once again, he hints at the notion of harmonics but does not describe it explicitly in in 
his theory of duration and intuition.  The analysis of his arguments for partial finalism, 
his theory of number, his rejection of mathematics as having the ability to account for 
duration, his sympathy with Pythagorean number theory and philosophy, the veiled 
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Pythagorean inferences, together with his insistence on precision, suggests that duration 
conceived as melody is not metaphorical because the harmonic principles underpinning 
it are precisely those that underpin his theory of the élan vital and duration as a 
temporal process.  In Chapter 4 it was noted that Plotinus is more explicit about 
harmonic principles when describing the nature of Soul; however, he never uses 
musical metaphors when describing the generation and nature of Being, Intellect and 
matter, because the process itself is not metaphorical; hence his reliance on metaphors 
of light and vision to explain it.  Bergson appears to adopt a similar approach; he is 
slightly more open in his musical references in his account of partial finalism but uses 
metaphors of fireworks and shells in his account of the division of the élan vital.  While 
it is possible to question Plotinus’ understanding of the mechanism of harmonics, there 
is no doubt about Bergson’s knowledge because he was explicit about it, particularly in 
Laughter, where he refers to harmonics pertinent to optics as well as music, and later in 
The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.  The increasing frequency of explicit 
references to harmonics, particularly in the latter book, possibly reflects a growing 
confidence in his theory due to scientific developments.  In The Creative Mind, 
published in 1934, he comments: 
 
When I began to write, physics had not yet made the decisive advances which 
were to bring a change in its ideas on the structure of matter …The great 
theoretical discoveries of recent years have led physicists to suppose a kind of 
fusion between the wave and the corpuscle – between substance and movement 
(C.M., ‘Introduction II’, p.71-72). 
 
While electromagnetic wave theory originated with the work of Maxwell in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, according to the electric and magnetic equations 
postulated by Maxwell, electromagnetic fields resemble a wave in both structure and 
action (Maxwell, 1865, p.466).  Theories of the harmonic oscillation of matter began 
208 
 
with De Broglie’s discovery in 1925 that electrons are both particles and waves of 
vibration complete with harmonics and overtones that follow the same property and 
characteristics of vibration as the vibrating string of a musical instrument (Root-
Bernstein & Root-Bernstein, 1999, p.139).  In 1925, Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan 
expressed the quantum field's internal degrees of freedom as an infinite set of harmonic 
oscillators and in 1927 Schrödinger wrote down an equation for quantum waves 
(Heisenberg Society, 2017). 
 
 
    
Conclusion 
 
 
 
This Chapter argued that Bergson’s harmonics of evolution are influenced by 
Pythagoreanism.  Significantly, Bergson’s argument for partial finalism replicates 
Plotinus and relies on key Pythagorean concepts: an original undifferentiated unity, the 
division and association of opposites, the notion of microcosm and macrocosm being a 
sympathetic whole, the notion of war generating new forms and the destruction of 
others as a result of harmonic interference, and the fact that musical ratios or 
proportions can account for the development of identical structures in independent lines 
of evolution.  It was acknowledged that while commentators have noted the harmonics 
model, mystery surrounding Bergson’s cosmology means they have not made the 
connection in any depth.  It is proposed that his arguments for a musical theme are 
consistent with, ultimately depend on, and therefore support the harmonic model 
proposed in Chapter 5. 
It was contended that Bergson’s arguments for a difference between quantitative 
and qualitative multiplicity replicates Plotinus’ distinction between monadic and 
substantial number and he acknowledges he is following Plotinus’s theory of logos.  
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Despite having a clear understanding that Plotinus’ logos refers to substantial number 
and form, it was considered noteworthy that he failed to explain it as such in his lectures 
and talks. 
It was argued that commentators’ perceptions of the influence of mathematics on 
Bergson should be re-evaluated in the light of the Pythagorean influence on him.  The 
spatial conceptual mathematics of Riemann is not consistent with the temporal nature of 
duration, and it was suggested the calculus Bergson had in mind for his philosophical 
method was able to operate genuinely qualitative differentiations and integrations as the 
Pythagoreans conceived it.  Hence the mathematics underpinning it was not the 
mathematics of science, but music, the significance of which is that it takes account of 
the intervals.  
The examination of his ‘Lectures on the Pythagoreans’ assessed his attitude 
towards them, and it was ascertained he was familiar with their cosmology, and he 
adopted key concepts in his work.  It revealed sympathy with their theory of number 
and philosophy of transformation. 
It was argued that the combination of harmonics and Pythagorean concepts in his 
work suggests his concept of duration as melody cannot be interpreted as mere 
metaphor.  While Bergson insisted on precision in philosophy, the harmonic principles 
forming the basis of melody are precisely those forming the basis of the élan vital and 
duration.  It was also suggested that his spatial metaphors are intended to form part of 
the process of ‘unveiling’ or initiation for the reader. 
The argument for a Pythagorean influence on Bergson will be developed further 
in Chapter 9 with an examination of how the Pythagorean concept of kairos impacts on 
his work.  The next chapter will introduce the concept of kairos with an explanation of 
how it was understood in ancient Greece.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Kairos (Kαιρός) 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Kairos is a term used in ancient Greece to refer to the moment of ‘happening’, or the 
incomplete moment that bridges or intersects the past and the future and is therefore 
essentially temporal in nature.  In the modern literature, the concept of kairos is 
prevalent in the studies of rhetoric, theology and to a lesser extent, politics. Theology 
has placed increasing emphasis on it due to the work of Paul Tillich who was hugely 
influenced by Schelling; however, a survey of the literature reveals it to be a subject 
largely neglected by scholars of Plotinus and Bergson, particularly in the English 
language literature.  French language sources provide only a scattering of articles that 
indicate its relevance to Bergson, notably from Vladimir Jankélévitch whose own 
philosophy is highly influenced by kairos, and J.M. Gebaude who has written 
specifically on the strong influence on Bergson, while E. Moutsopoulos, a philosopher 
of kairicity, has written extensively on the general subject of kairos, including its 
relevance to the philosophy of Plotinus.  Kairos is an important concept that links 
Bergson and Plotinus to ancient Greece and the Pythagorean tradition, thus 
strengthening the argument for a Pythagorean influence on them.  As it plays an 
important role in the cosmology and psychology of Plotinus and Bergson, this brief 
Chapter is a prelude to explaining the nature of kairos in their work.  It introduces the 
subject of time in the form of Chronos and Kairos as it was understood in ancient 
Greece, by the Pythagoreans, and how their influence pervades classical rhetoric, the 
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importance of which will be addressed in Chapter 9 in an examination of how Bergson 
incorporates the principles of rhetoric into his philosophy.  
  
 
   
7.1   Chronos and Kairos in Ancient Greece 
 
 
     
For the ancient Greeks, Chronos was the primeval god of time, who in Orphic 
cosmogonies emerged self-formed at the beginning of creation.  With his consort 
Ananke (necessity), he circled the primal world-egg and split it apart to form the 
ordered universe of earth, sea and sky.  As they subsequently continued to circle the 
cosmos, their passage powered the circling of heaven and the eternal passage of time.  
While the ancient Greeks measured the time of day by shadows, months by the phases 
of the moon, and seasons by animal migration and astrological movement, they 
considered the natural world to be anything but stable or trustworthy, as Allen 
comments:  
 
…a closer look at the evidence suggests that Hesiod, like a number of other 
early Greek writers, had a far subtler sense of how deeply irregular and 
unreliable the passage of time in nature really is. (Allen, 2003, p. 63) 
 
The Greek oral poet Hesiod (circa. 750-650 B.C.) provides a clear insight into the 
ancient Greek perception of time in ‘Works and Days’, in which he guides the reader 
on natural signs including animal and plant behaviour, weather, seasons and astronomy 
that indicate conditions for action.  Time here is referred to as “time to” or “time of” 
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(τότε - II. 452), “season” (ὡραῖος - II. 663-677), “right time” (ὡραῖος - II. 663-677), 
“when” (ὅτ᾽- II. 111), (ὁπότε - II. 494).136  
Time did not assume any regularity until the fourth century B.C. when sun dials 
were used to indicate the time of day, and water clocks (clepsydrai) were used like 
stop-watches in the courts to time speeches and for imposing a time limit on a client’s 
visit in Athenian brothels (Landels, 1979, p.33).  Time was fashioned by human 
decisions, and since life accommodated changing circumstances and focused on 
agricultural need, religious festivals as well as political and military activities were 
scheduled according to the demand for agricultural labour (Foxhall, 1995, pp.97-110); 
hence, even solar or lunar calendars varied between different regions, and civil 
calendars were regularly adjusted by the archons (chief magistrates) as they saw fit.    
Since the application of measured time was very limited, in everyday life it was not 
generally considered to be directly measurable, uniform, or absolutely predictable; as 
such, it was purely subjective and greater emphasis was placed on the notion of time as 
kairos. 
In Greek mythology, Kairos was the youngest son of Zeus, considered to be the 
daimon (spirit) of opportunity.  He is depicted as a young man with wings on his feet, 
indicating the speed at which he passes, balancing on the tips of his toes on a sphere, 
representing the fact that he is running.  He holds scales balanced on a razor signifying 
that justice or a decision is required at the point of kairos that stands between the past 
and the future.  The tuft of hair on his forehead represents the opportune moment that 
can be grasped as he approaches, while the back of his head is bald indicating a lost 
opportunity for action.  Such depictions may also be read as literal ek-stases from the 
                                                            
136  See p.213 where it is explained that in Hesiod time as kairos is associated with: “the proper 
amount in the given circumstances” and in speech it refers to the use of language that is     
“appropriate, straightforward, and correct”. 
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world, as a function of that world.  Aesop's Fables, written between 620 and 560 B.C., 
describe Kairos in Fable 536.  Pollitt refers to a bronze statue of Kairos in the entrance 
to the stadium in which the first Olympiad was held in 776 BC, and Pausanius refers to 
a statue of Kairos sculpted by Lysippos from Sikyon, which was complemented by an 
epigram by Poseidippos describing the character of Kairos (Pollitt, 1986, pp.53-54).137  
According to the Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon, kairos (καιρός) acquired 
many different meanings ranging initially from the spatial and later to the temporal, 
including: due measure, proportion, fitness, a vital part of the body, exact or critical 
time, season, opportunity, advantage or profit (Liddell-Scott-Jones, 2017).  Kairos, as 
subjective qualitative time, centred on the demands of action necessary for agriculture 
and required a flexible response to natural signs and conditions. 
In a study of kairos in Greek drama, Race advises that the adjectival form of the 
word first appears around 800 B.C. in Homer’s Iliad (4.185, 8.84, 326) in which it 
refers to a vital place in the body.  As a ‘normative word’, it often had no specific 
temporal meaning.  In Hesiod, it refers to “the proper amount in the given 
circumstances” and in speech it refers to the use of language that is “appropriate, 
straightforward, and correct” (II. 694).  While these concepts can be associated with 
time in Works and Days in terms of “time to”, “time of, etc. as explained above, Race 
proposes that the temporal aspect is developed by the Greek lyric poet Theognis of 
Megara (600 BC), and later by the comic playwright Aristophanes (446-386 B.C.) for 
whom the meaning of kairos becomes ‘success’ resulting ‘from action which is 
                                                            
137   In Gibbs translation of Fable 563 he also notes that “This fable is based on a famous statue 
of Kairos, 'Opportunity,' by Lysippus, a famous Greek sculptor of the fourth century B.C.E 
(the statue is described in Posidippus, Anthologia Planudea 275 and Ausonius, Epigrams 
11).” 
 
See also Phaedrus Book 5.8, p.367, in Babrius & Phaedrus, 1989. 
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appropriate to or needed in the particular circumstances’.  Race however, finds 
references to kairos as ‘success’ in Sophocles and ‘advantage’ in Euripides.  Kairos as 
‘opportunity’ or ‘chance’ is proposed by Euripides (Ion 1062) in the fourth century B.C.  
Race concludes: 
 
the temporal sense often enters the question because we naturally think of 
"times," "occasions," and "moments," when we are dealing with given 
circumstances or situations that change in time, and it is a short step from 
"appropriate to the given situation" to "correct at the moment" to "timely”. 
(Race, 1981, pp.197-213)138 
 
While kairos is also sometimes translated as ‘profit’, Wilson’s study of the citations in 
the lexica to the end of the fourth century B.C. suggests very limited relevance (Wilson, 
1981, pp.418-420).     
As an indicator for action, kairos was also important in moral life and provided a 
sense of control over the instability of time.  It was therefore an influential concept in 
ancient Greece, covering the realms of medicine, literature, poetry, performing art, 
rhetoric as well as the philosophy of the pre-Socratics, and subsequently the aesthetics 
and ethics of Plato and Aristotle (Sipiora, 2002, p.3).  All these different fields 
acknowledged that the concept of proportion is fundamental to Kairos. 
Eskin argues that kairos is a core theme in the medical writings attributed to 
Hippocrates (460-375 B.C.), where there is an emphasis on giving practical advice to 
the physician on using experience, judgement and instinct when treating patients.  
Successful treatment was based around the concepts of observation and enquiry; the 
physician had to take all relevant environmental factors into account, including the 
symptoms presented, astronomical factors, season, weather conditions, the patient's 
                                                            
138  For an extensive commentary of kairos in Classical Greek literature, see: Levi, 1923. 
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emotional state, what is said or done by the patient and physician etc.  Kairos means 
providing the right treatment at the most opportune time and in the right proportion.  
Eskin notes: 
 
Hippocrates' literal use of the word kairos is frequent and telling: among the 
fifty-six works included in IBYCUS, kairos appears in thirty-three; within those 
thirty-three works, some form of the root kair- appears 264 times. (Eskin, 2002, 
p.98) 
 
 
 
7.2    Kairos in the Pythagorean Tradition 
 
 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the Pythagorean study of numbers was applied in both a spatial 
and temporal context, where geometry was considered as number in space, and music 
or harmonics as number in time.  Unlike Kant who proposed that time and space are a 
priori and necessary for experience, the Pythagoreans considered time to be generated 
with the cosmogonic and cosmologic process; Archytas wrote: “Time is the interval of 
the nature of all” (Simplicius, Aristotelis categorias Commentarii, in Ariotti, 1975, 
p.72).  A compendium of essays in Rhetoric and Kairos; Essays in History, Theory, and 
Praxis edited by Philip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, is a key source of information 
regarding the philosophical roots of kairos.  Sipiora acknowledges the importance of 
the examinations of pre-Socratic thought by the Italian scholars Augusto Rostagni, 
Doro Levi, and Mario Untersteiner, and significantly all relevant contributions refer 
almost exclusively to these sources. Rostagni examined the role of kairos in sophistic 
rhetoric, particularly Pythagorean influences on Gorgias and Antisthenes (Rostagni, 
1922).  Doro Levi examined kairos in Greek literature and in the Seven Sages, 
Thucydides, Democritis, and Pythagoras, and this influence on Plato, who uses kairos 
to link ethics and aesthetics which subsequently shapes his thinking on philosophical 
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rhetoric (Levi, 1923; Levi, 1924).  Mario Untersteiner produced a detailed analysis of 
the influence of kairos on Sophistic thought with an emphasis on Gorgias 
(Untersteiner, 1954). 
The philosophical source of kairos is generally accepted by scholars to be 
Pythagorean, for whom it had cosmological and ethical significance.  The potentially 
free decisive act of the individual required the necessary kairos of the outer world for 
its application, as Smith comments: 
 
The important point … is that the time of kairos is seen as an ontological 
element in the basic structure of things and, while that time calls for a human 
response, the occasion itself is not of human devising. (Smith, 2002, pp.53-54) 
  
The significance of kairos as a dynamic and generative temporal concept in 
Pythagorean cosmology arises from the importance they attributed the number 7; its 
power appears to be one of transition from the old to the new, the past to the future, 
and the Pythagoreans acknowledged it in the outer world as well as the inner.  
Alexander of Aphrodisias refers to the Pythagorean notion of kairos as ‘opportunity’: 
 
The number 7 is opportunity (kairos), for natural things seem to have their 
seasons of completion, both of birth and of maturity, according to [periods of] 
seven, as in the case of man. For a man is born seven months [after conception], 
and cuts his teeth after the same number of months, and reaches puberty at 
about the end of the second period of seven years, and grows a beard at about 
the end of the third.  The sun too, since it is itself thought to be the cause of the 
seasons, they say it is situated [in the place] where the number 7 is, which they 
call ‘due season’ (kairos); for they say that the sun occupies the seventh place 
[from the periphery] among the ten bodies that move around the centre, or 
hearth. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Metaphysics I, 38, 17-38, in Dooley, 1989).  
 
In this context, the number 7 arises cyclically, but always as part of the natural 
evolutionary process involving real change that may be necessary or even providential.  
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The number 7 is also important in the science of harmonics; it is the last note before the 
start of a new octave and carries with it the potential for the most concordant harmony.
 Untersteiner comments that the Pythagoreans considered kairos to be "one of 
the fundamental laws of the universe" because kairos was implicit in the generative 
process of the universe through harmonia, the integration of opposites (Untersteiner, 
1954, pp.110-111).  The link to harmonics also had important implications for 
Pythagorean ethics; in ‘Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory’, James L. 
Kinneavy refers to Rostagni: 
 
One of the most significant ethical components of kairos had to do with its 
close relation to justice, particularly among the Pythagoreans.  Justice was 
defined as giving to each according to merit … Justice, therefore was 
determined by circumstances: justice was kairos (Rostagni, 163).  This 
combination was omnipresent in Pythagoras; according to Rostagni, “All of his 
[Pythagoras’s] teachings, his influence as founder of a school and as expert and 
custodian of minds – everything is based on the combined principles of kairos 
and dikaion [justice]” (168). (Kinneavy, 2002, p.61) 
 
Kinneavy also discusses the civic educational dimension of kairos, referring to the 
Pythagorean influence: 
 
we know that Pythagoras had oriented his training in education to civic 
education, to training for public affairs, for life in the polis (Rostagni, 188).  
Iamblichus in his Life of Pythagoras states, “They say that he would have been 
the inventor of all civic education [politike paideia]” (Rostagni, 71).  The 
constant theme of all his speeches was virtue, with kairos the determining 
principle in each case. (Kinneavy, 2002, p.65) 
 
Proportion was an important subject of enquiry for Archytas, whose concern for 
fairness and stability in political and moral life approached it with mathematical 
precision, giving arithmetic or calculation (logismos) priority over the other sciences.  
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Like Philolaus he argued that through number, we can make discoveries about the 
world around us and understand it, as well as living a good life through its practical 
application (DK 47 B3).  Archytas formulated a proof that the musical intervals in the 
form of (n+1): n cannot be divided in half, i.e., that there are no mean proportional 
numbers in the superparticular ratios that govern the musical scale, 2:1, 4:3, 3:2 and 9:8 
(Huffman, 2005, p.62).  For Archytas, while all the ‘means’, arithmetic, geometric and 
harmonic have their rightful application, proportion is a relative value, which does not 
imply that the equality implicit in the arithmetic mean will always be appropriate.  A 
similar theory was adopted by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II), whose virtue 
ethics were developed by education, but which excluded the mathematical precision 
considered necessary by later Pythagoreans; however, for both the Pythagoreans and 
Aristotle a ‘sense’ of proportion was fundamental for living a good life (Nicomachean 
Ethics, Book V).  
While Eskin, as noted above, remarks on the influence of kairos in the medical 
writings attributed to Hippocrates, Iamblichus, in his ‘Life of Pythagoras’ wrote: 
 
And there are certain melodies devised as remedies against the passions of the 
soul, and also against despondency and lamentation, which Pythagoras invented 
as things that afford the greatest assistance in these maladies. And again, he 
employed other melodies against rage and anger, and against every aberration 
of the soul. There is also another kind of modulation invented as a remedy 
against desires. (Taylor, 1986, pp.59-60) 
 
While Iamblichus does not mention kairos explicitly, he describes how Pythagoras 
corrected these imbalances by prescribing melodies or sounds according to “the rule of 
virtue” which is understood to be appropriate action taken at the right time and in the 
right proportion.  Pythagoras helped to induce restful sleep and cleared heaviness in the 
morning through “certain peculiar songs and modulations, produced either by simply 
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striking the lyre, or employing the voice” (Taylor, 1986, pp.32).  His description 
therefore contains all the essential features of kairos.  
The Pythagorean notion of kairos was taught and employed in Greek rhetoric as 
important for phronesis (practical wisdom), for speaking intelligently in the assembly, 
the courts and in private discourse, to enable citizens to decide on the best course of 
action in specific circumstances.  It required an intense awareness of occasion, 
audience, and the situational context.  Sipiora notes how kairos dominated classical 
Greek rhetoric: 
 
Kairos plays a major role in the First Sophistic movement, especially in the 
works of Protagoras and Gorgias.  The legacy of kairos continues in Aristotle’s 
taxonomy of rhetorical principles …; it also assumes major importance in 
Plato’s concept of philosophical rhetoric and in Isocrates’ rhetorical paideia.  In 
short, kairos was the cornerstone of rhetoric in the Golden Age of Greece. 
(Sipiora, 2002, p.3) 
 
Kairos remained the foundational principle for Gorgias’ reputed student, Isocrates who 
considered it a way of life and developed a complete educational system around it.  He 
was a rival of Plato and his views on rhetorical theory influenced Aristotle. 
According to the Italian scholars, the Pythagorean influence has been traced 
within the field of classical Greek sophistic rhetoric from Isocrates, back through 
Gorgias and on to Empedocles who provides the direct link to Pythagoreanism.  Carter 
comments: “It was through Empedocles that kairos as the principle of opposites and 
harmony came to influence sophistic epistemology”.  Empedocles, who appears to have 
been influenced by Pythagoreanism, provided a relativistic epistemology based upon 
opposing concepts and upon which his student, Gorgias, built rhetoric on the basis of 
“conflict and resolution”.  Carter refers to Enos who states that Gorgias' rhetorical 
methodology was “based upon a system of investigation in which probable knowledge 
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or opinion was revealed as a synthesis from dichotomous antithetical positions” (Enos, 
1976, p.50); however, Carter also notes that a decision could also be arrived at by 
choosing “one position over its opposite based on the sense of greatest probability.” 
(Carter, 1988, pp.102-106).  According to Sipiora, kairos employed in rhetoric was "a 
dynamic principle rather than a static, codified rhetorical technique" (Sipiora, 2002, 
p.10); the idea was to overcome the possibility of inaction caused by the cycle of 
contradictory positions, both of which could be conceived as true.  Unlike the later 
Pythagoreans, the method employed by Gorgias was deemed irrational, and even 
though commentators who support the view that Gorgias uses the Pythagorean notion 
of harmonia between opposites, are in the majority, the verdict is not unanimous; De 
Vogel disputes the link with Gorgias: 
 
For Pythagoras kairos is rooted in a cosmic-ontological order, whereas for 
Gorgias this background is completely absent.  This makes for a radical 
difference; for it implies that for Pythagoras kairos had its place within a τάξις 
[order; system] and as such is of a rational-ethical character, whereas for 
Gorgias, where there is no such foundation, a complete irrationality remains. 
(De Vogel, 1966, p.118) 
 
One could certainly argue that there is no evidence to support the view that kairos was 
completely rational for the Pythagoreans because there are no Pythagorean texts that 
specifically address the concept of kairos, in general or its association with rhetoric.  We 
have to keep in mind that in the early Pythagorean era this is how time was generally 
conceived.  It called for action based on judgements made on the basis of instinct or 
intuition and it appears to have been developed by later Pythagoreans such as Archytas 
who endeavoured to provide a rational answer to questions of ethics. 
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7.3   An Introduction to Kairos in Plotinus and Bergson 
 
 
 
The concept of kairos has also been acknowledged to be at work in the philosophy of 
Plotinus and Bergson for whom the ontological aspect arises from a dynamic and 
ordered process of contemplation or intuition in which the universe and life within it 
are generated and evolve as harmonics and vibrations or overtones, as proposed in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  However, it will be argued that for Plotinus and Bergson the 
psychological and ethical significance of kairos is considered an act of determined 
indeterminacy, bridging the tension between providence and freedom (Plotinus) and 
determinism and freedom (Bergson).  This is possible because we have been provided 
with the basic structure or order that we use for our own evolution in which we create 
at will.  Kairos in the human domain, which has practical utility, is a moment of action 
or ‘timing’, an occasion signifying the emergence of qualitative change that is situation 
specific.  It is essentially open, undetermined and opportune; the crucial, decisive, 
though incomplete, interval that links the past to the future and one that requires human 
participation in the act of creation.  It is a poietic moment in which Plotinus and 
Bergson employ the Pythagorean notions of opposites and harmonia in their concepts 
of mind and matter, and freedom and determinacy, concepts that integrate to facilitate 
action.  Chapter 8 will present an interpretation of how Plotinus achieves this by 
examining his concepts of sense perception, memory, reason and contemplation, and 
how they impact on ethical action, while Chapter 9 will examine the operation of kairos 
in Bergson’s concepts of perception and memory, and their relationship with intellect 
and intuition, and how it functions in ethical action. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Plotinus and Kairos 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Plotinus discusses the concept of time in the context of chronos in Ennead III. 7, ‘On 
Eternity and Time’,139 where he claims eternity is the life of Intellect and its intelligible 
substance; its eternal existence or non-temporal nature means it has no past and no 
future (Ennead III.7.5, 27).  Time or temporal becoming is “the life of soul in a 
movement of passage from one way of life to another” (Ennead III.7.11, 44-45), and 
the moving image of eternity (Ennead III.7.13, 24-25), a concept taken from Plato 
(Timaeus, 38 b6-c2; 37 d7-e4).  Time is not measured time as we think of it; it is kairos 
as the Soul moves between Intellect and the material world, and in Ennead IV.7.9, 
Plotinus claims time is indefinite, non-spatial, and as such is neither a magnitude that 
can be measured or numbered, nor is it a measure or a number itself;140 it is a 
continuous unbounded succession (Ennead III.7.11, 55-56).  As such it is a precursor to 
Bergson’s account of duration originally espoused in Time and Free Will because 
Plotinus argues that time is not a quantitative multiplicity that is measured as discrete 
units in space. 
                                                            
139  It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive critique of this treatise, thus replicating 
the work of others.  See, for example: (Wagner, 2008); (Smith, 1996); (Clark, 1944).  I 
merely take what is relevant to understanding the concept of Kairos in the Enneads. 
  
140  See also Ennead VI.1.5, 16–20.   
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At the level of the Hypostasis Soul, all Souls are considered a unity; however, 
they have different functions or faculties operative in the process.  The World Soul 
generates the world and there is a Soul that unifies the individual souls and their powers 
within it.  Because kairos applies to the World Soul as well as individual human souls, it 
is pertinent to clarify how it operates with their respective functions: the making of the 
material world, the action of the individual soul within its corporeal environment, and 
how Plotinus incorporates freedom within his concept of Providence.  It is therefore 
necessary to consider how Plotinus’ cosmology relates to his psychology, a subject that 
has caused difficulties for most commentators because both are founded on the concept 
of logos, which, as was argued in Chapter 3, has been unsatisfactorily interpreted.141 
The Chapter begins with an explanation of the nature of kairos as it applies to the 
World Soul and nature, and then it examines the key concepts of sense perception, 
memory, reason, and freedom as they relate to the individual soul.  A comprehensive 
critical analysis of these concepts is not possible here, so the intention is to present the 
salient features, note the perceived difficulties, and draw upon textual evidence to 
support the argument that they can be resolved, if the theory that Plotinus founds his 
philosophy on Pythagorean harmonics is applied to these concepts.   
 
 
 
8.1   Kairos and the World Soul 
 
 
 
Moutsopoulos refers to kairos in nature as “the infinitesimal moment that causes the 
transition (and conversion) of a given phase of natural evolution to the next” 
(Moutsopoulos, 1984, p.443), and the function of the World Soul and nature, its lowest 
                                                            
141  Chapter 3.4, pp.82-89. 
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aspect, is to make the beings of the world as a temporal unfolding of logos in matter as 
a process of contemplation.  It achieves this according to Providence, that is, it does not 
make by deliberate choice or reasoning, but by necessity.142  How then does Plotinus 
consider the making of the world an act of freedom?  Plotinus refers to freedom as ‘ἐφ’ 
ἡμῖν’, often translated as ‘that which is in our power’, ‘that which is in our control’, or 
‘that which depends on us’.  In Ennead VI.8, Plotinus explains how ‘ἐφ’ ἡμῖν’ applies 
to the One and Intellect, which helps us to understand its application to the World Soul.  
There are three key requirements for freedom: (1) self-sufficiency; (2) what it makes 
must be within its power; and (3) its knowledge is right knowledge or wisdom.  Self-
sufficiency means there is no affection arising from outside influences.  The One is 
self-sufficient in that it is cause of everything else and Intellect’s freedom arises from 
its self-determination, its thinking, or self-contemplation.  He proposes: 
 
…we shall grant voluntary action to one whose doings depend on the activities 
of Intellect and who is free from bodily affections.  We trace what is in our 
power to the noblest principle, the activity of Intellect, and shall grant that the 
premises of action derived from this are truly free. (VI.8.3, 19-23) 
             
Plotinus proposes that “all things come from contemplation and are contemplation, 
both the things that truly exist and the things which come from them” (III.8.7, 1-2).  
Furthermore, 
 
That which is called the Soul of the All …considers what lies below it 
contemplatively and remains attached to the realities before it for ever; both are 
certainly possible; it can receive from There and at the same time distribute 
here, since it was impracticable for it as soul not to be in contact with this 
world. (IV.8.7, 26-32) 
 
                                                            
142  Chapter 4.2, p.106. 
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Deck’s analysis of this statement is helpful, suggesting the consideration of what lies 
below the World Soul implies that it cannot be “caused or conditioned” by it, hence 
ruling out knowledge arising from sensation which is posterior to it, and discursive 
reasoning which is dependent upon sensation.  He adds, “The consideration here must 
rather be the World Soul’s eternal wisdom”; that in contemplating Intellect, the World 
Soul knows the world as the imitation of Intellect, “an imitation which is its function to 
produce”.  Deck also proposes that reference to ‘same time’ here is not meant 
temporally but indicates the internal duality of the World Soul (Deck, 1991, p.64).   
Plotinus states in Ennead III.8.5, 20, “action cannot come before contemplation”, so 
kairos, as the moment of happening, is paradoxical because while the world is 
providentially and necessarily ordered, it is achieved by the contemplation of Intellect 
in its desire for the Good, and while its lower aspect, nature, makes the world, it does 
so by contemplating itself, and is self-disposed in this respect.  In summary then, the 
World Soul fulfils the requirements for freedom, or ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, because it is not under 
outside influence, what it makes is within its power, and its knowledge is right 
knowledge or wisdom because it directly contemplates the forms in Intellect that are 
Beings of eternal truth.   
The generation of the world by the World Soul as kairos therefore includes the bi-
directional movement found in Intellect, procession and reversion; however, while this 
movement may be considered horizontal because the highest aspect of the World Soul 
remains in Intellect, it distributes the forms to its lower aspect, nature, vertically and 
temporally.  Movement from the higher to the lower is necessarily determined, whereas 
the ascension to Intellect fulfils the requirements of ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.  The World Soul has no 
need of a temporal memory because its being and its knowledge are complete due to its 
contemplation of Intellect, an activity that Plotinus describes as “recollection” of what 
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is already present in the Platonic sense.  Recollection is also an activity of individual 
human souls, who, as we will see, also possess the powers of sense perception, 
temporal memory and reasoning, as well as the ability to achieve ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.  
 
 
 
8.2   Kairos and the Individual Soul 
 
 
 
Specific reference to kairos arises eight times in the Enneads,143 always in the context 
of ‘occasion’ and with reference to Soul.  In Ennead III.5.8, Plotinus refers to Zeus as 
Intellect, with Soul being his offspring, who was Kairos in Greek mythology,144 and 
while this may not have been his intention here, it is in Ennead IV.4 that Plotinus 
comes closest to describing the life of the individual soul in terms that replicate the 
ancient meaning of kairos as described in the previous chapter: 
 
There is one thing after another related to our needs and the present 
moment, not definite in itself but always related to one external thing 
after another: as a result our decisions are different and relevant to the 
occasion when the need arises, and now this and now that external 
incident occurs. (IV.4.17, 5-9) 
 
In this quotation Plotinus refers specifically to occasion as ‘καιρός’. The present 
moment is indefinite or constantly changing, hence man needs sense perception to be 
consciously aware of what is externally present, memory to provide temporal 
continuity between those perceptions, and reason to help us understand what we 
                                                            
143  Enneads: I.4.16, 19; I.8.8, 35; II.3.1, 10; II.3.3, 22; II.9.13, 24; IV.4.17, 7; VI.8.18, 44 and 
      VI.8.18, 47. 
 
144  Armstrong comments: In ch.2 of this treatise, and elsewhere, Kronos is Intellect. This 
      passage shows … how little importance Plotinus attaches to the interpretation of myths. 
      (p.197) 
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perceive and make decisions about how to respond to the occasion with appropriate 
goal directed action.  The ability to decide also suggests an element of freedom is 
involved in the process.  
When considering the notion of kairos in the context of individual human souls, 
things become more complicated because the individual has a body possessing a trace 
of soul made by nature, the lowest level of the World Soul, as well as possessing a 
higher incorporeal soul operating independently of the body and remaining distinct 
from it.  The lower aspect of soul functions with the body, considered an instrument for 
practical activity (Ennead IV.3.26, 2-8), and its higher aspect is purely intellectual 
since it possesses its own intellect as well as having access to Intellect that is common 
to all souls.  Blumenthal comments that Plotinus never gives a comprehensive account 
of all the faculties operative within the material body and individual soul, and our 
understanding is blurred because “we find both Platonic and Peripatetic doctrines, 
apparently left in more or less haphazard juxtaposition”.  We have the tripartite division 
of the soul from Plato mixed with an Aristotelian division of faculties (Blumenthal, 
1971, p.21).  While Plotinus tends to refer to faculties as ‘souls’, it is more helpful to 
think of them as different powers operative within the composite living being.  
Blumenthal has summarised the faculties in a helpful diagram (Blumenthal, 1971, 
p.44), placing the various faculties within each of its aspects, though this is by no 
means clear.  The material body appears to possess a vegetative soul, which is 
responsible for growth, nutrition, reproduction, and maintainence of the body (Ennead 
III.6.4, 32; IV.3.23, 35), a sensitive soul, and an appetitive soul that is the seat of 
natural desires, pleasures and pains (Ennead VI.4.15, 8-17).  The cognitive faculties 
including imagination, memory, opinion, discursive reason and intellection appear to be 
mainly operative within the higher soul that functions with the lower sensitive soul to 
228 
 
provide information.  Plotinus seems to suggest all the faculties are present to all living 
beings, however they are not all operative to the same degree, for example, the 
vegetative soul will be dominant in plants, while the cognitive faculties may be unused, 
and even in human beings one or more faculties may dominate others, the effect being 
either positive or negative in terms of practical action or well-being. 
The examination of kairos in human practical action will primarily focus on 
sense perception, and the faculties of memory and reason, powers providing the 
individual with conscious temporal apprehension of its environment and thoughts, 
which is essential for deciding appropriate action.  
 
 
 
8.2.1   Sense Perception 
 
 
 
For Plotinus, sensation occurs in the body as a separate function to perception, which is 
a faculty of the individual, lower, or irrational soul forming a composite with the body.  
These two functions must therefore be distinctly examined before uniting them as sense 
perception.   
In Ennead IV.5, Plotinus discusses the affection of the sense organs, with the 
primary focus being the relationship between the eye and the object of vision, while 
proposing his theory of sensation also applies to the other senses (Ennead IV.6.1, 11-
14).  He suggests a sensory organ is affected or receives an impression (τύπος) and 
becomes assimilated to the object (Ennead IV.4.23), while specifically rejecting 
materialistic theories of material impressions, such as an impression of an object in wax 
(Ennead IV.6.1, 1-2), or of a medium such as air being involved; instead, he claims 
sensation is achieved by sympathia.  If it is in the nature of a given thing to be 
sympathetically affected by another thing because it has some resemblance to it, the 
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medium is not affected, or at least not in the same way (Ennead IV.5.1, 35-38).  The 
concepts of ‘impressions’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘resemblance’ are implicit in sympathia, a 
subject causing difficulty for those analysing Plotinus’ theory of sense perception.  
Emilsson, for example, examined the subject in depth and is referenced by other 
commentators.  He admits that he cannot account for the link between similarity and 
sympathia, and while he comments that Plotinus discusses sympathia as action at a 
distance to explain the efficacy of magic, prayer, the influence of the celestial bodies, 
as well as visual and auditory transmission, he remains in the dark: 
 
…beyond what has been said, Plotinus says nothing about the mechanism by 
which sympathia is supposed to work.  At any rate I have not been able to gain 
many insights relevant to the issue of visual transmission from what Plotinus 
says about sympathia outside IV.5. (Emilsson, 1988, p.48) 
 
No other commentator appears to have offered an adequate explanation either.  
Emilsson correctly refers to Ennead IV.4.23 where Plotinus refers to the body as being 
assimilated to its object, where assimilate means “to make alike”, and he also notes that 
the organ passively receives the form from its object; however he proceeds to argue 
that the sense organ receives the quality of the form; that the affection is a “literal 
assimilation”, suggesting that “something in the eye is supposed to become literally red 
when a red thing is seen”.  On pages 82-86 he explains this as the eye taking on colours 
in a phenomenal sense; for example, vision undergoes experiences of the colours in 
things that are before its eyes, and this does not require knowing that red is red.  It is a 
pure experience of sensation that is outside of consciousness (Emilsson, 1988, p.87).  
He therefore proposes that objects have an independent existence as qualities, a view 
also shared by Chiaradonna (Chiaradonna, 2012, pp.194-198).  Emilsson’s and 
Chiaradonna’s literal interpretation would be flawed according to how Plotinus 
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conceives sympathia from the perspective of the model of harmonics explained in 
Chapter 4.  In this model the universe consists of logoi or forms that are vibrations and 
substantial numbers, and sympathia creates change or novelty through a process of 
constructive and destructive interference; however, another of its features is the passive 
affection of an object by another object at a distance from it, but one which leaves the 
passive recipient unchanged.  It is referred to in modern physics as ‘sympathetic 
resonance’, a term defined by Green and Butler as follows: 
 
Sympathetic vibration is a special type of resonance in which sound waves, 
traveling in air, transmit energy from one sonorous vibrator to another.  The 
second vibrator must possess the same natural frequency …, or have a 
frequency that is an integral multiple of that natural frequency. (Green & Butler, 
2006, p.248) 
 
Similarly, Plotinus refers to the strings of separated lyres having a ‘sense’ of 
attunement with each other, and because of its importance to the current subject I repeat 
the passage quoted in Chapter 4:145 
 
But often too, when one string is plucked another has a kind of sense of this by 
its concord and the fact that it is tuned to the same scale.  But if the vibration 
can even pass from one lyre to another in so far as a sympathy exists, then there 
is also one single harmony in the All. (Ennead IV.4.41, 4-8) 
 
While Emilsson does not acknowledge this passage, Plotinus is obviously aware that 
sympathetic resonance is a natural phenomenon because he uses it as an example of 
sympathia in which there is action at a distance.  Such a resonance will not affect 
surrounding objects in the same way unless they are also attuned to it.  It is therefore 
suggested that when Plotinus refers to a sensory organ receiving impressions, he means 
                                                            
145  Chapter 4.3, p.115. 
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that one form resonates to the vibrations of another, which also makes sense of his 
assertion that apprehension of the object of vision occurs where the object is (Ennead 
IV.6.1, 16-17).  It must be noted that this also Bergson’s understanding of sympathia in 
Plotinus.146  An understanding of  ‘resemblance’ or ‘similarity’ can be found in Ennead 
I.2., where Plotinus refers to “likeness” in two senses:  
 
one requires that there should be something the same in things which are alike; 
this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same 
principle. (Ennead I.2.2, 5-7) 
 
The “likeness” between sense objects and sense organs arises because they are bodies 
that originate from the same principle, the World Soul or nature, and possess the same 
natural frequency, and also the same substantial number or harmonic linked to that 
frequency.  The other kind of  ‘likeness’ will be discussed later. ‘Assimilation’ refers to 
the fact that the receiving form is caused to vibrate at that frequency, in sympathetic 
resonance with it, just as sympathetic resonance occurs between the two strings.  While 
physics acknowledges that sound vibrations need air as a medium, for Plotinus’ non-
material theory, a medium such as air is not necessary because the universe is a living 
being whose parts are integral to it, just as a hand is an integral part of the body while 
being distinct from the other parts.  It is, as Emilsson notes, like that of light which is 
able to pass through a vacuum, making air unnecessary for visual sensation (Emilsson, 
1988, p.41).  The sense organs have their own forms or vibrations that resonate with 
what they sense, for example, the eye resonates to the vibration of light and the ear 
resonates to the vibration of sound; the eye does not see sounds because it is not 
attuned to the same scale.  
                                                            
146  See: Appendix 4, p.48.  Here Bergson states: “But for Plotinus perception is sympathy of 
the organ with the object with which it vibrates in unison”. 
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This new interpretation suggests that as products of nature, bodies are forms in 
matter only as contemplations, or imitations; not qualitative images of the forms in 
Intellect as Emilsson proposes.  Emilsson interprets εἴδωλον as “image or reflection in 
the sense in which an ontologically posterior item is said to be an image of an 
ontologically prior one”, and he states that it is used “synonymously with … mimêma” 
or imitation (Emilsson, 1988, p.119).  There is a possible confusion in the secondary 
literature caused by Plotinus’ use of the word mimêma.  While Emilsson tends to 
interpret this as a qualitative image, it raises the question of where these images come 
from.  Nature does not imagine, it only contemplates the forms in itself, and matter 
reflects the forms as an imitation of those in Intellect, which are certainly not images, 
because matter is nothing and has no power (Ennead I.4.10, 17-22; IV.6.2, 18–19).  
Plotinus explains in Ennead III.6.15 that an image or representation (φαντασία) is 
produced by the faculty of the individual soul functioning in sense perception.  The 
interpretation proposed implies that sense objects are living beings and parts of a whole 
that is living, active and vibrational.  Objects have a real existence outside the 
perceiving subject, but not as images having mass or spatial qualities, since this 
depends on an activity of the perceiving soul.  While the eye, for example, receives 
affections from external objects, it is an organ of vision (sight), but the soul does the 
seeing.  Sensation cannot be understood if we consider impressions of material objects, 
as Plotinus argues, or even of their qualities, because it makes the idea of similarity or 
assimilation between sense object and sense organ incomprehensible.  The main 
difference between this new interpretation and Emilsson’s, is that it places much 
greater emphasis on Plotinus being influenced by Pythagorean sympathia which is 
underpinned by the science of harmonics, whereas Emilsson suggests that he “adapts” 
sympathia as proposed by the Stoics (Emilsson, 1988, pp.47-48).  Furthermore, he 
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interprets the word mimêma (imitation) as a qualitative image and the new 
interpretation considers it a form or forms (vibrations).147  Imitation as an activity 
rather than a static image, is also found in Plato in Ion (533e - 535a) and Republic X 
(600c - 602b), where he refers to the activities of poets craftsmen and artists who 
engage in imitation. Similarly, Aristotle writes of the work of poets and artists as an 
activity (Poetics 1447a and 1449a).148  While Emilsson struggles with Plotinus’ 
concept of sympathia as it applies to sensation, Pythagorean sympathia offers a 
plausible solution worthy of further investigation in more depth than can be achieved 
here. 
Plotinus noted the discovery of the nerves by the physicians Herophilus and 
Erasistratus in the third century B.C., and acknowledges the view elaborated by Galen, 
that impressions received by the sense organs are transmitted to the brain via the nerves 
(Ennead IV.3.23, 9-2I), but it is not a view that he adopts.  For Plotinus, it is the 
function of the lower soul to unify the sensations received by the sense organs; the 
body is however a pre-requisite for sense perception by the individual soul as it acts as 
a medium through which the lower soul perceives.  This brings us to the perception of 
the sensation by the soul. 
Plotinus states that the soul only contemplates forms (Ennead I.1.7 14-17), so the 
sensations are conveyed to the soul as forms: 
 
the perception of sense objects is for the soul or living being an act of 
apprehension, in which the soul understands the quality attaching to bodies and 
takes the impression of their forms….when it is by itself [the soul] apprehends 
what is in itself, and is pure thought; but if it also apprehends other things it 
                                                            
147  Imitation as ‘μίμησις’ as action rather than a static image, also informs Aquinas’ account  
      (S.T. 1 Qu.117 art.1) of “art as imitation of nature in her manner of operation.” 
 
148  For a comprehensive analysis of μίμησις in Plato, see Marušič, 2008, Chapters IV and V.   
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must first have taken possession of them as well, either by becoming 
assimilated to them, or by keeping company with something which has been 
assimilated. (Ennead IV.4.23, 1-9) 
 
Being immaterial, the soul is not affected by objects (Ennead III.6.1, 25-32) and does 
not directly receive impressions from them; it receives their impression via the body: 
 
And soul’s power of sense-perception need not be perception of sense-objects, 
but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the 
living being; these are already intelligible entities. (Ennead I.I.7, 9-12).  
 
This brings us to his second account of “likeness”.  The first account referred to things 
derived from the same principle, and the second refers to things derived from different 
principles: 
 
But in the case of two things of which one is like the other, but the other is 
primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in its likeness and not said to be 
like it, likeness must be understood in a different sense; we must not require the 
same form in both, but rather a different one, since likeness has come about in a 
different way. (Ennead I.2.2, 7-10) 
 
In this passage, “likeness” is not based on similarity of form, but difference of form, 
because the form of the soul is not the same as the form of the body; however, while 
Plotinus does not speak of their assimilation in terms of sympathia, Chapter 4 
explained that the individual soul is attracted to its body because of a ‘correspondence’ 
or attunement between them.149  Each individual soul must be considered a microcosm 
of the Soul at the level of the Hypostasis Soul.  Viewed from the perspective of 
harmonics the individual soul is a logos, a form or vibration, just like a body without 
its matter.  As such, it can be considered a fundamental possessing all the logoi in 
                                                            
149  Chapter 4.2, p.108. 
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itself, but only as an imitation of those at the level of the Soul, which in turn possess 
the intelligibles as an imitation of Intellect.  Plotinus asserts that we possess the forms 
in Intellect either as common to all souls, or, “particular to ourselves”, because each 
has the whole of it in the primary part of his soul, “written in us like laws” (Ennead 
V.3.4, 2-3); hence comprehension of the link between perception, memory and 
reasoning rests on the notion that Intellect is the primary lawgiver whose laws are 
substantial number and form, or logos.150 
The stimulation of the soul awakens the faculty of imagination (φαντασία) 
(Ennead VI.8.3), which actively unifies the vibrations (forms) it receives from the 
various senses to produce a non-extended pictorial image that provides us with 
conscious awareness of our experiences (Ennead IV. 4. 13, 15-17).  If the image creates 
consciousness of an object, it makes sense that it will be one that includes the qualities 
and quantities associated with the forms.  Plotinus proposes: 
 
Imagination is from a stroke of something irrational from outside: and the soul 
is accessible to the stroke because of what in it is not undivided (Ennead I.8.15, 
18-19). 
 
In Intellect the forms are all together and undivided; however, in the soul they are 
‘unfolded and separated’ (Ennead I.1.8, 1-8) enabling the soul to combine or 
differentiate the features each form contains rolled up within it.151  While the 
intelligibles in Intellect are akin to those in the soul, so are the intelligibles in sense 
objects which it receives in sense perception.  If the soul is attuned to its own body, 
they do not have to share a natural frequency because sympathetic resonance also 
applies if the body has a frequency that is an integral multiple of that which the soul 
                                                            
150  Chapter 3.3, p.79.  
151  Chapter 4.1, p.105. 
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possesses.  An example of this would be that a musical note C will be in sympathetic 
resonance with a note C that is an octave or octaves higher or lower.  The assimilation 
will not affect the soul, it simply activates the form or vibration that the soul potentially 
has within it.  
The faculty of imagination is also operative in Plotinus’ account of memory 
(Ennead IV.3.29, 31-32) enabling the recognition of objects previously experienced 
(Ennead IV.4.13), and as Remes comments, it provides “a unified stream of 
consciousness” that temporally connects “past, present and future moments” (Remes, 
2007, p.111).  However, being conscious of impressions received from the body is 
meaningless unless we understand what we have perceived, and this requires the 
faculty of reason operating together with perception and memory.  Memory depends on 
the image produced in sense perception, and as Warren rightly states, “Imagination … 
is an intimate link which holds the various operations of the human soul together” 
(Warren, 1966, p.279); let us now examine how this is achieved.  
 
 
 
8.2.2   Reasoning and Memory 
 
 
 
Plotinus refers to memory as the past remaining in the present (Ennead I.5.8, 1-2), and 
a memory that may be conscious or unconscious.152  Unconscious memories include 
those responsible for habitual behaviour (Ennead IV.4.4, 7-14) and are not 
accompanied by an image, whereas memories must be accompanied by an image if 
they are to contribute to our temporal conscious experience, and this is Plotinus’ 
primary focus.  He proposes, recollection or the soul’s perception of the forms in 
                                                            
152  This view of memory is replicated by Bergson.  See: Chapter 9.1 pp.255-256; Chapter 9.1.2, 
      pp.263-266.  
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Intellect, while being a form of conscious memory, must be differentiated from 
temporal memory consisting of the preservation of images arising from sense 
perception and discursive thinking. (Ennead IV.3.25, 30-35).  At its highest level, the 
soul remains undescended in Intellect and only acquires a temporal memory when it 
descends.  
Memory is the preservation of images after the sensation has ceased (Ennead 
IV.3.29, 23-26), and like perception, memory is neither an affection of the soul, nor are 
memories stored as mental pictures in the soul like physical impressions on wax 
(Ennead III.6.3, 29-31; IV.6.1, 1-4), so how are memories preserved?  Blumenthal 
comments that Plotinus does not provide an account of how the soul retains and recalls 
information from sense perception (Blumenthal, 1971, p.83); however, it will be argued 
that he does, a view also shared by more recent commentators.153  Memory belongs to 
the image-making power that works with forms; therefore, memory as image recall 
must also involve forms.  It does not mean that images are stored as images, but as 
forms the imagining power uses to present an image to the mind.  This view is 
confirmed by Plotinus’ assertion that memory is a power of the soul.  He refers to 
memory as “being in a particular state.  And a state is something present, and so is 
actuality of life”. (Ennead I.5.1, 3-6): 
 
The soul awakes the power of memory in such a way as to have what it does not 
have …it is a passage from potentiality to actuality. (Ennead III.6.2, 43-47). 
 
The passage from potentiality to actuality replicates the generative nature of Intellect; 
furthermore, memory is “a stable condition” (Ennead IV.3.26, 52-53) and therefore 
non-temporal in nature, even though it is associated with temporal preservation and 
                                                            
153  See also: Chiaradonna, 2015. 
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recall of sense perceptions.  The individual soul possesses the impression of the forms 
in Intellect as an imitation but is not conscious of them in the sense that they are “not 
active, lying apart and unilluminated” (Ennead I.2.4, 21-22).  Consciousness of them 
arises when the soul directs its attention towards Intellect and they come out from 
within (Ennead IV.6.2, 20).  As King comments, the individual soul: “has objects 
insofar as it is essentially related to them, not in the sense of having acquired them” 
(King, 2009, p.115), therefore recollection is not memory that acquires its objects over 
time; it possesses them a priori as potentialities.  So, the forms within the intellect of 
the individual soul exist as potentialities and become actualities when they are brought 
into consciousness (Ennead I.1.11, 1-8): 
 
But, being in the middle, it [the soul] perceives both, and is said to think the 
intelligibles when it arrives at memory of them, if it comes to be near them; for 
it knows them by being them in a way: for it knows not because they settle in it, 
but because it has them in some way and sees them and is them in a rather dim 
way and becomes them more clearly out of the dimness by a kind of awakening, 
and passes from potentiality to actuality. In the same way [the soul] makes the 
objects of sense which are, so to speak, connected with it, shine out, one might 
say, by its own power, and brings them before its eyes, since its power is ready 
for them, and in a way in travail towards them. (Ennead IV. 6. 3, 10-19) 
 
The soul’s a priori potentialities become actualities by the soul’s reasoning power, 
which Plotinus refers to as representing the ‘true man’.  Considered as a function of the 
soul’s higher aspect, it does not identify itself with the body (Ennead I.1.10, 3-10), but 
has powers found midway between the sensible and intelligible and can therefore direct 
its attention towards both.  Its role is to judge or evaluate the sense data received by the 
perceptive soul by comparing or ‘fitting it’ to the forms in Intellect, and therefore 
differs from sense perception that does not make value judgements but merely 
identifies an object is there and its qualities: 
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the reasoning power in soul makes its judgement, derived from the mental 
images present to it which come from sense perception, but combining and 
dividing them; and, as for the things which come from Intellect, it observes 
what one might call their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with 
these; and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognising the new 
and recently arrived impressions and fitting them to those which have long been 
within it: this process is what we should call the “recollections” of the soul. 
(Ennead V.3.2, 8-14) 
 
Plotinus states the reasoning power judges according to the forms in Intellect, which act 
as standards or measures of judgement written into us like laws (Ennead V.3.4, 16-19), 
and as previously explained these laws are those applying to logos, substantial number 
and form, that is, the laws of harmonics.  It is suggested that this is confirmed in 
Ennead VI.7, where Plotinus refers to the judgement being possible because the 
reasoning power perceives them and there is a correspondence or attunement (ἁρμονία) 
between them:  
 
How, then, is there a power of sense perception in the better soul?  It would be a 
power of perceiving the sense objects there, and would correspond to the sense 
objects there.  This way, therefore, in which the better soul perceives the 
melody of sense [αἰσθητὴν ἁρμονίαν], when the man of the sense-world 
receives it by sense perception and comes into tune [συναρμόσαντος], to the 
last and lowest degree, with the melody [ἐκεῖ ἁρμονίαν] there in the intelligible, 
and fire is tuned [ἐκεῖ ἁρμονίαν] to the fire there, of which that better soul had 
a perception which corresponded [ἀνάλογον] to the nature of the fire there. 
(Ennead VI.7.6, 1-8) [My emphasis and brackets] 
 
It is noteworthy that Armstrong translates ‘ἀνάλογον’ as correspondence without 
clarifying that it is proportionate.  Plotinus also refers to the judgement made by 
reasoning in the context of sympathia: 
 
Reasoning when it passes judgement on the impressions produced by sensation 
is at the same time contemplating forms and contemplating them by a kind of 
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sympathy [συναίσθησις] – I mean the reasoning that belongs to the true soul: 
for reasoning is an operation of acts of the intelligence, and there is often a 
resemblance and community between what is outside and what is within. 
(Ennead I.1.9, 18-23) [My emphasis and brackets.] 
 
In this passage Plotinus does not use the word συμπαθεία which means ‘sympathy’; 
however, Armstrong translates συναίσθησις as sympathy in this context.  In in IV.4.8, 
20, Plotinus refers to συναίσθησις as consciousness or awareness, and similarly, 
Aristotle uses the term in the sense of common or shared consciousness (Eudemian 
Ethics 1245b 21-24)154 
Plotinus also notes that we have memories of our thoughts that may, or may not, 
be accompanied by an image because we are not always conscious of our thinking.  
Consciousness of the discursive thinking of the rational soul must be accompanied by 
an image, or copy of the thought (Ennead IV.3.30, 1-5), while images do not 
accompany thinking the forms in Intellect (Ennead 1.4.10, 17-21; IV.6.2, 18-19), hence 
our inability to remember them as images; however: 
  
Perhaps the reception into the image-making power would be of the verbal 
expression [logos] which accompanies the act of intelligence. The intellectual 
act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but 
remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression [logos] unfolds its 
content, and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power 
and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is 
apprehension and persistence and memory of it. Therefore, even though the soul 
is always moved to intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-
making power that we apprehend it. (Ennead IV.3.30, 5-13 – brackets mine); 
see also I.4.10, 6-16) 
 
                                                            
154  For an analysis of συναίσθησις in Aristotle, see: Kosman, A., 2014, pp.174-176. 
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In this passage Armstrong translates logos as “verbal expression”; however, it is 
suggested that it is easier to comprehend if the act of intelligence involves logos as 
substantial number and form, as proposed in Chapter 3.155  This passage proposes the 
faculty of imagination (φαντασία) is also operative in the reasoning soul.  In the same 
way that the perceptive soul actively unifies the vibrations (forms) it receives from the 
various senses to produce a non-extended pictorial image that provides us with 
conscious awareness of our experiences of sense perception, the reasoning soul works 
with the imagining power to unify the divided logoi or forms the soul has within its own 
intellect to make a similar image.  Plotinus suggests the imaging faculty acts like a 
mirror; on one side it holds images from sense perception, and on the other it holds 
images of the forms the soul possesses.  Reason makes its judgement by placing one 
over the other.  When the images are ‘in tune’ they form one image; however, if there is 
“conflict or disharmony” both images remain activated for memory but either one of the 
images may dominate, depending on whether the soul’s, attention is directed to the 
sensible or the intelligible (Ennead VI.3.31, 9-18).  For Plotinus, in practical life, most 
will direct their attention towards the sensible.   
The texts support the view that the reasoning power thinks and makes its 
judgements by comparing forms and images; however, the passage quoted above 
(Ennead IV.3.30.5-13) remains a major source of confusion for commentators.  Warren 
comments on this passage as follows: 
 
The chief difficulty with the text is the translation of the term λόγος. Clark 
follows Bréhier in translating, la formule verbale. Harder has Begriff (Wort); 
MacKenna, 'verbal formula'; and Guthrie, 'reason'. It seems to us that no one 
phrase can indicate the entire meaning of λόγος here; and if one is forced to 
attempt a translation, Bréhier's is the most acceptable. (Warren, 1965, p.282) 
                                                            
155  Chapter 3.4, pp.82-89. 
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Emilsson also acknowledges a problem with interpreting the meaning of logos in this 
passage and considers the unfolded forms in the soul as something like “concepts”, 
“notions” or “mental representations”, and finally concurs with Armstrong’s translation 
as “verbal expression” (Emilsson, 1988, p.135).  Chiaradonna also claims in this 
statement the meaning of logos is “far from clear” and “the opinions of interpreters 
greatly vary”, and he suggests “Plotinus … seems to present logos as a thought-
structure rather than a verbal expression.  More specifically, he regards logos as a 
discursive or predicative unfolding of our higher thoughts”, but he does not explain 
what these are (Chiaradonna, 2015, p.12).  Blumenthal notes that Plotinus uses two 
terms for the reasoning employed in making judgements, διανοητικὸν, thinking 
discursively, and λογιζόμενον, reasoning, and he analyses whether the two terms 
should be taken as equivalent.  He concludes they are but notes that Plotinus refers to 
them separately at Ennead V.3.3, 18-21 (Blumenthal, 1971, pp.100-102).  Whilst it is 
agreed that an analysis of the use of these terms in the Enneads is not conclusive, it is 
helpful to consider that Plotinus states: “intellectual activity is normally accompanied 
by a mind picture but is not a mind picture” (Ennead I.4.10, 20-21), which suggests two 
kinds of intellectual activity of the reasoning soul as described in Ennead V.3: 
 
soul is a kind of intellect in that it is discursively intelligent – it has its power 
through and from Intellect. … it comes to know what it sees and knows what it 
speaks … it is a rational principle and receives things akin to it, and fits them to 
the traces in itself. (Ennead V.3.6, 20-28) 
 
At V.3.3 Plotinus states that: 
… sense-perception sees a human being and gives its impression to discursive 
reason [διάνοίᾳ]. What does reason say? It will not say anything yet, but only 
knows, and stops at that; unless perhaps it asks itself “who is this? If it has met 
the person before, and says, using memory to help it, that it is Socrates. And if it 
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makes the details of this form explicit, it is taking to pieces what the image-
making power gave it. (Ennead V.3.3, 1-7.  Brackets, mine.) 
 
As Blumenthal notes, later in the same section, Plotinus makes a clear distinction 
between διανοητικὸν and λογιστικὸν when refers to the soul reasoning on the 
illumination from Intellect: 
 
… it must be soul that is engaged in reasoning [λογισμοῖς]; and all this is the 
work of the reasoning [λογιζσμένης] power. …But if someone were to say 
“What prevents this part of the soul from observing what belongs to itself by 
another power? He is not looking for the power of discursive reasoning 
[διανοητικὸν] or rationality [λογιστικὸν], but in grasping pure Intellect. (Ennead 
V.3.3, 14-7.  Brackets, mine.) 
 
Liddell Scott translates λογισμοῖς as ‘counting’ or ‘calculation’, and Armstrong 
translates λογιζόμενον as ‘calculation’ in Ennead IV.12, where the subject is addressed 
at length, and where Plotinus asks: 
 
For what else could calculation be but the effort to find intelligence and reason 
which is true and attains the truly existent? (Ennead IV.12, 6-8) 
 
Therefore, it makes sense to consider διανοητικόν as thinking in concepts, i.e. words or 
images, facilitated by the imaging power of the soul, and λογιζόμενον (or any form of 
reasoning where λόγος appears to be the root), as reasoning that specifically addresses 
logos as substantial number and form, as explained in Chapter 3.  This is consistent with 
a theory that is based on harmonics and vibrations, especially, as was noted in Chapter 
7, that for the Pythagoreans, logismos is a form of harmonia or rational calculation, 
where opposites are fitted together using numbers or proportions to provide knowledge 
and understanding about the world, as well as forming the basis of ethical action.156   
                                                            
156  Chapter 7.2, pp.217-218. 
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Without mentioning it explicitly, Plotinus provides a further clue to the nature of 
rationality involved in λογιζόμενον when he refers to the musician who is naturally 
disposed to the beauty of the intelligibles, but he begins with sounds and rhythms 
perceived by the senses: 
 
He must be led and taught to make abstraction of the material element in them 
and come to the principles from which their proportions and ordering forces 
derive and to the beauty which is in these principles, and learn that this was 
what excited him, the intelligible harmony and the beauty in it, and beauty 
universal, not just some particular beauty, and he must have the doctrines of 
philosophy implanted in him; by these he must be brought to firm confidence in 
what he possesses without knowing it. (Ennead I.3.1, 30-35) 
 
By stripping away the material element in sound, the musician arrives at “the principles 
from which their proportions and ordering forces derive”.  In effect he wants the 
musician to understand the numbers associated with harmonics.  Panaiotidi suggests 
music has worth for Plotinus “only as a means of ascent to a higher reality, and this 
capacity is grounded in its mathematical nature” (Panaiotidi, 2014, p. 409).  This also 
explains why Plotinus considers training in mathematics to be essential for the 
philosopher, a training that must occur before dialectic.  He states in ‘On Dialectic’: 
 
He [the philosopher] is by nature virtuous, and must be brought to perfect his 
virtues, and after his mathematical studies instructed in dialectic, and made a 
complete dialectician. (Ennead I.3.4, 8-9) 
 
He continues to describe dialectic as the process of consciously rising to Intellect: 
It is the science which can speak about everything in a reasoned and orderly 
way, and say what it is and how it differs from other things and what it has in 
common with those among which it is. (Ennead I.3.4, 2-4) 
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Dialectic distinguishes what is true and good from what is not, but, importantly, it is a 
process of collection, division and definition of the contents of Intellect, thus following 
Plato’s account of dialectic in the Phaedrus in which he describes collection and 
division “as aids to speech and thought” (Phdr.265b3-266c1, in Fowler, 1914, p.535).  It 
therefore makes sense that for Plotinus λογιζόμενον, the fitting together of musical 
ratios and the forms associated with them, is what he refers to as theoretical wisdom, 
which precedes, and is an ‘aid’ to διανοητικόν, discursive thinking, or practical 
wisdom, but both are necessary.  One must be able to ascend to a higher level of soul 
or even Intellect itself to make a judgement based on harmonia, or the fitting together 
of opposites, before being able to speak or think about it discursively as words or 
images, which is a descending movement because it is directed towards external 
objects (Ennead V.3.2-3).  The idea of ‘before and after’ must be considered as one of 
priority in Plotinus’ kairos rather than having a temporal context.  
While the explanation here potentially resolves the difficulty perceived by 
commentators, it is speculative and not exhaustive; hence further in-depth analysis of 
how Plotinus uses διανοητικόν and λογιζόμενον in the Enneads is warranted, not only 
for clarification for those commenting on Plotinus’ psychology, but it could be 
significant for anyone translating the Enneads.   
The operation of sense perception, reasoning and memory can therefore be 
summarised along these lines: sense perception becomes conscious of an object by 
unifying the forms it receives from the senses using the imagining power to form a 
qualitative image.  To judge the nature of the image from sense perception, reason 
divides the image into its appropriate forms and makes an initial movement towards 
Intellect (recollection) with which it is in tune, and Intellect makes it conscious, or 
activates the forms the soul possesses potentially in a divided state.  The imaging power 
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then generates an image from those forms by combining them.  Once activated, the 
forms serve as memory and are ready for future use (Ennead IV 6 3, 58-59).  The 
reasoning power compares the forms and image from sense perception with those 
activated in itself to provide knowledge about the object.  The activated forms may be 
recalled by the reasoning power to make its judgement when the same or similar forms 
are encountered again in sense perception or discursive reasoning, and the power of 
memory is ‘strengthened’ with repetition (Ennead IV.6.3, 39-40), making recognition 
much faster because reasoning does not need to search all the potentialities in the soul.  
This is the accepted interpretation by recent commentators;157 however, a modern 
metaphor may be helpful to clarify Plotinus’ meaning: a computer’s hard drive contains 
all the information that is potentially available for us to access, and if a word or 
filename is typed into the computer for the first time, it will search its hard drive to find 
the file or files most fitting to the search entry.  Having selected a file and opened it, the 
computer stores the file as a temporary file in its active memory, meaning that any 
future access to that file will be much quicker.  There is no need to search the whole 
hard drive again.  The metaphor is not quite correct, though, because the computer does 
store temporary files in its active memory, whereas for Plotinus, there is no separate 
storage of memory, just an activation of potentialities, as if they are switched on in 
temporal order and are ready to use immediately, with the most recent being the most 
accessible.  The beauty of his theory is that it provides an account of memory that 
retains its stability, that is, it preserves significant perceptions unchanged because it is 
an activation of a potentiality.  The storage of memory does not become an issue 
because memory is not something acquired, and memory retrieval is simply the 
reasoning faculty accessing forms already activated. 
                                                            
157  King, 2009; Emilsson, 1988; Chiaradonna, 2015 
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Having established the mechanism by which the reasoning power judges and 
remembers its experiences, it is now pertinent to clarify how Plotinus interprets the 
freedom of the individual soul.  
 
 
 
8.3   The Freedom of the Individual Soul 
 
 
 
The concept of freedom as ‘ἐφ’ ἡμῖν’, or ‘that which is in our power’, ‘that which is in 
our control’, or ‘that which depends on us’, as explained in respect of the World Soul, is 
also important for understanding human freedom.  Plotinus refers to it in: ‘On Well-
Being’ (Ennead I.4), ‘On Destiny’ (Ennead III.1), ‘On Providence (I)’ (Ennead III.2), 
‘On Numbers’ (Ennead VI.6) and ‘On Free Will and the Will of the One’ (Ennead 
VI.8).  It is a subject analysed in depth by several commentators who tend to agree in 
their interpretations. 158  Of particular interest is that of Eliasson, who has placed it 
within its historical context and conducted a helpful review of the various 
interpretations of its use in the Enneads, classifying them under the headings of 
‘Freedom’, ‘Free Choice’, ‘Free Will’, ‘Free Action’, and ‘Self Determination’ 
(Eliasson, 2008, pp.27-42).  The most detailed account of ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in the context of 
human life given in Ennead VI.8, ‘On Free Will and the Will of the One’, which is also 
highly relevant for understanding its relationship to knowledge: 
 
Everything is a voluntary act which we do without being forced to and with 
knowledge [of what we are doing], and in our power which we are also 
competent to do. (Ennead VI.8.1, 33-34) 
 
                                                            
158  Eliasson, 2008; Leroux, 1996; Ousager, 2005; Remes, 2007; Westra, 1990; Westra, 2002 
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If one of these attributes is missing an act is not within our power.  For action to be 
voluntary it happens because we wish it and with nothing opposing our wishes; it 
cannot arise from “opposing chances …, compulsions and strong assaults of passions 
possessing our soul” (Ennead VI.8.1, 28-30).  Plotinus states, while the body receives 
many incidental impressions from its physical environment, the soul only becomes 
conscious of those to which its attention is directed (Ennead IV.4.8, 1-17).  Remes, 
referring to Ennead IV.4.8, 17-20, comments in this respect there is a “voluntary 
element”, an element of choice in that the soul selects the forms that will ultimately 
form an image on the basis that they are significant for us (Remes, 2007, p. 113); 
however for Plotinus, the ability to choose sense objects does not make the soul free if 
the motive of action is an unreasoned need or compulsion arising from an exterior 
source.  In his account of sense perception, action based on unreasoned images is 
merely opinion resulting in the enslavement of living beings to the sense world.  
Opinion is: “What we call thinking falsities…making of mind pictures which has not 
waited for the judgement of the reasoning faculty” (Ennead I.1.9, 8-9), and therefore 
has not taken the intelligible truths into account.  Warren explains: 
 
It is precisely the possession of and knowing through images that distinguishes 
human knowledge from the knowledge of Nous; for the human being possesses 
images rather than the objects themselves and, consequently, can never have 
truth but only opinion. (Warren, 1966, p. 279) 
 
Plotinus suggests that action based on mistaken belief or ignorance is not considered 
voluntary; the knowledge accompanying a particular act must “apply in particular 
circumstances” and “generally”; “generally” here meaning what we ‘ought’ to do in the 
situation.  “Not knowing that one ought to have learnt it is not voluntary, nor is what 
leads one away from learning” (Ennead VI.8.1, 39-45).  
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In Ennead VI.8.2, Plotinus suggests calculation and impulses, or desires not 
driven by ‘lust’ or ‘passion’, are also not in our power if the calculation accompanying 
the desire is wrong, for example, the desires and impulses of children, wild animals, 
individuals with mental illness, and those under the influence of drugs.  If the 
calculation is right we cannot say whether the motivating force was the calculation or 
the desire; and if the desire is of the composite living being, that is, soul with body in 
accordance with nature, “the soul followed the necessity of nature”; and if it is purely a 
desire of the soul, “many of the things which are now said to be in our power will be 
outside it”.  Similarly, if we feel compelled by the imagination, or if desire pulls or 
leads us, and whenever the motivating force does not originate from ourselves.  
Plotinus then proceeds to examine the question of knowledge, dismissing knowledge 
from sense perception alone because it is merely based on a bodily affection.  
Knowledge of a situation does not itself lead to action and ἐφ’ ἡμῖν does not mean 
action effected by rationally overcoming desires with another desire.      
Ennead VI.8.3 continues the examination of knowledge in terms of its rationality.  
Action based on opinion, even if that opinion is right, is not founded on right reasoning 
if the person does not know why his opinion is right; this is pure chance.  Opinions 
resulting in action based on chance and imagination arising from bodily experiences are 
not within our power.  He only defines voluntary or truly free action as that derived 
from the activity of Intellect (Ennead VI.8.3, 19-23).  
Ennead VI.8.5 addresses freedom of the soul in its two aspects, the first of which 
contemplates Intellect, and the second, its engagement in practical action and virtue.  
What does Plotinus mean by virtue?  He proposes two kinds of virtue; the first are civic 
virtues which “give limit and measure to our desires, and putting measure into all our 
experience, hence they abolish false opinion”; and these depend on the second type, 
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which he refers to as “greater virtues” being “a measure which forms the matter of the 
soul” (Ennead I.2.2, 14-19).  The matter of the soul must be understood as its 
‘intelligibles’, substantial number and form as an imitation of Intellect, and which act 
as measures for reason when deciding on practical action.  
  
Virtue is a kind of other intellect, a state which in a way intellectualises the 
soul, … being in our power does not belong to the realm of action but in 
intellect at rest from action. (Ennead VI.8.5, 34-37) 
 
He claims virtuous action is dependent on external situations, for example, brave action 
in war depends on there being a war; however, if the action arises from will or reason 
that compels us to certain action, we can say that freedom resides in virtue prior to 
action. Virtue is wishing and choosing the good.  In Ennead VI.8.6 and 7, Plotinus 
asserts being in our power rests within the province of virtue and Intellect because they 
“have no master”.  While Intellect is independent in itself, “virtue wishes to be 
independent by supervising the soul to make it good”.  When things happen that have 
not been wished for by the soul, it will not respond emotionally to what is occurring 
outside, but will refer to virtue to guide its action: 
 
The soul … becomes free when it presses on without hindrance to the Good by 
means of Intellect, and what it does through this is in its power. (Ennead VI.8.7, 
1-3)  
  
Reason in its highest form is then, for Plotinus, ascending to Intellect and 
contemplating Intellect by becoming one with it and remaining there, and this is 
ultimately what is in our power.  This cannot be achieved in practical life, because the 
soul does not remain in Intellect; it must act, and the succeeding action, even one 
arising from reason, “cannot have being in our power in a pure state” because it is 
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“mixed”, where ‘mixed’ means a combination of internal and external action (Ennead 
VI.8.2, 37-38). 
In summary, from the formation of the image in sense perception that gives 
conscious awareness of external objects or events, the succeeding action is based on 
different types of knowledge: opinion; the greater virtues in the soul that form the basis 
of civic virtues; and true knowledge, formed when the soul takes its knowledge directly 
from Intellect.  The third type of knowledge is only available to the wise, who 
contemplate the forms there while living a corporeal life, but not allowing the external 
world to influence their action. 
In Ennead III.6.2, Plotinus presents his arguments for the notions of virtue and 
vice, a view that “accords with the view of the ancients”.  Armstrong provides a 
footnote clarifying his reference to “the ancients” as “the Pythagoreans; cp. Plato, 
Phaedo 93c”.159  Plotinus explains that for the ancients, virtue was considered to be a 
harmony of the soul’s powers which bring nothing in from the outside; whereas vice is 
disharmony, which is evil when reason may not function to its full potential because it 
may be overridden by another faculty such as desire.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
    
 
 
This chapter examined Plotinus’ concept of time, the life of the soul, as kairos, both in 
its application to the World Soul in the making of the external world, and to the 
individual soul in its interaction with its corporeal environment. In both instances 
kairos is contemplation, a contemplation that is paradoxical because it is at once a 
                                                            
159  Ennead III.6.2, Armstrong’s fn. p.214 
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necessary process and an act of freedom or ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, as Plotinus defines it.  The World 
Soul fulfils the requirements for ἐφ’ ἡμῖν because it is not under outside influence, what 
it makes is within its power and its knowledge is right knowledge or wisdom because it 
contemplates the forms in Intellect, the Beings of eternal truth.  We find the same 
definition of freedom in the individual soul for whom the goal is the Good. 
In analysing Plotinus’ psychology, the key concepts implicated in kairos include 
sense perception, memory, reason, and freedom.  Plotinus appropriates the concept 
from its Pythagorean origins and is rational-ethical.  Kairos is not a static moment for 
Plotinus because deciding action appropriate to the circumstances involves a movement 
from the material word to contemplation of the forms that the individual soul possesses 
in itself, or ideally those in Intellect.  The function of sense perception, memory and 
reasoning all depend on Providence because it endows the human soul with everything 
it needs to become free because virtuous actions are “not done by providence but 
according to providence: for it is in tune with the rational principle” (Ennead III.3.5, 
47-49).  Providence enables us, with the appropriate training, to think like Intellect, that 
is, to think substantial numbers and forms, or as has been argued, to think and act 
according to the laws of harmonics. 
The model of harmonics once again has the potential to resolve ambiguities in the 
text and overcome two important difficulties experienced by commentators; his theory 
of sense perception as sympathia and the role of λογιζόμενον and διανοητικόν in the 
activities of the reasoning soul; however, both warrant further investigation due to the 
limited scope of the analysis presented here.   
The concept of kairos in the Enneads is ultimately dependent on the model of 
harmonics that has the ability to unite Plotinus’ cosmology and psychology, thus 
transforming our understanding by making sense of Plotinus’ philosophy as a complete 
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system.  It also suggests that the Pythagorean influence is more important than 
previously recognised. 
The next Chapter will continue to examine the concept of kairos in the context of 
Bergson’s psychological duration.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Bergson and Kairos 
 
* 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
J.M. Gabaude, in his article, Éclairage Sur Le Kairos A Partir De La Philosophie De 
Bergson, suggests: “… by appealing to kairicity, it is possible to shed light on certain 
features of Bergson and, conversely, he enables clarification of kairos.”  He refers to 
Vladimir Jankélévitch who considered kairos as “implicit in marrying the key 
elements” of Bergson’s philosophy (Gebaude, 1991, p.349).  Bergson has therefore 
been recognised as a philosopher of kairicity in French language articles, and while it 
has been discussed in very general terms, it has been relatively unacknowledged in the 
English language secondary literature. 
This Chapter aims to provide a deeper understanding of the relevance of kairos to 
Bergson’s philosophy and will explain how he utilises this ancient concept as one that 
is dynamic and generative in his theories of perception and memory as proposed in 
Matter and Memory, and how it is intimately connected to his understanding of 
individual freedom as proposed in the Two Sources of Morality and Religion.  Finally, 
it will be proposed that kairos in Bergson’s philosophical method may have been 
inspired by ancient Greek rhetoric under the influence of the Pythagorean tradition.  
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9.1   Perception, Memory, and Kairos 
 
  
  
Gebaude refers to kairos as “a highlight” in psychological life, “a critical threshold, a 
nodal point of fact, a significant note of the ‘continuous melody of our inner life’; 
melody which does not differentiate between before and after, and without having a 
punctual present” (Gebaude, 1991, p.356), which means it must not be considered a 
mathematical point in time because it is a moment in which the past, present and future 
coincide.  In Mind-Energy Bergson describes consciousness in terms that capture the 
essence of the mythological depiction of Kairos in ancient Greece.160 
  
To retain what no longer is, to anticipate what as yet is not, - these are the 
primary functions of consciousness.  For consciousness there is no present, if 
the present be a mathematical instant.  An instant is the purely theoretical limit 
which separates the past from the future.  It may, in the strict sense, be 
conceived, it is never perceived.  When we think we have seized hold of it, it is 
already far away.  What we actually perceive is a certain span of duration 
composed of two parts – our immediate past and our immediate future.  We 
lean on the past, we bend forward on the future: leaning and bending forward is 
the characteristic attitude of a conscious being.  Consciousness is then, as it 
were, the hyphen which joins what has been to what will be, the bridge which 
spans the past and the future. (‘Life and Consciousness’, in M.E., p.8-9) 
 
Kairos is exemplified in Bergson’s illustration of the cone (Figure 21) in Matter and 
Memory (M.M., p.197, Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
160  Chapter 7.1, p.212. 
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Bergson’s Cone Illustration (Figure 21) 
 
 
 
In the above illustration, S represents the “nodal point of fact” or “significant note of 
the continuous melody of our inner life”, as referred to by Gebaude.  It represents 
perception, or what Bergson refers to as “both a perception of the immediate past 
[memory] and a determination of the immediate future [matter]” (M.M., p.177), and a 
synthesis or coincidence of opposites defined by Bergson as pure perception (P) and 
pure memory (AB) that act as limits representing differences in kind.  Each of these 
concepts will be examined in turn; however it is important to note that once again 
Bergson employs the generative structure of Pythagorean cosmology’ differentiation 
and integration, where integration or harmonia generates novelty, a harmonic, and 
represents the moment of kairos. 
 
 
 
9.1.1   Pure Perception 
 
 
 
In Chapter 1 of Matter and Memory Bergson begins his account of perception by 
proposing a theory of ‘pure perception’ that he defines as: 
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a perception that exists in principle rather than in fact, and would be possessed 
by a being placed where I am, living as I live, but absorbed in the present, and 
which is capable, through the elimination of memory in all its forms, of 
obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous. (M.M., p.26) 
 
Pure perception is therefore a hypothetical construct that eliminates the influence of 
memory, even though this never happens in fact.  Bergson denounces realism and 
idealism for failing to capture the nature of matter as we experience it, and proposes a 
compromise, a theory based on common sense, that matter is constituted by what he 
calls an “aggregate of images”: 
 
And by ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the 
idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing, - 
an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’. 
(M.M., p.vii-viii) 
 
Bergson suggests extended matter exists as images that are present merely as a picture; 
a surface that does not have determined outlines, but which emits light consisting of 
colours that blend into each other, like a work of art that has depth or a reflection in a 
mirror.  The images are not inert and spatially extended because at its fundamental 
level matter is nothing more than a “pervading concrete extensity, modifications, 
perturbations, changes of tension or energy and nothing else” (M.M., p.266), an 
unlimited field of energy in which varying vibrations or durations coexist and 
reciprocally interact with each other in a dynamic and undivided continuity.  He 
regards the dynamic nature of matter as extensive such that matter is these vibrations 
rather than vibrations extended in a spatial medium.  There is no perceiving subject or 
mechanism that translates the vibrations into qualities because the vibrational aspect of 
matter is present in the colours, just as red light is a specific wavelength on the 
electromagnetic spectrum, or, as Lawlor comments, ‘just as when we strike a key of the 
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piano at the low end of the scale, we hear the note and can see the vibrations of the 
string’ (Lawlor, 2004, p.7).  As was explained in Chapter 5 consciousness and matter 
develop in succession as two individual élans,161 hence matter generates harmonics 
within itself that represent qualitative differences external to the perceiving subject. 
Guerlac explains that images are not produced by us, but they are images of things 
(Guerlac, 2006, p.117).  Bergson therefore follows Plotinus in rejecting any notion of 
subjective idealism because matter has an existence independent of the consciously 
perceiving subject.162   
Bergson claims the body is an image amongst images that interacts with its 
environment according to mathematically determined laws and which apply to physics 
in its “remotest aspirations” (M.M., p.260).  It was argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that 
Bergson understood the mathematics underpinning the physics of waves as studied in 
acoustics and optics, and to which the concepts of harmonics, sympathetic resonance, 
interference, both constructive and destructive, as well as reflection and refraction were 
considered basic.163  In his account of pure perception, it was these laws that Bergson 
appropriated to matter long before the notion that matter behaves like a wave was 
proposed by Louis de Broglie in 1924, as he notes later in The Creative Mind (C.M., 
p.71).  Bergson claims in pure perception the body isolates an object by suppressing 
other objects that have no interest for it (M.M., pp.28-29).  It does this by reflecting 
other images so that “pure perception stands towards matter in the relation of part to 
whole” (M.M., p.78); hence there can only be a difference in degree, and not a 
difference in kind, between matter and pure perception (M.M., p.19; p.24).  Bodies 
                                                            
161  Chapter 5.3, pp.159-160. 
162  Chapter 8.2.1, p.232. 
163  For references, see: Chapter 5.3 p.164; Chapter 6.6, p.207-208. 
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“allow to pass through them… those external influences which are indifferent to them; 
the others become ‘perceptions’ by their very isolation” (M.M., pp.28-29).  He states: 
 
everything thus happens for us as though we reflected back to the surfaces the 
light which emanates from them, the light which, had it passed on unopposed, 
would never have been revealed” (M.M., p.29). 
 
Bergson suggests that when light passes from one medium to another the light is 
refracted; however, the densities of the media may be such that there is total reflection, 
in which case an outlined image is formed indicating possible or virtual actions of the 
body in space.  He is drawing on the physics of light and the law of ‘reflection’ that 
occurs when objects stand out because the frequencies of light waves of the object do 
not match the natural frequencies of light shining on it.  For Bergson, a body is an 
image itself and therefore vibrational, so for example, if the object is emitting all the 
colours of the spectrum and the body lacks red light, red light will be reflected onto the 
object while the other colours will pass through the body or be absorbed because the 
body would vibrate in sympathetic resonance with them and they will not stand out.  
Bergson appears to interpret the body’s ‘lack’ as a condition of need or interest that 
isolates objects because our needs are “so many search-lights which, directed upon the 
continuity of sensible qualities, single out in it distinct bodies” because the need is 
reflected in the object (M.M., p.262).  Behind the object there is a virtual world of 
matter that remains unperceived.  Unlike Plotinus who employs sympathia in terms of 
sound vibrations to reveal similarities, Bergson applies it to light vibrations to reveal 
differences in the continuity of matter thus accounting for individuation and the 
creation of the other.164  Either way, resonance is the principle that explains the 
                                                            
164  See: Mullarkey, 2004, p.478 
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perception of an external object and the law of reflection enables Bergson to claim, as 
does Plotinus, that the pure perception of an object occurs in the object itself; not in us, 
because we do not project unextended sensations outside ourselves: 
 
… my perception is outside my body, and my affection within it. Just as 
external objects are perceived by me where they are, in themselves and not in 
me, so my affective states are experienced there where they occur, that is, at a 
given point in my body. (M.M., p.59)165 
 
Let us now consider the mechanics of the body in pure perception. He suggests 
that the body does not only reflect external images: 
 
It struggles and thus absorbs some part of this action.  Here is the source of 
affection.  We might therefore say, metaphorically, that while perception 
measures the reflecting power of the body, affection measures its power to 
absorb. (M.M., p.57) 
  
Having isolated an object by reflecting on it, Bergson proposes that each of the 
qualities perceived in an object by the different sense organs are determined by a 
particular need or direction of activity (M.M., p.46).  He refers to the sense organ as 
analogous to: 
 
An immense keyboard, on which the external object executes at once its 
harmony of a thousand notes, thus calling forth in a definite order, and at a 
single moment, a great multitude of elementary sensations corresponding to all 
the points of the sensory centre that are concerned. (M.M., p.165) 
  
The vibrations received are separated according to the frequencies that each sense 
organ can receive and then travel via the nerves to the brain, which analyses and 
                                                            
165 On this point, see: Lacey, 2008, p.84. 
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chooses the appropriate motor response of the body and sends the appropriate 
vibrations through the spinal cord to stimulate physical movement.  The function of the 
brain is to allow communication or delay it (M.M., p.30), hence it merely receives and 
transmits vibrations; it does not make representations or speculate, because it is only a 
material image amongst others.  For Bergson the brain is not an instrument of 
knowledge, but an instrument of choice, and, like Plotinus, he considers the body, a 
centre of action and sensation (M.M., p.178).  He describes sensation as: “in its 
essence, extended and localized” (M.M., p.180) and “that which must be subtracted 
from perception to get the image in its purity” (M.M., p.60).  In pure perception, the 
object, the sense organ and the nerves that stimulate action form a continuous whole, 
and while the body is the point of contact with the rest of matter, sensation admits a 
distinction between the body and external objects because it is internal to the body 
while perceptions are external (M.M., p.42; p.63).  Sensation is the real action of matter 
and represents the immediate past, while perception reflects possible action and 
represents anticipation of the immediate future.  Pure perception is wholly in the 
present, not as a mathematical instant, but is simultaneously the immediate past and 
immediate future, which he describes as consisting in an impending action, in an 
energy not yet spent (M.M., p.185) or unused; however, he suggests “we have no grasp 
of the future without an equal and corresponding outlook over the past” (M.M., pp.69-
70).  Bergson claims the choice of possible actions and continuity of perception 
requires past experience and therefore memory, and since he thinks of it as a melody, 
he concurs with Aristoxenus who proposed that the “understanding (xynesis) of music 
arises from two sources, perception and memory; for one must perceive what is coming 
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into being, and remember what has come into being” (Aristoxenus, Elements of 
Harmonics, 38.27-39.3).166  
  
 
 
9.1.2   The Preservation of Memories 
 
 
 
Bergson argued that the physics of Kelvin and Faraday can only lead to the hypothesis 
that matter is ontologically dynamic (M.M., pp.265-266) and he suggested that the 
internal nature of mater is vibrational and therefore repetitive.  While matter simply 
repeats the past, a being that evolves creates something new at every moment (M.M., 
p.297) and memory is vital for continuity in the creative process as well as 
implementing choice and freedom of movement (M.M., p.69-70).  He states: “With the 
immediate and present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past 
experience” (M.M., p.24); hence “the reaction does not take place without an appeal to 
the memories which analogous situations may have left behind them” (M.M., p.69).  So 
how are memories preserved and recollected? 
In Chapter 6 it was noted that élan vital is generated as a supra-conscious 
memory that possesses all degrees of consciousness, including intellect, instinct, 
intuition, as well as the latent consciousness of unorganised matter and the sleeping 
consciousness of immobile vegetable matter.   According to the model of the generation 
of harmonics “the past is preserved by itself, automatically” (C.E., p.5), and we find 
that the same model accounts for the preservation and recollection of our individual 
memories.  Bergson said that his aim in Matter and Memory was to overcome the 
Cartesian dualism of extended matter and unextended mind by establishing the 
                                                            
166  Chapter 2.4, p.53. 
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distinction between them in terms of time, not space (M.M., p.294), and he achieves 
this by integrating them under the concept of consciousness that has a durational or 
vibrational nature.  This is an ontological claim rather than an interpretive description 
because he believes that since the physics of his day considered matter as vibrational, 
the same concept must explain the durational and substantial nature of consciousness.  
Only the notion of tension or vibration can reconcile matter and memory, or physics 
and metaphysics.  This reconciliation occurs in perception to facilitate the integration of 
individual consciousnesses or mind with a material body and other material objects 
when the individual consciousness condenses the vibrations of matter within its own 
vibration, a condensation that occurs on the basis of attunement, or “correspondence” 
between them.167 Underlying the concept of “correspondence” is the notion that there 
are differences in number behind our distinctions of quality” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., 
p.58-59); hence Bergson’s assertion that consciousness “stores up the past by the 
necessity of its own nature” (M.M., p.92).  The past is retained as two types of 
memory; the first is a “quasi-instantaneous memory” (M.M., p.197) or habit that tends 
to be non-representational, unconscious, and consists in the mechanical repetition of 
bodily movements or cue reactions to objects perceived in the present.  It is directed to 
action and therefore the future; hence it does not conserve images of the past but 
“prolongs their useful effect into the present moment” (M.M., p.93) by acting them.  
Bergson refers to the second type of memory as “spontaneous” memory or “true 
memory” (M.M., p.195) that is represented by the cone in his illustration.  While he 
refutes the notion that memories are stored in the brain, he reluctantly acknowledges 
that they are in the mind (‘Soul and Body’, in M.E., p.68).  Perceptions are duplicated 
once in memory as a virtual mirror image or reflection of actual perception (M.M., 
                                                            
167  See Chapter 6.1, p.175. 
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p.165) and he appears to suggest that true memory records present perceptions as 
memory-images:  
 
[It] records, in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as 
they occur in time; it neglects no detail; it leaves to each fact, to each gesture, 
its place and date. (M.M., p.92) 
 
For Bergson a memory-image is a mixture of memory and the image of pure perception 
because neither exists alone; perception always consists of both; however, just as in 
pure perception where images are vibrational without clearly defined outlines in space, 
memory-images are also vibrational but without limits in time.  So, while memories are 
recorded as memory-images, they are not stored as isolated images in pure memory 
because they are always attached to what preceded and what followed them; they are “a 
succession of states each one of which announces what follows and contains what 
precedes” (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.163).  Pure memory is 
“coextensive with consciousness” and is the survival of the past as a totality of life 
experience.  Bergson claims pure memory contains virtual memories that are powerless 
and unchanged (M.M., p.163), and is a memory that is revealed in our character (M.M., 
p.191), becoming larger as life advances: 
 
[it] retains and ranges alongside of each other all our states in the order in which 
they occur, leaving to each fact its place and, consequently, marking its date, 
truly moving in the past and not, like the first, in an ever renewed present. 
(M.M., p.195) 
 
Therefore, at the other extreme of pure perception and habit memory, which is sensori-
motor and aimed at action in space, pure memory is the past, detached from life, and 
like unperceived matter has a virtual, powerless or unconscious existence because it no 
longer acts.  Deleuze remarks: 
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We have great difficulty in understanding the survival of the past in itself 
because we believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be. We have 
thus confused Being with being present. Nevertheless, the present is not; rather, 
it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but acts. Its proper element 
is not being but the active or useful. The past, on the other hand, has ceased to 
act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. Useless and inactive, impassive, 
it IS in the full sense of the word. It is identical with being in itself. (Deleuze, 
1991, p.55) 
 
It is important to clarify that in the above quotation Deleuze is referring to “being 
present” in terms of “the present “, i.e. “now” as a point in time, which he rightly refers 
to as “becoming” not “being”.   If, as Bergson claims, that pure memory is revealed in 
our character, it has ontological presence in the present, the moment of kairos, which is 
a synthesis of pure perception and pure memory.  Deleuze refers to the unchanging 
existence of memories as an “ontological memory” and “a pure being of the past” 
(Deleuze, 1991, p. 59).  While each individual consciousness has its own personal pure 
memory, pure memory extends beyond the individual in the form of the élan vital; an 
impersonal supra-consciousness that contains all individual histories or memories, as 
well as matter in itself.  Bergson can therefore claim it to be supra-conscious because is 
constituted from all degrees of consciousness.  It therefore possesses the presence of its 
past in its entirety, thus replicating the unchanging nature of Plotinus’ Intellect, a 
similarity noted by several commentators.168  From the perspective of Plotinus, this is 
accurate for most of the individual souls who are unconscious of Intellect, and it must 
also be acknowledged that while Plotinus does not refer to Intellect as memory, he 
                                                            
168  See, for example: Gale, 1973-1974; Lovejoy, 1912; Maritain, 1968, p.236; Taylor, 1911, 
      pp.101-107 
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states: “intellect has the memory of its products in itself” (Ennead V. 3. 8, 53).  
Intellect is not a memory that evolves in time as Bergson’s does:  
  
the whole of history might be contained in a very short time for a consciousness 
at a higher degree of tension than our own, which should watch the 
development of humanity while contracting it, so to speak, into the great phases 
of its evolution. (M.M., p.275) 
 
For Bergson memory-images are only actualised in perception through a process of 
recognition and recollection.  
 
 
 
9.1.3   The Recognition and Recollection of Memories 
 
 
 
Bergson applies the principles of gestalt to his theory of perception.  These principles 
describe how the human mind fills in gaps between elements to perceive a complete 
image so that the whole is perceived first.  The object is constructed by the mind not 
seen by the eye.   For Bergson, pure perception perceives matter in its most simplistic 
form that excludes familiarity, while the mind or memory fills in the details and creates 
a sense of familiarity and meaning from what is perceived.  Perception is therefore an 
act of creation or invention. 
In the fourth Chapter of Matter and Memory Bergson states that “it is from the 
present that comes the appeal to which memory responds” (M.M., p.197); however, he 
suggests “in most cases recollection emerges only after the perception is recognised” 
(M.M., p.107): 
 
the ordinary feeling of recognition has its root in the consciousness of the 
organisation of motor accompaniments.  We act our recognition before we think 
it. (M.M., p.93) 
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Recognition therefore has two aspects: Bergson defines the first as recognition by 
inattention that produces a feeling of familiarity arising from the consciousness of 
sensations and impending automatic bodily reactions; the second is attentive 
recognition that “requires the regular intervention of memory images”, which seem to 
repeat the present perception (M.M., p.118).  The two types of memory are 
complementary and mutually supportive (M.M., p.112-113).  While habit memory 
associated with the attitude of the body can inhibit the realisation of spontaneous 
memory, it is also encourages recognition within spontaneous memory because any 
relaxation of the inhibition will encourage pure memories that fit into this attitude 
(M.M., p.114); hence it is the sensory-motor apparatus that effectively materialises 
memories.  In perception there is a moment of delay or hesitation between the brain 
receiving and transmitting vibrations, thus providing an opportunity for the 
transmission of automatic movements to be overridden, and for consciousness to 
choose how to react; a choice that is made actual by the brain under the influence of 
memory.  This requires an effort of consciousness to suppress immediate action and to 
venture into the past in general to facilitate the recognition of memory images that 
could fit into the present attitude of the body (M.M., p.114).  While Bergson refers to 
the process of attentive recognition as an intellectual act of interpretation or reasoning 
accompanied by a feeling of effort, it is helpful to remember, as Lawlor remarks, that 
attentive recognition is Bergson’s method of intuition which he only develops in later 
work (Lawlor, 2004, p.50).  Intuition is an act of sympathy that provides knowledge of 
its object in terms of its internal vibration and which produces an affective disposition 
or sense of meaning that facilitates the determination of differences in kind.  We find 
an example of attentive recognition in Mind-Energy where he describes how some 
chess players are able to play several games at once without looking at the boards.  
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Bergson suggests that they mentally retain the power of the pieces as a “composition 
of forces” and “remake the history of the game from the beginning” as “a reciprocal 
penetration of all the elements” such that it is grasped “as a musician grasps a chord” 
(‘Intellectual Effort’, in M.E., p.198).  Attentive recognition takes memory as a 
heterogeneous composite of vibrations over time, which Bergson describes as a 
“dynamic scheme” that is generated prior to the formation of the image (‘Intellectual 
Effort’, in M.E., p.196), hence it is a formative idea that lacks extension or direction, 
being only an “expectation of images” (‘Intellectual Effort’, in M.E., p.227).  While 
inattentive recognition operates according to the law of similarity or sympathetic 
resonance, attentive recognition operates according to the laws of similarity and 
contiguity because its function is to consider the circumstances that preceded, 
accompanied and followed a past situation in order to “understand the present and 
anticipate the future”.  Bergson refers to association by similarity as the “means” of 
achieving this while association by contiguity is the “end” (‘False Recognition’, in 
M.E., p.176-177).  Therefore, as McNamara points out, we must not consider attentive 
recognition to be purely the sympathetic resonance of individual qualities (McNamara, 
1999, p.37), though this may occur.  While the memory must be acted by the body and 
thought by the mind concurrently, the dynamic scheme must ‘harmonise’ with the 
perception, rather than resonating with it in a precise form, though harmonisation is 
ultimately dependent on resonance.  In ‘Dreams’, Bergson provides the example of 
rapid reading, and suggests that we only perceive a few letters or words of a sentence 
while the remainder is produced by the externalisation of memories, the meaning of 
which appears to harmonise with the letters or words perceived (‘Dreams’, in M.E., 
pp.119-120).  Bergson proposes that pure memory consists of different “tones” or 
planes of consciousness, such that in his illustration of the cone, those further down at 
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the point are closest to action while those at the base are more distant in the past, 
having the nature of dream states (M.M., p.221).  Attentive recognition traverses the 
different tones of consciousness and makes a series of attempts at synthesising 
different memory images with the present perception.  While some are identical to the 
present image and others resemble it, having a vague similarity, they all come forward 
to meet it, one behind the other; however only images able to interpret the actual 
perception insert themselves into it (M.M., p.125).  So, for example in the sentence 
“…cat … on … mat”, attentive recognition will fill in the words to complete the 
sentence: “The cat sat on the mat.”  Alternatives such as “The cat ate on the mat” or 
“The cat slept on the mat” simply feel wrong and will be rejected.   
Bergson claims the process of interpretation or reasoning is effectively a 
contraction of memory and a “reconstruction” of the perception that occurs through 
“reflexion” or “the projection, outside ourselves, of an actively created image, identical 
with, or similar to, the object on which it comes to mould itself” (M.M., p.124).  The 
memory image is therefore projected into the object rendering the whole process of 
perception a circuit that starts and ends with the perceived object (M.M., p.127).  The 
detail of the outlined object is filled in by capriciously selected repetitions through 
deeper levels of memory of which each creates a new circuit that envelops the first. 
This continues until memory “follows regularly, in all their details, the movements of 
the body” (M.M., p.130). Hence:  
  
to act is just to induce this memory to shrink, or rather to become thinned and 
sharpened, so that it presents nothing thicker than the edge of a blade to actual 
experience, into which it will thus be able to penetrate.  (M.M., p.130) 
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Bergson states that the brain “serves to recall the recollection” and is “contrived” 
to secure “adjustment to the situation” (‘The Soul and Body’, in M.E., p.65) using 
organs of virtual perception: 
 
there are … in that substance [of the brain], organs of virtual perception, 
influenced by the intention of memory, as there are at the periphery organs of 
real perception, influenced by the action of the object. (M.M., p.164) 
 
He refers to these organs as an internal keyboard analogous to the external keyboard of 
real perception; however, they both share the same set of strings or nervous system 
which instigates movement of the body.  The stimulation of the internal keyboard is 
therefore a prelude to a motor reaction. 
As noted by Moulard-Leonard, Bergson’s account of reflexion in perception is a 
further example of the pendulum or harmonic motion referred to in the Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, and which is implicit in his philosophical method of intuition 
and cosmology of Creative Evolution (Moulard-Leonard, 2008, pp.41-42).  While his 
philosophical method of intuition in the generation of multiplicity in life was explained 
in Chapter 5, its relevance to perception and kairos will be examined in more detail 
later.  Figure 22 illustrates one circuit of the harmonic motion implicit in his account of 
perception where the body occupies the centre.  
 
Perception (Figure 22) 
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Following the movement by starting with the body, the body isolates a material image 
by reflecting on it, and in return the sense organs (the external keyboard) receive its 
vibrations which travel via the nervous system to the brain.  Before sending the 
appropriate vibrations through the spinal cord to stimulate physical movement of the 
body as an impending action that outlines the object in space, memory condenses the 
vibrations within its own duration and projects the whole of its content towards the 
internal keyboard stimulating the process of reasoning or interpretation.  The brain only 
allows a memory image (vibrations) through if it resonates or harmonises with the 
present perception and is projected in an act of reflection onto the material image, 
providing detail to the image.  The material image initially perceived is transformed as 
the process is repeated as a series of hypotheses until the image is provided with 
sufficient detail to integrate the memory thought with the memory acted.   Bergson 
describes the process of intellectual effort as playing our thoughts externally, such that 
the “play of ideas” receives a response from the “play of sensations…which is an echo 
of it …in another tone”, and he states that: “these mental oscillations have their sensory 
harmonics” (‘Intellectual Effort’, in M.E., p.222) which is illustrated in Figure 22 
above.  The body or brain acts as a node in the harmonic motion of perception, a node 
being a harmonic; the intersection of matter and memory is kairos in his theory of 
perception. 
Despite Bergson’s assertion that memory or consciousness implies freedom, one 
may however question how much freedom an individual really has when operating 
within a mechanistic model of harmonics.  This subject will therefore be addressed in 
the following section.  
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9.2   Bergson and Freedom 
 
 
 
The aim of Time and Free Will was to establish that when we conceive things as static 
in space we think of free will as providing a choice between pre-existing alternatives; 
however, the inner life is durational, and the future is invented as it progresses, hence a 
self–determined future.  Bergson claims that freedom is a fact of experience and is not 
a concept demanding an explanation because defining it gives rise to a paradox; 
freedom becomes determined (T.F.W., p.220).  Lutzow comments: 
 
Freedom offers Bergson the ground from which he can explain the existence of 
other realities and at the same time criticize the scientific theories of his day. 
Freedom and duration are facts of immediate experience. If these facts are 
inadmissible to science, science must be faulted, not human experience. "We 
cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of a system" (CE 45). (Lutzow, 
1977) 
 
Bergson claims freedom is indefinable because it is an act and not a thing, and he 
defines a free act as an outward manifestation of an inner state or a “relation between 
the self and its action” (T.F.W., p.165); his theory of perception in Matter and Memory 
establishes how this is achieved. 
In Creative Evolution Bergson refers to the creativity of God as unceasing life, 
action, and freedom, and that we also are free when we create (C.E., p.245).  For 
Bergson, freedom is associated with the creation of novelty in space and time, and the 
durational process defines him as a philosopher of kairos: 
 
The living being chooses or tends to choose. Its role is to create. In a world 
where everything else is determined, a zone of indetermination surrounds it. To 
create the future requires preparatory action in the present, to prepare what will 
be is to utilize what has been: life therefore is employed from its start in 
conserving the past and anticipating the future in a duration in which past, 
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present and future tread one on another, forming an indivisible continuity. 
(‘Life and Consciousness’, in M.E., p.17) 
 
While kairos is understood as perception, the synthesis of past, present and future, 
for Bergson, it is also the moment when the brain actualises the freedom of the 
perceiving subject by allowing the spontaneous memory to override the automatic 
memory, and he concludes Matter and Memory with the following statement: 
 
Whether we consider it in time or in space, freedom always seems to have its 
roots deep in necessity and to be intimately organised with it.  Spirit borrows 
from matter the perceptions on which it feeds, and restores them to matter in the 
form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom. (M.M., p.332) 
 
Bergson links freedom with necessity and Plotinus describes Intellect as the “principle 
of necessity” (Ennead V.3.6, 10-11) operating as a “law of being” (Ennead V.9.5, 26-
29).  The One is the source of the substantial numbers in Being and Intellect (Ennead 
V.1.5, 15-17) that arise from its radiation, and since these numbers are necessary for 
freedom or ‘that which depends on us’, it is the means by which the One providentially 
confers its freedom.  Similarly, Bergson’s God is essentially autonomous and confers 
freedom onto us providentially, therefore overcoming the challenge that if we do what 
God wills then we are not free. 
Bergson claims that necessity in the process of evolution is intended to produce 
the ultimate goal of freedom of action; however, this is determined by the degree of 
consciousness of the organism.  It was explained in Chapter 6 that Bergson’s partial 
finalism rests on the notion of the élan vital as a supra-consciousness that is essentially 
mind-like because it lacks consciousness in some of its manifestations.  It contains all 
degrees of consciousness, including that pertaining to intellect, instinct and intuition, as 
well as the sleeping consciousness of immobile vegetable matter and the latent 
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consciousness of unorganised matter.  For Bergson “consciousness is essentially free; it 
is freedom itself” (C.E., p.270) because “to be awake means to will” (‘Memory of the 
Present and False Recognition’, in M.E., p.155); however, he contends that the degree 
of consciousness and freedom in organised matter varies with the complexity of the 
nervous system: 
 
Equally they measure, the one by the complexity of its structure and the other 
by the intensity of its awareness, the quantity of choice that the living being has 
at its disposal. (C.E., p 286) 
 
Freedom to choose is also limited to a certain “order of greatness for condensation” 
(‘Introduction II’, in C.M. p.59); hence Bergson contends “the body extracts from the 
material environment whatever has been able to influence it” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M. 
p.55) and this is determined by attunement: 
 
Nothing would prevent other worlds, corresponding to another choice, from 
existing with it, in the same place and the same time: in this way twenty 
different broadcasting stations throw out simultaneously twenty different 
concerts which coexist without any one of them mingling its sounds with the 
music of another, each one being heard, complete and alone, in the apparatus 
which has chosen for its reception the wavelength of that particular station. 
(C.M., p.60) 
 
Barnard refers to this as “Bergson’s radio reception theory of consciousness” (Barnard, 
2011, p.237).  We only pick up on those durations or vibrations of matter to which we 
are attuned; hence our perceptions are generally limited.  An insect and a human 
perceive the world very differently because an insect perceives the colour spectrum at a 
higher frequency than human perception, for example red light is invisible to insects; 
however, they see ultraviolet light which is invisible to us; hence different worlds 
simultaneously existing in the same place and time.  Because the body is limited by 
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what it can consciously extract from the material environment Bergson claims that 
freedom is not in nature an “imperium in imperio” (M.M., p.331), that is, it is not an 
independent feature or tendency that exists as an order within the whole.    
Despite the natural limitations of freedom imposed on unorganised matter, 
Bergson refers to living bodies as privileged “zones of indetermination” (M.M., p.23) 
because they do not always react instantly to external influences in a determined way; 
they are capable of novel actions in the surrounding matter.  Also, by placing matter 
under the auspices of consciousness he can argue that matter is not necessarily 
determined in the way science conceives it; hence the ability to account for 
spontaneities in the evolution of life. 
In Time and Free Will Bergson claims man is free to the extent that he throws off 
the shackles of the intellect that spatializes things and acknowledges: 
 
It is the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free decision, and the act will 
be so much the freer the more the dynamic series with which it is connected 
tends to be the fundamental self. (T.F.W., p.167) 
 
We understand the fundamental self to be the durational spontaneous memory that 
shapes our character, and which gives rise to the free decision, while the body gives rise 
to the free act.  Bergson’s focus on the integration of mind and body in his notion of 
freedom therefore differs from Plotinus who interprets freedom as “that which depends 
on us”, which is “free from bodily affections” and dependent on the activities of 
Intellect (Ennead VI.8.3, 19-23).  For Plotinus the goal is to be in Intellect at rest from 
action because from here contemplation of the One is possible, and hence Bergson’s 
criticism of Plotinus’ “incomplete” mysticism in The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion where he states that Plotinus: 
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…did not get beyond this last stage, he did not reach the point where, as 
contemplation is engulfed in action, the human will becomes one with the 
divine will. (T.S.M.R., p.221) 
 
For Bergson, it is action in the world that is paramount, action that transforms it and 
furthers its evolution by participating in the creative freedom of God.  From his 
perspective not only does Plotinus lack this goal because the body becomes 
insignificant, but ascension to the One is not realised.  This leads us to an examination 
of how kairos fits into Bergson’s account of freedom in The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion. 
In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion Bergson continues his philosophic 
method of differentiation and integration by establishing two sources of morality and 
their associated types of religion; closed morality and static religion is counterbalanced 
by open morality and dynamic religion respectively.  Closed morality is dominated by 
feelings of moral duty established within individual closed societies, and Bergson 
refers to these feelings as customs or habits of social obligation that he likens to a 
quasi-biological instinctive social necessity implicit in nature that resists change and 
stifles individual freedom.  Despite this, Bergson claims that individuals feel 
contentment, well-being and pleasure from their social obligations.  At the other 
extreme is morality practised by Christian mystics who are open to humanity and the 
world in general.  Both types of morality are driven by emotion; however, while closed 
morality is infra-intellectual because its ideas generate emotions that “spur us on to acts 
answering to needs”, open morality is supra-intellectual; it is emotion, and specifically 
the emotion of love that produces ideas considered as “real inventions” (T.S.M.R., 
p.41).  The mystic acts as a role model for others and encourages transformation of self 
and society in general, thus inducing a feeling of joy.  Bergson claims mystics are the 
pinnacle of the evolutionary process of humanity because they are “capable of 
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transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature” (T.S.M.R., 
p.220).  They can directly align themselves with the will of God or the élan vital, 
participating in its absolute creative freedom, thus being “capable of transposing human 
life into another tone” through their actions (T.S.M.R., p.99).  Bergson proposes that 
the mystic possess a supra-intellectual quality of “supreme good sense”: 
  
…there is an exceptional, deep-rooted mental healthiness, which is readily 
recognizable. It is expressed in a bent for action, the faculty of adapting and re-
adapting oneself to circumstances, in firmness combined with suppleness, in the 
prophetic discernment of what is possible and what is not, in a spirit of 
simplicity which triumphs over complications. (T.S.M.R., p.228) 
 
Compare this with what Bergson says about good sense in Matter and Memory where 
he refers to a man of impulse who lives in the present, responding to a stimulus by the 
immediate reaction which prolongs it, while a dreamer lives in the past and his 
memories become conscious without benefit to the present situation.  Neither of these 
individuals is geared for action, whereas the man maintaining equilibrium between 
these extremes is action-focused, possessing a “well-balanced mind” that employs 
“good sense” in that he makes the right use of spontaneous memory: 
 
Between these two extremes lies the happy disposition of a memory docile 
enough to follow with precision all the outlines of the present situation, but 
energetic enough to resist all other appeal. (M.M., p.198) 
 
The notion of equilibrium is therefore important at the moment of kairos where 
Bergson’s metaphor of the ‘blade’ mentioned in the quotation on p.269 marks the 
distinction between memory and the movements of the body (M.M., p.130).  These 
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features are also found in the depiction of the mythical Kairos who holds scales 
balanced on a razor.169   
So, while the man of good sense in Matter and Memory appeals to personal 
memories to choose his action, the mystic appeals to the supra-conscious memory that 
is the élan vital.  Both however engage harmonic motion in returning to the perceived 
image and instigating action.  While in the moment of kairos the well-balanced mind 
generates harmonics that are sensations, the supreme good sense of the mystic operates 
in the moral domain where “Creation signifies, above all, emotion” (T.S.M.R., p.45), 
and therefore generates harmonics as emotions when he reintegrates with closed 
morality and static religion, effectively transforming it and facilitating the evolution of 
humanity.  Bergson acknowledges that pure mysticism is rare (T.S.M.R., p.213) and the 
freedom of ordinary individuals is limited; in fact, in Time and Free Will he states: 
“Many …live and die without having known true freedom” (T.F.W., p166).   
Bergson does not refer to kairos explicitly and possible reasons for this will be 
discussed in the Conclusion.170  He does however appear to follow the ancient Greeks 
in adopting it as a generative and dynamic principle within his cosmology, theory of 
perception, ethics, and it is implicit in his philosophical method of intuition.  While it is 
commonly accepted that he used the mathematical calculus for its model, the following 
section will examine how Bergson’s method of intuition may also have been inspired 
by kairos in ancient Greek rhetoric under the influence of the Pythagorean tradition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
169  Chapter 7.1, p.212. 
170  Conclusion, pp.307-308. 
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9.3   Kairos in Bergson’s Philosophical Method 
 
 
 
In the ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ Bergson argues most of the unresolved 
philosophical problems remain unresolved because metaphysics has adopted the  
intellectual method used by science studying nature systematically and analytically, and 
that views reality as absolutely mechanistic; hence he proposes metaphysics requires a 
method of intuition to capture reality as duration in its indivisible dynamic creative 
activity.  Deleuze describes Bergson’s method of intuition as follows: 
 
Intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a fully 
developed method, one of the most developed methods in Philosophy. (Deleuze, 
1991, p.13) 
 
It is commonly accepted that Bergson refers to mathematics as a model of his 
philosophic method and it was suggested in Chapter 6 that the 3-stage generative 
structure of Pythagorean cosmology is more appropriate; however, it is also implicated 
in the notion of kairos in the rhetoric of ancient Greece.  It is a model with which 
Bergson was well acquainted, as his friend, Jacques Chevalier, informs us that Bergson 
“was also a finished humanist, to whom was awarded, at the Concours Général, the 
"Honors Prize" in rhetoric as well as in mathematics” (Chevalier, 1928, p.43).  The 
influence of rhetoric and kairos appears to be a subject that has been neglected by 
Bergson scholars; however, it will be proposed that Bergson’s philosophical method, 
and hence his cosmology, is a rhetorical operation that connects Bergson with kairos 
and the Pythagorean tradition, as was explained in Chapter 7. 
Bergson’s skill in the art of rhetoric implies that he would have been familiar 
with the five canons of the Rhetorica ad Herennium (86-82 B.C.) that include 
Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory and Delivery, and which still form the basis of 
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method in modern rhetoric, the purpose of which is to resolve conflicts of knowledge.  
While its author is unknown, Enos refers to it as “the earliest and most complete 
manual of Roman rhetoric” that “synthezises Greek rhetoric into Roman education” 
(Enos, 2005, p.336); the Rhetorica ad Herennium therefore has its roots in ancient 
Greek rhetoric.   
Carter argues that the earlier concept of kairos, the principle employed by 
Gorgias and the earlier Sophists, became immersed in the concept of stasis, a formal 
theory proposed by Hermagoras around 150 B.C., and which later became central to the 
notion of invention in the Rhetorica (Carter, 1988, pp.97-112).  He notes striking 
similarities between kairos and stasis, the key points of which are summarised and 
compared to Bergson’s method. 
 
Kairos and stasis adopt the role of “opposing forces” or arguments. 
 
As explained in Chapter 7, the Sophists, under the influence of a Pythagorean 
philosophy based on harmonia or the integration of opposites, aimed to resolve the 
intransigence arising from opposing concepts or arguments (dissoi logoi), considered 
foundational for the art of rhetoric.  We only have to consider the titles of Bergson’s 
books and subjects he examined to find a similar point of departure: space/time, 
determinism/freedom, matter/memory, intellect/intuition, static/dynamic religion and 
morality, realism/idealism, possible/real, order/disorder, and being/nothing. 
 
Kairos and stasis “act as an invitation to, and indeed even allow for, rhetorical 
action.” 
 
Rhetorical action must be understood as a generative or transformational act of 
resolving the conflict between opposites and providing a sound decision.  This is 
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achieved by the first canon of the Rhetorica, ‘Invention’, the function of which is 
described by Lauer as “supplying ideas, subject matter, and arguments to flesh out the 
introduction, the statement of facts and the proof or the refutation for judicial, 
deliberative, and epideictic discourse.” (Lauer & Pender, 2003, p.52).  Sloane 
comments in his Encyclopedia of Rhetoric: 
 
…while English distinguishes between invention, which brings into existence 
something new, and discovery, which finds what is already there, both Latin 
and Greek use the same word, inventio or heurein, for both. (Sloane, 2001, 
p.389)  
 
‘Invention’ in rhetoric therefore includes both the creation of something new and 
discovery of what already exists in terms of providing evidence on which to form an 
argument.  ‘Invention’ is a dynamic concept starting with commonly accepted facts and 
moving to a new perspective; it therefore encompasses the whole of the rhetorical 
argument from start to finish.  For Bergson, invention is the key aim of his 
philosophical method, the first rule of which Deleuze defines as, “Apply the test of true 
and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and 
creation at the level of problems” (Deleuze, 1991, p.15).  This is because Bergson 
claims philosophical problems remain unresolved due to an intractable contradiction of 
opposites caused by a lack of precision in specifying them (‘Introduction II’ in, C.M., 
p.77), and that the solution for any philosophical problem will always be found 
providing the problem is precisely specified; “it is a question of finding the problem 
and hence of posing it even more than of solving it.  For a speculative problem is 
solved as soon as it is well posed” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.51).  In a letter to Floris 
Delattre, (1935) he writes: 
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…philosophizing for real should mean at once creating the position of a 
problem and creating the solution. … I consider an amateur the one who 
chooses between ready-made solutions, as one decides to register as a member 
of this or that political party. But I consider a philosopher the one who creates 
the necessarily unique solution of the problem which he has posed anew by the 
very effort of trying to solve it. (Melanges, p.1528) 
 
While Bergson rejects the notion of discovery in favour of invention in his method, he 
suggests this work of discovery or preparatory study is essential for analysing a 
problem in its elements.  The method he proposes “demands that [a philosopher] be 
ready, no matter what his age, to become a student once more” (‘Introduction II’ in, 
C.M., pp.67-68).  Thus, he conducts analyses of philosophical, scientific, and other 
empirical evidence to support his arguments, which is, on his terms, an act of discovery 
of what already exists (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.51).  The philosophical method that 
Bergson employs therefore includes discovery and invention, the constituents of 
‘invention’ in rhetoric. 
 
Kairos and stasis both “serve as guides to resolving the initiating conflict through a 
judgment. 
 
The formation of a judgement occurs in the act of invention, and Carter notes that 
judgements were "non-rational" in the case of kairos and “rational” in the case of 
stasis, where decisions were based on a formal four-part invention process in which 
questions were asked to determine the facts, nature and seriousness of an issue, and a 
plan of action.  Bergson adopts a method of questioning in his texts; however, a much 
deeper analysis would be necessary to discover whether his questioning follows the 
systematic character of stasis.  The emphasis Bergson places on intuition in his 
philosophical method suggests it more closely resembles the non-rational method 
employed by Gorgias who adopted the notion of kairos.  Gorgias, a rhetorician and 
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philosopher, held the view that rhetoric could rarely provide objective truth through 
reasoning because words distort reality.  Heidlebaugh suggests that for the Sophists, 
and for Gorgias in particular, kairos promotes active artistic judgement through an act 
of intuition: 
 
In attempting to teach Rhetoric … Gorgias suggested a technê in which subject 
and object merge in response to the dictates of a powerful moment.  The power 
and novelty of the moment are such that habitual thinking like that in the 
methods useful to everyday craftsmanship are inadequate for meeting the 
moment.  A technê grounded in “radical occasionality” must assist in disrupting 
the methods of routine production, in muting or concealing the habitual, and 
thus allow for the craftsperson to respond directly to the moment, to see it 
freshly.  (Heidlebaugh, 2001, p.47) 
 
It is suggested that Gorgias considered reality as a Heraclitean becoming in which the 
moment of kairos was grasped by intuition (White, 1987, pp.16,34) and succeeded by 
rational reflection.  White refers to Gorgianic kairos as the “irrational novelty of the 
moment that escapes formalisation” (White, 1987, p.20); however it was a method of 
intuition that originated with the senses, thus having an aesthetic component 
(Untersteiner, 1954, pp.185-194), leading commentators to classify him as an 
empiricist (Consigny, 2001, p.27).  Rhetoric was therefore intuitive in the sense that the 
rhetorician had to read the energy of the time, place, the audience, and be aware of the 
assumptions they make, the present and historical arguments as well as understanding 
the relevant facts.  Once again, we find echoes of this interpretation of Gorgias in 
Bergson who proposed a “true empiricism” and for whom judgement formed by 
intuition is the source of philosophical knowledge (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ in, 
C.M., p.175).  Like Gorgias, he proposes in Creative Evolution: 
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The duty of philosophy should be to examine … the living without any 
reservation as to practical utility, by freeing itself from forms and habits that are 
strictly intellectual.  Its own special object is to speculate, that is to see. (C.E., 
p.196) 
 
For Bergson, intuition is an intellectual act that choses to observe itself internally, that 
is to think in duration, an act that requires us to reverse the direction of habitual 
patterns of thought, i.e. to the external world.  It is an act that relies on the concept of 
sympathy in which the act of perception or sensing (sentir) provides immediate 
knowledge of its object in terms of its rhythms, vibrations or power, by becoming one 
with it; hence an example of good sense.  As a conscious act that produces knowledge 
from internal observation, intuition is the experience of self-sympathy, because, as 
Bergson proposes, we can ‘sympathise with ourselves’ and nothing else (‘Introduction 
to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.162-3).  Lawlor explains that human intuition ‘is a 
particularly difficult way of sensing’ which means harmonising the senses.  He notes 
that Bergson considers intuition in terms of sense of touch and hearing, as well as 
vision.  There is ‘contact’ or ‘coincidence’ as well as ‘spiritual auscultation’:  
 
In the Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson describes intuition: ….to penetrate 
the self, and through a kind of spiritual auscultation, to sense its soul palpitate. 
Auscultation is a technical term in medicine meaning to listen attentively to 
organs either by the ear directly or by means of an artifice like a stethoscope 
…when one auscultates, one must really listen ... The image of the ausculator 
tells us that Bergsonian intuition is like a doctor’s intuition, an intense intuition 
in which one recognises differences and continuities. (Lawlor, 2004, p.65) 
 
Intuition is therefore not pure thinking or idea; it is an immediate experience that 
implies sensibility arising within consciousness that facilitates the determination of 
differences in kind.  Intuition enables us to become aware that false problems arise 
because of badly analysed composites; we fail to distinguish differences in kind, 
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mistaking them for differences of degree, hence the second rule of method that Deleuze 
attributes to Bergson is “Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in 
kind or articulations of the real” (Deleuze, 1991, p.21).  This is achieved by making 
qualitative distinctions between opposites that Bergson considers in terms of static and 
dynamic tendencies.  
Thinking for Bergson is: 
 
essentially a continuous change of internal direction, with a tendency to 
translate itself into changes of external directions, I mean to say, into actions or 
gestures able to draw in space and express metaphorically the comings and 
goings of mind. (‘The Soul and the Body’, in M.E., p.56)  
 
Therefore, as Frédéric Worms notes, thinking “is a process of mediation between pure 
intuition and pure intelligence …We have to live and think in the double movement of 
concentrating and expressing” (Worms, 2005, p.1233).  While the intellect expresses 
itself externally and spatially, for Bergson the intuition of duration “fits none of our 
categories of thought” (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.34) because the intuition can only 
be communicated or expressed by means of the intelligence, whose language fails to 
capture its dynamic nature (‘Introduction II’, in C.M., p.42): 
 
We call intuition the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of 
an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently 
inexpressible in it. (‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, in C.M., p.161) 
 
While their underlying arguments differ, Bergson follows Gorgias in proposing a 
theory of intuition in which judgements formed by sensibility only produce knowledge 
considered as approximate when expressed in language.  This brings us to Carter’s 
fourth similarity between kairos and stasis. 
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Both offered systems of questioning which generated probable knowledge from a 
synthesis of the opposing arguments. 
 
As noted above, the earlier Sophists synthesised the opposites in a kairic act of 
intuition, as does Bergson, who endeavours to overcome the contradiction of his static 
and dynamic concepts with an ontological shift that refers to them as tendencies rather 
than discrete objects or states, as shown in the table below. 
 
Static Dynamic 
Intellect Instinct/Intuition 
Space Time 
Matter Memory 
Closed Morality Open Morality 
Closed Religion Open Religion 
 
In each case he integrates the opposites by an act of intuition that enables a question to be 
posed in terms of duration or consciousness; hence, as revealed by the harmonics model, 
the differences in kind become differences of degree; the dualism becomes a monism. 
While the generative process for both Plotinus and Bergson begins with an 
undifferentiated First Principle whose radiation or élan vital respectively, takes the form 
of an undifferentiated dualism as potentialities, it could be argued that Plotinus’ dualisms 
of motion and rest, same and other, and Bergson’s dualism of matter and memory, take 
the form of unlimited and limiting, thus following the lead of the Pythagorean 
Philolaus.171   
For the earlier Sophists employing kairos, and with the later concept of stasis, 
knowledge was not considered absolute but probable.  Rhetoric did not aim at absolute 
                                                            
171 Chapter 2.1, p.33; Chapter 2.1.2, p.35. 
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knowledge; rhetorical kairos especially, was regarded as process, that is, a forward and 
backward movement between the intuition of the rhetorician and its expression in 
language, and which encompassed the process of asking questions, considering 
evidence, creating ideas and building arguments, with the aim of deciding the right 
action and in the right measure appropriate to the circumstance.  Sometimes it resulted 
in a choice between the opposite arguments posed, and sometimes a synthesis of both.  
Similarly, we find that for Bergson, his method of philosophy is an act, a dynamic 
movement between intuition and intelligence which progresses towards knowledge, 
thus leaving scope for further progress.  Philosophy does not find immediate certainty; 
it is: 
 
…a gradual ascent into light.  Borne along in an experience growing ever wider 
and wider, rising to ever higher and higher probabilities, it would strive towards 
final certainty as to a limit. (M.E., p.6) 
 
But as with everything durational, his philosophical method was essentially open-ended 
because the whole is constantly changing.  Closely linked to the probability of 
knowledge is Carter’s final comparison of kairos and stasis. 
 
Both are concerned with the rhetorical situation in terms of opportune moment and 
appropriateness of speech. 
   
This concerns the rhetorical context and arguments that are appropriate to a rhetorical 
issue that is situation specific.  Similarly, Bergson insists that we cannot reason 
mathematically about problems; they cannot be constructed hypothetically from general 
notions stored up in language, and each new problem demands a new effort of intuition 
that considers all the relevant facts available at the time.  Gorgias in his ‘On Nature’ or 
‘On Not-Being’, and Bergson (C.M., p.162) refer to language as only providing a 
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symbolic representation of reality; however both require that invention employs 
creativity in using language.  The notion of creativity encompasses invention, or what 
is said, as well as the style, or how it is said.  ‘Style’ is the subject of the third canon of 
the Rhetorica ad Herennium.  Gorgias is described as: 
 
 …using a language enriched by the exuberance of a poetical imagination. He 
was much addicted to the substitution of rare expressions—γλῶτται, as the 
Greek critics called them —for the ordinary forms of speech. His language 
abounded in archaic and poetical words, striking metaphors and unusual 
compounds. (Dobson, 1919)  
 
Bergson’s use of language is described by Gunn in similar terms: 
 
Bergson’s style of writing merits high praise. …he is highly imaginative and 
picturesque… at times he rises to a high pitch of feeling and oratory. … There 
is in his works a beauty of style and a comparative absence of technical terms 
which have contributed much to his popularity.  The criticism directed against 
his poetic style accuses him of hypnotising us by his fine language, of 
employing metaphors where we expect facts, and of substituting illustrations for 
proofs. (Gunn, 1920, pp.103-104) 
 
The analysis of the principles of kairos and stasis in rhetoric and in Bergson’s 
philosophical method suggests that while it is uncertain whether Bergson employs the 
act of systematic questioning used in stasis, he appears to adopt the intuitive notion of 
kairos and the style of Gorgias.  The similarities between them can be summarised as 
follows: a reality informed by opposites; an opportune moment of intuition that must 
but cannot be adequately expressed in language; the acts of invention, discovery of 
facts, and judgment that provides probable knowledge that progressively approaches 
certainty or resolution of a conflict using highly creative language and imaginative 
metaphors described as ‘poetic’; and the commitment to appropriate action.    
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The link between rhetoric and kairos therefore appears to be more compatible 
with Bergson’s philosophy than the mathematical model that he suggests.  Once again, 
the Pythagorean connection is apparent because Bergson’s philosophical method 
closely follows the rhetoric of Gorgias who was influenced by the Pythagorean 
understanding of kairos through his teacher Empedocles.  
   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Bergson has been argued to be a philosopher of kairicity and the examination of its 
application to his theories of perception, ethics, freedom and his philosophical method 
of intuition has revealed that it is implicit within his philosophy founded on the model 
of the generation of harmonics.  The integration of the static and dynamic opposites is 
only possible because the élan vital generated matter and consciousness as a series of 
harmonics, and the creative process is continued as more harmonics are generated at the 
moment of kairos, the point at which they coincide.  The kairos of perception, the 
coincidence of matter and memory, is a node of sensation; the kairos of morality, the 
coincidence of the closed and open, is a node of emotion; and the kairos of 
philosophical intuition, the coincidence of intelligence and intuition, is a node of 
knowledge or understanding.  Each moment of kairos presents the opportunity for the 
expression of freedom.  While this freedom is not absolute other than in the rare case of 
the mystic, freedom exists in degrees, leaving it open to evolve as the harmonic motion 
continues its course.  Bergson alludes to the mythological depiction of Kairos in 
ancient Greece in his description of duration as the hyphen or bridge that connects the 
past and future, and he appears to have adopted kairos as employed in the rhetoric of 
ancient Greece in his philosophical method.  The link that connects a philosophy of 
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harmonics with a philosophy of kairicity is the Pythagorean tradition, an influence that 
appears more than coincidental in Bergson’s work. 
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Conclusion 
 
* 
 
 
Mossé-Bastide’s Bergson et Plotin surprisingly, remains the only work that 
comprehensively studies the key concepts shared by Plotinus and Bergson, as well as 
their differences.  She notes that the significant resemblances between them include: a 
presentation of metaphysics as psychological experience that requires a special kind of 
consciousness that dispenses with images, and is one in which subject and object are 
united; secondly, a shared conception of causality in which multiplicity emerges from a 
prior cause and which is a continual process of change; and thirdly, the way in which 
salvation is offered to man by the dialectic of love and the inner experience of freedom. 
However, she points out that the shared concept of logos that is implicit in the 
generation of multiplicity is of prime significance (Mossé-Bastide, pp.397-402). This 
study has aimed to build on theses shared concepts and to add another dimension to the 
relationship, by arguing that they both present a philosophy modelled on the dual and 
interlinked concepts of harmonics and kairos that have their roots in the Pythagorean 
tradition.  Apart from the French literature linking kairos to Bergson and Plotinus in 
very general terms, the subject of harmonics and its related Pythagorean influence has 
not previously been addressed, therefore there is little secondary literature to either 
support or refute the arguments presented.  The following summary reviews each of the 
chapters, focusing on aspects of the texts scholars have found challenging, and how the 
new interpretation resolves the perceived difficulties.  In addition, it will highlight 
important new revelations and opportunities for further work.   
To provide context for the following chapters, Chapter One examined how 
Bergson and Plotinus could have been influenced by Pythagoreanism in their respective 
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eras, and it was found that both philosophers lived in eras when Pythagoreanism was 
experiencing a revival.  Plotinus was subject to the influence of Pythagoreanism 
through Plato, the Neo-Pythagoreans of his era, his teacher Ammonius Saccas, his own 
study of ancient philosophy, as well as its prevalence in the wider culture.  He adopted 
an ascetic lifestyle, and like the Pythagoreans, treated philosophy as an initiation into 
higher knowledge.  
It was more important to establish the Pythagorean background for Bergson as 
neither he nor anyone else has acknowledged their influence on him; however, it was 
shown that in Bergson’s era scientific and mathematical developments coincided with a 
revival of Pythagoreanism in the wider culture, and these developments, as well as the 
philosophy of Plotinus, complemented his interest in French Spiritualism as advocated 
by Maine de Biran and Ravaisson.  It was proposed that Bergson encountered 
Pythagoreanism through his family, his study of mathematics and rhetoric, the 
influence of Theosophy, and through his lectures on Greek philosophy, including the 
Pythagoreans and Plotinus, influences that possibly contributed to his interest in 
esotericism and psychical research.  It was noted that while Bergson did not adopt an 
ascetic lifestyle, it appears that he intentionally continued the ancient tradition of 
regarding philosophy as an initiation; hence there are noticeable similarities with 
Plotinus and the Pythagorean approach to philosophy in terms of content and style.   
The aim of Chapter Two was to examine the generation of multiplicity from the 
perspective of Pythagorean cosmogony and cosmology and to introduce key concepts 
Plotinus and Bergson employ in their respective philosophies: nature, the principles of 
limiting and the unlimited, harmonia (ἁρμονία), and the function of the Pythagorean 
Monad in their number theory.  This was followed by a brief history of Pythagorean 
harmonics and number theory, and a basic introduction to the Pythagorean science of 
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harmonics.  It was proposed that Plotinus and Bergson would have conceived 
Pythagorean numbers as powers.  
The generation of multiplicity in Intellect has proved challenging for scholars of 
the Enneads, and Chapter Three argued that the model of the generation of harmonics 
is buried in the text, thus suggesting the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus is greater 
than previously realised.  It is significant that the model of harmonics and the 
Pythagorean influence explain several concepts not fully understood by Plotinian 
scholars, for example, why procession and reversion is necessary for the generation of 
Intellect and the multiplicity within it; the nature and shape of the forms; the nature of 
logos as substantial number and form; how number relates to the primary kinds and 
generates the Beings in Intellect; and finally, it explains the nature of the Plotinian 
decad.  While it could be objected that the physics of standing waves and harmonics 
were not understood in Plotinus’ day, it was noted that the Stoics, Vitruvius (1st century 
B.C.), as well as Boethius (A.D. 480-524) considered sound a transverse wave and that 
Nichomachus (c. 60-120 A.D.) specifically refers to the inverse proportion obtaining 
between the length of string on a canon and its vibration when the string is plucked.  It 
suggests that Plotinus understood that the correspondence of physical distance and 
musical ratios could be determined in terms of vibrations, a theory he applied non-
spatially to Intellect.  If this interpretation is correct it is an important and previously 
unrecognised development of Pythagorean philosophy.  
Chapter Four examined Plotinus’ account of the generation of Soul and the origin 
and nature of matter, suggesting that the harmonics model and Pythagorean influence is 
operational at every stage in the procession from the One.  Once again it was argued 
that the harmonics model resolves difficulties perceived by commentators.  It clarifies 
the various levels of Soul, challenges the view that the Hypostasis Soul is a rational 
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form, explains how Plotinus could conceive of the World Soul as the eldest, and how 
each primary Soul form generates its own offspring as an infinite series, one after 
another in temporal succession as in a musical scale or melody. 
Plotinus’ account of the generation of the world and its contents by the World 
Soul employs the concepts of attunement, correspondence and conflict, which it was 
argued can be understood as constructive or destructive interference in physics; hence 
new ‘nodes’ and forms are generated that do not receive their rational forming 
principles from Intellect.  Individual souls are fitted into bodies according to 
providence facilitating attunement and sympathy, which is akin to the Pythagorean 
concept of harmonia.  While Pythagorean harmonics underpins the ontological 
structure that facilitates sympathy in Plotinus’ metaphysics, it was speculated that 
Aristoxenus influenced his epistemology with the concept of synesis, an a priori innate 
musical intuition.  The harmonics model is more obvious in Plotinus’ account of Soul, 
and it was argued that the commonly held view that Plotinus’ concept of sympathia has 
Stoic origins requires re-evaluation because the Pythagorean influence is more 
compatible with his account.  
It was suggested that disagreement amongst scholars concerning the role of music 
and musical metaphors in the Enneads arise because they have not grasped how 
harmonics are generated in Intellect.  It was therefore proposed that the Pythagorean 
influence on Plotinus has been misunderstood and underemphasised in his theory of 
Soul.  
The ambiguity concerning the nature and origin of physical matter in the Enneads 
has again resulted in differences of interpretation among commentators.  It was argued 
that the harmonics model accounts for why physical matter does not exist in Being but 
is necessary for the making of the universe and conforms to Plotinus’ assertion that 
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matter is “a sort of form” and must therefore have its origin in Intellect.  It was 
suggested that matter is a form in as much as it is generated as a flat line, formed when 
the distance between the nodes or harmonics generated from the fundamental as an 
infinite series approaches zero.  It therefore acts as a powerless but reflective surface 
for the forms, just as matter acts as a reflective surface onto which sound waves are 
projected to produce sound that is perceived.   
The model of harmonics it is not completely hidden in the Enneads, neither is it 
obvious, and it was noted that Plotinus is more explicit about harmonic principles when 
describing the nature of Soul, but never explicitly refers to it in the generation and 
nature of Being, Intellect and matter.  It was concluded that Plotinus’ account of Soul 
supports the argument that the harmonics model applies to Intellect and matter, because 
aporias remain in his philosophy without it.   
Plotinus’ lack of clarity has been the cause of vagueness, misunderstanding and 
debate amongst those attempting to understand various concepts in the Enneads, and it 
all appears to originate from the ambiguity linked to the generation of multiplicity in 
Intellect; in particular the lack of explanation about the mechanism of procession and 
reversion and the nature of logos.  An appreciation of the importance of the science of 
harmonics and the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus could transform our 
understanding of the Enneads.  
Chapter Five commenced the exploration of the Pythagorean influence on 
Bergson with an examination of the role of God and the élan vital in his cosmology as 
described in Creative Evolution.  It was concluded that while Bergson strongly rejected 
the notion of pantheism he followed the Pythagoreans and Plotinus who could be more 
accurately placed in the category of panentheism, because, in the latter theory, God 
remains distinct from its products but is active within them.  
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It was noted that commentators have failed to grasp the significance of the 
impulsion and inversion of the élan vital in Bergson’s cosmology as proposed in 
Creative Evolution.  This is surprising because Bergson always considered duration as 
vibrations of energy, and one plausible interpretation is that vibrations are formed by 
harmonic motion.  It was therefore argued that Bergson followed Plotinus in adopting 
harmonic motion as the mechanism of his method of philosophical intuition and 
therefore the élan vital.  The élan vital generates itself ‘fanwise’, firstly as a single 
vibration or ‘fundamental’, and matter and consciousness as harmonics, or two separate 
tendencies that each generate their own harmonics, forming a supra-conscious memory 
analogous to Plotinus’ Intellect, while Plotinus’s Soul becomes Bergson’s intellect 
whose function is to spatialize matter.  Despite the similarities, Plotinus hypostasises 
Intellect as eternity and Soul as its temporal expression, whereas Bergson synthesises 
them, so his ontological and epistemological structure is a wholly temporal process.  It 
was therefore concluded that the model of harmonics solves the ‘mystery’ of Bergson’s 
cosmology and explains the durational nature of consciousness and matter.   
In Chapter Six the examination of Bergson’s arguments for partial finalism, his 
theory of number, the influence of mathematics, and his sympathy with a Pythagorean 
philosophy of transformation supported the arguments made in Chapter Five and 
developed the argument for a Pythagorean influence on him.  It was proposed that 
Bergson’s arguments for partial finalism revealed that he followed Plotinus in adopting 
the 3-stage generative structure of Pythagorean cosmology.  Furthermore, he adopts 
key Pythagorean themes with his analogy of microcosm and macrocosm, his theory of 
attunement between and intellect and matter, the sympathy of instinct and intuition with 
matter, as well as his notion of conflict and war, which can be understood as destructive 
interference.  All these concepts are consistent with the model of harmonics.  It was 
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argued that the harmonics model is compatible with his account of how consciousness 
and matter are integrated in the whole to create organic life, and how he includes 
spontaneity and freedom within his account of partial finalism.  It also accounts for 
similarities in structure in the evolutionary process due to the proportional existence of 
tendencies within matter and organic life and is consistent with the musical theme 
Bergson proposes.   
While Bergson does not discuss number as having a specific role in the generation 
of multiplicity, in Creative Evolution he acknowledges that he is following Plotinus’ 
theory of logos, thus distinguishing between monadic number or quantitative 
multiplicity and substantial number or qualitative multiplicity, the latter being generated 
with the generation of multiplicity as nodes and vibrations. 
Bergson makes a clear distinction between the geometrical order and the vital 
order and insists that mathematics cannot account for duration because it does not 
concern itself with the intervals between the static points on which it bases its 
calculations.  It was argued that Deleuze was mistaken to have considered Riemann’s 
conceptual spatial mathematics to have influenced Bergson to the degree that he 
suggests due to the temporal nature of duration.  Furthermore, it was proposed that the 
influence of modern calculus on his philosophical method has been understandably 
overemphasised.  It was suggested that the calculus Bergson had in mind produced a 
“fan-wise” generation of multiplicity in the form of the Pythagorean tetractys, which 
was also adopted by Plotinus; hence the mathematics underpinning Bergson’s 
qualitative differentiations and integrations is not the mathematics of science, but 
music; the significance of which is that it takes account of the intervals in which kairos 
represents a harmonic, as explained in Chapter 9.  
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The argument for a Pythagorean influence on Bergson was supported by an 
examination of his lectures, which revealed his sympathy for their number theory and 
philosophy of transformation, which is not surprising since his own philosophy is an 
open system of dynamic transformation. 
It was therefore proposed that while commentators have noted a similarity of 
Bergson’s ‘creative evolution’ with Pythagorean cosmology, it was a mistake to have 
dismissed it, as was dismissing his musical references as mere metaphor.  It was noted 
that Bergson specifically links the generation of novelty to harmonics in several places 
in his work and that he replicates arguments made by Aristoxenus, an ancient Greek 
theorist of experiential harmonics who was linked to the Pythagoreans.  It was also 
noted that Bergson makes several references to Pythagoras or Pythagoreanism that 
indicate a possible influence.   
This new interpretation of Bergson’s metaphysics not only clarifies his 
cosmology but potentially touches many aspects of his philosophy that may be read in a 
new light from the perspective of the influence of Plotinus and the Pythagoreans.   
Chapter Seven introduced the concept of kairos that has already been 
acknowledged as significant to the philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson, though it has 
been largely neglected in the English language literature.  In ancient Greece kairos 
differed from chronos or chronological time in that it was understood as time 
considered to be dynamic and purely subjective, hence not measurable, uniform, or 
absolutely predictable.  It was understood as the interval that links the past to the future, 
requiring human participation in the act of creation and signifying the emergence of 
qualitative change that is situation specific.  Kairos was prevalent in Greek drama, 
medicine, as well as being important in Pythagorean cosmology and ethics, which in 
turn influenced the rhetoric of Gorgias and Isocrates.  It was proposed that Plotinus and 
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Bergson adopt kairos as a poietic moment, applying the Pythagorean notions of 
opposites and harmonia to their concepts of mind and matter, freedom and 
determinacy, concepts that integrate to facilitate action. 
Chapter Eight examined the concept of kairos in the Enneads, with reference to 
the World Soul in its making of the world, and individual souls in their interaction with 
the world, clarifying how it is linked to the model of harmonics.  It was explained how 
the World Soul makes the world as an act of contemplation that is paradoxical because 
it is an act that is concurrently necessary as an act of providence and free.  While the 
World Soul contemplates the harmonics or substantial numbers and forms in Intellect, 
analysis of Plotinus’ definition of freedom or ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, meaning ‘that which depends on 
us’, revealed that the World Soul fulfils one of the requirements for freedom because it 
is not under outside influence, what it makes is within its power, and its knowledge is 
right knowledge or wisdom because it contemplates the forms in Intellect, which are 
Beings of eternal truth. 
An examination of Plotinus’ account of the psychology of individual souls 
included his theories of sense perception, memory, reason, and freedom.  In sense 
perception, Plotinus considers sensation arising from the stimulation of sense organs of 
the body and perception as conscious awareness of external objects as other than itself.  
It was noted that commentators have experienced difficulties in comprehending 
Plotinus’ concepts of ‘impressions’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘resemblance’ and how they are 
related to sympathia.  It was argued that once again difficulties arise because they 
assume Plotinus’ sympathia to have a Stoic origin, and that they are resolved if 
sympathia is understood from a Pythagorean perspective because the harmonics model 
underpins Plotinus’ theory that facilitates the interaction between body and soul.  This 
is important because sympathia is also relevant in his theory of memory, reason and 
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ultimately human freedom.  It was explained that in sense perception the soul is able to 
receive the impressions of sense objects through the body because there is a 
correspondence or attunement between them, made possible because each soul 
possesses all the logoi in itself, but only as an imitation of those in Intellect, as are 
those in sense objects and the sense organs.  It was proposed that ‘impressions’ can be 
understood as forms or vibrations, where one form resonates to the vibrations of 
another; ‘assimilation’ arises when two bodies possess the same harmonic linked to the 
frequency of the vibrations; and sympathia can be understood as sympathetic 
resonance, in which the passive affection of an object by another object at a distance 
from it leaves the passive recipient unchanged.  It was suggested that this interpretation 
is consistent with an alternative form of perceptual realism in which external objects 
are forms in matter considered as imitations, not ‘images’, of the forms in Intellect.  
This new interpretation of the role of sympathia in sense perception warrants further 
investigation due to the limited scope of the analysis presented here.   
While Plotinus’ account of memory presents less difficulty in the secondary 
literature, commentators have debated the role of λογιξόμενον and διανοητικόν, two 
terms that Plotinus uses for the activities of the reasoning soul.  While commentators 
usually interpret them as both meaning ‘discursive reasoning’ as thinking in words or 
images produced by the imaging power of the soul, it was argued, based on the new 
interpretation of logos in Chapter 3 as substantial number and form, that Plotinus is 
referring to two different activities of the reasoning soul.  λογιζόμενον uses 
sympathetic resonance and accounts for the ability of the reasoning power to make its 
judgement about the perceived object in terms of harmonics (substantial numbers) and 
forms (vibrations), that act as measures used in the judgement.  This is followed by 
διανοητικόν interpreted as ‘discursive reasoning’ or thinking in words or spatial 
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images.  It was noted that λογιζόμενον is also highly relevant to Plotinus’ account of 
virtue that he acknowledges to originate with “the ancients”, and who are understood to 
be the Pythagoreans, for whom logismos is a rational calculation where opposites are 
fitted together (harmonia) using ratios to provide knowledge and understanding about 
the world, as well as forming the basis of ethical action.  While the examination of 
these two terms was limited in scope and the interpretation speculative, further in-depth 
analysis of how Plotinus uses διανοητικόν and λογιζόμενον in the Enneads is warranted 
as it could be important for those commenting on Plotinus’ psychology, or for anyone 
undertaking a translation of the Enneads.  
The examination of human freedom revealed it to function as it does for the 
World Soul.  ‘ἐφ’ ἡμῖν’, or ‘that which depends on us’ ultimately comes from the 
individual soul contemplating the forms in Intellect, by becoming one with it and 
remaining there.  Freedom cannot be achieved in a pure state in practical life, because 
the soul does not remain in Intellect; it must act; however, freedom is enhanced if the 
soul does not allow the external world to influence its action. 
 Plotinus appropriates the concept of kairos from its Pythagorean origins, and 
because kairos is contemplation it is not a static moment; the soul requires continual 
interaction with the outside world, becoming conscious of it in its perception and 
memory of those perceptions, aided by the power of reason that provides knowledge 
and the ability to think discursively for deciding action appropriate to the 
circumstances.  Providence provides the human soul with everything it needs to 
become free and enables it, with the appropriate training, to think like Intellect, that is, 
to contemplate substantial numbers and forms, or as has been argued, to think and act 
according to the laws of Pythagorean harmonics. 
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Why should we accept that Pythagorean harmonics underpin Plotinus’ 
philosophy?  In the absence of any other interpretation that potentially resolves so 
many perceived ambiguities, and unites Plotinus’ cosmology and psychology, it is a 
speculative theory that offers, for the first time, a plausible explanation of Plotinus’ 
concepts of procession and reversion, and clarification of the nature of logos, a concept 
of supreme importance, in that its interpretation determines whether Plotinus’ 
philosophy makes sense as a complete system.  While it is not explicitly explained in 
the text, the evidence suggesting a strong Pythagorean influence on him appears to 
support it and develops recent scholarship that has recognised the importance of 
musical entities in the Enneads.172  An appreciation of the importance of the science of 
harmonics and the Pythagorean influence on Plotinus has the potential to resolve the 
acknowledged obscurities perceived by scholars in many areas of Plotinus’ 
metaphysics, and therefore provides a fresh perspective and basis for further work of 
analysis and review of the secondary literature.   
Chapter Nine explained how Bergson utilises kairos and the model of harmonics 
in his theories of perception, ethics, freedom and his philosophical method of intuition.  
The task was easier to achieve with Bergson than it was for Plotinus because his 
account of matter and consciousness is integrated in the concept of duration that he 
describes as vibrational.  He also makes several specific references to harmonics and 
captures the essence of the mythical Kairos of ancient Greece. 
It was argued that Bergson’s account of pure perception draws on the physics of 
light waves, and hence the law of resonance, to reveal differences in the continuity of 
matter and to account for the isolation of an object.  It was noted that he differed from 
Plotinus who employed sympathia in terms of sound vibrations to reveal similarities.  
                                                            
172  Gersh, 2005; Panaiotidi, 2014 
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Either way, resonance is the principle that explains the perception of an external object, 
and the law of reflection enables Bergson to claim, as does Plotinus, that the pure 
perception of an object occurs in the object itself. 
The examination of his account of memory clarified that memories are preserved 
in the body and the mind as pure memory through correspondence or attunement, only 
because of the vibrational quality of matter and consciousness.  The condensation of 
pure perception in consciousness triggers a response from inattentive recognition or 
habitual body movements that resonate with the present image, and from attentive 
recognition as it traverses the different tones or levels of consciousness, making a series 
of attempts at reasoning, or synthesising different memory images with the present 
perception; an act that is completed when there is either resonance or a harmonisation 
of the memory with the present image.  The attempts at synthesis are achieved by 
harmonic motion that transforms the present in the moment of hesitation or delay, 
between the brain receiving vibrations from the external keyboard or sense organs and 
its resonance or harmonisation with the internal keyboard located in the brain, and 
which is influenced by the intention of memory.  The body or brain acts as a node in 
the harmonic motion of perception, a node being a harmonic or kairos, the prelude to 
action at the intersection of matter and memory.  
While Bergson suggests that at the moment of kairos the brain actualises the 
freedom of the perceiving subject by allowing the spontaneous memory to override the 
automatic memory, it was questioned how much freedom an individual really has when 
operating within a mechanistic model of harmonics.  Like Plotinus, Bergson argues that 
freedom is intimately linked with necessity, that God is essentially autonomous and 
confers freedom onto us providentially; however, the examination of the theory of 
freedom in Time and Free Will and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
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confirms that freedom is rarely realised.  It is ultimately linked to becoming one with 
the élan vital itself, a task only achieved by the supra-intellectual mystics who possess 
supreme good sense.  For ordinary individuals kairos is linked to freedom to the degree 
that they possess good sense, where kairos is a harmonic linked to sensations, and in 
their moral life it is linked to emotion at the intersection of the attitude of closed and 
open morality. 
The examination of the role of harmonics and kairos in Bergson’s texts not only 
resolves the mystery associated with his cosmology, it helps to clarify the relevance of 
his pendulum or harmonic motion that is present in all his texts and which explains the 
generation of novelty.  The integration of the static and dynamic opposites he proposes 
is only possible because the élan vital generated matter and consciousness as a series of 
harmonics, and the creative process is continued as more harmonics are generated at the 
moment of kairos, the point at which they coincide.  Matter and Memory, the text 
Bergson scholars find the most challenging, becomes much easier to understand.    
The Pythagorean tradition connects a philosophy of harmonics with a philosophy 
of kairicity and it was argued that Bergson was trained in rhetoric and appears to have 
employed the principles of kairos in his philosophical method as they applied to the 
ancient Greek art of rhetoric, thus questioning the influence of mathematics as is 
commonly accepted by Bergson scholars.  
The philosophy of Plotinus and Bergson therefore embodies four key features of 
Pythagorean cosmology: firstly, they all have an original source; for the Pythagoreans 
it is the ‘central fire’, for Plotinus it is the One, and for Bergson it is God.  Secondly, 
the original source emits an energy that is an undifferentiated unity with immense 
potentiality; for the Pythagoreans it is the theory of opposites, for Plotinus it is the 
indefinite dyad that actualises itself as Being, and for Bergson it is the élan vital as an 
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undifferentiated unity of matter and consciousness. Thirdly, the undifferentiated unity 
divides itself into opposite tendencies by a movement that is consistent with the 
generation of a fundamental and its harmonics, and the unlimited becomes limited in 
the process.  For the Pythagoreans we have a table of opposites that divides according 
to numbers in the tetractys; for Plotinus, Intellect divides itself, generating substantial 
numbers as a base for the forms; and for Bergson, the tendencies within the élan vital 
differentiate, generating the rhythms of duration and the differences in numbers behind 
our distinctions of quality, making the proportional nature of the tendencies in life 
possible.  It is the differences in number that are expressed as ratios, and it has been 
argued that not only do Plotinus and Bergson imply that they are musical ratios, but 
their philosophies make more sense if they are considered as such.  Fourthly, at the 
moment of kairos the opposites coincide, either harmoniously or disharmoniously, 
generating new nodes or harmonics.  For the Pythagoreans this is harmonia 
underpinned by an analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, and cosmic sympathy 
or resonance, features also found in Plotinus and Bergson.  Finally, Bergson and 
Plotinus replicate the Pythagorean tradition by proposing a philosophy that is an open 
system of dynamic transformation.  The primary difference that separates the 
Pythagoreans from Plotinus and Bergson is that the latter develop Pythagorean 
philosophy by utilising the mechanism of harmonic motion by which harmonics are 
generated, a mechanism that only became apparent with advances in the field of 
acoustics that were evident in their respective eras. 
The proposition that the harmonics model underpins the philosophy of Plotinus 
and Bergson raises an important question: Why did they not make their intentions 
clear?  In respect of Plotinus, the most probable answer is that he followed Plato and 
the ancient philosophical tradition for whom an ascetic lifestyle, concealment, secrecy 
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and silence is the norm.  Plato, in his Seventh Letter also suggests that not everything 
was written down: 
 
Every serious man in dealing with really serious subjects carefully avoids 
writing, lest thereby he may possibly cast them as a prey to the envy and 
stupidity of the public. In one word, then, our conclusion must be that whenever 
one sees a man's written compositions—whether they be the laws of a legislator 
or anything else in any other form, - these are not his most serious works (VIIth 
Letter, 344c). 
 
Similarly, Aristotle writes about the Timeaus and Plato: 
  
It is true, indeed, that the account he gives there of the participant is different 
from what he says in his so-called unwritten teaching. (Physics 209b 12-14) 
 
Cornford notes that the doctrines of mysticism are secret because they cannot be taught 
by intellectual processes; they must be experienced in an emotional or non-rational 
state, and the initiate undergoes purification so that he is most receptive to the 
experience; however, while the Pythagoreans attempted to intellectualise Orphism, it 
retained much of its spiritual nature (Cornford, 1912, pp.198-199).   
In Chapter 1 it was explained that Plotinus followed the Pythagorean tradition by 
upholding the view that certain information should not be disclosed to the uninitiated, 
and in the Preface to Plotinus: Myth, Metaphor, and Philosophical Practice, Stephen 
Clark refers to the propensity of Plotinus to encourage guesswork (Clark, 2016, p. xiii).  
It is likely that Plotinus remained faithful to his teacher by not openly revealing the 
elements of Ammonius’ teaching that he included in the Enneads, and while Plotinus 
did not follow Plato in using allegory to hide the Pythagorean teachings, he made 
copious use of metaphors and analogies.  It is also important to consider that Porphyry 
tells us that Plotinus opened his classes to anyone who wanted to be there; it could be 
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that many of his students had no training in music theory and hence the mathematical 
aspect of harmonic theory; so, while Plotinus encouraged education in these subjects he 
may not have considered it appropriate for his audience.  On making the statement that 
“no one ever writes down everything he or she believes”, Clark also provides valuable 
insight about the nature of an oral tradition: “Plotinus’ seminars took their start from 
texts and textual commentaries, and that the discipline of philosophy is learned in a 
long apprenticeship to some master, not just “from books”.  Furthermore, that the 
“living voice” was to be preferred to any written text, as it was only - or at least 
principally - from such a voice, such a living presence, that we could hope to pick up 
the things that cannot be said but only shown” (Clark, 2016, p.xiv).  
As with Plotinus we find that the model of musical harmonics in Bergson’s texts 
is not completely hidden and also not that obvious.  The mystery of his cosmology in 
Creative Evolution arises from his use of metaphors to explain the mechanism of the 
impulsion and inversion of the élan vital that generates consciousness and matter as 
independent tendencies, rather than explaining it as a literal process of harmonic 
generation; however, several other links to the field of harmonics and the Pythagorean 
tradition have been revealed, though they are speculative.  Can it be mere coincidence 
that Bergson applies a number of Aristoxenus’ arguments to his theories of duration, 
perception and memory, or that concealed inferences to Pythagoras or Pythagoreanism 
appear in his work?  His references to the élan vital as the ‘breath of life’ and ‘earth’s 
hidden fire’; his example of an ‘anvil and hammer’ and the ‘humming of life’s depths’ 
as well as his comment on ‘vegetarianism’ are comments that seem to suddenly emerge 
from nowhere.  One or two could be nothing more than coincidence, with no 
Pythagorean link intended; however, five, and there could be more that have gone 
unnoticed, raise suspicion, especially when considered with the Pythagorean 
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connection to the harmonics model and kairos.  Similarly, Bergson’s failure to explain 
that Plotinus’ logos is substantial number and form could imply that like Plotinus he 
followed the tradition in deliberately adopting an attitude of concealment or secrecy; a 
further example of ‘silentium philosophorum’ (Casel, 1919).  This may have been 
prompted by philosophical influences alone; however, it is very likely that it was 
reinforced by the revival of Pythagoreanism in his era that impacted on his personal life 
and the wider culture as discussed in Chapter 1.  We cannot ignore the fact that 
Bergson would have been subject to these influences, even if only subconsciously; 
however subconscious awareness does not appear to be the case because the 
Pythagorean influence together with the mechanism of harmonics in his work is too 
precise to be mere coincidence.  It is also conceivable that following the praise he 
received in his day for the novelty of his philosophy, it would have been uncomfortable 
to acknowledge the Pythagorean influence as it would mean admitting that his 
philosophy was not as novel as it was assumed to be.    
The question of why the harmonics model and Pythagorean influence has not 
been acknowledged by commentators on Bergson needs to be addressed.  It is possible 
the assumption that Bergson’s musical analogies are merely metaphors may have been 
a distraction, as could a reliance on what is explicit in the text; however, the most likely 
reason is a lack of understanding of Pythagoreanism and/or the science of harmonics, 
from both a scientific and musical perspective.  Bergson’s continual reference to 
duration as a melody veils the fact that harmonics are also produced temporally and 
have a geometrical and dynamic aspect that is consistent with his theory of duration.  A 
contributory factor in the lack of understanding about Pythagoreanism could be, as 
Huffman remarks, that Pythagoreanism is a subject that been ignored by most scholars 
of ancient history.  Bergson does not explicitly refer to Pythagoreanism as having an 
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influence on him while he does acknowledge Plotinus as his favourite philosopher.  
The argument presented in Chapters 3 and 4, that Plotinus also employs the harmonics 
model under a strong Pythagorean influence,  has not previously been considered by 
Plotinian scholars; however the similarities between the philosophies of Bergson, as 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and the new interpretation of Plotinus suggest that 
Bergson had a much deeper understanding of Plotinus than previously realised; that he 
was aware of the harmonics model in the Enneads, and that Plotinus acted as a catalyst 
for an additional Pythagorean influence on him.  This builds upon the work of Mossé-
Bastide who has already examined the similarities in their philosophies. 
The nature of secrecy and concealment presents scholars of Bergson and Plotinus 
with difficult challenges because there is much more buried within the texts than they 
state explicitly.  The method of study employed has therefore necessitated an 
examination of what they specifically say and speculation on what they do not say; and 
what has emerged is a new interpretation of both philosophers that makes sense of their 
philosophies and reinforces the influence of Plotinus on Bergson.  
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[p.11] If a document of great historical-philosophical interest exists within the corpus 
of Bergson’s Lectures, it is the Black Notebook1.  This course was recorded by 
anonymous students, in a notebook with a black cover.  André Ombredane2 was in 
possession of this book for a time and he donated it to Jean Guitton3, who passed it on 
to us.  It is not known when and how Ombredane had come to own it, but the style is 
quite clear, brief, serious and direct, so that there is no doubt that it is attributed to 
Bergson. The writing is not Bergson’s.  It is also not unique.  Many scribes have 
succeeded each other, with each one making approximately ten pages of notes.  We are 
presented with a notebook of the class, on the model imposed by Émile Boutroux at the 
École Normale Supérieure.  One student has the responsibility for taking notes for each 
lecture, and they are all reread by the teacher/professor.  The text can be stored in the 
class library where it can be referred to by the students.  However, this is not a lecture 
course that Bergson would have received from Boutroux, because he quotes a work of 
Évellin that was published in 1881, after Bergson had left the École normale.  
Moreover, it is neither the style nor the general philosophy of Boutroux. The main 
influence exerted here is that of Zeller4, who [p.12] Boutroux had translated at the time 
when Bergson was a pupil of the latter at the École Normale.  
As regards the form, in the Black Notebook we find the manner of Professor 
Bergson's inner rhythm, his mode of explanation.  As for its substance, firstly we find 
many of his familiar references.  For example, Bergson made reference to Évellin’s 
Infinity and Quantity, 1881, which he quoted in Time and Free Will5.  His course on 
Socrates draws heavily upon that of Boutroux on the same subject, as do his strong 
references to Zeller6.  Furthermore, we find the core interests, the problems and 
theories of Bergson's Essai.   The Ionians are presented as physicists and most of the 
Presocratics are studied from the standpoint of the philosophy of science.  The Eleatics 
are the subject of special attention (two lessons).  Zeno's arguments are detailed and 
examined with the greatest care. 
In the Black Notebook at the end of the lecture on Zeno of Elea is the following: 
“In any event, you should always accept, in the presence of motion, that reality is 
absurd or an illusion” (vol. IV p.179), which is a hollowing, or an inversion, of the 
germinal Bergsonian intuition.   Here we have the main philosophical document on 
which Bergsonism was born, or rather about to be born.  Without being overly 
romantic, it is possible to imagine Bergson walking in the main square of Clermont, 
turning this amazing formula over in his mind, until the intuition of duration emerges, 
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the formula of which was only indicated by the presence of the paradox7.  It also 
demonstrates the date of the course, the oldest that we have of Bergson.   But let us 
return to the subject of its date. 
Henri Gouhier once said to me: While it is obviously after 1881, the date of 
Évellin’s book, this course is no less obviously prior to 1896, the date of the publication 
of Matter and Memory.  In fact you will notice that in the Black Notebook, Bergson 
explicitly rejects the fourth argument of Zeno of Elea, the stadium, and is only 
interested in the first three, since in his eyes only they are worthy of consideration.  
However, in Matter and Memory, p.328 a significant note [p.13] rehabilitates the 
stadium argument and concludes: "The fourth argument is exactly the same as the other 
three."  The notes in the Black Notebook have therefore been taken between 1881 and 
1896. Could we narrow it down? 
Both the level and type of education given in the Black Notebook make it 
unsuitable for pupils in the Baccalauréat class, and for pupils in the second year 
preparatory class for literary studies [at the Écoles Normales Supérieures], for whom it 
would be far too scholarly and meticulous.  Rather, it seems to be intended for 
philosophy students. But additionally, it is difficult to compare it with the 
unconventional style, the brilliance of expression and the masterful authority in the 
course on Plotinus taught at the École Normale.  It therefore could not have been 
delivered there or at the Collège de France. Bergson’s only university teaching that can 
match the characteristics of the Black Notebook was during the years when he was 
teaching at the University of Clermont, between February 1884 and June 1888. We can 
therefore date the Black Notebook to that period. 
Let us reconsider the list of courses for which Bergson was responsible over 
several years at this university8.  Bergson, among others, was responsible for a 
comprehensive education in the history of Greek philosophy.  The Black Notebook is 
probably the first of the courses; the final one is lost, or currently misplaced. Since he 
chose to teach Greek philosophy in chronological order, can we say that common sense 
tells us that the Black Notebook relates Bergson’s first ever academic teaching at 
Clermont?  In our opinion, the reading makes it extremely likely.  We conclude that the 
Black Notebook dates from 1884 or 1885 at the latest. 
It contains the first third of a course Bergson devoted to the history of Greek 
philosophy from Thales to Plato. The book is full.  The presentation of Plato begins in 
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the last few pages and had to continue in another book, because there is no trace of any 
conclusion whatsoever in the last page of the book. 
There are therefore four texts and courses presented in this fourth and final 
volume. 
These courses are edited with the accompaniment of notes, the addition of which 
obeys the following rules:  1. To indicate when necessary, or suggest, parallels within 
the Course or to locations in Bergson’s works.  2. To clarify the main references and 
identify the main quotations, especially when it may support better reading, without 
breaking it up more than is reasonable.  3. Indicate places where the Course permits, or 
where we are required, to clarify the interpretation of the works.  4. Not to smother 
Bergson’s text in an extravagance or a wealth of Hellenistic scholarship, claiming to 
clarify it, which would risk distorting Bergson’s undertaking.  Bergson remains a bold 
and creative thinker [p.14] for whom knowledge of opinions and doctrines is never a 
means towards the knowledge of things. 
This volume, like the previous three, is content with providing texts to feed 
reflection on philosophers and hopes to contribute to the revival of Bergson studies. 
The Introduction is not the place to present the conclusions for which we have 
grounds, particularly concerning the origin and the deep logical sequencing of the 
various works published by Bergson.  Let's just say that he draws extensively upon the 
Stoics; that with Plotinus he leaves aside everything Platonic (in the sense he intends, 
that is to say, the theory of ideas and the interpretation given to it) and brings a Jewish 
or Christian influence to his thinking of the One.  The universe is a sympathetic whole 
and a double process of materialization/spiritualisation, as we see in Matter and 
Memory.  It is also a process of pluralisation. But Bergson reverses the Plotinian 
system.  Pluralisation goes in the direction of spiritualisation. The future is not a 
deprivation of the Absolute but a glory for God.  Above all, the system of necessity 
must leave scope for the narrative of a universal history where the free personality is 
the unsurpassable term of all change, and which expresses itself as an act of divine 
freedom: hence, Creative Evolution.  But from the outset ecstasy is always seen as a 
summit to discover, hence The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. 
If it does not present in detail the image of the history of Greek philosophy that 
emerges from Bergson’s courses, it cannot avoid saying a word about it, brief and to 
the point.  Bergson is primarily interested in the Ionians, and Heraclitus, as physicists. 
He opposed the Eleatics from the outset.  He appreciates Socrates as a mystic and that 
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he was concerned with moral existence.  He retains very little of Plato and bypasses the 
philosophy of Ideas; also Zenoism.  He appreciates Aristotle, whose realism and 
intuitions are an approximation of his own thought.  He returns however to the Ionians, 
via the Stoics, but goes further than Plotinus. He is Plotinian a little like Marx was 
Hegelian.  Bergson seems to have thought that the system of Plotinus was upside down, 
and he was putting it back on his feet.  The fall of the soul becomes the ascendancy of 
the soul.  Action is not a diminution but a fulfilment in which even ecstasy has to 
develop so that mysticism is complete. The ineffable One is also as personal as 
possible.  The point of view of the culture of the free personality undoubtedly takes it 
on to that of reabsorption within the whole9.  The general spirit is unmistakably mystic, 
but a mysticism that he would like to make as positive as possible.   
These courses of Bergson help us to know his specific thinking on a large number 
of subjects, on the condition that a precise [p.15] method of appropriate interpretation 
has been developed.  The principle of such a method lies initially in the precise 
comprehension of the conceptions/ impressions Bergson had from studying the 
philosophical doctrines. 
Take a doctrine studied (e.g., that of Plotinus, the Stoics, etc.). Bergson always 
presented it as a doctrine in itself, impersonal and scientific in the broad sense, that is to 
say, based on experience that is theoretically renewable and the arguments critically 
analysable10.  This is not an object of history, in the sense that it would be a lifeless 
object: it is a thought that is always possible, always possibly living, provided that one 
can revive it11; and considered as always possibly true of a rational truth.  Bergson’s 
outlines are mostly "objective", but when he takes the point of view of the author 
studied (e.g., Plotinus), it is not as if it were a question of him coinciding with a process 
of thought which would be constitutive of its object. Bergson is indeed realistic.  
Rather, he thus adopts in his reading the conduct of a friend of the author, who would 
like to coincide with the view and the certainty which the author himself had of certain 
things existing in them, and which the friend would like to be able to see as the author 
himself says to have seen them.  In the end, it may therefore be an agreement and 
understanding of the community view. The interpretation is thus an effort to review 
what has been seen and critically to ensure an effective identity between what was seen 
by the friend and what had been seen by the author. 
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The interpretation of what has is said is only possible with a view of the thing 
about which it is spoken, and the interpretation of ideas cannot be separated from a 
judgment about the truth or falsity of the ideas.  Historical objectivity is thus possible 
only by philosophical judgment, provided that the latter is not the effect of a 
reconstruction a priori12. 
There is often disagreement; the friend (e.g. Bergson) including well what 
appeared to the author (e.g., Plotinus), but also including how and why the author could 
say that he had seen this or that, when he had not seen it accurately.  However, the 
unwritten law of the explanation of the doctrine is that a friend of the author does not 
always express his own judgment, rather disappearing behind the thought of the author.  
And yet, if a presentation is lively, the friend has his judgement but does not allow it to 
penetrate in the same way as when he presents the thought of the author.  As friends of 
Bergson, our problem consists in discovering his thoughts about certain things; finding 
his unspoken judgment wrapped up in the way he explains another author’s words 
about [p.16] certain things in question.  Undoubtedly this is a very general rule of 
hermeneutics, but it is particularly challenging in the case of the study of Bergson.  The 
comprehension of Bergsonian realism requires hermeneutics that is itself realistic. 
Sometimes, when making notes, we engage in exercises of this kind in order to 
illustrate a possible method and make suggestions. 
Such a method naturally presupposes that we have a personal course and it is 
good that Bergson speaks while engaging personally, albeit discreetly, with his 
thinker's authority.  However, such is generally the case. 
It would be surprising if we only wanted to judge the Course of Professor 
Bergson by subsuming these "Bergson’s lectures on philosophy" under the general idea 
of "philosophy lectures" and that of "Bergson’s lectures" under that of "lectures in 
general".  These are only general ideas, while they are a summary of a set of 
experiences of a collection of individuals whose average level is, by definition, 
average.  But we must judge things on the basis of their most complete copies. 
Having claimed to deduce that a Bergson lecture would necessarily be impersonal 
because a lecture tends to be rather impersonal, and that a teacher would not think 
much because otherwise he would not be teaching, he must be resolved to state a fact, 
always being strong enough to work through what we imagine to be a principle: with 
Bergson we have a thinker who teaches as a thinker teaching, freely sovereign, 
admirable and gushing creativity, armed  with the undivided fullness of his power to 
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see and judge.  The commonplace parts of his lectures are there to heighten the most 
relevant; just as one needs wood to make the strings resonate. The radiance of his 
teaching has no explanation other than the manifestation of his genius.   Bergson 
reminds us that a civil servant who helps a student to acquire a diploma can also be a 
master who helps a disciple to walk towards the truth.  He reminds all teachers of the 
nobility of their profession. Everything one says is forgotten, the dust settles, only the 
sacred fire and Life remain. 
This Volume IV concludes the publication of Bergson’s Lectures, an undertaking 
of 15 years.  My gratitude goes first to Annie Neuberger, niece of the philosopher, his 
worthy successor; then to Jean Guitton and to the memory of Henri Gouhier, two 
unforgettable masters; to Françoise Vinel and Remi Brague, whose collaboration was 
so valuable; to Jean-Louis Dumas, Catherine Brisson, Thibaud Collin, always faithful; 
to Peter Magnard, generous friend; to Jean-Luc Marion, who hosts this prestigious 
work in the "Epimetheus" collection; to Claire. 
 
Notes 
1.    This whole section is a reproduction of that found under the title The Black 
Notebook in the second volume of Henri Hude, Bergson, I, Paris, Editions 
Universitaires, 1990, p.108 sq. 
2.    This philosopher entered the École normale in 1919, in the class of demobilized 
soldiers, André Ombredane died prematurely in 1934. Jean Guitton knew him 
during their schooling at rue d'Ulm. He should not be confused with his distant 
relative, Dr. A. Ombedane, celebrated author of a thesis on aphasia. 
3.    We know that in his will Bergson appointed Jean Guitton and several others, 
including J. Wahl and W. Jankélévitch, to preserve his memory. 
4.    E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 3 t., 
1869-1881, trans. E Boutroux, La philosophie des Grecs, t. 1, 1877; Boutroux 
translated t.2 in 1884.   Bergson uses Zeller as a template and builds his 
bibliographic information on it; that does not mean that he simply repeats Zeller 
and works second-hand.  See notes on le Cours sur Plotin, n08 73, 89, 90, etc.  Our 
references to the work of Zeller are given according to the 7th ed., 1963, reprint, 
for t.1, 6th ed. leipzig, 1919, and for the t.2, the 6th ed. Leipzig, 1922. 
5.    Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, p.76.  Other references in the 
course of metaphysics at Lycée de Clermont-Ferrand, Cours, vol.1, p.336, and 
subsequently in L’évolution créatrice, p.758, in a note. 
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6. See above n.32 and the last in the notes of the Cours sur Plotin, n.76; in the notes 
of The Black Notebook, n.1, 8, 24,79 etc. 
7. La pensée et le mouvant, p.1254 sq. 
8. Melanges, p.332 
9. Henri Hude, Bergson, 11, Paris, Éditions Universitaires, 1990, p.83 
10. What is said here of Bergson does not contradict what he wrote in La pensée et le 
mouvant, p.1431.  See for example, Cahier Noir, vol IV, p.2-3. 
11. La pensée et le mouvant, p.1351 
12. See for example in the Cours sur Plotin, manuscript, p.28, vol.IV, p.28, the critique 
of Kirchner’s book, Die philosophie des Plotin, 1854. 
Henri Hude 
 15th August 2000 
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[p.180] Sources currently available are numerous.  One finds a wealth of alleged 
references in Diogenes, Proclus, Stobaeus.  We even have texts claimed to be written 
by Pythagoras; [p. 181] but there is evidence that the texts are not authentic. 
Furthermore, it has pretty much been shown that there was no disclosure of 
Pythagoreanism before Philolaus the Pythagorean.  It is therefore possible that the 
fragments of Philolaus are genuine, but those attributed to earlier philosophers may be 
regarded as dubious. 
 Intermediary sources are considerable but most unreliable.  During the third and 
second centuries, a kind of Pythagorean legend develops, and at the time of neo-
Pythagoreanism, a host of texts appear that have the effect of Pythagoreanism, but these 
writings only resemble theories of Pythagoras to a small degree.  It is true to say that by 
way of authentic documents, we only have Aristotle's texts, and the most accurate and 
reliable information comes from commentators of Aristotle who merely repeat him.  
We shall therefore refer to him. 
 In summary, the authentic immediate sources are meagre: the pieces of 
information are few, but probably accurate.  As for the later sources, since they only 
repeat Aristotle they have no value.  It is therefore difficult to study the doctrine of each 
particular Pythagorean, so we shall study Pythagoreanism in general. 
  Pythagoras, born in Samos between 584 and 581 BC, came to Italy between 
544 and 542.  He undertook several journeys.  He founded a kind of moral and political 
religious society at Croton, in Magna Graecia.  The tendency of this association was 
aristocratic.  Nevertheless, there he preached to the community about well-being.  An 
initiation was a prerequisite for entering the Society.  Silence was imposed on novices. 
They recognised each other by using mysterious signs.  Perhaps this information is not 
authentic, but it is interesting because it confirms the opinion that we have of 
Pythagoreanism: that this doctrine probably is of foreign oriental origin.  In any event, 
its political character proved fatal.  Pythagoras, driven out of Croton, died in 
Metapontum. 
 Other Pythagoreans lived outside Italy: Philolaus, Lysis, Timaeus of Locri, 
Eurytus, etc. 
 Others lived in Italy: Clinias, Archytas of Tarentum, the latter in about 375. 
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[p.182] 1. Exposition of the System 
 
The principle of Pythagoreanism is clear in Aristotle (Metaphysics, I, 5). 
Mathematical principles are the principles of things, and the elements of numbers are 
the elements of all beings.  Everything is explained.  Before interpreting this principle, 
it is necessary to indicate the reasons which could have lead the Pythagoreans to pose 
it. 
1. According to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans remarkably believed that 
things bore more resemblance to numbers than to fire, earth or water. 
2. Numbers appeared prior to anything else, which probably means that 
things are understandable, intelligible only by means of numbers.  Philolaus says in a 
fragment: "It is number that makes things knowable, nothing is knowable without 
number, and all that is known is number"48.  It is impossible to conceive anything 
without it.  The Pythagoreans are therefore mathematicians who, struck by the 
relationship between things and the constructions of mathematics, imagined that the 
principles of mathematics were the principles of things.  But in what sense have they 
considered numbers as the principles of things? 
What is the nature of number as understood by the Pythagoreans?  Does it exist 
by itself or is it an attribute?  Is number a substance or is it only a quality of things?  A 
text of Aristotle gets us out of an embarrassing situation on this point (Physics, III, 4). 
Aristotle says that, according to the Pythagoreans, the principle of things, infinity, 
exists by itself and not as an attribute.  However, we will see that according to the 
Pythagoreans the infinite is only part of number.  But if number exists by itself, is it 
able to exist separately?  In other words, is the world considered as pure number 
something real or is it a simple abstraction of the mind?  The texts seem to indicate that 
the Pythagoreans considered numbers as bound to sensible things in such a way that it 
cannot be detached by an effort of abstraction.  The number in the thing is [p.183] the 
principle of the thing.  However, discussions have been raised on this point.  In fact, 
Aristotle tells us that, according to the Pythagoreans, things are numbers.  He also tells 
us that the Pythagoreans make number the material cause of things; and on the other 
hand, in a passage of Metaphysics, I.6, Aristotle tells us: “Plato professes participation, 
and in that respect, he only changes the word used by the Pythagoreans.  The 
Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers and Plato only replaces the 
word imitation with the word participation, μίμησις becomes μέθεξις”.  Moreover, the 
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text of Stobaeus (1-302) could confirm Aristotle’s testimony.  “I know, he said, that 
many consider Pythagoras as having said that things arise from number, but in reality, 
Pythagoras did not say that things come from number, but that they are according to 
number, κατ'άριθμόν”.49  It seems difficult to reconcile the opposing texts.  According 
to some critics, and Brandis50 in particular, there would be two opposing tendencies 
among the Pythagoreans.  According to one, number would have been the immanent 
principle of things; and, according to the other, number would be an ideal, of which 
things would be made as an imitation.  But none of Aristotle's texts gives us the right to 
distinguish between these two tendencies.  On the other hand, in Metaphysics, I.5, we 
find a phrase which perhaps allows us to reconcile seemingly contradictory texts: 
"Because the Pythagoreans found a resemblance between numbers and things, they 
accepted that number is the principle of things".  It seems likely that, among the 
Pythagoreans, confusion occurred between simple resemblance and identity.  Such 
confusion now seems strange, because later philosophical doctrines have clearly fixed 
and distinguished both notions.  But it seems unlikely that the Pythagoreans made a 
difference between resemblance and constant conformity, and absolute identity.  
Perceiving that things are subject to precise mathematical relationships that had the 
character of number, they concluded that they were numbers.  It was only several 
centuries later that we came to distinguish between the two conceptions.  Some fixed 
their attention on the reason given by the Pythagoreans: simple resemblance; others on 
the conclusion they drew: identity or immanence.  What it is necessary [p.184] to say, 
is that for the Pythagoreans, as Aristotle clearly said, number is the principle of things 
because things resemble numbers. 
In summary, we will singularly clarify the dominant thought of Pythagoreanism 
if one is transported to the fragment of Philolaus where it says: "If we want to explain 
the harmonious arrangement of things, it is necessary to put harmony inside things.”  
The Pythagoreans, mathematicians above all, perceiving that things are intelligible 
when they are reduced to numbers, conceived the idea of putting number inside things 
like matter, moreover matter that is immanent.  Aristotle’s expression is extremely 
accurate51.  In fact, the Pythagoreans, having not yet distinguished a metaphysical 
principle from a material principle, had not realised that the reality of things and their 
intelligibility are two separate things; perceiving that number is the condition for the 
intelligibility of things, they concluded that number constituted the substance, the 
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matter of things.  Number is a metaphysical principle used as material principle by 
philosophers who did not make the distinction. 
One last question remains to be resolved, concerning the nature of Pythagorean 
number.  This issue is raised in a text of Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII, 6.  It says that the 
Pythagoreans make sensible things consist in numbers.  They therefore consider units, 
says Aristotle, as having magnitude, but, how the first One, the first unit was able to 
acquire magnitude, is a problem for them.  From this text it seems that Pythagorean 
number is something corporeal, material, and this theory was in fact supported by 
several historians.  Number would be regarded by the Pythagoreans as matter from 
where things emerge, as they would emerge from water, air, fire, etc., according to 
other philosophers.  This opinion seems inconsistent with Aristotle’s other, more 
accurate texts, where it is said that number is subject and not an attribute; it is substance 
itself, without the need of any natural quality.  Furthermore, Aristotle called 
Pythagorean number μαθηματικός [mathematical].  Therefore, it is not material.  
Elsewhere Aristotle [p.185] criticizes the Pythagoreans in that it is a contradiction to 
have regarded material bodies as forms of mathematical number.  So, the materialist 
interpretation of German historians Reinhold and Brandis cannot be accepted.  But 
another historian, Retter52, suggested a fine, even though, in our opinion, just as 
inaccurate interpretation.  According to him Pythagorean number, without itself being 
material, would be a geometric entity: the unit would be the point and the numbers 
relationships of magnitudes in space.  Thus, the Pythagoreans would have reduced all 
bodies to their geometric properties and it would be these geometrical properties which 
they would have represented by numbers.  Note that a theory of this kind is hardly 
possible before Democritus. This way, the point would be identified with the atom.  
However, the atom is a direct product of the eclecticism after Pythagoreanism.  In 
reality, the challenge is to explain the text we quoted at the beginning.  But note the 
historical process of Aristotle: his interpretation of his predecessors is based on his 
ideas.  According to him likeness only explains its likeness.  Consequently, extended 
elements are needed to explain extended things.  So, for Aristotle, if the Pythagoreans 
reduced things to numbers it is because they granted extension to numbers.  But the 
Pythagoreans never expressed this opinion, and if Aristotle makes them say it, it seems 
absurd, contradictory, to assume that an extended thing is formed with un-extended 
elements.  The evidence that they have not said it comes from words in the phrase from 
Aristotle: “how the first One, the first unit was able to acquire magnitude, is a problem 
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for them”53.  Indeed, they would have a problem with giving material magnitude to the 
units if they considered number as purely mathematical. 
Knowing the nature of number in general, we ask, how did the Pythagoreans 
apply number to make it the general explanation of things? 
The numbers are divided into even and odd. There is even a third category, odd-
even numbers. 
They identify the odd with the unlimited, infinity, because it puts an end to the 
division by two.  Alternatively, even is considered [p.186] finished, perfect.  Thus, 
even numbers, odd numbers and even-odd numbers, whose nature is very obscure, are 
the various categories of numbers used by them. 
The Opposites. The even and odd constitute two opposing determinations. 
Presumably, the oppositions between the qualities of things are reducible to the 
fundamental opposition of unlimited and limited.  The Pythagoreans compiled a table 
of opposites. They are ten in number: 
1. Limited and Unlimited 
2. Odd and Even 
3. Unity and Multiplicity 
4. Right and Left 
5. Masculine and Feminine 
6. Rest and Movement 
7. Straight and Curved 
8. Light and Darkness 
9. Good and Bad 
10. Square and Rectangle 
 
Harmony.  The elements of things, that are different in nature, must be linked to 
bring together opposite determinations in each object.  This is what harmony consists 
of.  Within all things, there are oppositions first, then a harmony that unites them all. 
This results from the fact that everything is reduced to a number.  But every number is 
composed of even and odd, and yet any number is one.  In other words, the 
Pythagoreans noticed that number is one and multiple at the same time.  It therefore 
combines opposites and substance so to speak, and since everything is number, it must 
be admitted that the opposite qualities that we find in any object, right and left, straight 
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and curved, etc., are reduced to the numerical oppositions of even and odd, which 
makes the unity of an object; it is the same cause that makes the unity of number. 
This theory of opposition and harmony is quite obscure.  So, it is not surprising 
that various interpretations have been [p.187] proposed in antiquity, and which for the 
most part inspired ideas after Pythagoreanism. 
The principal of these pantheistic explanations is to be found in antiquity.  
According to the Neo-Pythagoreans and the Neo-Platonists, Pythagoras would have 
identified the One with Divinity.  From this original unity two principles would 
emerge: the One and the indefinite duality.  Everything good must be attributed to the 
first of these two principles, and everything evil to the second.  And it is these two 
principles, diversifying and taking on different forms, which have given rise to the 
contrary qualities we find listed in the table of opposites.  We recognise here, in a 
slightly modified form the doctrine of the Neo-Platonists and Alexandrians.  They 
assumed the emergence from unity and superior origin of thought and even existence; 
multiplicity by a sort of procession.  But this opposition of unity and the dyad, and 
especially the progress of being, come from ideas that date back to the later time of 
Greek philosophy.  We said that Aristotle's texts are the only ones that deserve any 
confidence when it comes to the essential points of Pythagoreanism; however, all other 
texts which we could use for such an interpretation are much later.  It is not until the 
first century that a similar theory is found in Alexander Polyhistor, the historian.  It is 
certain that the Pythagoreans recognised multiple gods, while following to a certain 
extent the direction of monotheism, which was so important in philosophy starting from 
Xenophanes.  We therefore reject it as being like a neo-Platonic theory, the idea of the 
development of God in the world, of a division, an emanation of the original unity 
giving birth to the oppositions of the one and the many. This is a pantheistic theory 
which the Pythagoreans probably never considered.54 
To apply numbers to things, they almost always resorted to superficial 
analogies.  Aristotle says that if the Pythagoreans encountered some analogy between 
numbers and celestial phenomena, they expressed this by it, and if there were gaps 
between things, they filled them with some elements. 
For example, they concluded that since the decad was the perfect number, there 
are ten planets, but as we saw only nine, they [p.188] invented the antichthon or 
counter-earth to complete the number.  One finds a considerable number of 
symbolisations of the same kind.  So, Justice which consists of making like for like is 
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identical to the square, and as the square is identical to 4, they represented justice by 4.  
The occasion is the number 7 because the moon changes phase every seven days, 
because some diseases include seven periods, etc.  Marriage was represented by the 
number 5, the sum of the first male number 3 and first female number 2.  However, it 
should not be assumed that these connections are always made without method. 
Pythagoreanism gradually progressed systematically: music, geometry, physics and 
natural history. 
Arithmetic.  Pythagorean arithmetic was dominated by the importance attributed 
to the decad.  The Pythagoreans are said to have invented the system of decimal 
numeration.  The invention of the so-called Arabic numerals must probably be 
attributed to them.  The number 4 was also of great importance in the system because it 
is the first square and because the sum of the first four digits is 10. The numbers 3, 4, 5 
were also favoured, because the sum of the squares of the first two is equal to the 
square of the third. 
Music.  The Pythagoreans made great strides into the theoretical study of 
music55.  They determined the relationships which exist between the pitch of a sound 
and the length of the vibrating string.  For the fourth they found the ratio 3/4, 2/3 for 
the fifth, and 1/2 for the octave. 
Geometry.  They had the idea that would later return with Descartes, to 
represent figures with arithmetical symbols.  Descartes had to make use of them for 
creating a line for the law of motion.  This lead to analytical geometry, in which they 
limited themselves to artificial integrations [links].56 
Physics.  According to Philolaus, the Pythagoreans acknowledged five 
primordial bodies: earth, fire, air, water, and a fifth of which it is difficult to determine 
the exact nature. 
Cosmogony.  Pythagoras believed in a beginning of the world.  Initially fire 
forms at the heart of the universe.  This central fire draws [p.189] portions of the 
infinite and this attraction gives form to the indefinite.  So, the world was formed as a 
sphere, having fire in the centre and rotating from west to east around the fire.  There 
are ten celestial bodies.  According to the first Pythagoreans, the earth is spherical, but 
it does not revolve around the sun.  However, little by little, the Pythagoreans admire 
not only a movement of the earth around the sun, but also a movement of rotation on 
itself.  Harmony is the result of these revolutions around the central fire.  Indeed, these 
bodies move quickly, and all motion gives a sound whose pitch is in a certain 
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relationship with the speed of the mobile.  Thus, each of the celestial bodies, while 
rotating, produces a special note, and all the notes together produce a harmony.  It is 
habit that prevents us from hearing the music. 
Moral Ideas.  This moral doctrine, as Zeller has shown, is not one with the 
philosophical doctrine of the Pythagoreans.  Pythagoras is above all commonly known 
for his doctrine of metempsychosis.  But this is precisely what does not belong to him; 
he borrowed it from the East.  Thus, the soul would be in the body as in a prison, and 
the day that it separates, it may enjoy an immaterial life if it is made worthy.  The duty 
of man on earth is to purify himself morally.  It happens by controlling his conduct, 
above all by fighting caprice.  Pythagoras recommended respect for parents and the 
law, loyalty, friendship, respect for old age, and especially of proportion and 
moderation.  It is also pretty well established that within Pythagoreanism moral 
qualities and virtues were represented by numbers.  It is difficult to know what 
consequences were drawn from this symbolisation. 
What should we take from Pythagoreanism?  What is obvious, is the 
indisputable, undeniable fecundity within the mathematical abstractions - and 
convinced, the Pythagoreans acknowledged it - contending that everything is number 
and that nothing is knowable other than by number.  Any specialist has experienced a 
similar tendency, a tendency to explain all things by the science he knows best.  This is 
the starting point, the reason for this idea.  It is indisputable that this idea has given the 
Pythagoreans [p.190] superiority over the Ionians.  They understood that, when it 
comes to science, the main question to ask of scientific explanation is; will the 
explanation be convenient for the mind?  Without making the distinction between the 
subjective and the objective, they glimpsed that the object, the absolute such as it is in 
itself, is not probably an object of science57, and that the mind should simply choose, 
between all the possible conceptions of things, the one that lends itself to calculation 
and best satisfies our needs.  So, the idea of explaining things with an intelligible 
element represents real and significant progress.  On this point, we can put the 
Pythagoreans and the Eleatics on the same plane.  But the Pythagoreans are superior to 
the Eleatics; not only because they understood that we must firstly be concerned about 
intelligible explanation, but they foresaw what was to become classic of our times, that 
the most intelligible scientific explanation is a mathematical explanation. 
It is Descartes who gave this idea its legitimate place in science, but the 
Pythagoreans were the first to have glimpsed it.  They realized that to explain things, is 
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above all to represent them with symbols and that the object of science is to substitute a 
mathematical symbol for the object.  This idea is enough to make the Pythagoreans 
unparalleled.  They are, perhaps with the atomists, those who best understood science. 
(Aristotle is far from having understood ideal science with this precision.) 
But they did not understand that the application of the mathematical symbol for 
things had to be made, not because of a superficial analogy, but after conscious 
observation.  It is firstly the perfecting of the methods of investigation, physical 
appearance, then the analysis of the phenomena of heat.  Therefore science, as the 
moderns see it, includes two processes, two approaches: 
1.   The study of mathematics and the progressive development of the science. 
2.   The systematic and reasoned application of mathematics to physical things, 
following observation, experiment and all kinds of assumptions. 
[p.191] The Pythagoreans had excellently grasped the principles of these two 
operations.  Regarding the first, they not only grasped the principles, but they drew 
conclusions which made them the most skilful mathematicians of antiquity.  But they 
were misguided in the second.  They believed that between nature and the mind there 
was an agreement such that one could, by virtue of superficial analogies, choose a 
number and substitute it for the object.  It is for this side of their doctrine that they are 
often ridiculed.  But we must not forget that the basic idea of the Pythagoreans was 
taken on by Descartes and dominates the whole of modern science. 
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51.  This passage is interesting, like other analogues, where Bergson uses the word 
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gives on the authors “precise information”, p. 3: "the motive for the doctrine of 
Parmenides is indicated with precision," p.23; here "extreme precision of Aristotle 
on the Pythagoreans " other texts of Aristotle are "more precise", p.23, 40, 44, etc. 
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and clarify the important text The Perception of Change, p.1253. 
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[p.5] First we present a course on Plotinus, the manuscript of which is preserved 
in the Victor Cousin library at the Sorbonne. 
The authenticity of this course is not in doubt. We find evidence: 
1. In the chosen subjects and direction of research.  It is without fear of 
retrospective illusion that one detects the author of Matter and Memory in its reading, 
the theory of logoi faithful and sympathetic, but staggered and full of unexpressed 
reinterpretation.  Bergson applies his intellectual effort to the question of Plotinus’ 
World Soul and its relation to individual souls.  The question that arises at the outset is: 
"What does it mean to be alive?”1 
 
[p.6] Bergson emphasizes the individuality of Plotinus’ Ideas and logoi, and he finished 
his course with a lecture on consciousness in Plotinus. 
2. In the characterization of Plotinus’ method:  "His metaphysical method 
is deep introspection, which is to go beyond the ideas by appealing to a deep sympathy 
between our soul and the whole of reality.  (…) His method is psychological.  And 
therefore, it is natural that his attention had been drawn, more than that of Aristotle, to 
psychology, the life of the soul.2 
3. The style itself: a) images/concepts and their treatment (the cone3, the 
diffracted rays4, distention5, etc.).  b) a number of words, expressions and ideas that are 
quite characteristic, such as, for example, “The more the logos works the more it 
divides itself.  It deposits more and more forms which it maintained united within it, 
etc.”6; or when he speaks of Plotinus who proceeds “not by juxtaposition, but digging 
so deeply beneath the ideas he brought forth the source from which these ideas had 
sprung.”7 Or again, the passage on the method cited above; and one could extend such a 
list. 
These three kinds of internal evidence develop the overall impression of being 
in the presence of the man and of feeling the lead of the master.  Prof. Pierre Magnard 
said it perfectly in 1989 during a conference devoted this course of Bergson at the 
Congress of Clermont.7 
 
From the nature of the subject, which is neither from the program of the 
baccalaureate class nor from preparation to compete for the ENS, and by its scientific 
level (both of erudition and of speculation), it can only be a course of higher education.  
It cannot have been given at the Faculty of Clermont-Ferrand, where Bergson was 
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responsible for teaching classes between 1885 and 1888.  Firstly, no course on this 
subject is listed in the programs published by the Academy of Clermont (and 
reproduced in the volume of Mélanges);8 and secondly, the style and authority of the 
master, the writing and casualness of the listener, excludes it from being the work of a 
novice teacher addressing novices.   The course [p.7] in question could therefore have 
been given at the École Normale Supérieure, where Bergson was a senior lecturer from 
February 1898 to November 1900, or at the Collège de France, where he was elected 
(Chair of Greek and Latin philosophy) in April 1900; but the course would not have 
been given at the Collège de France, because of its very general character.  For 
comparison, in 1901-1902, Bergson lectured on the ninth book of Ennead VI at the 
Collège.9   The lectures on Plotinus must therefore have been given at the École 
Normale, and probably over a whole school year, which leads to a credible date 
between 1898 and 1899.  
For confirmation, a clear reference to the latin thesis of Couturat on Platonic 
myths, dating from 1896, can be noted on p.55 manuscript of this course.  The course is 
after the publication of Matter and Memory10 and contemporaneous with the 
preparation for Creative Evolution.11   It provides a magnificent testimony and an 
irreplaceable document both on the genesis of Creative Evolution, and as the so 
delicate suture between Evolution and Matter and Memory. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. This is the subject of Ennead I, 1, but Bergson declared the order adopted by 
Porphyry to be arbitrary and that it does not follow the development of Plotinus’ 
thought. 
2. Manuscript, p.44, Vol. IV, p.34 
3. Manuscript, p.36, Vol. IV, p.31 
4. See below, p. 9-11 (Introduction: Authenticity of the Lectures at Clermont) 
5. Manuscript, p.43, Vol. IV, p.34 
 
6. Manuscript, p.35, Vol. IV, p.31 
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7. Pierre Magnard, ‘Bergson Interpreting Plotinus’, in Bergson. Birth of a Philosophy. 
Proceedings from the Symposium at Clermont-Ferrand, 17th and 18th November 
1989, Paris, PUF, p.111-119.  At this conference Pierre Magnard gave a legitimate 
place to Bergson’s lectures. 
8. Henri Bergson, Mélanges. The idea of Place in Aristotle; Duration and 
Simultaneity; Correspondences; diverse pieces, Documents, text published and 
annotated by André Robinet with the co-operation of Marie-Rose Mossé-Bastide, 
Martine Robinet and Michel Goutier.  Forward by Henri Gouhier, Paris, PUF, 1972, 
documents reproduced p.332, 342 and 343. 
9. Document reproduced in Mélanges, p. 512. This treatise VI, 9 is entitled ‘On the 
Good or The One’ 
10. 1896. 
11. 1906. 
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Lectures on Plotinus 
<1> The Life of Plotinus 
 
[p.17] Plotinus was a Greek uniquely inspired by the Greeks1.  It is important to 
establish if the study of his life confirms this impression from reading his work. 
The primary source of information is Porphyry’s The Life of Plotinus2; however 
there is some very concise information from Eunapius3 in his Vitae sophistarum (Life 
of the Sophists) (Ed. Boissonnade, 1824), and a few words in Eudoxus4.  The 
information provided by Porphyry must be accepted barring exaggeration in 
expression, because at that time Plotinus was greatly admired and fascinated his 
followers. 
The name Plotinus is Latin: he came from a Roman family of Egyptian origin.  
He was born in 209 AD.  Disdainful of material life, he would not talk about his birth, 
or of his family or country, nor would he allow a portrait.  Eunapius tells us <2> that he 
was born in Lyco, and the other two refer to him as Lycopolitan; however, this does not 
determine whether they are referring to Lycopolis, Thessaly.  The detail is not 
important.  
[p.18] He came to study in Alexandria at the age of twenty-eight and devoted 
himself exclusively to philosophy.  He was not happy with the schools he attended until 
he was presented to Ammonius Saccas who he followed with enthusiasm.  What were 
these schools? 
Towards the middle of the third century Alexandria had long been the seat of a 
great scientific movement.  It was a place where the exact sciences, and predominately 
the human sciences, were cultivated.  It was home to a number of commentators, not 
least on Plato and Aristotle.  In addition, throughout the Roman period, philosophers 
were represented in almost all ancient Greek schools.  It was a time of learning and 
eclecticism.  They taught the same doctrines of Heraclitus and Pythagoras, and the field 
supported the emergence of a system that would bring together all the ideas of the 
teachers of Greek philosophy5. 
<3>  It is certain that this purely Greek education had a decisive influence on 
Plotinus.  But we must also mention other sources of influence. 
Firstly, Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy represented by Philo.  Had he read Philo? 
It cannot be proven; however, he knew one of his disciples, the neo-Pythagorean 
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Numenius.  Porphyry protests against those who claim that Plotinus had stolen ideas 
from Numenius, proving that he was influenced by him.  Plotinus could have known 
Philo through this intermediary. 
Philo combined Platonism and Judaism, and we can establish some similarities 
between Philo and Plotinus.  Philo spoke of a God above science, κρεῖττον τῆς 
ἐπιοτήμης and he immediately set the world of ideas below it, which he locked, it is 
true, in a logos.  The question is whether these ideas have the same meaning.  Perhaps 
the resemblance <4> is purely external.  Perhaps it is only for his suggestions that 
Plotinus is beholden to him.  Finally, Plotinus has nothing in common with Philo that 
cannot be found in Plato. 
Additionally, we must consider an important doctrine of Syria, gnosis, a mixture 
of Christian doctrine, Eastern mythology and Greek speculation, which proposed a 
theory of successive emanations of the Godhead, which was considered a heresy in 
Christianity.  Section 9 of Ennead II is a refutation of the Gnostics, and a refutation 
leaving nothing in common with them. 
[p.19] There remains the Christian doctrine of Clement and Origen, but there is 
little trace of it in Plotinus.  Presumably, like Gnosticism he knew about Christianity. 
Therefore, Plotinus probably commenced his studies with Greek philosophy and 
religious philosophy, i.e. Judeo-Alexandrian and Gnostic.  Porphyry tells us that 
Plotinus countered all of them.  Only Ammonius held his interest, so who was he? 
<5>  We know little about him.  Plotinus does not mention him once.  Ammonius 
wrote nothing.  We only have two witnesses to his doctrine. 
l. - That of Nemesius6, a Greek Christian bishop of the fifth century (περὶ φὑσεως 
ἀνθρὡπου), who cites two passages that refer to the views of Ammonius. 
2. - That of Hierocles, a fifth century Neoplatonist who referred to Ammonius in 
a fragment of his Treatise on Providence7. 
What Nemesius has preserved for us is the "developments" of Ammonius on 
immortality and the relationship of the soul to the body. 
Firstly, he taught that the soul is essential to the body because the body is subject 
to a thousand vicissitudes, made of multiple dissolvable elements and which needs a 
principle that retains that which is constant, συνέχον τι (p.29).  It is Aristotle’s 
expression; there is nothing new. 
Secondly (p. 56) it is said that the soul enters νοῦς when it ceases to reason, 
λογίζεσθαι, on passing into intuition.  He adds that it is united with the body as the 
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sunlight is united with air.  It is not the soul which is in the body, but the body is in the 
soul.  These are theories that we find unchanged in Plotinus, not only in substance but 
in form.  We must therefore accept that Plotinus not only borrowed ideas of primary 
importance from him, but also the same phrases that Ammonius used, and without 
quoting him, he who so loves to quote.  But this treatise was written two centuries after 
Ammonius who wrote nothing.  Nemesius notes his words as if he were an immediate 
disciple of Ammonius, but he could not have known Ammonius’ ideas with precision.  
This would necessarily require a written account of the ideas of this philosopher at that 
time.  However, one can be certain that there never was one.  Had there been [p.20] a 
statement like that, containing the basic ideas of the Alexandrian, it would have been so 
important, cited by Plotinus and some of the philosophers of Alexandria.  However, this 
is not so.  Porphyry only named him explicitly in the Life of Plotinus8 once in passing, 
and neither Iamblichus nor Proclus mentioned him.  We cannot accept the existence of 
such a statement, but we can go further. 
There are positive reasons to believe that Ammonius never professed any ideas 
that play an important role in Plotinus.  Plotinus was not the only pupil of Ammonius. 
Longinus was as well.  If Plotinus had accepted at face value the important ideas of 
Ammonius, a mediocre thinker such as Longinus would have noted it.  Yet in a letter 
from Longinus to Porphyry, he said that despite his admiration for Plotinus, he did not 
accept his theories (Life of Plotinus, §19).  And at §21, Longinus says that Plotinus has 
his own way of philosophising9.  
The truth seems to be that Nemesius text presents no guarantee.  The opinions 
and expressions attributed to Ammonius were taken by Plotinus or by any Alexandrian 
having quoted Plotinus.  When a tradition had been made of Ammonius the founder of 
the School, and because he was followed by Plotinus, it was natural for those who 
passed for his disciples to pick up on Ammonius’ ideas. 
Secondly, Hierocles’ text has been preserved by Photius, Patriarch of 
Constantinople in the ninth century (ed. Bekker, p. 171 and 460, Hierocles’ Treatise on 
Providence).  The nature of this testimony is vaguer and less suspect.  Ammonius 
brought the principle that serves as a rule, that the truth about the nature of things is 
entirely contained in the purified doctrine of Plato, έν τῇ  Πλάτωνoς,  which is a view 
commonly shared by Plotinus, Origen, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Plutarch.  To him, the 
Platonists and Aristotelians exaggerated the differences between the two systems, and 
these discussions continued up to Ammonius the Theodidact. 
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It seems that in the eyes of the tradition Ammonius was the great conciliator of 
the systems of Plato and Aristotle.  As for the purification spoken of here, we do not 
know what to say.  If Ammonius [p.21] demonstrated the concordance of the two 
philosophers, it was probably in some way, an interpretation of Plato.  Note that we 
find this fusion internally in Plotinus, though externally the similarity with Aristotle is 
much more striking than with Plato10.  Kirchner has said that Plotinus is a neo-
Aristotelian, not a Neoplatonist.  It is an exaggeration and a mistake.  But we must 
remember that there is a fusion of the two philosophers with him.  So, he would only 
have borrowed it from his master; the method would have been one of fusion, the idea 
that Aristotle and Plato were basically in agreement, in a word, faith in a philosophy 
that is always basically the same, taught initially by the first philosophers, then 
consciously by Plato, then, a little distorted by Aristotle.  This interpretation is 
confirmed by the single testimony of Porphyry: “In his examinations Plotinus brought 
the mind of Ammonius to bear on the investigations in hand” (Life of Plotinus S 14), 
and after having said that: “His writings are full of concealed Stoic and Peripatetic 
doctrines.  Aristotle’s Metaphysics in particular is concentrated in them.” 
 We have no reason to attribute the great ideas of Plotinus’ philosophy to 
Ammonius.  It seems difficult to see him as the creator of Alexandrian philosophy.  The 
truth seems to have been that this school formed the thought of Plotinus. 
 For ten years, he contented himself with orally teaching the pure and simple 
teaching of Ammonius.  Was this doctrine a more intimate relationship with a method 
outside of the Enneads?  The silence of Plotinus, Porphyry and others reminds us that 
Plotinus was the creator of the doctrine in its general theses.  What he was able to take 
from elsewhere, is material that has worked.  His originality is of having made a great 
effort of inner concentration which could only be borrowed from elsewhere. 
 He was thirty-nine years old when he followed the Emperor Gordian against the 
Persians, to study philosophy in Persia and India.  He and Gordian were only able to 
make it, and not without difficulty, to Antioch11.  The question arises as to how he 
could know the philosophies of the East, which some say he would have borrowed.  
The East can be understood as Persia or India, or finally Egypt. [p.22] However, in 
terms of India, there is no reference made in the Enneads and there is no reason to 
believe that he knew anything of these doctrines.  As for Persia, he had the curiosity to 
go, but he did not succeed, and we have no reason to suppose that even in Alexandria 
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he became acquainted with Persian philosophy.  Now, we find no trace of emanation in 
him; he even disputes this Gnostic theory. 
 There remained Egypt.  There is no evidence that he has deepened the 
monuments of Egyptian wisdom.  Egypt comes up once, in Ennead, V.8.6: in this text, 
he refers to the Egyptian and symbolic hieroglyphic characters.  He merely said that the 
Egyptians found a way to represent things instead of only designating sounds.  This 
reference has no philosophical character except a word on which it is necessary to 
return. 
 Eastern influence on Plotinus will therefore only be accepted if we discern in 
him something that is explained neither by Greek philosophy nor from Plotinus’ roots. 
< 13 > There is a text on Egypt in V.8.6: 
“The sages of Egyptians either receiving an exact science, or through some innate 
instinct, about the things they wanted to communicate, seem wise not to have been 
content with borrowing letters which trace words and their order, nor which mimic the 
sounds and utterances of opinions; but having drawn images and having each one 
engraved in pictures in their temples, and they showed the composition of each of these 
images, in such a way that each image is also a science and a wisdom, and a wisdom 
that is found underlying this inscription which is picked up, being neither a science nor 
discursive reflection.” 
These are purely ideographic hieroglyphs.  Plotinus said that there is a profound 
<14> way of speaking, of indicating ideas.  It was intuition, not thinking: the wisdom in 
words was picked up immediately.  But it is not a question of Egyptian beliefs, solely 
their symbolism.  It therefore seems unlikely that Plotinus was influenced by them. 
[p.23] Thus, for him, there is no trace of any influence other than Greek.  If studying 
his philosophy leads us to believe that everything about him is explained by earlier 
Greek philosophy, or by his own genius, we can say that he is purely a Greek 
philosopher.  At most he has suffered from an ambient impact in his style which is a bit 
relaxed and rambling. 
 Upon his return from Asia he settled in Rome for forty years.  He opened a 
school and its teaching had considerable success.  It would have been interesting to stop 
at this time to study the environment in which his philosophy fully developed, to see 
the enthusiasm it aroused, and the influence it had, especially on women, such as the 
two Geminas mentioned by Porphyry.  According to Porphyry, the emperor Galen and 
his wife Salonina admired him so much that they planned to turn for him a ruined city 
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in Campania into “Platonopolis” which would be governed according to the Laws of 
Plato.  According to Porphyry it did not happen because of the jealousy of the courtiers. 
Hegel (History of Philosophy, IIIrd Century) considered it to be contrary to common 
sense12.  
 The influence of Plotinus was considerable.  Porphyry cites several anecdotes. 
Rogalianus, a senator who attended his lectures, relinquished so many things in life; he 
renounced his property, his servants and dignities, and ate only every other day - this 
cured his gout. 
 Two characters stand out in from Plotinus’ entourage <16>: Amelius and 
Porphyry. 
Amelius13 came from Etruria.  He wanted to be called Amerius (a pun on the 
name Αμερία, which evokes the meaning of indivisible divine nature, while the name 
Amelius means negligence, ἀμέλεια).  He came to Rome in 246, became attached to 
Plotinus and was close to him for twenty-three years.  At the instigation of Plotinus, he 
wrote forty books against the Gnostic Zostrien.  He also defended Plotinus against 
those who claimed that he had appropriated the ideas of the neo-Pythagorean Numenius 
(evidence that Plotinus knew Numenius, and through him, Philo).  Amelius seemed to 
have had a mediocre mind and was an applied and passive disciple. 
Porphyry is a philosopher.  In his biography of Plotinus, he provides details about 
himself.  He claims himself to be Tyrian. St. Jerome refers to him as a native of 
Balanea, Syria, but his own testimony is preferable.  He calls [p.24] himself called 
Malchus, which means ‘the king’ in Syrian.  It was Amelius <77> who translated this 
word for Porphyry.  He came to Rome around 254 and became attached to Plotinus; 
however, no one seems to have understood him as well.  He lived with him for six 
years.  Among other things to come before us, is a small treatise, ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ 
νοτἁ, consisting of a collection of comments on some passages from the Enneads.  In it, 
we find a brief summary of Plotinus’ key points, which is of an extraordinary 
penetration.  Porphyry had a somewhat original mind but was capable of deeply 
entering into the thoughts of others. 
 In his school14 they read the works of the Platonists and Peripatetics.  After this 
reading and a short meditation, Plotinus expounded his thoughts.  There was much 
discussion, and Plotinus spoke eloquently without correction.  It is undoubtedly from 
these discussions on a wide variety of subjects that Plotinus’ doctrine gradually 
emerged.  For ten years he did nothing but develop Ammonius’ ideas <18>, most likely 
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commenting on Plato and Aristotle and combining them.  He only began to write at the 
age of fifty, and he wrote as he spoke, beginning with questions.  According to 
Porphyry, he wrote fifty-four treatises and passed on to us everything he experienced15. 
  Plotinus not only inspired admiration, but he appeared to his circle to be a 
supernatural being, most likely because he applied the same insight to practical matters 
as he did in his writing16.  Porphyry thought about suicide, and on realising, Plotinus 
and ordered him to make a journey that healed him.  Porphyry even attributed him with 
the power to break magic spells.  An Egyptian priest propositioned him to evoke a 
demon, and it was a god who appeared, because it was indeed a god who accompanied 
him.  On being invited to attend a sacrifice, he said: “It is for the gods to come to me.”17 
There is no doubt <19> that Plotinus felt he was in contact with the divine.  He 
experienced ecstasy, and during the six years that Porphyry was with him, Plotinus 
experienced it four times. 
 Plotinus' last words were: “I am trying hard to bring together what is divine in 
me and what is divine in the universe.”18 
<20> 
 
[p.25] II.  The Work and Bibliography of Plotinus 
<21>  
(i) Plotinus’ Work  – The Enneads 
 
Porphyry tells us that Plotinus began to write after lengthy meditation and wrote 
without stopping or re-reading.  His style has the master qualities of a great writer.  
Porphyry and Longinus have honoured him. In §14 of his Life of Plotinus Porphyry 
states that: “His style was quick, full of ideas, concise and more abundant in thoughts 
than words, often speaking with passion and inspiration”.  Longinus, at the end of §19 
in the same work says that: “I extremely admire and love his writing style, for the 
multitude eager for the thoughts of this man and for the philosophical nature of his 
enquiries, and I think that researchers have to place his books among the most 
remarkable.”  That's All.  But the detail is overlooked.  The syntax is completely 
incorrect.  The development lacks continuity.  There are <22> tangled phrases.  It is a 
style that notes perceptions.  In the Lives of Sophists, p.9, Eunapius19, says that Plotinus 
is remarkable for the enigmatic character of his speeches, which are laborious and 
difficult. 
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This explains the difficulties of the text.  Porphyry was its editor, at least 
principally.  Eustochius, Plotinus’ doctor made a compilation of his writings in a 
slightly different order.  Some of Plotinus’ manuscripts, in which the material is 
presented differently, are attributed to Eustochius.  The tradition was therefore 
preserved.  We only have the edition of Porphyry. 
According to him, Plotinus left fifty-four treaties which are provided in the 
chronological order in which it was written.  Instead of maintaining it, he followed the 
example used by Andronicus for Aristotle and Theophrastus; he grouped together the 
books of related subjects.  He composed groups [p.26] in which he went from the easier 
to the more difficult and generally <23> the shortest to longest.  He formed six novenas 
and was pleased that he encountered two perfect numbers.  Actually, he considered it 
lucky and this is probably why he separated certain chapters of some treatises.  For 
example, the ninth treatise of Book 1, ‘Suicide’, is very short and was most likely taken 
from another treatise; or VI, a brief summary of no importance20.  There are sometimes 
two or three consecutive books continued under the same title.  Porphyry probably 
made these divisions.  Example:  Ennead IV.3, 4 and 5.  Finally, it is true that Ennead I 
is primarily moral; II and III are primarily about the physical; the IVth deals with the 
Soul; the Vth Intellect and the intelligible; the VIth, the One and the categories of 
being.  This rigorous distinction had to me made.  There is no important book where we 
more or less find his complete system. 
 As a matter of fact, the mode of Porphyry’s’ classification is arbitrary and 
furthermore Porphyry left a list of these treaties that may be in chronological order. 
Only Kirchhof has returned <24> to this so-called chronological order.  Mueller and 
Volkmann have returned to the order of the Enneads.  There are reasons; probably: 
1.   The chronological order is of no interest.  There is no trace of a development 
with Plotinus.  The reason is probably that he wrote later. 
2.   I would add that the order may not be chronological.  Porphyry simply says 
that twenty-one of these treatises were already written when he came to Plotinus, and 
he gives a list.  He adds that he composed twenty-four books when he was with him 
and names them.  Finally, the nine other treatises were composed after the departure of 
Porphyry.  It is quite likely, but not certain, that this list is chronological. 
<25> 
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3. Bibliography 
 
Plotinus’ text came to us in very poor condition.  The manuscripts are quite numerous, 
but riddled with errors.  None goes beyond the 13th century and many are much later.  
Mueller has described [p.27] thirty-nine manuscripts of Plotinus and declares that only 
a sixth deserves some consideration (cf. Mueller, Hermès, t. 14, 1879).  The best is 
Mediceus A. 
 The first edition is from Basel, 1580.  A century before the Latin translation of 
Marsilio Ficino appeared, with commentary used by all subsequent editors.  The 
commentary mainly consists of comparisons with Plotinus’ successors.  The Basel 
edition was reproduced in 1615.  The text was very defective and almost unreadable. 
 The following edition is that of Oxford, 1835, Plotini Opera Omnia, by Kreuzer 
and Moser; a wonder of typography.  The text is very defective; the edition was done 
with the utmost lightness and riddled with misprints.  Ficino's translation is reproduced, 
and his <26> commentary arranged. 
 Then, Paris, 1855, with the Latin translation of Ficino, edited by Dubner, in the 
"Didot" collection.  It roughly reproduces the previous, but the punctuation was given 
attention. 
 The next editor, Kirchof, whose edition of 1855 is in the "Teubner" collection, 
was harsh on his predecessors.  It is the first decent text presented of Plotinus.  It 
presents a grouping after the order indicated by Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus. 
 In 1876 a series of important remarks by Vintringam appeared which were used 
by editions that followed. 
 Hermann Friedrich Mueller, 1878, Werdman.  The text, which is quite good, is 
based on a methodical classification of the manuscripts. 
 Finally, Volkmann, 1883 Teubner.  The text is similar to that of Mueller, but it 
is more prudent in the rejection of the glosses assumed by Mueller.  This is the best 
edition. 
 Let us quote the publications separated from the books περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ [On 
Beauty], I, 6; περὶ τοῦ <27> νοητοῦ κἀλλους [On Intelligible Beauty]; Against the 
Gnostics23, II, 9. 
 There is a French translation of Bouillet, 1857-1861, in three volumes, with 
comments and notes - largely from Marsilio Ficino.  It is less a translation than a 
paraphrase. 
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 In German, Engelhardt, translator of the second Ennead. 
 Translation completed by Mueller, 1878-1880 'Berlin, the first volume being 
better than the second. 
 
[p.28] In English, Taylor has translated excerpts from Plotinus. 
In 1840, Steinhart, Meletemata Plotiniana 
1845, Simon, Histoire de l’École d’Alexandrie 
1837-1846, Ravaisson, La Metaphysique d’Aristote. 
1846, Vacherot, Histoire critique de l’École d’Alexandrie.  Remarkable work, though a 
bit vague.  In addition, preconceived ideas about <28> Eastern and Philonic origins of 
Plotinus’ ideas. 
1858-1859 and 1895, articles by M. Lévêque in the Journal des Savants, in connection 
with Bouillet, then with Chaignet. 
Zeller, Philosophie des Grecs, IIIrd part, 2nd section, second half. - Mediocre 
1864-1867, Richter, Neoplatonische Studien, Halle.  Conscientious work of analysis. 
1875, Von Kleist, La critique du materialism par Plotin, 1875. 
-  Similarly Plotinische studient24, Heidelberg, 1883 
1893, Chaignet, Psychologie des Grecs, Vol. IV. 
Not to mention the detailed work on the books on ‘On the Beautiful’ and ‘Against the 
Gnostics’. 
<29> 
 
4. The Doctrine of Plotinus 
The Place of the Theory of the Soul Therein 
 
<30>  Plotinus came to Alexandria in the 111th century of our era.  It was a time of 
intellectual eclecticism and vague moralism, pagan religion, Greek spirited, deeply 
attached to classical culture, and having a background that was contemptuous of 
Eastern imports, he naturally tended to resist this foreign invasion by combining the 
forces of the whole of Greek philosophy; not by process of juxtaposition, but digging 
so deeply beneath the ideas he brought forth the source from which these ideas had 
sprung25.  
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It would be interesting to follow this philosophy in its struggle with Christianity, 
especially to ask why this philosophy and this religion that had so much in common, 
immediately found themselves irreconcilable enemies, and why it was that it was this 
philosophy that died.  It would also be necessary to find out how this religion, after the 
triumph of philosophy, absorbed, and retained the best of it (St. Basil, Augustine), 
<31> and how this thinking now has a somewhat important role in modern thought. 
I shall limit my examination of the philosophy of Plotinus to its central part, the theory 
of the Soul26 that is concurrently the theory of the individual soul and the Universal 
soul.  The course will show that it is the centre of this philosophy; but as there is no 
special book devoted to this theory it will be helpful to present it, and following the 
method of Plotinus, to start with a presentation of the complete preliminary and 
schematic doctrine of Plotinus.  
The starting point of Plato’s dialectic of was the spectacle of contradictions of 
which material things are the theatre, Republic, VII27.  In the presence of contradictions 
presented by the subject matter, the philosopher is encouraged to reflect, and he 
concludes that the things we perceive are only appearances, and that reality must be 
sought in the immutable ideas. 
Above all Plotinus seems <32> to have been struck by the contradictions of 
human affairs (Enneads, III)28.  The things we hold to be serious or even tragic, wars, 
etc.., all this is child's play, banter.  It is not the man inside but a shadow of the man 
who is engaged here below with lamentations and groans.  The evidence is in the same 
regularity of physical evil, the rhythm of a Pyrrhic dance.  We are spectators. 
We must understand each of the actors; follow the lines of the world in all its 
articulations.  The analysis with which the Platonic dialectic begins consists in 
determining reality as qualities, the mixture of which specifically engenders 
contradictions.  According to Plotinus, it is in living beings [p.30] that this analysis 
ends, Ennead VI 29.  A stone must be put back into the earth (ground), and we will see 
that the earth is an animated being, and so for all elements. 
<33> What is a living being?  A microcosm of the world order.  It is divided, but 
in each part is the whole.  It goes through phases, or each is implied in the other.  It is 
therefore a principle that unites the multiplicity; it is the λόγoς έν σπέρματι, the 
generative reason. 
 Logos is less than an idea, because it works, more than a thing because a thing 
is inert.  It is a "function", an idea that moves; a thought in motion. 
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 Let us then consider all living beings formed by the work of the generative 
reasons.  Each one of them manifests a logos and the same time a certain love of life; 
hence selfishness and struggle.  But at the same time that all living beings are 
struggling together, we are also witness to a concert.  A fundamental harmony is 
revealed30.  In addition to individual logoi, there is a universal logos of the body of the 
entire world. 
 <34> Proofs: 1. ---- If astrology can guess the events in the sky, it is not because 
of the influence of the stars on destinies, but that there is such conspiracy of everything 
that arrangement or disturbance has repercussions elsewhere.  Astrology reveals the 
fundamental harmony of all things. 
2. ---- Magic, by acting at a distance produces certain modifications of matter. 
3. ---- Love, which has something of the magician.  The real affinities of things, which 
reveal themselves in magic, also appear in love. 
And also in music. 
So, there is a harmony of all things and a universal logos.  But what explains the 
agreement of individual logoi with the reason of the whole?  This point has been poorly 
addressed by most interpreters.  Suffice it for now to note this agreement.  In addition, 
we must consider the individual reasons to be placed <35> on the same plane as 
universal reason, coordinated with it, emanating from it. 
 It is appropriate to consider the point or aim of these logoi.  These reasons 
succeed in shaping living bodies, that is systems of forces [p.31] or qualities organised 
them.  The more the logos works, the more it divides itself.  It deposits more and more 
forms which it maintained united within it and also distends in space and time.  What 
was undivided in it unfolds, thereby constituting bodies and living beings. 
 What is his point of departure? The work is < >31.  Therefore, his point of 
departure is an idea that does not work; a Platonic idea.  Only, for Plotinus, the idea 
represents an individual object.  Therefore, the immobile ideas are what we find at the 
other extreme from the logos.  The ideas are above, the body below; and stretched 
between them, the beam of the beams of guiding ideas.  However, we are still neither at 
the base nor at the summit.  <36> Plotinus says that if we represent reality as a cone, 
ideas are a section closer to the point of the cone, forms a section closer to the base. 
 The forms require a support, a matter, initially to account for their reciprocal 
action, then to explain their gradual decline; because when the form acts, it is 
weakened.  One should not seek to define matter, which would be to give it a form; and 
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the hypothesis is that it has no forms.  It is a phantom which lies about all that it claims 
to be; it is the deprivation of any form, of any link, infinity [indefinite], άπειρον.  
 Must we actually conclude that there is a principle really distinct from the form 
which is mixed with it?  No, because this expression, matter, is entirely provisional.  
We can regard it as the exhaustion of the reasons as they move away from their starting 
point.  A divergent cone of light into the darkness, <37> for the divergent rays never 
cease to weaken.  Matter is a limit that is never reached. 
 Now go back up to the other end, the Ideas, immobile essences.  These Ideas are 
much more than the reasons themselves, being neither in space nor in time: they are 
cast into each other and represent each other.  However, there is an Idea which is more 
than any other representation of the whole, it is the universal logos: the νοῦς.  This idea 
is not substantially different from the others; it is under it that the others are 
coordinated.  Yet it is not pure unity; it contains a multiplicity. 
[p.32] Above, there was therefore pure unity.  How can it be defined?  We can give no 
name worthy of it.  It is superior to all determination.  Compared with being, it is more 
than being, and is more than thought.  If the ideas are <38> causes of objects, it is cause 
of cause.  If it must be named it is τό έν [the One], τό αύταρχες [the authoritarian], τό 
πρώτον [the first], τό ύπέρτατον [the ultimate]; but it is still άπειρον [the 
infinite/indefinite]. 
Here we are between the less than infinite being and the infinite more than being. 
It is between these two infinities that we find the chain of existences stretched.  At the 
top, that which is more than light, then the luminous point, the unity of a point which 
shines, but encompasses all the light rays which diverge, and finally all these rays 
diverge more and more, losing themselves in the darkness [obscurity]. 
 This third hypostasis is the Soul.  The Soul <39> is a mixture.  We should say 
that there is initially the idea, then reason, then form and then matter.  Soul is Idea at 
the top; it is within the Ideas and can return; it is logos in the middle, then form and 
matter at the base. 
Consider the idea par excellence, νοῦς.  If we think the intelligible, we think the 
same intelligible last, working by distension.  This is the World Soul.  It is the thought 
that overflows, which overwhelms itself by distraction.  Then the World Soul will 
produce the body of the world, that is, to sketch out possible living bodies. 
But then each of the particular ideas, which also virtually contain a soul, is 
extended by its logos towards the body that universal reason has prepared for it.  Each 
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of the particular souls contained in each <40> of the particular ideas, perceiving the 
body that the universal logos has only sketched as its image, is fascinated by this 
image.  And, seduced at the idea of being something separated from everything in space 
and time, it drops; hence the fall. The soul is then taken into the body, into this great 
phantasmagoria that is the material world. [p.33] It takes this phantasmagoria seriously.  
It could always return to God who is its father; but more often it takes reality for that 
which is merely the shadow of reality and becomes an actress in the drama unfolding 
before our eyes. 
 So, we came back to our starting point.  We know how to produce the 
hypostases. I would now like to eliminate from Plotinus’ doctrine the ideas which do 
not belong exclusively to him. 
 Initially at the two ends, we have the One, superior in essence and thought, 
<41> and matter lower than them both.  We can recognise there the frustration of the 
two principles of Aristotle, form and matter, the latter having become less than power.  
Similarly, one could bring closer the One of Plotinus to the One of Plato, and its nature 
is similar to the indefinite principle of which Plato speaks.  The resemblance is obvious 
when one considers the principles at rest; much less when you consider the route that 
goes from one to the other.  There is a very particular irradiation.  Nevertheless, let us 
eliminate these two terms. 
There remains the logoi and Ideas. The logoi are similar to those of the Stoics, the 
Ideas are Plato’s.  But the difference is great, especially in the transition from one to 
another.  The Stoic logoi are immanent in matter, not derived from a transcendent 
principle.  The Ideas of Plato are the genres [kinds].  Instead, Plotinus’ logoi are only 
the prolongations of ideas; and the ideas themselves <42>, being individual, are all 
prepared to live again in the logoi.  Therefore, what exclusively belongs to Plotinus is 
the passage, the effort to overcome dualism latent in his predecessors. 
If we take the Ideas and the One, we have the intelligible world of Plato and 
Aristotle; and the sensible world below it.  Plotinus wants to derive one of the worlds 
from the other, passing the ideas across with logos, from Noûs to the psyche.  That is 
his great originality. 
And how he is able to represent this transition?  The material world is the world 
of action and production; the world of Ideas is that of contemplation.  The question then 
is: how do we pass from speculation to action?  What is outside of space and time that 
distends and degenerates?  Plotinus has resolved the question psychologically [p.34] by 
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trying to make the transition from the purely intelligible to the purely analytically 
sensible by bringing simple decay to it <43>.  See Ennead III where he declares that 
action and production are a weakening of the speculation33.  Action for the one that acts 
is to weaken the thought; it is to be relaxed.  Like the geometrician who inadvertently 
draws a figure while he is thinking intensely, pure contemplation weakens during 
action.  Here therefore is what there is of capital in the idea of irradiation, and which he 
tried to extend to all the transitions between hypostases. 
   His idea is again more psychological.  This idea is not a simple thesis to which 
we can oppose others: it is a fact, an observation.  In Ennead IV34 he describes the 
condition found when, waking from his body, he became conscious, and then had a 
vision of a wonderfully beautiful world, beside which the rest was a dream.  The body 
is sleeping, and action, of which the body is the instrument, is a decrease of 
contemplation; it is the mind <44> that sleeps.  
Ecstasy is only an extension of this much more scientific state that consists in 
passing from the sphere of the Soul to the intelligible.  His metaphysical method is deep 
introspection, which consists in going beyond the ideas by a profound appeal to 
sympathy between our soul and the whole of reality.  Ecstasy is a form of sympathy, 
but not the only one35.  From below it is the effort by which the soul elevates itself to 
νοῦς and according to VI. 7, from well below; a very special state at which one must 
arrive if one wants to represent oneself materially.  You cannot think it, but you can 
place yourself in a state of ἃνοια [folly] which is in sympathy with what in reality is 
truly non-being.  So, there are several attitudes of the soul that seek to coincide with 
what is not strictly thought. 
<45> His method is psychological.  And then it is natural that his attention was 
called, more than Aristotle, to psychology, the life of the Soul.  Plotinus considers the 
maxim of Socrates as being scientific36.  He says in VI that the Soul is representative of 
everything; that of knowing one knows everything.  His successors have clearly 
understood this.  In a fragment of a treatise sent by Iamblichus to Porphyry on the 
subject of γνῶθι σεαυτόν [know thyself], it is stated that he who knows the Soul knows 
the essence of things37.  [p.35] Similarly Proclus, in his Commentary on Alcibiades, and 
also in the Timaeus, says that knowing the Soul is to know everything and to rise to 
God38. 
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<46> 
5. Plotinus’ Interpretation of Plato 
 
 <47> We will discuss the relationship between Plotinus’ philosophy and 
previous philosophies. 
 That Plotinus extracted key ideas from previous philosophies emerges from a 
cursory reading of the Enneads.  Porphyry says that theories of the Stoics and 
Peripatetics are interspersed in his writings and that during Plotinus’ lectures all the 
philosophers were read, especially the commentators of Plato.  
  Secondly, it is also indisputable that of the earlier philosophies to which he 
made all others measure up is the philosophy of Plato.  Kirchner claims that he was 
inspired by Aristotle much more than Plato, but he acknowledges that he uses 
Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato.  Of the rest, Plotinus mentions many Greek 
philosophers and constantly criticises them.  He would happily inspire men with the 
early philosophers.  Nevertheless, he <48> reproaches Heraclitus for forgetting to be 
clear40; Empedocles for having grossly mistaken the nature of elements by making 
them material, that is, destructible41; Anaxagoras, for having introduced the νοῦς, but 
failing to take advantage of it42, since he puts all the forms in the primitive μίγμα 
[mixture] and renders νοῦς unnecessary; the Pythagoreans for having made substantial 
numbers.  He attacked Aristotle on all the essential points: the theory of the entelechy 
of the soul, IV43, he likened to materialist theory - the theory of categories, VI. I - the 
theory of God (having put thought at the top is a big mistake, all thought is 
conversation toward something), V44.  The same applies to the Stoics; he criticizes their 
conception of the soul, their theory of categories, etc.  There is a philosopher against 
whom he has never even directed an objection of detail: Plato. 
 [p.36]  Plato is the divine philosopher, the master that he does not even need to 
name when quoting.  Plotinus puts all <49> his key ideas in Plato’s name.  He does not 
even admit his differences with him; of spiriting them away; of saying that Plato 
concealed his thoughts behind images.  At the beginning of the Vth Ennead, he declares 
himself to be only an “interpreter" of Platonic philosophy45.  Interpreting Plato, and in 
the light of this interpretation, collecting what is best in all of Greek philosophy is what 
Plotinus wanted to do. 
 But this interpretation of Plato is very new and different from that of Aristotle 
and his successors.  The novelty of this interpretation characterises the time of Plotinus, 
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the post-Platonic influences he was subject to, the idea that it consisted of Greek 
philosophy in general, especially his personal originality.  What is this interpretation? 
 There are two parts at work in the dialogues of Plato: 1. - The aspect which 
strikes us most is the dialectical aspect 46, the theory of Ideas.  It is built entirely <50> 
using a dual method of analysis and synthesis; notably, analysis is the dialectic.  The 
philosopher shares contradictions that he notices in sensation as an assemblage of 
opposite qualities.  He separates these qualities and perceiving in each the shadow of an 
immutable essence he studies the other side of these essences instead of looking for 
their affinities; their parent, their filiation.  In restoring the true order, arranges the 
Ideas in a hierarchical series up to the super essence to which all the essences owe their 
clarity and existence. 
2. - A second aspect of this philosophy is the myth.  Myths are common in Plato.  
They are of a very diverse nature and importance.  a) Some are obviously only more or 
less prolonged poetic images - for example, in the Phaedrus47men charmed by the 
muses become cicadas; or in Republic48, III, the metals that are used to form souls.  b) 
The more significant myths: allegories that can be easily translated, for example, within 
the Phaedrus49, the comparison of the soul to a chariot drawn by two horses.  These are 
only <51> that of imaginative play.  But next to these accidental myths in the 
philosophy, there are some that are essential because [p.37] without them the 
philosophy of Plato would be something other than it is. 
 Firstly, they are recognized by their extent (Republic, X, and the great myth of 
Phaedrus, the myth of the Phaedo); secondly by their tone:  he is more serious, more 
personal; it seems that Plato wants to introduce us to some mystery; thirdly, a less 
general feature, Plato puts his myths in the mouth of a foreigner or a Pythagorean, or at 
least there will be Pythagoreans in the dialogue (Er the Armenian, Diotima, Timaeus…)   
These are the external features. 
 Here are the essential internal, features.  If we compare these myths, we shall 
see that the subject which occupies the centre is always the soul, and particularly the 
human soul.  There are often cosmogonical details surrounding it, but it is oriented 
towards the soul, and to the theological relation to the human soul.  In Republic X, 
<52> Er saw the resurrected souls of the wicked punished and the good rewarded.  He 
saw the necessity of the spindle, and the eight rings with eight Sirens.  Phaedo: after 
death the souls of men are escorted to their respective place of residence and the land is 
described from the view of the soul.  In both myths, it is the destiny of the soul after 
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death, while in others, it is the soul before life (Phaedrus: human souls chasing divine 
souls; Protagoras: the gods forming mortal souls). 
 For the life of the soul itself, as distinct from the contemplation of Ideas, as it is 
impelled to recollection and love, recollection and love are still presented mythically: 
love (Phaedrus, Banquet) recollection (Meno, where we find mythical expressions).  
Finally, in the Timaeus, it is the formation of the world soul and, symmetrically, of 
human souls, and around cosmogonic details. 
 So, the becoming of the soul and <53> generally becoming in general, but 
oriented towards the becoming of the soul - these are the subjects of Plato’s myths. 
 But why does Plato treat these subjects in the form of myth?  It seems that he 
had no other form at its disposal, because outside of it was only the form of dialectic; 
but the essence of the dialectic is precisely to take change and solve it in forms that do 
not change.  [p.38]  It is a static mode of explanation: it is in short, analysis.  Becoming 
as becoming, remains by hypothesis outside of a dialectical explanation50.  
 Therefore, becoming remains outside - and yet it is something; Plato is not an 
Eleatic.  He admits the reality of change.  Change exists, but it is not an object of 
thought.  He had to find a way of explanation, or rather expression, casting becoming, 
as a participant of being and non-being, of <54> truth and falsehood. 
 In summary, if we depart from things, we can go back to the Ideas via the 
dialectic, from inferior to superior ideas, hence to the Good.  If we assume the Good 
and descend to Ideas, but especially to sensible things, no scientific explanation will 
account for this process, by hypothesis, and this is where the myth comes in.  When 
using the Alexandrian terms πρόοδος and έπιστροφή [procession and reversion] in 
Platonic philosophy, reversion is explained by dialectics and procession in mythical 
terms. 
 These are two very different aspects of Platonism.  From a philosophical point 
of view, these two aspects do not have with the same resilient strength.  The dialectical 
element addresses the general and impersonal faculty of conceiving and reasoning; 
myth the personal whim of each of us: everyone can interpret it in his own way.  It 
amounts to <55> an approximate kind that keeps a certain subjectivity alongside 
impersonal science.  
 These two elements are, one absolutely stable, the other unstable according to 
the individual.  The theory of Ideas, easily expressible in words, necessarily had to 
move around the other, something very personal, and that is what happened.  Aristotle 
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immediately ignores this mythical element of the Platonic philosophy, and that is why 
he perceived no transition of the intelligible to the sensible; he therefore made the Idea 
descend into things.  And this interpretation has remained the traditional interpretation: 
Plato remains foremost the philosopher of the theory of Ideas. 
 In his theory of the soul there is something that shocks anyone presenting the 
systematic explanation of the ideas of Plato.  In some works they resolve to throw 
overboard anything not in accordance with that theory.  [p.39]  It is commonly said that 
anything that is not the theory of Ideas should not be taken seriously51. <56> 
 Philosophers they met took these myths seriously and put the mythical 
philosophy of Plato in the same rank as the other.  It was natural that it occurred in a 
religious environment where all the religions were in conflict.  It is also understandable 
that Plotinus was struck by the explanation that Plato made certain ideas mythological 
as a matter of fact; it is also understandable that he sought a justification of paganism 
and that precisely for this reason, he attributed paramount importance to this 
philosophy and interpreted all Greek philosophies in the light of that one. 
 At this time, the inner life became intense.  Inside, all new shades of feelings 
came to the light of day.  They were more prepared to seek a path of truth on the side of 
the idea.  Finally, the idea of having to enter the myth by a route other than reason was 
no longer shocking. 
 <57>  In Plotinus’ philosophy, I see primarily an effort to recapture Platonism 
in its entirety.  Plotinus wholly accepts Platonic dialectic, and even puts something 
beyond the Ideas that is more than Idea and which we can reach.  But he also accepts 
the Platonic theory of the origin of souls, their descent into the body, love and 
recollection, and the destiny of souls. 
 How has he reconciled the two aspects?  By a compromise that has rendered the 
mythology more dialectical and the dialectic more mythological. 
 1.- Consider the myths.  In a passage at the end of Ennead, IV.252, Plotinus 
again calls us back to the theory of the relationship between ψυχή [soul] and νοῦς 
[nous], and more particularly of the soul located in space and time, and the soul located 
in the intelligible.  And he ends the exposition by providing an interpretation of the 
Timaeus. <58>  He quotes a sentence from the Timaeus53, where reference is 
made to a mixture of indivisible essence and divisible essence, made by God to form 
the soul. Plato presents this mixture as a historical fact.  However, according to 
Plotinus, the doctrine is not something different to his, and yet, the relationship of the 
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soul to the intelligible in Plotinus is metaphysical in nature: it is not that of an artist's 
work, but a metaphysical derivation.  Placing νοῦς with the Soul following.  Thus, in 
the Timaeus, there is a history [p.40] that happens with the characters in time, while 
being wholly contingent54.  In Plotinus, the process is timeless and metaphysical.  Yet 
Plotinus provides this theory as that of the Timaeus. 
 Is it a coincidence or {a} method of interpretation?  Plotinus provides in III, an 
interpretation of myths.  He says that myths must divide in time what they say, and they 
separate from each other <59> many things that are given one within another but which 
differ in rank and powers.  When they have taught what they can teach, they leave to 
him who represented them the task of making the synthesis55.  So, the role of the myth 
is to present in the form of a story in time, what in itself is a necessity of being. 
 Example: the origin of souls and their descent. 
 Initially souls exist by themselves and are invariable.  But this means that the 
body is not that which receives the soul, it is the body which is in the soul as one that it 
is representing.  And, as such, it is there after a fashion, from all eternity. 
 For successive existences, each having rewards and punishments - all these 
successive existences are complementary to each other and all together form something 
that is other than the idea of the soul. 
 <60>  So, Plotinus considered a timeless process that is given in myth as a 
history.  This amounts to saying that this interpretation implies a certain conception of 
time and of a relationship of time with the eternal.  Because if the same reality, which is 
viewed on one side as a succession in time and on the other as given suddenly in 
eternity, it could only be because time is the development of the successive form of 
something which in itself is timeless.  Ennead III, 7 (περὶ αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου) [On 
Eternity and Time] expresses this theory of time.  Time is to eternity as the Soul is to 
νοῦς.  The mind, νοῦς, is eternal.   If the Soul is identical in itself and outside of νοῦς, 
time in the Soul is the movement, the life of the Soul as it passes from act to act, from 
state to state.  Once posited, the interpretation of Platonic myths is deduced from this 
theory, because these myths relate to the soul, and what is becoming in the soul 
coincides with the eternal.  [p.41]  So, we see how the myth coincides to some extent 
with the dialectic. 
 2. - Similarly, the dialectic of Plotinus has something more mythical.  It is also 
more abstract.  For Plato, the soul that rises to the contemplation of Ideas comes out of 
itself, and the Idea is something rather distant from the soul: it represents a kind, the 
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soul is individual.  For Plotinus, many ideas are individual.  There is an Idea of 
Socrates that is in the eternal, the same Socrates who, developed over time is the soul. 
Thus, the soul enters the region of Ideas.  The importance attributed by Plotinus to 
psychological studies comes largely from the established link between the soul and the 
intelligible, the soul being, as one that goes back up, plunging into the Idea.  The idea 
of a science of the individual is of paramount <62> importance in the philosophy of 
Plotinus56. 
 So, whether we consider the doctrine of Plotinus in itself, or as an interpretation 
of Plato, we are brought back to the study of the Soul as its centre. 
 
V – The World Soul 
 
 <63>  Firstly, we have to speak about the World Soul.  According to Plotinus 
the theory of the particular soul and the Universal Soul are constantly intertwined.  The 
idea of starting with a study of the World Soul and giving the psychology of the 
universe as an introduction to the psychology of the individual, is less strange than it 
seems if one relates to the meaning that the ancients, and especially Plotinus, have 
given to these words: ψυχή τοῦ παντός [Universal Soul].  This is the principle of order 
and nature, which creates matter and the laws of matter.  In proceeding this way, we 
simply deal with nature in general before the conscious mind; we put consciousness 
into the conditions of life before dealing with the question of consciousness: it is 
basically the modern approach57.  The question of the relation between the physical and 
the moral is the same issue as that of the relation between the Universal Soul and the 
individual soul58. 
 [p.42]  Plotinus <64> drew very special conclusions from this general 
statement, as well as the theory of physical heredity.  He explains it by determining 
precisely the responsibility of the Universal Soul and that of the individual soul, 
sketching the body and so bestowing it with general, transmissible characters, and 
therefore hereditary.  The individual soul intervenes and perfects this work.  Moreover, 
it chooses a certain body because it is suitable, and adapts itself to it.  The problem of 
‘being’ posed in ancient form is solved in a rather modern form. 
 The question of a Universal Soul is not as strange one would think.  We accept 
that there is a certain unity of nature; finalists see in the development of things the 
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development of a single idea; their opponents accept the unfolding of a great 
mechanical theorem.  The unity beneath this double form veils that the World Soul 
explained in concrete form59. 
 But what is the origin of this terminology that equates the unity of the whole to 
that of the Soul?  Probably Pythagorean; although there are no specific texts.  The only 
quote of Philolaus by Stobaeus, is inauthentic60; but other texts attribute to the 
Pythagoreans certain ideas that, synthesised in the mind, had to be translated within the 
specific conception of a Universal Soul. 
 Aristotle, Physics, N, 2b [=213b23].  “For the Pythagoreans the sky is, 
surrounded by empty space, and the world breathes."  The world was a living being for 
them; but was there a centre of life? 
 Stobaeus, Philosophical Extracts (Eclogae philosophorum) 1.488. “Philolaus 
put fire at the centre. This fire was called the home of the universe and even the home 
of Zeus and the mother of the gods".  It is indeed a matter of centre.  Is it a Soul? 
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 986 a2. “The whole world is harmony and number”.  
But for the Pythagoreans these words are the very definition of the Soul.  The 
Pythagoreans had to believe that the world is a manifestation of Soul.  Furthermore, we 
think of the efficiency they attributed to number and especially to the decad.  It is 
number that holds everything together and makes things knowable.  In the Timaeus, the 
soul <66> is characterized by number, from which we may conclude that the 
Pythagoreans did not refer to the world as number and harmony without [p.43] it doing 
something.  The Pythagoreans were therefore led to posit the world as living. 
 We see from this analysis that for Pythagoras the Soul was only a principle of 
order and measure.  The Soul is still that, but something more for Plato.  I will not try to 
explain the formation of the World Soul, Timaeus, 39 a: text that immediately passes 
for a model of obscurity (Cicero, Sextus) and which Proclus, Plutarch, Plotinus 
interpreted differently.  It concerns the operation of a mixture of divisible and 
indivisible essence.  We shall only define the role and function of the soul according to 
Plato’s information. 
 For him, the World Soul is what the individual soul is to the body, the principle 
of movement. Laws, X, 896 a: “The movement capable of moving itself”, Phaedrus, 
249 c: "Only that which moves itself is the source and principle of <67> movement”.  
Thus, the soul's first role is to provide an impulsion to things. 
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 Secondly, it is the principle of measurement and harmony.  In the Timaeus, the 
soul is composed according to the numbers which express harmony, the harmonics, and 
astronomical systems. 
 What then is the soul in itself, what place does it occupy between Ideas and 
sensible things? εἶδος or αἰσθητόν?  Neither one, nor the other.  It cannot be a sensible 
thing since αἰσθητά [sensibles] are inert; they are all ready-made, not principles of 
becoming.  Nor an idea: the idea is first of all eternal and timeless, immutable, not 
subject to becoming, and represents the kind [genre].  But the World Soul: 1. becomes, 
being the very principle of becoming; 2. is an individual.  The soul is something 
intermediate, which is natural given its mathematical character.  It takes its place 
among these mathematically ordered existences that Plato puts immediately below the 
Ideas (Metaphysics, 987 a14). 
 <68> Why do we need a plurality of intermediate essences between the Idea and 
the sensible?  In Plato’s philosophy, the passage from the sensible to the intelligible is 
clear as dialectic, but the reverse passage is an obscure thing that is mythically 
expressed.  In the Platonic myths that express all this descending movement by which 
one passes from Ideas to things, there must be reference points in this movement: souls, 
gods, and especially the World Soul, play this role. [p.44]  These are the objects of 
Platonic myths.  It is a vague definition, but the idea is not more distinct in Plato who, 
by his conception, could not clarify it. 
 Plotinus pulled this idea from the shadows because he borrowed it exclusively 
from Plato.  The Soul of Plotinus is sometimes compared to the Stoic fire; however, the 
analogy is wholly superficial, the differences profound.  According to the Stoics, the 
fire is self-sufficient; it is not derived from a superior, extra-temporal essence.  For 
Plotinus it is a <69> derivation of νοῦς; one cannot even look closely at it without 
seeing it contract and ultimately become absorbed in νοῦς.  Moreover, the soul of the 
Stoics becomes matter and matter, soul.  In Plotinus, if matter comes from the Soul, it is 
not by transformation; it is a derivation which does not prevent the Soul from 
remaining itself.  The source of his conception is solely Plato. 
 Plotinus brought Plato's theory fully into the light.  He produced a theory of the 
body, an implicit theory of space, an explicit theory of time, and even a theory of 
consciousness.  This hypothesis, the latter metaphysically, is primarily important for 
knowledge.  Plotinus spoke of the others in terms of extension and purification of the 
concept of the Soul. 
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 Recall the manner in which he gradually came to attribute a Soul to the 
universe.  It is by the consideration of analogies between the world and a particular 
living being.  A living being manifests a soul, first in the form of generative <70> 
reason.  A living body is a multiplicity of parts between which there is κοινωνία [a 
communication of properties]; an animal is one whole and sympathetic with itself 
(ὁμοπάθεια [common affection or quality], συναίσθησις [conscious perception] = 
consensus).  Therefore, there must be a principle of harmony.  Ennead, III.2.2: “In the 
logos generator, everything is given together and in the same thing”. Ibid., VI.7.14 : 
“Logos is a multiple unity, a scheme, a sketch that contains sketches ... an undivided 
centre that contains and summarizes its entire circumference.”  So, a living being is the 
manifestation of a logos. 
 Also, logos is not completely Idea; the Idea is the archetype outside of space 
and time.  Logos is what comes out of the Idea, to act as it descends in space and time; 
it is the Idea become force.  Precisely because the Idea becomes action, it is exposed to 
[p.45] meet with resistance, to imperfection.  If there is a logos in every living body, 
there is at the same time something that resists it.  It does not mean that the logos of a 
man <71> is lame.  So, there is something it has resisted, which was not in the 
generative logos.  But in this fault of production in becoming, the logos has not gained 
the upper hand, and what prevails is a deterioration, by chance, of the idea that the 
logos brought with it63.  It is that matter is there, bringing to the form its lack of form, 
in the measure of its excess and its defect, until, in the process of formation it has 
brought the being to be not of itself but of it [matter].  Therefore, matter opposes the 
information of the logos.  Moreover, we shall see that matter is only a weakening or 
exhaustion of the logos in proportion to its work. 
 So, let us say that a living being is the soul as logos and, by the same effect of 
this work, it becomes weaker; additionally: it extends into space.  Logos expands into 
space by the same work.  Porphyry (άφορμαί [theory of rational tendencies], 37) 64 has 
clarified this idea well: “Solidity [mass] is a reduction in the power of the immaterial 
being, who is solely real.” 
 In summary, in a living being there is logos, the aspect of which is materiality, 
and finally distension in space that always implies a harmony.  As for the Universal 
Soul, one wonders, does the universe have the external appearance of a living being 
thus defined? 
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 There is much sympathy between all parts of the universe.  Astrology 
establishes this point.  It would be impossible if we did not assume that which is 
present at any one point.  The stars have no influence, but significance (IV.4.6).  
Furthermore (IV.4.33), the universe is compared to a dancer, all of whose movements 
<73> are so related that the scholar who perceives it as one could reconstruct the whole 
movement by interpreting the movements, one by the other.  This is also how astrology 
proceeds. 
 Likewise, magic is the power to act on a specific point of the universe by acting 
on another point. 
 Finally, why are prayers answered?  It is not that the gods are listening. By the 
effect of sympathy, there is a way to influence the animated universe. 
 [p.46]  The universe is therefore a living being and as such is the manifestation 
of a generative reason.  We must now determine this Soul of things.  We will firstly 
determine the relation to what is below it, the matter it informs, then the relation to 
νοῦς (see also II.12.31) above it, and finally we will try to determine it in itself. 
 <74>  The first question is this: If we take Soul, that is to say something that 
comes out of νοῦς but which by its higher aspect is still something of a one, how can 
we explain this Soul as the indefinite multiplicity of things in space and time?  Plato 
had to speak about non-being next to the Ideas.  Plotinus wants to bring the same Ideas 
out of non-being.  How can something that, by its nature, appears repugnant to Intellect 
– the totality of things - be the Soul that, from above, is still within the mind? 
 Soul is firstly flagged as a force which, as such, has the need and the power to 
produce, draws from itself all that it contains and which, by virtue of the principle that 
the generated is inferior to what generates, it produces an imperfect body at the bottom 
of which is matter that would be the bitter dregs of an inferior being (II.3.17) 65. 
 <75>  But why would the Soul which is form produce anything formless? 
 “A great light that shines out of the Soul tends to become dark in proportion as 
it moves away from its hearth” (VI.3.9). – “But the darkness, by that very fact that the 
Soul sees it, penetrates them and gives them a form.”  So, in letting them escape from 
it, the Soul lets them out more diminished to the limit ever reached, where they would 
be darkness.  Wanting to grasp pure matter, it would want to grasp the absolute shadow 
without light. 
 In this form, matter would still be purely negative, but it must have something 
efficacious, otherwise why would the Soul remain remote66 from its original unity?  (cf. 
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III.6 to the end)67.  Matter is initially presented as a Platonic non-being.  Its role is to 
arrest the procession of things coming out of νοῦς <76>, he compares it to the < > 68 
which lives continuously.  But mostly, III.6.14, matter is compared to a mirror that 
reflects an illusory image; [p.47] and the mirror is an image itself, a mirage that is the 
source of mirages.  And “if the images directly emanated beings, they subsist without 
needing to be in something else, but as the real beings remain confined within 
themselves, there must be something that provides them with a place where they do not 
subsist”.  In other words, if images, sensible things, were an immediate effect of the 
Idea, the Idea would be sensible immediately; there would be no need of matter.  But it 
must be said that every image needs to rely on another image.  V.9.5: This image is by 
its very nature in something other than itself.  Only the Idea is in itself.   IV.8.6: The 
process must continue up to the limits of the possible. II.3.18: The world <77> is an 
image that is formed continually.  That is, if the Soul remains where it is originally, 
there would be nothing sensible.  Suppose a cause that acts [makes] going out of νοῦς; 
we fully present things because an image cannot occur without placing it in another 
image, and so on.  Thus it engenders the indefiniteness of space, time and matter.  
Matter is only the indefiniteness of things, the ceaseless creation of images. 
 Compare this theory to Kant.  Plotinus presents on the one hand the Idea, and, 
on the other hand, phenomenal reality, and like Kant, made phenomenal reality consist 
of an indefinite progress.  For Kant, this is the experience, and two mathematical 
antinomies come from what we mistake for the nature of experience that is progress 
and movement, and what we want to grasp as an actual [in the present time] infinity.    - 
But the difference is great <78>: for Kant, neither space and time, which determine the 
flux of phenomena, nor the causality that links them, can be generated; they are given 
as pure forms and a scheme.  In Plotinus we have instead, an effort to deduce space, 
time and even temporal causality.  Space and time are deduced from what is in space, 
and time is the incomplete manifestation of the Idea, the image.  And then the image 
seeks completion; it is in this way that space and time are generated.  Similarly, 
causality is the effort of a thing to bring out what it has in it.  For Plotinus, it is the 
effort of a thing to find something else on which to sit, and rather than appearing, the 
seat slips away. [p.48]  So, causality is also explained by the journey of an incomplete 
being in search of himself.  All this is deduced from the extra-temporal and extra-
spatial. 
<79> 
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6.  The Procession of the Soul and the Principal of Radiation 
  
 <80> We have seen how the Universal Soul engenders images that feature in 
space and time, because the mere fact of the multiplicity of images is what engenders 
time and space.  The indefinite in time and space is simply the translation of the 
poverty of the image that seeks to rely on another image. 
 The Universal Soul is that which is called ὴ ἐν κόσμῳ or ἐν σώματι ψυχή; but 
above this Soul, he sometimes puts another that is opposed to it: the Divine Soul, ψυχή 
θειοτάτη. 
 II.3.9: The world is made of a body and a Soul, but above that <81> a Soul that 
illuminates this one, the pure Soul, χαθαρά, which if joined to the world, makes that 
aberrant world a god; but if it withdraws, a demon remains there (?).  II.3.18: the 
Universal Soul turned towards God contemplates the best, and the general Soul is the 
image of this superior and contemplative Soul69. 
 So according to Zeller there would be two universal Souls in Plotinus, the 
second would be the image, reducing the first.  What can we make of it? 
 First, there is never a question of three hypostases: One, Intellect, Soul.  On the 
other hand, if one assumes a higher Soul whose function would only be contemplation, 
it is not clear how this Soul differs from νοῦς (see also II.16.21, 28).  So, it seems that 
there is one, above all <82> contemplation, νοῦς which contemplates it, and finally a 
being which is less than contemplation, that is action.  Nevertheless, Plotinus seems to 
say that there are two Souls. 
 Reference should be made to the function of the Universal Soul, but first we 
must present the one superior to essence and knowledge.  All the ideas [p.49] that make 
up νοῦς are then presented within the eternal as many visions of the One.  All of this is 
outside of time; unity and multiplicity are equally timeless.  Below there can only be a 
multiplicity in space and time: the images, or things.  The function of the Universal 
Soul will be to fetch the Ideas from within Intellect and bring them down into space and 
time in the form of generative reasons.  The Soul will be the vehicle of the Ideas in 
space and time.   <83>  It takes the Ideas and divides them: III.9.1 : μεριστὴν ἐνέργειαν 
ἔχει ἐν μεριστῇ  φύσει [it has a divisible action in divisible in nature]70. 
 Hence the Universal Soul taken at its source is indistinguishable from νοῦς, the 
world of Ideas.  Given this intelligible world, let us recognize that sensible things come 
from these Ideas.  How do they come out, if not by the action of this special force that 
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leaves little by little?  Firstly the Soul coincides with Intellect, but a logical moment 
comes when the Soul emerges to materialise.  And consequently, we can say that at a 
certain moment it is within Intellect, and is the radiance: V.1.3.  There are not two 
World Souls but one, taken when it is about to go out of Intellect, and at the moment of 
its exit.  <84>  When Plotinus opposes the divine Soul to the lower Soul, he said that if 
the first is pure, it is because it is taken at its exit from νοῦς.  And, II.3.18, the higher 
Soul is described as celestial and the lower Soul is said to ensue from above.  Finally, 
there are texts saying that these two Souls are aspects of the same Universal Soul.  
V.1.10: A part of the Soul proceeds in the sensible world, while a part remains in the 
intelligible world.  V.2.5: The Soul must be one without being absolutely, otherwise it 
would not produce a plurality if remote from the unity.  IV.2.2: The Soul is both one 
and many, divided and undivided. IV.1.1: IV.3,19: VI.7.9. 
 But we should clarify this idea.  Plotinus speaks of a single Soul: but both 
powers of the Soul are not so different, to the point of being logically exclusive.  The 
Soul is infinitely divisible <85> and absolutely one - infinitely mobile and dispersed in 
space and time, and absolutely changeless outside space and space and time.  These 
contradictory attributes may be juxtaposed: while it is nevertheless a matter of two 
Souls.  How did Plotinus reconcile two sets of attributes which logically, seem to be 
exclusive in the Universal Soul [p.50]?  It is all a question of the Universal Soul, and 
consequently the individual soul.  It is to know whether Plotinus triumphed over 
Platonic dualism.  The problem posed by Plato, according to Plotinus, is that of the 
passage from the intelligible to the sensible and from the idea to things; and the 
Universal Soul has exactly the function of taking Ideas, multiplying them and diluting 
them in things.  It is therefore intended to solve the Platonic problem, to give us a 
metaphysical translation of the myths of Plato, who only expressed <86> mythically the 
process of descent with stories taking place in time. 
 If Plotinus is merely taking these two contradictory attributes, timeless unity 
and multiplicity in time, and juxtaposing them in a Soul he calls one but that is in fact 
two, the problem is not resolved. 
 The problem is more important still.  The process by which the Ideas descend is 
the same kind as the operation by which the One refracts itself into Ideas. V.2.1: The 
operation is the same, the principle is the same. 
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 What is this principle?  In the case before us, the derivation of the Soul, this 
principle should make us understand how sensible things proceed from Ideas.  It is 
therefore a matter of a type of causation. 
 But causality can take two forms71 depending on whether <87> it is generation 
in time or a causality that is logical and timeless; when a being generates another being, 
or when the consequences come out of their principle.  The first process involves 
succession; the second does not imply time.  However, the causality in question in 
Plotinus is neither one nor the other: but the cause is outside of time and the effect 
within time.  The lower and general Soul is time itself; the higher Soul which coincides 
with νοῦς defines itself by its eternity.  But we could generalise this definition.  It must 
be said that the cause is one and indivisible, the effect is the multiplicity to which it 
gives birth. 
 This is due to the fact that the causation of substance, of hypostasis to <88> 
hypostasis is unilateral.  For us the relation of cause and effect is like any relationship, a 
relationship between two terms such that if B is related to A, A is related to B.  In 
Plotinus, the effect is in [p.51] relation with the cause, and not vice versa.  The One 
generates the multiplicity of Ideas, but without occupying it, and Ideas do not exist for 
it.  Similarly, the engendered Soul turns towards Intellect.  But the Soul does not exist 
for Intellect. Intellect is absolutely locked up in itself.  If we place ourselves within the 
effect, the cause exists.  If we place ourselves in the cause, for it at least, the effect does 
not. 
 The cause is sometimes a source that remains itself while feeding rivers, 
sometimes the life of a plant which remains in the roots but feeds the branches, 
sometimes it is a hearth <89> which radiates (ἔκλαμψις [shining forth], ἐπίλαμψις 
[epilampsis, illumination], περίλαμψις [radiation]).  But Plotinus does not need images.  
VI.8.8: “The first principle is the cause, though in another sense it is not the cause.  
Because to speak of cause here would be to speak of an action on something else; yet, 
nothing is related to the cause.”  VI.9.3: “When we speak of the principle of causality, 
we are not talking about something that is added to it, but to us, since we derive 
something from it; it however remains itself.”  VI.8.18: It happens to be without having 
been brought into being.  Plotinus therefore defines causation between the hypostases 
metaphysically. 
 Before examining this principle of illumination, let us say that it has an origin 
that is easily determined.  Vacherot and some others have argued that this <90> 
31 
 
principle could only come from some oriental influence; and the only proof of the 
oriental influence on Plotinus is quoted by Vacherot.  Is it true that this idea is not 
Greek?   But Plotinus sought to examine Plato, and to know the process of the Idea.  
But in Plato, the intelligible is the immutable; it is the sensible that changes.  The Idea 
alone has an absolute reality.  Sensible reality cannot hold the Idea, therefore the Idea 
produces it; but the Idea cannot go out of itself without ceasing to be the Idea.  
Therefore, it will be a cause seen from the side of the effect, but that view of itself will 
no longer be a cause. 
 So, the principle of radiation is by no means the solution of a problem, it is the 
statement.  It is the mere finding of the need for <91> multiple things to go out of Ideas 
without the Ideas coming out of themselves.  It is unnecessary to appeal to the Orient.  
It is the same problem stated in its precise form.  There is not even an original effort 
from Plotinus and if he remained there he would not have done much. 
 [p.52] This is what Zeller reproaches him for.  According to him, images only 
mask a contradiction; the assertion of a cause that does not belong to causation, that has 
no relation to its effect, and is perfectly sufficient to itself.  It is this contradiction that 
shows through the images covering it.  What should we make of it? 
 I assume that in the mind of Plotinus there is a certain experience that he was 
able to take from life, the grasping of one side, sensible, the other intelligible, and the 
transition from one to the other, which together showed him the “soul awakened” and 
the “soul that dreams”, and which proved to him that awakening exists for the dream, 
but not the dream for the awakening.  How would Plotinus make us understand it other 
than by images, which furthermore, are intended to suggest a state of mind similar to 
that experienced by the philosopher?  The concepts that Zeller opposes in Plotinus are 
images, although familiar ones, it is true: there must be a cause either within or outside 
it, so that the relation of cause to effect is reciprocal.  These are real things in space and 
time.  Any development beyond the concept cannot be made with images.  Plotinus was 
able to make an effort <93> to extend the limits of intelligence72. 
 That is right.  At the start of IV.8 Plotinus invokes the experience well in a 
considerable text73: “Often I wake up from my body, outside all other things, inside 
myself, living the higher life, coinciding with the divine; then when I descend from 
contemplative reason to discursive reasoning I wonder how it is that this descent is 
done”. 74 
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 So, there is an ascertainable passage within the experience of the descent, 
during which the question does not arise; but it rests when we are at the bottom.  At the 
end of III.8.10: Plotinus advises us on the intuition for grasping the principle.  Finally, 
the idea that God is the cause in relation to us, not in relation to him, is proved by the 
experience, VI.975. 
 <94>  This does not prove that Plotinus had wanted to make the passage 
intelligible.  Has he at least made an effort to explain why we cannot understand?   
Zeller treats the theory of categories, VI.1.3 contemptuously; however, it is a very 
important part76.  Porphyry placed these three books in the final Ennead.  The main 
idea is that Aristotle was wrong to believe that the sensible categories are the same as 
those [p.53] of the intelligible, considering that the general determinations of sensible 
being cannot be the same as the general determinations of intelligible being.  Here there 
is an indication of something which announces critical philosophy.  Furthermore, there 
is not a huge difference between mysticism and critical philosophy, <95> mysticism 
reserving the absolute for supra-empirical knowledge. 
 We cannot therefore apply categories to being per se.  In the first book, he 
studied ποιεῖν [poiesis] and πάσχειν [receiving an external impression, suffering], and 
established that this category only belongs to the sensible and cannot be related to the 
intelligible.  On the other hand, one type of experience shows us the sensible being 
derived from the intelligible77.  So, if we place ourselves in the sensible, we have the 
right to apply the category of causality, and if we place ourselves in the intelligible, we 
lose that right. 
 By this alone, Plotinus saw how his doctrine of higher intuition required a kind 
of logical complement, that without making an Idea intelligible, which it is not, at least 
allows us <96> to understand why we do not understand.  That's all we can ask of a 
philosopher of a mystical background.  But we must note in Plotinus this effort to move 
closer to the mysticism of rationalism to a certain extent. 
  
7. The Universal Soul Considered in Itself 
 
 <97>  We determined in turn the Universal Soul in relation to what follows and 
what precedes it.  It creates nature by creating space and time, because the image once 
produced demands to be completed.  On the other hand, its apex is within νοῦς, but in 
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addition, or rather less, it has a tendency to come out of it: it comes out thanks to a 
certain form of single sided causality.  We must now determine the Universal Soul in 
relation to itself, considered in itself.  How does Plotinus depict it?  Is it a conscious 
Soul? 
 [p.54]  If Plotinus has represented the World Soul as a higher consciousness, 
which would create the material world like we create <98> our dreams, then this 
conception is still semi-mythical.  Plotinus has not gone past the point of view of Plato. 
We are seeking a metaphysical explanation of the procession in him, but we would still 
be within mythology. 
 If, on the other hand, Plotinus, instead of representing it as an intensified human 
soul, constructed for himself the concept of Universal Soul, and in descending by way 
of impoverishment, arrived at the idea of consciousness, we find in him: firstly a new 
theory of consciousness, since it will not be something simple, but a product, or 
something which can be reached by deduction or synthesis;  then the Universal Soul 
can no longer be defined as consciousness, and he must reach inside the Universal Soul.  
Which of these two solutions did he adopt? 
 If the texts are examined superficially, the impression given is that the 
Universal Soul <99> is a conscious Soul, and many people have been deceived, 
believing that the Universal Soul would have consciousness like ours.  Kirchner even 
maintains that it has reasoning essentially, τὸ λογίζεσθαι.  Zeller, without going so far, 
uses a text in which Plotinus speaks of συναίσθησις [conscious perception], that he 
translates as consciousness, but recognizes that there are texts and particular theories 
that oppose it; he concludes that Plotinus contradicts himself and oscillates. 
 The truth is that Plotinus is the only ancient philosopher that has sought to 
elucidate the concept of consciousness, to study the fact of consciousness 
independently of thought, and he had to create a terminology; with a certain 
awkwardness and some hesitations.  But his thinking is clear.  If we give to the word 
‘consciousness’ a sense of something that tends towards the personal78 form, i.e., its 
ordinary meaning, it is beyond doubt that the Universal Soul is unconscious. 
 <100>  We will see later what consciousness is for Plotinus in detail.  Let us 
indicate only the functions of άντίληψις [sense perception].  There is   
1.  the restlessness of the body, 
2.  pleasure and pain, 
[p.55] 3.  the perception of the external body 
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4.  memory 
5.  διάνοια, discursive reason. 
 
 However, none of these functions can belong to the Universal Soul. 
1. The restlessness of the body.  We, who are souls joined to partial bodies, 
are exposed to dangers.  The human body is subject to the influence of other bodies and 
is exposed to decomposition.  Restlessness is the law of the life.  But the body of the 
Universal Soul is all of matter; nothing can threaten it.  It flows on, but inside itself, and 
as it is contained in the World Soul, it is eternal.  
2. Pain occurs when the body is under threat of losing the image of the 
soul, that is when a separation between body and soul becomes <101> possible.  In 
other words, this is the beginning of death.  Pleasure occurs when (VI.4.19) the 
equilibrium is restored, when the soul readjusts is to the body.  "Pain is consciousness 
of a separation from the body, which is deprived of the image of the soul.”79  But the 
body of the world is inextricably bound to the Soul, being its necessary unfoldment in 
the form of space and time. 
3. External perception is purely an internal phenomenon of the soul: It 
demands the meeting of two opposing elements. By right, we all have the perception of 
all things in the form of νόησις [intellection] that is in a latent form.  In order for what 
is virtual to become actual, an impression has to occur in the body; then the thought 
goes to the fore, and φαντασία [imagination], occurs at the meeting.  This however, is 
nothing but a phenomenon of sympathy <102> with an external phenomenon. 
 Perception presupposes firstly multiple external bodies, and secondly, an organ 
of perception in the perceiving body.  However, there is no outer body to the body of 
the world, and (II.8.2) the World Soul has no organ. 
4. Memory.  Plotinus disentangles the relationship of consciousness and 
memory and saw that there is no consciousness where there is no prolongation [p.56] of 
the past in the present, i.e. memory.  But memory belongs to a being that is making 
progress, which is fallen and seeks itself (IV.4)80.  In the same Ennead, IV.4.681, he 
explains the conditions of memory: its condition is time.  But the World Soul does not 
occupy time; time is in it, goes out of it, but [the Soul] is not in it, dominating it, 
expressing it, but eminently in the form of eternity. 
5. Reasoning remains.  Kirchner argues that the Universal Soul reasons and  
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<103> has λογισμός [reasoning] as its essential function.  He quotes V.3.3: ψυχήν ἐν 
λογισμοῖς εἶναι, but the context is sufficient proof that it is not a question of the 
Universal Soul, but of the human soul. This is a clerical error. 
 We see from this examination that the World Soul does not perform any 
specific function of consciousness.  Should we conclude that it is unconscious?  The 
text seems to indicate otherwise, IV.4.24: συναίσθησιν μὲν αὑτῦ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν 
συναισθανόμεθα82.  But συναίσθησις does not mean consciousness.  Let us analyze the 
word that will tell us about the nature of the Universal Soul. 
 Quoting a few texts.  IV.5.5 ὥσπερ ἐλέγετο…  (These concern hearing, that is 
external perception): “One can say about the affection of hearing what we said of 
vision; that is a certain συναίσθησις [conscious perception] as in an animal.” <104> 
The word here means the sympathy of an organ with the body which it perceives, as in 
an animal where all the parts correspond.  And, indeed, the soul is a living thing.  
IV.4.45: “Within any animal each of the parts contributes to the whole and there is a 
συναίσθησις where all are completely in rapport with the whole.”  The meaning of the 
word here is consensus, reciprocal agreement.  This is the fundamental meaning of the 
word. 
 Returning to our text: “The Universal Soul must be attributed to have 
συναίσθησις [conscious perception] of itself, just as we have συναίσθησις [conscious 
perception] of ourselves; but it should not be attributed to the sensation, αἴσθησις 
[sense perception] such as this is always the sensation of a foreign object.”  We cannot 
attribute sensation to the Universal Soul, friends we must give it συναίσθησις 
[conscious perception].  Our συναίσθησις [conscious perception] of ourselves is an 
agreement of αἴσθησις [sense perception] and is consequently one consciousness.  But 
συναίσθησις [conscious perception] of the whole may not be <105> consciousness, 
since there is no αἴσθησις [sense perception].  Συναίσθησις [conscious perception] may 
therefore mean accidental consciousness, in the [p.57] case where unified elements are 
elements of consciousness.  We translate this word as "internal synthetic unity." 
 If it is not consciousness, what is it? V.3.13: “The synthetic unity of everything 
seems to me to be, when a multiplicity converges towards unity, the thought, τὸ νοεῖν.”  
Plotinus repeats incessantly: the lower function of the Universal Soul is to produce; its 
superior function is to contemplate.  Its divine part is within Intellect. 
 But what is this thought?  Is this consciousness?  We shall see that Plotinus’ 
νόησις [intellection] is a superior function of the human soul, but which does not 
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strictly belong to it.  The truly human function is λογίζεσθαι [reasoning].  With <106> 
intellection we go out of ourselves.  The understanding then is not conscious, and if we 
keep the word’s meaning it manages to create an imagination, φαντασία, in which it is 
reflected, as in a mirror.  In other words, there is consciousness where there is a 
diminution of νοῦς, a progress which shows a decline, where there is action and 
weakness of contemplation.  Consciousness occurs after a fall: as it falls into the body, 
it substitutes for the eternity of thought, the continuity of progress over time, that is, 
consciousness. 
 The συναίσθησις of the Universal Soul is then the unity of all, the convergence 
of all the parts which is characteristic of the pure Idea <107>.  Each human soul 
contains the reason of his body and this reason is included in the universal reason.  All 
individual souls are contained within the Universal Soul and each is conscious, but if 
we take them all synthetically within the Universal Soul, there is no longer 
consciousness.  This unconsciousness is, if you like, something at which we arrive, 
starting from consciousness, but by way of enrichment, and assuming that within the 
eternal, our consciousness develops in time.  Being given the Soul in the νοῦς, there is 
nothing to add to it for it to become aware, but something to lose. 
 It takes a great effort to represent this form of being, but it is not impossible to 
arrive at it.  It will take the realisation that thought is explained by the Intellect.  It was 
said that the Platonic Ideas [p.58] were thoughts <108> of God, but by basing it on 
Plotinus.  It is quite the opposite; according to Plotinus, the act of thinking can get 
clearer only if we go back to the intelligible, to νοῦς.  How?  I am conscious of the 
image of a triangle.  It is conscious because I represent it for a certain time and within a 
certain space.  To advance to the idea of a triangle, I will disregard particular images; 
but as long as I represent it in time, I place under it the idea of a general image.  If I 
want to represent the pure idea to myself, I go out of consciousness, I coincide with the 
intelligible, and I am no longer me83. 
 Yet, there is a conscious Socrates.  It is only the unfolding of the eternal idea of 
Socrates into space and time, and consequently if we want to pass from Socrates to his 
Idea, it will be necessary to assume a pure coincidence with the intelligible, where all 
consciousness <109> will be abolished; to move to the idea of Socrates, or of the 
triangle, it is necessary to infinitely intensify the image of the triangle or Socrates.  And 
conversely, to descend from the Idea to the image, from thought to consciousness, there 
is nothing to add, there is only impoverishment.  Aristotle said that we cannot think 
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without an image; but it is more than conscious thought.  This is the super-conscious 
thinking that Plotinus attributed to the Universal Soul. 
 This conception of consciousness is absolutely opposed to the modern 
conception.  For us consciousness is something simple.  The state of consciousness is 
the type of individuality.  Plato had already made the soul a μῖξις [mixture].  For 
Plotinus, it is a mixture, something that occurs between thought, or upper limit, and 
materiality, lower limit.  A triangle is between the idea of the triangle and the 
indefiniteness of space and time. <110> Similarly, a soul can be resolved into pure 
materiality and the idea of this soul.  Finally, there is the movement of this lower limit 
to the upper limit, and this movement is consciousness. 
 So, we can understand why Plotinus called Soul the hypostasis that unfolds the 
Ideas in space and time.  If consciousness was bare essence, it might seem surprising 
that he had given the name of Soul to a being that is not conscious: and this is why the 
term Universal Soul surprises us.  But consciousness is an accompaniment; the Soul 
could bypass it if need be.  The essence of the Soul is its function as a vehicle for the 
generative reasons. 
[p.59]  <111>  Having solved this problem, Plotinus resolves the necessary relations for 
the fundamental problem of the origin of the individual soul. 
Firstly, the problem of life.  What part does nature and the moral person play in 
the formation of our physical person? 
The living body is a collaboration between nature and the soul.  It is nature that 
produces the body; the Universal Soul at least, in the form of nature, and on the other 
hand the individual soul makes [is] its body.  The living body is the meeting point of 
these two operations.  What is the respective role of these two causes? 
Essential texts: VI.4.15.  The human body exists before the soul has come <112> 
to take possession of it, but it had the ability to receive it, it was in his vicinity, he 
received a warmth and illumination.  He was prepared for it because it was a body that 
was not without participation in the soul; because nature has already sketched the body.  
VI.7.7:  “What prevents the Universal Soul from preparing a sketch, because it is the 
universal logos before the individual souls are inserted?  This sketch would be like a 
preliminary illumination of matter, and then the individual soul going back over these 
lines, organizes them part by part.  And so each soul becomes the body to which it has 
been added, having thus accomplished his figure, like one who being part of a dance 
chorus <113> is in keeping with the role assigned to it.” 
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Interpretation. 
 Let us represent it as a person who sees figures when looking at clouds, or a rug 
in the form of geometric lines running in all directions.  In a sense it is not without 
participation of the soul, because it took a geometer to draw these lines.  If I look at it, I 
can unravel a determined figure there, a hexagon, and then I will see nothing else.  In a 
sense it is I who trace, and in another sense it is the manufacturer of the fabric.  The 
design is there; but it is by projecting something from me that I have produced this 
design there, and even I could project the whole design by imagination; but I found the 
design ready-made, and I chose what was more agreeable to my imagination.  In a 
sense <114> this is analogous to the body being produced by both nature and the 
individual soul.  [p.60]  In the first sense it is simply part of the whole, in the second 
sense the soul adds nothing by fitting in to it, but is detached from everything.  As 
Plotinus says, there is superposition of the sensible man on intelligible man. 
Let us try to go beyond these comparisons and go back to theoretical principles.  
The principle was clarified by Porphyry, Elevations 84, §14: “There are two kinds of 
generation; one causal and the other is by composition.  Simple substances are 
generated by way of causation, as ψυχή [soul] is by νοῦς, but there is also genesis by 
composition.  However, living bodies are generated in two ways at the same time, by a 
cause, and by composition”.  The method of composition is the path of the physical; we 
would say that a body <115> is shaped physically by composition.  The other mode is 
one in which a higher cause descends into matter, which is the procession. 
Today we distinguish between two theories that explain life85.  Firstly, the 
mechanistic explanation in which it is assumed that the phenomena of life are the result 
of physico-chemical forces that cause the combination of molecules.  Plotinus refuted 
the principle of this theory, arguing that organization cannot come from inertia.  
Secondly the theory that a principle of a psychological order would descend towards 
the material, would manage to pull the molecules within its orbit, to magnetise them in 
its direction. 
Plotinus’ solution is not to accept any of these two extreme explanations86.  
Matter alone cannot constitute the living.  The individual soul cannot produce life 
because it is <16> in the presence of the work of the Universal Soul, and it cannot 
organise constituted matter.  There will be cooperation of the two forces.  The soul 
must submit to the laws of nature:  it can only lean towards matter in seeking to give 
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itself a body; but at the same time the body aspires to life because it is the work of the 
Universal Soul.  It is the meeting point that constitutes life. 
 It is a very profound solution.  If the problem is theoretically conceivable, we 
find that the physico-chemical forces can generate something that already imitates life 
fairly closely; bodies that are organized chemically happen to rub shoulders with the 
living.  It lacks a beginning, and it would seem that there must be something coming 
from above.  But this something [p.61] would make nothing if matter was not already 
by <117> itself ready to be organised.  All is happening as if life could only be added if 
these forces were already quite prepared and advancing there. 
 More generally, the conceivable causality between the different degrees of 
nature seems to be something like this.  We neither conceive how lower forces would 
manage to create new properties by themselves, nor how superior forces would come to 
impose refractory matter.  Everything happens as if the superior forces were there, 
waiting for the moment when the lower forces will sketch the form to be received.  So, 
the higher forces, attracted by their image descend into the lower forces to continue the 
movement87. 
 <118>  The first consequence to be drawn concerns the problem of freedom.  
We have just looked at how life can be reconciled with natural forces.  We need to find 
how the freedom he attributes to the soul is reconciled with the necessity of nature.  
The solution is in the theory of the formation of the body. 
 IV.3.13.  The question is posed in narrow form: to what extent is the choice of a 
body free?  It is neither necessary nor voluntary.  “Souls neither descend of their own 
free will nor are they sent.  It is not necessity, because the descent is made by virtue of 
an internal inclination which brings the soul to the descent, as one is brought to 
marriage.  It is indeed necessity, but it seems as though νοῦς obeys necessity when it 
stays where it is.”88  In other words, if being free consists in remaining entirely what we 
are, the descent is not pure freedom.  But if necessity consists in undergoing an external 
influence, then the descent is not necessary because it is consistent with a natural 
inclination of the soul. 
 Plotinus generalises the problem.  To what extent, once the body is chosen, are 
we independent of nature in which we are inserted?  III.1.7: “There is a doctrine - that 
of the Stoics89 - according to whom there is only one principle, which would bind all 
things to each other and determine each of them by generative reasons.  Close to this is 
the doctrine which says that any state and any movement, of either us or the whole is 
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derived from the Universal Soul - Heraclitus.  [p.62]  In this doctrine, all our 
representations and all our tendencies occur <120> by necessary causes, so that our 
freedom is only a word.”   Thus, the formula for necessity is: a single cause develops 
all of these effects.  “It is a question of finding the solution which, firstly, leaves no 
phenomenon without a cause and maintains the continuation and order of things, and 
which secondly, allows us to be something.”90  Thus the problem is: preserve causality 
without sacrificing our freedom. 
<121> 
 
8. The Fall of Souls 
 
<122> We turn to the individual soul. What is it? What relationship does it have with 
the World Soul, with Intellect, with the One?  What relationship do we maintain with 
nature, intelligence and God?  The question that immediately arises is the relationship 
of the human soul to the Soul of all.  It is to know whether the most natural solution is 
real: that of Vacherot and Kirchner91.  According to them, the human soul derives 
purely and simply from the World Soul as the effect of the cause and a part of the 
whole. 
 We know that the One generates Intellect, and Intellect the World Soul.  It 
seems natural to say that the World Soul <  > individual souls92, and this solution is 
similar to the Stoic solution. <123> Finally Plotinus spoke of three hypostases: The 
One, Intellect, and Universal Soul.  It seems natural, since there is nothing to make the 
individual souls come out, as there is for the nature of the Universal Soul. 
 If it is claimed that the human soul was created by the World Soul you will 
certainly need to say what the nature of this derivation is.  Is it a derivation in time, as a 
temporal cause generates its effect?  No, because our soul predates its birth, predates its 
body since it survives it; it is eternal like the World Soul.  Therefore there is no 
derivation in time. 
[p.63] There remains the hypothesis of the derivation outside of time that comes 
out of the Soul just like the theorems of a definition.  This solution is also unacceptable, 
because for Plotinus there is a criterion of this kind of metaphysical derivation:  the 
thing derived is lower and consequently possesses other functions.  However, Plotinus 
nowhere says that it has inferiority of this kind; the <124> functions of the human soul 
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are the same as those of the Universal Soul.  He even said that each individual soul 
would have been able to create the world and did not do so because it was beaten to it 
by the Universal Soul.  If the system seems to demand a pantheistic derivation, Plotinus 
expresses himself in terms which exclude this derivation.  
Richter states the insoluble difficulty.  According to Zeller there are at least two 
hypotheses between which it floats: identify the Universal Soul and the human soul; 
distinguish between human souls and the Universal Soul; but the contradiction is very 
rough. 
The relation of souls to the Soul of the whole is not at all simple.  There is 
certainly no independence, but also no derivation.  When red light comes out of white 
light through a prism, one cannot say that it has white light as its cause; it is not a 
causal relationship. 
Before presenting the solution, <125> it is necessary to solve another question as 
to how and why individual souls become detached from the Universal Soul, because at 
first they are in it or with it. Do they abandon it? 
First there were mythical answers.  The Universal Soul derives from νοῦς, and 
hence is lower.  The result is that in nature, which is the manifestation of the Soul in 
space and time, there is not the same harmony as within Intellect: the unity of the world 
is not perfect.  III.2.16: “The Universal Soul is a logos that opposes some of its parts, 
and thus in nature it generates struggle and war.  It is similar to the plan of a drama that 
contains a thousand battles within its unity.”  So, if the infinitely many bodies that the 
World Soul sketches and animates carry within themselves traces of discord, it is 
natural that the individual souls which will be fitted in to it follows the gradient of 
inclination <126> that bodies draw.  III.2.17: “Every part of the whole pulls all it can to 
it”; and this would be egoism which would therefore dominate the world of embodied 
souls, because that which dominates [p.64] each part is the desire to live.  Egoism is the 
law of life, because in space and time each party aims at being the whole; the harmony 
disappears. 
 In fact, it is on moral grounds that Plotinus first explains the fall of souls into 
bodies.  At the beginning of V93, he wonders "why and how were they able to forget 
God their father, they being divine, and ignoring him in themselves?  The principle of 
all evil is audacity, that is desire, the desire to belong only to oneself”.  The desire for 
self-existence is the origin of separation. 
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 Of what does this audacity consist?  And where does it come from in souls?  
They exaggerated to themselves their importance because of an effect of a mirage. 
 <127> IV.3.12: “The souls of men, having contemplated their image in the 
mirror of Bacchus, have yearned to be down here”.  This mirror is matter in general, 
refraction of the Universal Soul, matter that offers every human soul a body like his.  
Attracted by the promise of independence, the soul rushes, and then it is a prisoner, 
chained; and this is the punishment for wanting to live. 
 Plotinus claims that this doctrine is from all of time.  In IV.8.1, he attributes it to 
Empedocles, “for whom it is a law for sinful souls to fall down here, and with the 
knowledge that having fled from God, they came here to become the slave of furious 
discord”.  Similarly, Plato said that the soul is chained and entombed within the body.  
Plotinus adds that this is not just theory, but a fact of experience.  We know the passage 
IV.894 where he speaks of the passage of the soul to Intellect <128> and then to the 
One.  Coming out of this state, the soul feels itself descend, καταβαίνειν.  The fall is 
therefore a fact that can be experienced. 
 Therefore, in a sense the soul falls into the body by free choice and as a mistake. 
What is it the result of its fall?  It is twofold. 
 Firstly, when it lived in the Universal Soul, it participated in the administration 
of the whole world, and as the world is eternal, the individual soul is free of concern as 
it rests within the Universal Soul; but when it falls into a body placed between other 
bodies and is destroyed by them, worry about the body and concern for life 
commences. 
[p.65] Secondly, the human soul possesses all the Ideas in the Universal Soul, 
which is bound by its higher part with the whole of Intellect.  But as soon as it takes a 
body, it possesses more than a part.  It possesses by right <129> all of the ideas, in 
which it can always be reinstated with effort; but in fact, it concentrates on a part of 
Intellect refracted in space and time.  VI.4.16: "Of the whole of Intellect, it jumped to a 
part.  It's as if the scholar who possesses the complete science did not envisage more 
than one proposition in it."  Moreover, for Plotinus, every proposition reflects the 
whole science.  “The soul thus becomes a particular being, because it focuses its 
activity on the body.”  The same idea energetically expressed in Porphyry’s άφορμαί 
[rational tendencies], §39: “The soul inclining towards matter is reduced to deprivation 
and the exhaustion of its own strength.  Instead when it goes back up to νοῦς it finds the 
fullness of its strength.  These are the states of poverty and abundance”. 
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 Thus, it is by an effect of their audacity that individual souls have jumped out of 
the breast of the Universal Soul <130> into the body.  Hence, they experienced a 
diminution of themselves, because they focus on the body and no longer possess that 
part of the intelligible world which by right would belong to them whole. 
 This is the moral point of view.  But already, in IV.3, we see a new explanation 
appearing - §695: “Perhaps it is the multiple element of souls that pulls down, pulling 
with it the souls themselves, they and their representations”.  In IV.796, he explains that 
the individual soul made his body.  So, there would be a physical point of view: the fall 
would not be the effect of a choice and punishment for audacity, it would be a natural, 
necessary, automatic process.  The soul would no longer fall into a body that it must 
suffer:  it would be productive.  Audacity, fall, and punishment would be the moral 
aspect of a process that would be natural; the soul being something that partakes of the 
Idea, but <131> carries within itself a multiplicity which, as a weight that is too heavy, 
pulls it into space and time; so that it becomes the creator of a body by this dividing 
activity. 
 It is necessary to briefly review the Universal Soul and its relation to the whole 
of nature.  It is the generative reason of the world.  It develops in space and time, 
creating nature which is found to be [p.66] a large organism whose parts are all 
sympathetic.  On the other hand, each of the component parts of nature is itself an 
organism, provided we know how to distinguish the parts properly; and there must be 
generative reasons for all the component parts.  There are therefore one logos, a 
universal fabricator of the world, and particular logoi which are the creators of parts of 
the universe. 
 These logoi are ideas, deprived in some way, taken out of eternity, or <132> 
rather, extended in space and time.  Therefore, the root of the logoi is in Intellect. 
 What are the Ideas which correspond respectively to souls fabricating bodies 
and to the Universal Soul?  For individual souls, each corresponds to a certain Idea that 
represents it eternally in the intelligible world.  Plotinus is less precise about the 
Universal Soul, but it is clear.  He says that the Universal Soul is generated by νοῦς, 
which is the totality of the intelligibles.  While the Universal Soul is represented in the 
intelligible by all the Ideas, it is an extension of the intelligible considered in its 
entirety. 
 Now, for Plotinus, each of the Ideas is in a certain way representative of the 
entire νοῦς, it contains all others and carries within it the totality of the others in virtual 
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form:  as in geometry, a proposition fully encompasses the science in its entirety.  
<133> 
 Let us draw the conclusions.  Take a human soul that is represented by a certain 
Idea in the intelligible world.  This soul prolonging an Idea that is representative, as an 
idea, of any intelligible whole, could, if need be make everything made by the 
Universal Soul, an extension of the whole of the intelligible.  The soul of Socrates, 
extending the idea of Socrates which is in a sense νοῦς, could create the world.  IV.3.6: 
“Why did the Universal Soul, which has the same nature as individual souls, produce 
the world, and not each of the particular souls, while each also contains everything in 
it?”  The idea has nothing of the paradoxical: if it were my soul, my soul would be the 
whole world; if I do not create is because I find myself in the presence of a universal 
dream that displaces my dream; to the question posed, Plotinus responds that this is due 
to the fact that it has been beaten to it <134> by the Universal Soul.  It is not a question 
of time, but the individual souls are pre-empted in law by the Universal Soul [p.67] 
which is their superior by degree.  And if one soul can create the world it will be this 
one.  Every soul expresses everything from a particular point of view, whereas the 
Universal Soul is placed at all points of view at the same time. 
 Each human soul tends to make the world, but more particularly tends to create 
the particular body that expresses his point of view.  Then the Universal Soul which 
also manufactures the body of Socrates, but at the same time the idea of Socrates tends 
to constitute his body.  This body can therefore be considered as mechanically 
produced by nature, and as created by the idea of Socrates.  The fall of the soul is 
nothing other than the process by which the soul, according to its natural tendency, 
suddenly finds itself encountering a body already fat with <135> the universal logos.  
There is a natural insertion and in a certain sense, a fall. 
 I suppose a white beam falling on a prism and refracted into a thousand multi-
coloured rays.  I chose the red ray.  White light is the Universal Soul, the multi-
coloured rays, bodies; the red ray the body of Socrates.  In a sense it is the work of the 
white light that produces the full spectrum; but in another sense, it is merely an 
extension of a red ray that already existed in the white light.  In a sense it extends the 
white light, in another sense the red light.  In the same sense, each living body is both 
the work of the Universal Soul which creates all bodies, but as inserted into the whole 
of the matter, and of the particular soul which comes to go into one of these bodies to 
shine on everything else, and in this way to create it. 
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 <136>  We now understand in what sense bodies are the natural works of 
human souls manifesting their power, and in what sense this insertion is a fall, since by 
taking refuge in it the soul’s powers are decreased.  The insertion is at the same time a 
natural process and a kind of fall. 
 <137>  We have started studying the operation by which the soul takes a body, 
and we found that Plotinus put forward two alternative points of view, the moral point 
of view of the fall where the taking of a body is the cause of audacity for immediate, 
selfish means, resulting in a decline, and the physical point of view, where the fall into 
the sensible world no longer appears as a morally qualified act, but as [p.68] a physical 
fact, natural and, in a sense, necessary, which comes under the general law of 
procession through which everything radiates unity. 
 Is there a transition from one point of view to another in the mind of Plotinus?  
Does he have a passage between the fall into the sensible world considered a moral act 
and the fall into the sensible world considered physically? 
 It certainly exists in Plotinus’ mind.  <138>  In IV.3.12-13, the descent is firstly 
presented as a kind magical operation: “The soul is drawn into the body like the forces 
and powerful attraction of magic.  It is a kind of fascination; therefore, this again is the 
moral perspective; but furthermore, there is a necessity that makes every soul descend 
at its time, as if it was called by a messenger.”  And then: “The soul automatically 
descends into his body.” 
 There is the same difference as regards the choice of a body. 
 “The soul goes to the body, which is the image of its preference and of its 
original disposition” – “to the body which was prepared by the resemblance of its 
disposition” – “to the suitable and similar body”.  It is the moral perspective. 
 But another expression: "The soul is going to insert into the body that is 
necessary for it".97 
 In Section 8 of Ennead 4, Plotinus constantly speaks <139> of the body as if it 
was manufactured by the soul:  it is the logos added to matter that makes the body.  
Thus, there is an insensible transition in his thinking from one point of view to the 
other. 
 But does it follow that there is logical kinship between the two ideas?  Is it 
possible to reconcile the idea that the soul has chosen a body by sinning and the idea 
that an internal necessity makes it enter into space and time?  We do not explicitly find 
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it in the Enneads, but it is easy to do if we refer to the meaning of these different terms 
in Plotinus: idea, soul, time and space. 
 In the intelligible world, all ideas are given one inside the other.  Each idea is 
representative of all the others.  In the intelligible world, everything is whole; 
everything is the same and everything is different.  Thus, all the ideas of individual 
souls are <140> data in each other. 
[p.69] This is because we are outside of space and time.  It is different in time 
and space.  In the intelligible world, harmony stems precisely from the fact that each 
part is the whole; but as a place of space can only contain one object, and a moment of 
time a single event, each soul, by taking a body, will exclude all the other souls from a 
certain place and a certain time, and as it carries within it a vague representation of the 
entire world, it aspires to take up all the room.  It cannot do it, being limited by other 
souls, especially the World Soul that anticipates it.  The individual soul is therefore 
restrained.  However, this restraint is precisely the very definition of sin, which, 
considered physically is the natural descent of the soul into space and time; <141> that 
is called sin or fall by very definition even when interpreted morally. 
 I.8.14: “Entering matter, establishes the fall of the soul.  It weakens, since all its 
powers can no longer take action, and what prevents it is matter which forces it to curl 
in on itself, to tighten”.  In other words, we can say that sin is a cause, but also that it is 
an effect.  In reality, it is both at the same time; it is the same as the necessary, physical 
descent, of the soul into the body.  There are two aspects of the same operation: moral 
if it is considered, physical if we simply describe it. 
 The theory of the fall into the sensible world is therefore very complex. 
 < 142 >  We will compare this conception to that of Plato.  The object of Plato's 
philosophy was the resolution of the sensible in intelligible, things in Ideas.  This is the 
path of the dialectic.  The reverse process, the descent of the intelligible to the sensible 
had been indicated by Plato in mythical form.  What Plotinus did was to take elements 
of Platonic philosophy and to restore continuity to them through a process that starts 
from the Good and descends to the Ideas, culminating in the sensible world.  The 
important part of this procession is the procession of Ideas to the sensible world, and it 
is the soul that effects the passage, hence importance of the theory of the Soul in <143> 
Plotinus. 
 There is a World Soul and individual souls.  They play the same role of 
lowering the intelligible into the sensible.  Plotinus believed that the main points of this 
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theory are found in Plato, and indeed they are indicated, [p.70] but without being 
connected to each other; these are only the stations along the procession. 
 The Universal Soul is a mixture of divisible essence and indivisible essence 
(Timaeus) 98.  According to Plotinus, Plato would have meant that the Soul is the 
vehicle of Ideas, being Idea from above and sensible world at the bottom.  Indeed, Plato 
presents it neither as creative nor as organizing things: it is a conservative power of 
movement.  It is true that for Plotinus, the Universal Soul creates the material world; 
but Plato (Laws, X) already said that the World Soul is prior to all bodies.  Even in 
<144> the Timaeus, it is mathematically composed, so that we would be right to put it 
among these intermediate essences, between the intelligible and sensible.  Plato 
prepares Plotinus for this point of view. 
 Moreover, we find in the Timaeus the indication of a theory of time, the moving 
image of eternity99.  But for Plato, time is primarily the movement of the heavens, 
which is maintained by the World Soul: already it is, if not creative, at least supportive 
of duration.  In Plotinus, the World Soul is what develops the eternal idea in duration.  
 For the human soul, there are fewer relationships.  In Plotinus, it is already 
something intermediary between the pure idea and the sensible thing, less than one, 
more than the other.  And we already find the theory of a fall of the soul into <145> the 
body, and the idea that this incarnation is done by a natural process.  Only in Plato are 
both theories given without there being reconciliation, one in the Phaedrus, the other in 
the Laws100.  In addition, we do not see the exact relationship of the human soul with 
the idea: it is relative, but the idea is a kind, the soul is individual.  What is lacking is an 
indication of the procession. 
 Here again Plotinus completed Plato, but he had to part from him.  First, how 
can the soul come out of the Idea?  Plotinus’ solution is that it is essential that the Idea 
is already individual.  Then the passage becomes easy; the Good generates the Ideas by 
radiation and if they are supposed to contain souls virtually they are individual.  It 
suffices to assume a fall into time and space <146> in order to pass from the idea to the 
soul. 
 Furthermore, every individual soul is going to end up in a body.  On the other 
hand the Universal Soul flourishes in the material world.  However, it is required that 
everything that [p.71] comes out of the individual soul to flourish in space and time is 
perfectly coordinated with what comes out of the Universal Soul.  But the individual 
soul extends one intelligible, the Universal Soul all of the intelligibles: in other words, 
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every intelligible is representative of all the intelligibles; each particular idea of all 
other ideas.  Yet, it is an essential point of Plato that everything does not participate in 
everything. 
<147> 
9. The Theory of Consciousness 
 
<148>  We will now take the human soul incarnated in a body and study its main 
properties. At the forefront is consciousness. 
 Plotinus is the only ancient philosopher who has presented a theory of 
consciousness, which has even reached the idea of consciousness.  He did not find a 
fixed terminology for doing so, hence there are great difficulties, and we understand 
that historians of philosophy have made mistakes. 
 Richter recognizes that the concept of consciousness is at the bottom of many 
theories of Plotinus, but believes that he has not made it clear.  Zeller still claims that 
Plotinus <149> contradicts himself and sometimes said that pure Intelligence thinks 
itself - Vth Ennead -  and sometimes Ist Ennead - that consciousness is only possible 
for the imagination.  We believe just the opposite.  Νοῦς is the only one to think itself, 
and consciousness implies a set of images: it simply means thinking itself; this is not 
being conscious, as we shall see in detail. 
 Let us try to fully understand the texts taking into account the fact that Plotinus’ 
terminology is not fixed. 
 Among the terms that have been translated as consciousness, we find the word 
συναίσθησις [conscious perception].  What does that mean?  IV.5.5: “One can say 
hearing what we have said about the view; the condition is a συναίσθησις, like that of 
the parts of an animal.”  The word here has a clear meaning.  [p.72] But for Plotinus 
<150> perception is sympathy of the organ with the object with which it vibrates in 
unison.  The word signifies sympathy.  Similarly, I.1.9: "The discursive mind, in 
making a choice of impressions coming from the sensation contemplates the Ideas and 
contemplates them as a συναίσθησις [conscious perception], because authentic διάνοια 
is a likeness and an internal communication with the outside world.”  Again, the 
meaning is clear.  Plotinus attributes to διάνοια the role of searching for an Idea within 
νοῦς that it approximates to the sensation.   It has this role in perception.  The word 
here means the sympathetic communication between διάνοια and the material object 
which is going to be picked up within the representation.  Sympathy is the fundamental 
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meaning of the word.  Step by step we are moving towards the meaning of 
consciousness. 
 If it is a sympathy, more particularly it may be the sympathy of the <151> parts 
of a being one for the other, their agreement with each other.  IV.4.45: “In an animal, 
there is sympathy of each organ towards all the others and of the whole for the whole.”  
IV.4.9: “The Universal Soul will no longer be whole; there will be various powers in 
the diverse parts of the world; there will be no more συναίσθησις.”  This is already the 
more particular sense of consensus, of inner harmony. 
 In this second sense, we'll go within the meaning of consciousness.  Let us 
suppose that for Plotinus consciousness is, from a certain point of view, sympathy, a 
harmony between the different parts of the Soul; then the word may mean 
consciousness.  In III.8.4, Plotinus attributes to nature a space of slumbering 
consciousness: “Nature remains within its <152> own equilibrium and within a sort of 
συναίσθησις.”  Here this consciousness is an internal consensus; an equilibrium.  
V.3.13: “συναίσθησις is the αἴσθησις [perception] of a plurality.”   The word can 
therefore mean consciousness, but it is not the fundamental sense of the word. 
 We can already see a certain conception of consciousness.  Plotinus fell upon a 
quite modern conception of consciousness at the first attempt.  Consciousness is 
primarily synthesis, assimilation, sympathetic communication of all parts of the soul.  
Contemporary psychology admits increasingly of unconscious states of mind.  For a 
state to become conscious there must be assimilation, that we do it within the current of 
our personality.  [p.73] Plotinus said that it is something of this kind.  Consciousness 
would be a power possessed by the soul. <153> 
 Plotinus often uses the word άντίληψις [sense perception].  At V.1.12, he asks 
himself "how it is that we have certain ideas (justice and beauty) without being aware 
of it."  When the part of the soul is not communicating with the part of the soul that 
feels, then it does not cross the whole soul; we become conscious of a part of the soul 
when there is transmission and consequently άντίληψις.  IV.8.8: “We do not know what 
is happening in a part of the soul: it has to have penetrated the whole soul.” This is 
Plotinus’ first meaning. 
 But this is only the least important part of his theory.  Consciousness is 
primarily a certain unification of impressions from below, but it is much more a 
division <154> of elements, instead of going up, descending.  The soul is an 
intermediate essence between νοῦς and the body.  It therefore has two functions: first, 
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to unite the impressions that come from the body and from there into consciousness; 
secondly, to bring down the Ideas, again into consciousness.  Consciousness occurs 
either by the unification that comes from below, or by division that comes from above.  
In the second direction, it is analysis of the Ideas. 
 IV.3.30.  We constantly participate in pure thinking, in νοῦς, but we are not 
conscious of it, “because thought is one thing, consciousness of thought is something 
else.  We always think, but we are not fully conscious of it”.  What is necessary for 
consciousness to join the thought?  “The pure act of thought is hiding within, having 
not yet proceeded to the <155> outside.  But the logos having developed and directed 
the imaginative power reveals it as in a mirror: then conscious perception of thought 
occurs.”102 
 Therefore, for the Idea to come into consciousness, it must be coupled with an 
image that it is reflected in the imagination, the faculty for forming images with 
sensations, and especially keeping them under the gaze of consciousness. 
 Important passage: I.4.10.  Consciousness is not essential for thought, neither 
for virtue or happiness.  The hero does not know he acts with [p.74] courage; 
consciousness of an act only weakens the energy.  “The intense life is that which does 
not dissolve in feelings.”  How and when does consciousness occur?  “Consciousness 
of thought appears to be born when <156> thought bends back on itself and when this 
thought which takes place in the direction of the life of the soul is as if it were pushed 
backwards, just like the image in a mirror rests on the free and shiny surface… In the 
soul, when there is tranquillity of the surface on which images of thought are revealed, 
we perceive them and we have so to speak, sensible knowledge.”  Consciousness 
occurs when pure thought divides, like falling on a mirror. 
 We have already found this image of the mirror in the theory of the fall of the 
soul.  The soul perceiving its image in matter like in a mirror is seduced and drops.  
This is the same image, and basically, it's the same idea.  For him, consciousness is 
<157> a transient state, the state of the soul after the fall.  Consciousness is less than 
thought, more than mere materiality.  The sphere of consciousness is coextensive with 
that of the soul; and this is because it is aware that the soul is superior to materiality and 
inferior to pure thought. 
 It follows that consciousness is coextensive with the life of the soul.  The soul 
sits in the intermediate realm between the sensible and the intelligible, and the same for 
consciousness, which also remains in the intermediate plane; it is a becoming, progress. 
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 In essence it is therefore something unstable.  It is not of being but change.  It is 
a movement that can take two directions: sometimes aspiration upwards, sometimes 
descent.  This perpetual oscillation in the soul is consciousness. I.1.11: “Consciousness 
must occur because we do not always use what we possess: we do use it when we direct 
our mean powers either up or down.”  Consciousness is essentially, instability. 
 It always comes down to saying that it is a deprivation: it is the effect and also a 
sign of the fall.  In V.8.11, Plotinus says "To become aware, is to stay out of what is 
grasped”.  Plotinus explained that to understand beauty, you must be merged with the 
beautiful itself; it is an [p.75] intimate union and sympathy.  Things that fall most 
clearly under consciousness are precisely those which are most foreign to us:  thus so, 
we are more conscious of disease than health.  “But we are unconscious of ourselves 
and the things that are truly ours.  But in this state of unconsciousness we are <159> in 
more complete ownership ourselves, of everything that belongs to us, and we are stirred 
to make our being coincide with the science of ourselves.”  IV.4.4: “We can possess 
something more strongly unconsciously than if we knew; because if we knew we would 
possess it as something else, whereas, being unaware, we tend to be at one with what 
we have.”  Consciousness always involves an exteriority of the subject relative to the 
object. 
 This is diametrically opposed to the modern conception, according to which 
adequate knowledge is consciousness, where there is perfect coincidence of the knower 
and the object known, but for Plotinus, consciousness involves externality. 
 What consequences are to be drawn?  A being that grasps through 
consciousness cannot grasp itself.  On the other <160> hand it is the attribute of the 
soul and it sits between the sensible and the intelligible.  Therefore, the soul does not 
know itself, and this should not be through consciousness.  Plotinus has drawn these 
consequences. 
 Firstly. The soul does not know itself.  V.3.9.  Why should we deny the soul the 
power to think itself?  “This is because we have reserved it the function to look outside 
and to engage in the unrest.”  The soul is condemned to live externally to itself, never 
being fully itself, what it wanted to be. 
 Secondly, the being that knows itself is pure Intellect.  It thinks itself and it 
alone thinks. 
 What does Plotinus understand <161> by νοῦς?  This is not a faculty of the 
soul.  The soul can rise up to Intellect, but on the condition of rising above itself.  
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Intellect does not sit in souls but is self-sufficient, it exists in itself.  It is something in 
which individual souls may participate but is not in the souls.  The Idea is independent 
of the soul:  the soul can return with effort to [p.76] the Idea from where it descended.  
In V.3.3, Plotinus clearly explains: “The soul falls towards the sensitive life, it rises to 
Intellect, but Intellect does not come to it, it is we who ascend Intellect”. 
 It is basically Plato’s conception, so it is surprising to see the opinion of Zeller 
(2nd ed., p. 518).  According to him, one cannot see how νοῦς may be <162> both our 
reason and a being above us, nor how the soul distinguishes itself from it radically and 
nevertheless defines itself by it.  Souls participate in the world of Ideas to the extent 
that they can participate in it; but distinguish themselves from it because they went out 
of it; and yet are explained by it because they are their image.  The real difficulty is 
rather to understand how this superior Intellect, which is exterior to the soul, and by the 
same token a stranger to consciousness, can think itself, furthermore, be alone in 
thinking itself.  How is it possible? 
 Let us first recall why Plotinus puts νοῦς above all consciousness.  I.4.10: "The 
activity of νοῦς remains hidden in us because it has nothing to do with the sensible 
world, because it is through <163> the intermediary of the sensation that it has to work 
on consciousness.  But why wouldn’t νοῦς and Soul that surrounds it, act before the 
sensation and generally before consciousness?  For there must be an act prior to 
consciousness, because thinking and being are one.”  Thus, for νοῦς thinking and being 
are one and νοῦς has no consciousness because it has no sensation.  How will it 
understand? 
 Νοῦς is the κόσμος νοητός [intelligible world].  This world contains all the 
Ideas, all of which are related to each other.  Each idea is a νοητός [intelligible] 
therefore an object of thought; but on the other hand, each idea contains all other 
possible ideas wrapped up in it.  So, one side of each intelligible is one object of 
thought <164> and the other contains all the other intelligibles.  But in that capacity can 
we therefore not say that it thinks them?  What is thinking if not containing Ideas in 
oneself? 
 Plotinus tells us that in the Intellect there is movement, but this movement is "an 
immobile and tranquil movement”, an evolution that for each intelligible consists in 
browsing through the whole series of intelligibles; [p.77] but this review does not 
occupy time: it all occupies a single moment that is eternity.  There is therefore a 
reflection of the idea on itself, and finally a thought that has nothing in common with 
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consciousness of distinct moments that are heterogeneous and successive.  It is this 
course of thought by itself that is the thought of νοῦς thinking itself. 
 Text. V.3.13: “Thought <165> seems to be when a plurality of terms come to 
coincide, a συναίσθησις [conscious perception] of everything, while a certain thing 
thinks itself, which is strictly speaking νοεῖν [noesis - the exercise of reason].” 
 The word συναίσθησις here means internal synthesis.  When all the intelligibles 
come to blend into each other, then there is the thought of thought.  It is the presence of 
all intelligibles in every intelligible that constitutes the thought of thought by itself, the 
νοῦς is thinking itself.  If Plato did not name his intelligible world νοῦς, it is because he 
did not accept the participation of all the ideas in each other.  If he had accepted it, he 
would have called this world νοῦς because the thought of thought would have been 
wholly present everywhere to itself, there would have been thought of thought.  That is 
why Plotinus has spoken of a thought. 
 <166>  Thus thinking means penetration of the intelligibles, each by the others.  
Let us clarify this idea again, and the theory of consciousness at the same time. 
 In V.3, Plotinus seeks the required condition for self-knowledge.  He finds it is 
only possible by a coincidence of that which knows with what is known.  If there is 
only one footprint, then knowledge is imperfect.  For self-knowledge, it must therefore 
be an absolutely simple principle that requires the identity of subject and object.  In 
sensation, there is knowledge of exterior modifications to the being that senses.  In 
discursive intelligence, it either synthesises sensations, and then it is more than 
sensation, or it materialises Ideas; but it is always different from what it knows.  Self-
knowledge <167> cannot appear to be that which is both νόησις [intelligence, 
understanding] and νοητόν [intelligible], that is to say νοῦς. 
 We discussed the difficulties raised by the problem of consciousness.  To 
understand Plotinus’ Idea, we must first make a clean sweep of our current conceptions.  
We represent an Idea to ourselves as something subsequent to consciousness.  To 
represent it [p.78] as being independent is to project it outside of consciousness.  The 
idea is the centre around which consciousness gravitates, and which is given first.  
Consciousness is only a diminution.  How could we get to place ourselves in the state 
of soul which is that of the Ancients? 
 Here is the significant idea of identity: A = A.  How I am conscious of it 
<168>?  It is because I change constantly, that I constantly pay attention to myself and 
this idea at the same time.  Furthermore, I see this idea as an image.  Finally, I'm 
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exterior to it; it is a stranger to me.  So, it is for these three reasons I am conscious at 
the same time that I think.  I abstract from that which, at any moment comes back to 
me, of these images, of this exteriority, in respect of the Idea.  I have the pure Idea, but 
I have, so to speak, coincided with it; I shall participate in its eternity, unconscious in a 
sense, and yet coinciding with my thoughts: it thinks itself within the unconscious. 
 The Greeks took an idea, took it to the state of <169> purity, and saw nothing 
more in consciousness than something that comes out diminished.  Because if this idea 
is thought thinking outside of time, moving from eternity to time, there is nothing to 
add.  It is necessary that Idea degenerates into image, eternity into time, interiority into 
exteriority. 
 This amounts to saying that the ancients did not allocate to consciousness and 
the person the eminent dignity that we have attributed to them103.  Putting personal 
thoughts at the centre of things is a very modern idea.  For the ancients, consciousness 
is intermediate between the intelligible, which is hyperconscious, and the sensible, 
which is unconscious.  V.9.7: “It is not because Intellect thinks that the Idea exists, it is 
because the Idea exists that Intellect thinks.”  Consciousness is like an accessory.  A 
word referring to it incessantly is παρακολούθημα, accompaniment.  It joins the Idea in 
its descent, but in the opposite sense to that given to it by modern materialists, for 
whom consciousness is superadded to more complex movements of the cerebral 
substance; consequently, it is something inferior to it.  In contrast, for Plotinus, it is an 
attenuation of something superior to it.  It is not phosphorescence [emission of light 
without any perceptible heat] that illuminates the movement; it is darkness, a shadow 
that the Idea projects below it. 
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[p.263] Notes 
All references to Bergson’s works are given in the text of the Centennial Edition, Paris, 
PUF, 1959. 
Notes on 
The Lectures on Plotinus 
 
PRELIMINARY NOTE 
 
Bergson * indicated to a German translation of Mueller, extracts translated into English 
and to the French translation of Bouillet.  He was very critical of the latter: “it is less a 
translation than a paraphrase”- he hardly uses it when quoting passages of Plotinus; at 
least we find no literal quotation from Bouillet’s translation of it.  Bergson was a good 
Hellenist and the late Philippe Soulez had a French translation of book A of Aristotle's 
Metaphysics done by Bergson himself.  It is most likely that Bergson translates directly 
from Greek to French.  When it seemed useful to refer to the Enneads text itself, it is É. 
Bréhiers’ translation which is cited.  At this time (1996), a new translation of the 
Enneads is currently being published, by P. Hadot (three volumes published, Treatise 
38, Paris, 1988 Treatise 50, Paris, 1990 Treatise 9, Paris, 1994). 
 
1. “Plotinus is a Greek uniquely inspired Greeks."  This is a point on which Bergson 
hesitated.  The course of Clermont-Ferrand, vol. IV, p.147, reflects on the 
influence of the Christianity; the course at the Lycée Henri IV, in the same 
volume, p.146, ms. P.192-117 reflects more on the influence of Judaism; this 
course at the École Normale Supérieure supports the contrary thesis of Hellenic 
autarky [The word "autarky" is from the Greek: αὐτάρκεια, which means "self-
sufficiency"]; Bergson’s latest position on this point can be found in Two Sources 
of Morality and Religion, p.1161:  “The philosophy of Plotinus, in which the 
development culminates, and which owes as much to Aristotle as it does to Plato, 
is unquestionably mystic.  If it has undergone the influence of Eastern thought, so 
very much alive in the Alexandrian world, this occurred without the knowledge of 
Plotinus himself, who thought he was merely condensing all Greek philosophy, 
with the whole object of opposing it to foreign doctrines.”[A. Audra and C 
Brereton translation, p.219] 
 
2. Porphyre, Vie de Plotin, ed. and trans., É. Bréhier  in Éditions des Belles Lettres, 
en tête de l’Ennéade I, p. 1-31.  See also: J. Pepin, with the collaberation of L. 
Brisson, M.O. Goulet-Caze, R. Goulet, D. O’Brien, Porphyre, la vie de Plotin, 
vol. I (1982) et II (1992), Paris, ed. Vrin. 
 
3. Eunapius, Life of the Sophists, ed. and trans.,W. C. Wright, London, Loeb 
Classical Library, 1961. 
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*Manuscript, p.25-27, vol. IV, p.27 
 
[p.264] 
 
4. Eudoxe de Cnide, Fragments, ed. F. Lasserre, Berlin, 1996. 
 
5. “A system which combines all the principal ideas of Greek philosophy.”  This 
synthetic thesis sheds light on Bergson's understanding of Greek philosophy.  It 
helps to clarify the meaning of his attention to Plotinus; not only attention on a 
particular author, but wholly on an author who condenses in himself and 
summarizes all the Greek philosophy.  Having thus reduced the infinite historical 
diversity to the determined and the finite, Bergson goes out of mere scholarship 
and gives a critical and resolute judgment, not only on Greek philosophy, but on 
all those who, at least at times, withdrew, “hardly having done little more than 
repeating Plotinus” (Mélanges, p. 1076).  See earlier in this volume IV 
Introduction, p.8-9 for the constancy of Bergson’s synthetic thesis; but for a 
contradiction see, n. 64. 
  
6. Némésius d’Émèse, Sur la nature de l’homme, ed. and trans. French. G. Verbeke 
et J. R. Moncho, Leyde, 1975.  
 
7. Hiéroclès, Fragments et témoignages sur le traité de la providence, in Photius, 
Bibliotheca, ed. and trans. R. Henry. Part III, cod. 214, Paris, 1962, and Part VII, 
cod. 251, Paris, 1974 
 
8. Allusion to Ammonius in Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, S3. 
 
9. Life of Plotinus, § 20-21: long quotation of a passage from the book of Longinus, 
The End of the Line. 
 
10. Kirchner, Die Philosophie des Plotinos, Halle, 1854.  See also Zeller, Philosophie 
der Griechen, Part.2, p.474-475, note. 
 
11. The manuscript is defective.  With the mention of "Gordian", we can assume a 
reference to the Life of Plotinus, §. 3:  his interest in Persian and Indian thought 
motivates Plotinus to follow the Emperor Gordian to Persia; “…but Gordian was 
defeated in Mesopotamia. Plotinus barely escaped and fled to Antioch.” 
 
12. Hegel, in his history of philosophy praises courtiers for not having allowed the 
founding of Platonopolis. 
 
13. On Amelius: L. Brisson, “Amelius, his life, his work, his doctrine his style”, in 
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (ANRW), II, 36, 2, Berlin-New 
York, 1987, p.793-860 
 
14. That of Plotinus, of course.  We leave these tracks of speaking style, where the 
word translated a living thought, following its idea without caring about 
"reattaching the [railway] carriages." 
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15. Although the writing is not very legible, the manuscript seems to be: “Everything 
he experienced”.  Either there is an accidental slip of the tongue for “everything 
he wrote", or that is what Bergson thought; either way the slip of the tongue is 
revealing. 
 
16. In the notes to the listener: "He brought the same penetration to practical things as 
he did in his writings."  
 
17.  Life of Plotinus, §.10. 
 
18. Life of Plotinus, §.2. 
 
19. Eunapius, op, cit, p.358-359, “ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλωτῖνος τῷ τε τῇς ψυχῇς οὐρανίῳ καὶ 
τῷ λοςῷ καὶ αἰνιγματώδει τῶν λόγων, βαρὺς ὲδόκει καὶ δυοήκοος”. 
20. In this phrase, the words autre and encore were not included in the manuscript. 
 
21. On the order of Plotinus’ treatises, see P. Hadot’s Introduction to Treatise 38, 
Paris, 1988. 
 
22. Ennead V.8 : ‘On Intelligible Beauty’. 
  
23. Ennead II. 9 - title of the treaty in Bréhier’s translation: "To those who say that 
the author of the world is evil, and that the world is bad." 
 
24. Von Kleist, Plotinische Studien. Studien zur IV Enneade, Heidelberg, 1883. 
 
25. Compare with Lectures, Vol. 3, p.107-108 
 
26. This is also the main theme of Creative Evolution. 
 
27. Compare with the lesson on Plato, in the ‘Lectures on Greek Philosophy’, p.107-
131, from manuscript, vol. IV, p. 96-105. 
 
28. Ennead III.2.15-16. 
 
 [p.265] 
 
29. Ennead VI.7.11. 
 
30. One can compare the whole paragraph with Creative Evolution, p.578 
 
31. A word is missing in the manuscript. One can compensate, perhaps, with 
"decline", which would then be taken up a few lines down. See below, n.33. 
 
32. Matter and Memory, p.302; the Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p.1199 
 
33. Ennead III.8.4: “We always find that production and action are either a 
weakening or an accompaniment of contemplation”.  Quoted in ‘The Perception 
of Change’, p. 1374. 
 
58 
 
34. Ennead IV.8.1 – text quoted in p.93 of the manuscript, vol. IV, p.52. 
 
35. "Ecstasy is a form of sympathy, but not the only one."  One can take on the living 
progress of Bergsonian thought by comparing this phrase with those of the lesson 
on the ‘Alexandrian School’, ms. p. 184, vol. IV, p. 149.  It is by such phrases that 
one understands the organic unity of Bergson's thought through its development. 
See, for example. Introduction, p. 8-9. 
 
36. A word is missing in the manuscript. 
 
37. See note 38. 
 
38. It is in fact a treatise of Porphyry sent to Iamblichus; the closest passage that 
Bergson quotes is found in Stobaeus, XXI, 27, Commentary on Alcibiades, 
preface (ed. Segonds, Part 1, p.3-7).  It does not seem that the idea appears in the 
Commentary on the Timaeus. 
 
39. Ennead II.9.6. 
 
40. Ennead IV.8.1. 
 
41. Ennead II.4. 7. 
 
42. Ibid. 
 
43. Ennead IV.7.8. 
 
44. Ennead V.4. 
 
45. Ennead V.1.8: “Therefore our theories are nothing new and they are not modern; 
they were laid down long ago, but not developed and we are now the exegetes 
(interpreters) of these old doctrines, whose antiquity is testified by Plato’s 
writings. 
 
46. The manuscript states: didactique 
 
47. Phaedrus, 259 b-d. 
 
48. Republic, III, 415 a-b. 
 
49. Phaedrus, 246 a-d. 
 
50. One can easily imagine that it is precisely this mythical part which was of most 
interest to Bergson since it deals with becoming that is not reduced to fixed Ideas.  
On the last sentence of this paragraph, see the end of the lesson on Zeno in the 
Black Notebook: "Anyway, you should always accept, in the presence of motion, 
either that reality is absurd or it is an illusion"(ms. P.35, vol. IV, p.179). 
 
51. L. Couturat’s latin thesis, De platonicis mythis, 1986. 
 
59 
 
52. Ennead IV.2.2. 
 
53. Here is the sentence in question. As Plotinus quotes it: "In the indivisible essence 
and always identical to itself, essence becomes divisible in bodies, the demiurge 
made in mixing them, a third form of essence as space"(Timaeus, 69 d) 
 
54. In this phrase the term ‘wholly’ [tout] does not appear in the manuscript. 
 
55. Ennead III.5.9.  One can compare with text translated by Bréhier: “Myths, if they 
are really myths, separate the circumstances of the story in time, and often 
distinguish between beings that are confused and not distinguished by their rank 
or their powers ... but after we have been educated myths can teach, leaving us 
free, if we have understood them, to reunite their scattered data.” 
 
[p.266] 
 
56. Ennead V.7.1. 
 
57. The manuscript reads: "It is basically the modern approach.”  It is also Bergson’s 
in Creative Evolution, p.489-490. 
 
58. Illuminating sentence for understanding the suture between Matter and Memory 
and Creative Evolution, as two aspects of the same problem; personal 
consciousness is first placed in the conditions of life of the individual (M & M), 
then in the more general conditions of the whole system of living beings (EC). 
 
59. One easily recognises here the two ready-made garments which are spoken of in 
Creative Evolution, p.493.   But let's not jump to conclusions without having read 
Lesson 9 of this course and in particular the last pages. 
 
60. Stobaeus, Ecolgae Philosophorum, 4 vol., repr. Berlin, ed. C. Wachsmuth, O. 
Hense, Berlin, 5 vol., 1884-1923; repr. in 4 vol., 1958, Part I, p. 488. 
 
61. Timaeus, 34d-36e. 
 
62. Bergson said otherwise in his lectures on ‘The History of Greek Philosophy’ at 
the Lycée Henri IV, ms. P 192-117, Vol IV, p.146: "We recognize without 
difficulty the ψυχή of the Stoics in the World Soul (of Plotinus) ". Both assertions 
are perhaps not as opposed as it seems. As judgments on the history of ideas, 
there was undoubtedly a transition from one thesis to its opposite.  But as these 
Plotinian themes serve to support the reflection of Bergson himself, this evolution 
shows a deepening of his thinking more than the development of his erudition and 
its exegesis.  The first point of view is largely integrated in Matter and Memory 
and the second is already moving in the direction of Creative Evolution and 
perhaps leaves the area of research which will be the one of the Two Sources. 
 
63. Hypothetical sentence. The manuscript reads: "But this defect in production 
within becoming, logos has not gained the upper hand, but what wins out is a 
deterioration of the idea that the logos accidentally brought with it."- This does 
not seem intelligible. 
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64. Under this title Bergson quotes the Aphormai pros ta noeta (“Starting points for 
the intelligibles”), better known by its Latin title Sententiae Ad Intelligibilia 
Ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz, Leipzig, 1975. 
 
65. Ennead II.3.17: “This matter is like the bitter deposit left by higher beings; it 
spreads this bitterness and communicates it to the universe.” - Note that the term 
"bitter dregs" used by Bergson, may be borrowed from the translation of Bouillet 
(vol.1, p.192): “The matter of which it (the universe) is composed is in a way the 
bitter dregs of the higher principles…”. 
 
66. The word remote has been added by the editor. 
 
67. Ennead III.6.19. 
 
68. A word is missing in the manuscript. 
 
69. Ennead II.3.18: “The Universal Soul must contemplate the great beings and 
always bear towards intelligible nature and to God.” 
 
70. The whole sentence is: “διενόθη, ȍ όυ νοῦ ἒργον ἀλλά  ψυχῇς μεριστήν ἐνέργειαν 
ἔχει ἐν μεριστῇ  φύσει”,  “Reflection is not the function of the Intellect, but of the 
Soul whose act is divided in a divisible Nature”. 
 
71. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (Time and Free Will), p. 133-
134.  See also the Lecture on Spinoza in Cours, Vol. III, p.86-89. 
 
72. We can compare this expression of the widening of perception with that discussed 
in La pensée et le mouvant, “La perception du changement” (“The Perception of 
Change”), p. 1370. 
 
73. Bergson has already alluded to the text above, see n.34. 
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74. Ennead VI.9.9. 
 
75. Ennead VI.9.9. 
 
76. E. Zeller, La philosophie des Grecs, III, 2, Plotinus, S 4, ‘Nous’.  Bergson is often 
critical of Zeller in this course, ms. P.81, 91, 124, 161, etc.  It does not prevent 
him from being very indebted to him, as we shall sometimes indicate.  Moreover, 
read, a complimentary note on Zeller about his ideas on Socrates, infra in the 
hand-written notebook, p.81.  It reminds us that the background of the education 
Bergson received in Greek philosophy consists of Émile Boutroux’s courses at the 
École Normale Supérieure - three volumes (Lectures on Socrates, Lectures on 
Plotinus, Lectures on Aristotle) have been published in recent years by Éditions 
Universitaires with the help of Jérôme de Gramont.  Just after the war of 1870 
Boutroux was Zeller’s student, and he even translated the first volume of his 
Philosophie der Griechen into French.  It would also be interesting to carefully 
compare the two methods used by Bergson and Boutroux in their history of 
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philosophy.  Neither of them separates scholarship and speculation. They want to 
find every historical thought as both a living thought and as a possible truth, 
within the framework of a debate where exegesis remains constantly deployed 
together with a questioning of the content.  But in doing so, Boutroux, having a 
more discreet personality, a community attitude and an approach that so subtly 
insinuates, it is often unclear about what he thinks. Conversely, Bergson is more 
personally committed and mobilises thinkers to favour his way of thinking. 
 
77. For an essay about the genesis of bodies, see Creative Evolution, p. 653. 
 
78. Which is the Bergsonian meaning, see Creative Evolution, p.718, note p. 722-723. 
 
79. Bréhier translated this passage IV, 4, 19 as: "Pain is knowledge of a weakening of 
the body, being deprived of the image which it possesses; pleasure is the 
knowledge that the animal has of the reinstallation of the soul in the image of the 
body." 
 
80. Ennead IV.4.4. 
 
81. Ennead IV.4.6.  This is probably the most anti-Zenonian (in Bergson’s terms) of 
Plotinus’ texts that can support the theory of the ancient influence of Plotinus on 
Bergson. 
 
82. Ennead IV.4.24: "We must therefore give it (the universe) an intimate sense of 
itself similar to the one we have of ourselves." 
 
83. Regarding the presentation and critique of these concepts, see, for example, 
Mélanges, p. 1056 and 1059. 
 
84. Aphormai, see n.64 above. 
 
85. Creative Evolution, p. 413-414. 
 
86. Ibid. 
 
87. We agree that the preceding pages are a document of prime importance and 
irreplaceable for immediately grasping the genesis of the theses of Creative 
Evolution. 
 
88. Here is the translation of Bréhier: “The arrival of the souls is not voluntary and 
they have not been sent; or at least their will does not consist of a will of choice; 
they move towards the body without reflection, like jumping from instinct, or like 
the inclination without reflection to desire marriage.” 
 
89. The underlined expressions are Bergson’s notes, which he inserts into the 
quotation. 
 
90. Ennead III.1.8. 
91. See Bergson’ own bibliography, ms. p.27-28, Vol. IV, p.26-28. 
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92. An illegible word. Substitute with generates or produces. 
 
93. Compare with Bouillet’s translation: "Empedocles said that it is a law for sinful 
souls to fall down here, that he himself is far from God and came to earth to be 
the slave of furious discord." 
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94. Bergson is probably referring here to Ennead IV.8.6, but the reference is not very 
clear. 
 
95. Read Ennead IV.3.6. 
 
96. Ennead IV.7.1-2. 
 
97. Sic. 
  
98. Timaeus, 34 d-e. 
 
99. Timaeus, 37 d. 
 
100. Phaedrus, 248 a - 249 b; Laws, X, 892 a - 899 d. 
 
101. Bergson has already quoted this passage above and the following, ‘Lectures on 
Plotinus’, ms. P. 103-104. 
 
102. The two sentences quoted by Bergson are in the reverse order in Plotinus’ text. 
 
One could not better mark the distance between Plotinus and Bergson than he has done 
himself. 
 
 
